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Abstract 
 
This thesis situates China in the global shift from government to governance that has occurred 
in international environmental politics over the past decades. The thesis explores how this shift 
is expressed by studying the role of non-state actors in local climate action and how policy 
networks and partnerships are produced in this political system. The thesis employs a mixed 
methods approach to study this topic. The city of Rizhao serves as a case study on urban 
environmental policy making and governance modes involved in climate agenas. A 
comparative study of 150 urban climate initiatives provides insights into urban climate 
governance trends, including roles of actors and forms of climate partnerships.  
The thesis contributes to academic debates on China’s transition to a modern environmental 
state, argued to cause an increasing diversity of actors and strategies in environmental 
governance. This research highlights previously unexplored dimensions of network 
governance, such as conflict, balance of power, and the structure of the political economy. The 
thesis shows that urban planning processes are shaped by political-economic elites and that 
planning arrangements protect status quo, thereby reproducing trajectories of high carbon 
growth. The empirical material also demonstrates that local authorities use a mixture of 
governance modes to support emission reductions and that urban climate partnerships are 
common. Partnerships vary in form and function and can facilitate local climate action by 
introducing new technology and policy practices. However, partnerships and networks cannot 
be directly interpreted using theoretical perspectives developed in liberal democratic nations. 
The thesis demonstrates that participation is not open to all social groups, but only to those with 
access to political-economic resources or technical expertise. This is explained as a 
reproduction of enduring techno-economic rationalities that condition political practices in 
China. Thus, a rise in collaborative governance strategies does not equate democratization of 
environmental governance.  
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1 Introduction 
 
On 15 May 2015, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) Friends of Nature and Fujian 
Green Home took four mining operators in China’s Fujian Province to court. It marked the first 
time in China’s history that NGOs pursued a legal path to pollution compensation in the name 
of public interest (Chen, 2015a). China’s new Environmental Protection Law, passed in January 
2015, introduced the possibility for registered civil society organizations to sue organizations 
on behalf of the public. 
Earlier the same year, the companies Boeing, Hainan Airlines and Sinopec announced China’s 
first commercial flight using biofuel. Restaurants collaborating in the project produce the 
biofuel from leftover cooking oil. The companies proclaimed that this breakthrough would 
contribute a 50% reduction of carbon emissions in comparison with traditional airplane fuel. It 
was announced as “a milestone in scientific and technological innovation” in China’s climate 
mitigation action (Boeing, 2015).  
A month later, thousands of people took to the streets in Shanghai to protest the plans of 
construction of a large chemical plant. Residents of the industrial working class suburb stated 
that they launched this protest to protect the younger generation from the impacts of further 
environmental degradation. “I bet everyone here has someone who has died of cancer”, 
proclaimed one of the protesters living in an area surrounded by polluting factories (Ruwitch, 
2015).  
These three disparate incidents, occurring without direct connection to one another, illustrate a 
broader phenomenon in China. This phenomenon consists of a diversity of actors participating 
in environmental protection efforts. China’s environmental challenges are complex, and it is 
impossible for the central government to shoulder all the social, economic, technical, political, 
and legal responsibilities involved in solving environmental problems. The examples above 
indicate that non-state actors are taking on different roles and responsibilities in creating 
sustainable development paths. Meanwhile, this raises questions about the nature of 
participation, forms of collaboration, and distribution of authority that these roles and 
responsibilities involve. First, what forms of decision making emerge? During what stages of 
agenda setting and planning does participation occur? Can participation in policy making 
improve environmental agendas, what conflicts of interest will arise, and how are conflicts 
solved? Second, what can and should local governments and non-state actors do to contribute 
to sustainable development on an urban level? Who initiates and leads initiatives? How are 
responsibilities for planning, financing and delivery distributed? 
To shed light on these questions, this thesis studies participation in environmental policy 
making and climate action in cities during the period between China’s 10th and 12th Five Year 
Plans (FYPs) (2001-2015). This involves looking into roles and responsibilities of local 
government authorities as well as actors from the private sector and civil society. The thesis 
also addresses the nature and function of collaboration across the public, private, and civil 
society divide. The focus is on decision making arrangements and partnerships that emerge in 
urban climate action, and how these affect climate mitigation efforts. To demonstrate the 
relevance of this focus, the following section discusses participation in environmental policy 
and climate agendas in China, highlighting the importance of local authorities and non-state 
actors.  
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1.1 Current climate governance in China 
Through diversification of actors involved in environmental policy, representatives of different 
sectors take on new roles and gain new responsibilities in environmental agendas. In China, 
this involves new forms of participation of local authorities, companies, research organizations 
and think tanks, green NGOs, foreign organizations and the public. This section provides an 
overview of these new forms of participation and emerging channels of influence.  
First, China’s national policy encourages non-state actor involvement in climate change action. 
At the global climate change conference in Paris in 2015, China adopted Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC) for carbon emission reductions. This document calls for 
exploration of diversified paths of low carbon growth. This involves enhancing the 
responsibility of enterprises for low carbon development and introducing a stronger role for the 
public and media in supervising and participating in low carbon development (NDRC, p.15, 
2015). Furthermore, China’s National Climate Change Program aims to “widen the channels” 
for public participation and encourages enterprises to contribute to climate change mitigation 
(NDRC, IV, 2007). China’s recently revised Environmental Protection Law points to the 
importance of public participation in environmental action. It highlights the role of society in 
protecting public interest through monitoring environmental pollution, disseminating 
information, and taking legal action against environmental offenders (NPC, 2015).  
The central government is also creating new roles in environmental protection for authorities 
both at a provincial and municipal level. As part of a long term process of decentralization, the 
central leadership is increasing the autonomy of local governments, while fiscal 
decentralization is creating stronger capacity for local action (Cai & Treisman, 2007). The 
national government expects local governments to shift their focus from pursuit of economic 
growth towards greater protection of local ecosystems (Wang, 2013a). Moreover, the central 
leadership calls for municipal governments to move beyond the task of implementation and 
take on responsibility for climate policy development. Local impacts of climate change, and 
increasing knowledge and awareness are contributing to the engagement of municipal 
authorities in independent climate action (Qi et al, 2008). Further, local Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are gaining independence in determining priorities and financing 
arrangements (Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009). Central environmental institutions are, 
simultaneously, developing stricter standards of accountability to evaluate the environmental 
performance of local authorities (Lo & Tang, 2006). 
Further, the national government is involving an increasing number of stakeholders in national 
environmental policy making processes. This encompasses companies, research organizations, 
universities, think tanks, and foreign organizations interacting through rounds of consultations, 
provision of advice, and information sharing related to public policy (Rosen & Houser, 2007; 
Meidan et al, 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010; Francesch-Huidobro et al, 2012). Deliberative and 
consultative elements have been integrated into decision making processes on a national and 
local level, with the purpose of governing more effectively, maintaining social order, co-opting 
dissent, and increasing legitimacy of policy decisions (He, 2006; He & Warren, 2011).  
At the same time, participation in environmental policy is emerging through bottom-up 
dynamics. As in other countries, Chinese corporations lobby for certain policy options and 
some companies (in particular large SOEs) have considerable leverage over environmental and 
energy-related decision making processes (Rosen & Houser, 2007; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). The 
private sector plays an important role in delivery of public service and infrastructure. A 
comprehensive “new-type” urbanization plan, adopted by the State Council in 2014, attaches 
importance to constructing sustainable cities (China State Council, 2014). As part of its 
urbanization strategies, the central government aims to leverage private funds into the 
construction and operation of public facilities, including sustainable infrastructure (Tian, 2015). 
The national leadership sees Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a way to diversify financing 
arrangements of power assets, transport, water, and environmental services (Zhong et al, 2008; 
Lo, 2014, Xinhua, 2016a). In 2016, China’s Vice Finance Minister announced that domestic 
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authorities planned to invest in around ten thousand public investment projects based on a PPP 
model (Xinhua, 2016a).  
In parallel, actors from civil society are taking on new roles and seeking to influence 
environmental agendas. In China, civil society organizations need to be sanctioned by the state 
to be allowed to operate. This requirement places limits on social mobilization and 
opportunities of community groups to engage in environmental action (Zhan & Tang, 2013). 
Nevertheless, environmental groups have in recent years become more visible, well organized, 
and important in mobilizing public opinion (Ho, 2007; Tang & Zhan, 2008; Schroder, 2011). 
Some green NGOs are presenting policy options and aim to influence political decision making 
processes (Tang & Zhan, 2008; Zhan & Tang, 2013). Parastatal think tanks, or so called 
government owned NGOs (GONGOS) that operate within the political system, function as 
centres of knowledge that can have significant leverage over policy formulation (Francesch-
Huidobro & Mai, 2012; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015).  
Finally, international environmental policy trends influence China’s climate policy, both 
directly and indirectly. The central leadership is trying to frame itself as a responsible 
superpower and is increasing its active participation in international institutions. The Silk Road 
Initiative (“One Belt One Road”) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are 
major outreach projects that epitomize China’s efforts to become an influential global player. 
The central government demonstrated a constructive attitude towards the international climate 
negotiations through the adoption of the INDCs in Paris, and through its resolve to shoulder 
global leadership in the face of US abandonment of the scheme (Emmott & Bartunek, 2017; 
Hilton, 2016). China’s commitment to and active participation in the UN’s recently launched 
South-South climate partnership illustrates a similar ambition (Xinhua, 2016b). Further, foreign 
environmental NGOs cooperate with their Chinese counterparts and engage in international and 
local projects in China (Yang, 2005; Schroeder, 2008; Schroder, 2011; CCAN, 2015). Finally, 
Chinese companies are gaining a strong representation in global markets, which creates 
pressures for their products and production processes to meet international environmental 
standards (Seymour et al, 2005; Mol & Carter, 2006).  
These accounts demonstrate that non-state actors participate in environmental policy processes 
and environmental protection efforts in China. The central government recognizes that local 
authorities, companies, civil society and foreign partners can contribute to addressing the 
climate change challenge. However, some processes that are visible in central government 
institutions and processes may not unfold on an urban level. Also, some policy aims adopted 
by the central government may not be realized at all. This thesis attempts to clarify which of 
these processes are reproduced on an urban level and how they contribute to reconfiguration of 
agency and authority. 
 
1.2 Trends in climate change governance  
To understand participation of non-state actors in environmental policy and climate action in 
China, it is helpful to engage in the academic debate on the shift from “government” to 
“governance” (Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000). This thesis argues that current governance 
arrangements in China can be understood by situating them in global trends in environmental 
governance. This section explains the shift from a perception of national governments as the 
key actor addressing climate change, to a recognition of multiple actors formulating and 
realizing climate mitigation responses (Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). The 
section also explains the central role of local authorities and non-state actors in this shift.  
1.2.1 The shift from “government” to “governance” 
Traditional conceptualizations of how governments manage society are linear and state 
centered. In these models, states are separated from society and bureaucracies implement 
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political decisions strictly according to laws and regulations1. Weber’s theories of bureaucracy 
is the earliest and most well-known representation of this idealized form of government. His 
conceptualization is ordered by separation between decision making and implementation, 
hierarchy, and top-down lines of control (Weber, 1946).  
In the period after the Second World War, governments across the Western world were to a 
large extent based on welfare states with substantial public spending and market control. 
Traditional state centric theories were relatively well applicable to these systems, where 
governments acted as leading planners and regulators, providers of public goods, and policy 
implementers (Pierre & Peters, 2000). A number of trends that emerged around the 1970s 
challenged this dominant model. This included stronger influence of local governments and 
transnational institutions, globalization, deregulation of financial markets, and declining faith 
in representational politics. These trends unfolded alongside internal weakening of national 
governments through perceived inability to deal with issues of inefficiency and poor economic 
performance of public administrations (Ibid). In response to these pressures, national 
governments began to explore new ways of steering which involved reliance on horizontal 
connections and collaboration across private-public divides. This represented new ways of 
formulating and implementing public policy, which were described with the concept of 
“governance” (Pierre, 2000). Empirically, the concept represents adaptation of national 
governments to circumstances of weakened authority. Conceptually, it represents a new form 
of steering through “co-ordination of social systems” (Ibid, p.3). Through governance, 
government authorities interact with and rely on actors outside the public realm, such as 
companies, civil society organizations and supranational organizations. 
The shift described above refers to the role of national governments, but around the same time 
a shift from government to governance also occurred in studies of international politics. The 
literature on international relations traditionally focused on the roles and relations of and 
between nation states and international institutions. Two dominant directions in this literature 
are realism (Donnelly, 2000), which explains how nation states bargain in a context of anarchy, 
and (neoliberal) institutionalism, which focuses on how state action is shaped by institutions, 
in the form of international organizations, regimes, or conventions (Keohane, 1989). In the 
1990s, Rosenau (1995) pointed to the inadequacy of these perspective to capture the obscure 
authorities and emergent systems of rule that characterize interdependent interactions in a 
globalized world. Rosenau (Ibid) observed that global governance is more than the formal 
institutions involved in international affairs. These processes and relations can be better 
understood as a myriad of control mechanisms aiming to influence interconnected issues. He 
raised examples such as an ever larger number of NGOs, social movements and cross-border 
city coalitions operating at multiple levels. Rosenau proposed to understand (global) 
governance as “systems of rule at all levels” (Ibid, p.13). This involves steering through non-
hierarchical channels “through which ‘commands’ flow in the form of goals framed, directives 
issued, and policies pursued” (Ibid, p.14). 
The shift from government to informal rule systems of governance is central to explanations of 
global responses to climate change. Stripple and Bulkeley (2014) observe that climate change 
became a topic in the literature on international relations at the moment when the climate 
change issue became part of international politics. The authors fix this moment to the 
international Toronto Conference on climate change in 1988 (Ibid). During the events that 
unfolded in the years after this conference, international institutions and nation states occupied 
central stage. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
introduced at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, was the first big step towards formal international 
recognition of the need to address climate change (UNFCCC, 2014a). The key component of 
the Kyoto Protocol, adopted by 160 nations in 1997, consisted of legally binding targets 
assigned to the signatories (Breidenich et al, 1998). Policy makers and researchers adopted a 
traditional international relations approach to explain these events. This implied analysis of 
                                                 
1 An excellent overview and criticism of this separation is provided by Mitchell (1999).  
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international agreements, inter-state bargaining over emission reduction targets, and the 
interests of different nation states (e.g. Bodansky, 1993; Gupta, 1997). Up until this point, 
nation states (government) remained at the centre of international climate politics.  
In the early 2000s, these debates changed. The climate change conference in Copenhagen in 
2009 became emblematic of the inability of nation states to collaborate over the climate change 
issue. Media described the international negotiations as a “failure” while Greenpeace referred 
to the city as a crime scene (Vidal et al, 2009). The clashes of the Copenhagen conference 
dashed the hopes of creating a unified global climate change regime (Haug & Berkhout, 2010). 
An active search for strategies and solutions beyond formal institutions began. Hoffmann 
(2011) directed his attention towards experimentation with new climate change responses, 
ranging from a micro level (individuals imposing carbon rationing on themselves), to initiatives 
led by regions, cities, NGOs, corporations and hybrid networks experimenting with new 
solutions. In parallel with the breakdown of the Copenhagen treaty, Hoffmann (Ibid) discovered 
a dynamic universe of bottom-up experimentation populated by organizations such as the 
International Emissions Trading Association, the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, ICLEI, 
Climate Wise (representing a consortium of insurance corporations) and transnational 
movements.  
The reorientation in focus from national governments and formal institutions towards multi-
faceted, multi-actor dynamics of international climate politics represents a shift to global 
climate change governance (Stripple & Bulkeley, 2014). This shift involves recognition of new, 
non-hierarchical responses to climate change, such as transnational networks, partnerships, and 
carbon markets (Bulkeley et al, 2014). These forms of agency, along with associated norms, 
roles and responsibilities, make up a transnational arena of climate action rather than a 
traditional international regime (Pattberg & Stripple, p. 372-374, 2008). Attention is directed 
to new sources of power, blurred lines of division between private and public authority, and 
new dynamics between structures and agency (Okereke et al, 2009). This can be understood in 
terms of a “regime complex”, in which autonomous spheres of authority and a diversity of 
measures are aimed at steering society towards climate mitigation (Bulkeley & Newell p. 13, 
2015). Rosenau’s (1995) notion of governance as systems of rule on all levels is a theoretical 
conceptualization of steering that is used to capture these informal sources of authority and 
agency (e.g. Pattberg & Stripple, 2008; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). 
In the coming years, informal attempts to address climate change will remain crucial in global 
efforts to prevent catastrophic impacts of global warming. The combined national contributions 
(INDCs) of the climate agreement in Paris together fail to meet the two degree target necessary 
to avoid “dangerous” climate change consequences (Knutti et al, 2016), even assuming that all 
countries are able to implement their planned emission reductions (Rogelj et al, 2016). Other 
actors must step up and respond to the challenge to bridge this gap. Efforts that emerge beyond 
formal state interventions are therefore crucial to the success of the global emission reduction 
challenge. 
These discussions are relevant in China, where new forms of state society relations are 
emerging in environmental politics. The trends described above have led scholars to talk about 
new agency and relations in environmental governance. Zhang and Barr (2013) pose that 
environmental degradation in China is producing new actor strategies and increasing cross 
sector interactions that challenge static views of state-society relations. Mol and Carter (2006) 
suggest that China is experiencing a transition that is transforming a command-and-control 
system into new arrangements, approaches and instruments. Further, Mol and Carter (Mol & 
Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009; Carter & Mol, 2013) argue that these new approaches are 
reconfiguring relations between state, market and civil society, and represent a shift from 
government to governance.  
This thesis argues that China is part of the global trend involving a shift from government to 
governance. At the same time, this shift is taking place in a political system very different from 
the Western liberal states where these theories were developed. This thesis attempts to make 
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sense of the notion of climate intervention beyond formal activities of the state by focusing on 
roles and responsibilities of local government authorities and non-state actors in environmental 
policy and urban climate action. 
1.2.2 The rise of local action in sustainable development 
As nation states were perceived to lose influence over increasingly complex, interconnected 
global issues around the 1990s, other actors became more important in the formulation and 
delivery of public policy. Authority was “shared” with supranational institutions (such as the 
EU and the UN) and sub-national authorities (such as regional and municipal government units) 
(Hooghe & Marks, 2001a). This section explains the importance of local government 
authorities in sustainability action and climate change governance.  
Sustainable development was formulated as an issue of local action in the Brundtland Report 
Our Common Future, published 1987 (UNWECD, 1987). The United Nation’s Agenda 21, 
adopted in 1992, integrated local action into sustainability agendas (UNDSD, 1992). Both 
documents explicitly frame sustainability as an issue of local action. Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 
specifically addresses initiatives of local authorities, making the following introductory 
statement: 
Because so many of the problems and solutions being addressed by Agenda 21 have their roots in 
local activities, the participation and cooperation of local authorities will be a determining factor 
in fulfilling its objectives. Local authorities construct, operate and maintain economic, social and 
environmental infrastructure, oversee planning processes, establish local environmental policies 
and regulations, and assist in implementing national and subnational environmental policies. As the 
level of governance closest to the people, they play a vital role in educating, mobilizing and 
responding to the public to promote sustainable development (UNDSD, 28.1, 1992) 
Local authorities, municipalities and regions across the world responded to this call for action 
by adopting local Agenda 21 schemes. The establishment of movements for sustainability led 
by local governments, such as Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI) founded in 1990, 
strengthened the position of municipalities and regions in the quest for sustainability. In relation 
to environmental politics and the effect of globalization and distribution of authority to sub-
national units, Lipschutz (1997, p.83) observed: 
What we see is political fragmentation and the emergence of a multilevel and very diffuse system of 
governance, within which "local’ management, knowledge, and rule are of growing importance to 
coordination within domestic and international political ‘hierarchies’ 
Early international policy documents on sustainability framed cities as key arenas for action. 
Curiously enough, initial debates on climate change did not reflect this tendency. As discussed 
above, policy makers and researchers originally perceived climate change as a challenge to be 
addressed through international negotiations. As greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere, local 
reductions of emissions are unlikely to result in reciprocal, local benefits in terms of reduced 
climate change impacts. Climate change can therefore be interpreted as an “inherently global 
issue” (US EPA, 2016). It has even been framed as a “non-local” issue more appropriate for 
national and state governments, in which cities can be expected to act as “policy takers” rather 
than policy makers (Sancton, 2006).  
Nevertheless, there are reasons for framing climate change issue as “profoundly local” 
(Bulkeley & Betsill, p.2, 2003). One is that cities account for a large share of global resource 
consumption and the global carbon footprint. In 2011, the UN estimated that urban areas 
accounted for around 70% of harmful greenhouse gas emissions (UN HABITAT, 2011). 
Moreover, local authorities have considerable experience in and influence over decisions 
related to transport, infrastructure, energy management, and urban planning – all important 
aspects in local climate mitigation efforts (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2003). Further, cities are centres 
of technical and social development and arenas of experimentation, as the concentration of 
people, economic activities, social and technological capital allows for rapid spread and 
adoption of new ideas (Evans, 2011). Kern and Alber (p.172, 2008) observe that “linkages and 
synergies between climate policy and sustainable development become most obvious at the 
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local level.” All these reasons allow climate change to be conceptualized as a global issue that 
requires local action – a “glocal” challenge (Gupta et al, 2007).  
In Cities and Low Carbon Transitions, Bulkeley et al (2011) argue that addressing climate 
change will require fundamental transformations in urban infrastructure and urban society. 
Bulkeley et al (Ibid) also show that the need to respond to the climate change challenge is 
reflected in urban agendas across the world. Multiple studies of cities demonstrating leadership 
in the climate change issue confirm this suggestion (Betsill, 2001; Linsroth & Bell, 2007; 
Osofsky & Levit, 2007; Patton, 2007; Schreurs, 2008). In spite of conceptual and institutional 
barriers to action (e.g. Bai et al, 2009; Burch, 2010; Leck & Simon, 2013), there are incentives 
for municipalities to engage in climate change mitigation. This includes the political 
recognition of being seen as a forerunner, as well as co-benefits of potential cost savings and 
environmental protection (Betsill, 2001; Lindseth, 2004; Bai, 2007b; Kousky & Schneider, 
2003). 
Research on urban climate governance began around the middle of the 1990s, with studies of 
cities in North America and Europe (Bulkeley, 2010). The first of these focused on pioneering 
municipalities and often used case studies to illustrate strategies and motives of local authorities 
engaged in climate mitigation activities. A second area of research addressed the engagement 
of cities in multilevel governance systems. These studies showed how actors forge linkages 
across scales and levels to build knowledge, agendas and norms, and access resources as part 
of their climate mitigation strategies (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005). This 
research flourished with the emergence of a number of municipal led movements, such as the 
C40, the Energie-Cités, ICLEI Cities for Climate Protection, and the Conference of Mayors. 
These transnational networks came to attract increasing interest when private actors, NGOs, 
grassroots movements, and international institutions joined their efforts. Interest in urban 
climate initiatives also stems from the way in which new arrangements of collaboration and 
communication across jurisdictional and geographical borders represent reconfigurations of 
state authority (Bulkeley, p. 239, 2010).  
Today, it is widely recognized that cities play a significant role in global climate mitigation 
efforts. Studies that seek to contribute to new conceptualizations of governance in the context 
of global responses to climate change draw attention to the role of actors other than nation 
states, including sub-national authorities (Stripple & Bulkeley, 2014; Bulkeley & Newell, 
2015). The continued establishment of transnational climate action networks led by cities 
testifies to the ongoing engagement of municipal authorities in the climate mitigation cause 
(Bulkeley et al, 2014). International institutions such as the World Bank and the United Nations 
embrace the urban dimension of climate action as an urgent agenda (World Bank, 2010; UN 
HABITAT, 2011). As mentioned in section 1.1, the rising importance of local action is also 
debated in the literature on environmental protection efforts in China. This debate in particular 
centers on rising autonomy due to decentralization, increasing knowledge and awareness of 
municipal authorities, and increasing independence of local environmental authorities (Mol & 
Carter, 2006; Lo & Tang, 2006; Cai & Treisman, 2007; Qi et al, 2008; Mol, 2009).  
1.2.3 The importance of networks in environmental governance 
Studies of urban responses to climate change illustrate how responses often involve 
collaboration across levels and scales, as well as across traditional public-private borders. This 
section discusses why network governance is a key concept used to explain such cross-cutting 
climate governance approaches.  
The concept of “governance networks” emerged as an empirical observation of governance 
arrangements in Europe, but also as an analytical perspective for understanding policy 
processes in non-hierarchical contexts (Torfing & Sorensen, 2014). Early studies on network 
governance in Europe saw network arrangements as a response to declining state influence and 
an alternative to privatization (Kickert et al, 1997). The concept emerged in the context of 
disillusionment with “government” and its incapacity to solve complex problems, as well as 
similar failure of businesslike managerialism to address the same issues. Governing through 
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networks, through horizontal collaboration with the private sector and civil society, represented 
a novel approach to solve societal challenges. In studies of public policy in the EU, Kohler-
Koch and Eising (1999) observe that the core idea of network governance is that political actors 
see problem solving as the essence of politics. As contemporary states are vertically and 
horizontally fragmented, their roles shift from one of authoritative allocation, towards 
“activation” and negotiator of public values. This is realized by engaging in constructive 
interaction with the various sub-systems that cluster around public policy issues. Network 
governance is especially important in dealing with complicated policy issues that public actors 
cannot solve on their own (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2004). Climate change is a typical example of 
a cross-sectoral, complex policy issue though to require horizontal problem solving. 
On an international level, networks are central in describing climate responses produced outside 
traditional state borders. Transnational climate governance, or transnational climate governance 
networks, is a concept that captures non-state led global climate change responses. Bulkeley et 
al (p.18, 2014) see transnational climate governance initiatives as activities that explicitly seek 
to address climate change, that seek to govern, that operate across at least one nation state 
border, and involve at least one non-state actor. The authors portray the phenomenon as part of 
a larger trend of transnational governance and an alternative to traditional theories of the 
international relations literature. Transnational climate governance networks are populated by 
a diversity of actors unified by their common engagement in the public domain that revolves 
around climate change (Ibid).  
Transnational networks range from formal initiatives involving collaboration between states, 
international organizations, businesses and NGOs (for example the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM)), to loosely coupled, bottom-up initiatives led by, for example, grassroots 
movements, communities or NGOs (Bulkeley et al, 2014). Ideas of transnational networks 
suggest that forms of climate governance travel internationally, with a potential of shaping 
governance in China, and making it more similar to climate policy in the West. Schroeder 
(2008) demonstrates this empirically by showing how organizations involved in transnational 
campaigns transfer elements of climate policy into Chinese environmental politics through a 
process of norm internalization. 
The rise in importance of partnerships is part of the global shift from government to governance, 
and a greater affinity towards voluntary rather than regulatory agreements. This shift is 
illustrated by the change from the binding resolutions adopted through the UN Conference of 
Parties (CPOs) to the voluntary climate agreements of the Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs). It is demonstrated through the increasing number of transnational 
movements based on voluntary action and participation (Bulkeley et al, 2014). On a national 
and local level, a propensity to use persuasion, engagement based and collaborative approaches 
reflects the same tendency (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006). Given the interest in multiplication of 
efforts in Chinese climate governance, the concept of partnerships may help further our 
understanding of how actors work together to achieve common environmental objectives.  
One of the conceptual roots of the literature of network governance is theories on policy 
networks. The policy network concept implies that interaction between a diversity of 
stakeholders creates public policy, rather than decisions taken by political leaders or 
deliberation in parliaments. The policy network literature demonstrates how policy grows out 
of continuous interaction between civil servants, committees, working groups, professionals, 
and experts (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). Policy networks consist of “sets of formal and informal 
institutional linkages between governmental and other actors” that are structured around shared 
interests (Rhodes, p.1246, 2007). Networks regularize interactions between public actors and 
stakeholders, which results in semi-institutionalization of linkages (Smith, 1997). Key 
characteristics of decision making are bargaining, resource interdependence and continuing and 
game like interaction (Rhodes, p. 43-46, 1996).  
Policy making in networks and in partnerships occurs outside formal decision making 
arrangements of liberal democratic systems. This can create concerns related to structures of 
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power, inclusion, legitimacy and accountability of decision making processes. Network 
governance challenges the basic principles of liberal democratic systems, as networks consist 
of layers of authority in which the political system “melts together” with society (Sorensen, p. 
694, 2002). This means that the relationship between politics and administrations, as well as 
who “governs” and who is “governed”, shifts through a horizontal transfer of authority. In 
informal policy networks, the influence of elites tends to be more powerful than that of other 
actors (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Bogason & Musso, 2006; Khan, 2013). Outcomes of policy 
making in such settings run the risk of favouring economically or politically strong actors 
(Richardson & Jordan, 1983; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; Levy, 2005; Khan, 2013). This suggests 
a need to closely examine shifts of inclusion in decision making in network settings and 
partnerships, which is part of the aim of this thesis.  
The perspective of networks is a relevant framing for understanding climate change politics in 
China, as it offers an analytical lens that captures and explain the dynamics of interaction and 
interdependence of multi-actor policy processes. The literature of policy networks and 
partnerships offer established theories of the nature of and motivations behind policy 
interactions, as well as implications associated with pluralization in formulation and delivery 
of public policy.  
 
1.3 Research questions 
What does the global shift from government to governance mean for environmental agendas in 
China? Is this a shift that we can observe within this non-democratic system? If so, is it 
expressed in specific ways? In other words, is there a particular style of environmental 
governance that is endemic to China? This thesis explores the particularities of policy networks, 
urban climate governance modes, and climate partnerships produced in China’s political 
system. This involves examination of how agency and authority in the realm of environmental 
policy making and climate action on a municipal level in China is distributed vertically to local 
authorities and horizontally to non-state actors. The key research question answered in this 
thesis is:  
How have municipal authorities and non-state actors participated in climate mitigation 
action in cities in China during the period of the 10th to 12th FYPs?  
This thesis argues that while local authorities in China search for strategies to construct low 
carbon growth, municipalities face various institutional constraints, including economic, 
technical and knowledge barriers. To overcome these barriers, municipal authorities draw on 
resources from higher levels of government as well as from companies and “expert” 
organizations in the formulation of plans as well as in delivery of projects. This results in new 
lines of influence over urban decision making processes, as well as over low carbon 
infrastructure investments and other sustainability projects. 
The main research question is divided into three research sub-questions that map out the 
elements of this argument. A case study provides material for in-depth analysis of the first two 
sub-questions. The case study is the prefectural level city of Rizhao in Shandong Province, 
which illustrates environmental planning processes on a city level, urban climate governance 
strategies and the involvement of non-state actors in climate action. The case study is combined 
with comparative analysis of 150 climate initiatives carried out in 15 cities across China. The 
comparative study is used to answer the second and the third question, by mapping out actors 
and collaborative arrangements involved in climate action in a number of cases. The sections 
below present each sub-question, the theoretical perspective used to interrogate these, and a 
brief summary of the answers to the questions.  
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1.3.1 Sub-question 1 
How have non-state actors participated in environmental planning processes in Rizhao during 
the 10th and 12th FYPs (2001-2015)?  
The first research sub-question focuses on planning, as this is the main point of government 
intervention in environmental issues in China. China’s planning system is a remnant of the 
communist planned economy based on comprehensive, quantitative production targets. In 
China’s current political system, plans and policy documents, especially the Five Year Plans 
(FYPs), still outline key policy directions and function as the basis of the political evaluation 
system. Researchers in other contexts, such as Carmin et al (2012), also place planning at the 
heart of urban climate efforts and see plans as reflecting goals that officials and communities 
seek to advance. This thesis takes as point of departure the formal development objectives of 
government authorities and the way in which these are formulated.  
Previous research in China shows that a range of stakeholders, including companies, think tanks 
and research organizations, participate in policy making processes on a national level in China 
(Meidan et al, 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010; He & Warren, 2011; Francesch-Huidobro et al, 
2012). Local decision making similarly involves consultation and meetings with economic 
stakeholders, professional groups, and to some extent the public (He, 2006; He & Warren, 2011; 
Zhou, 2012). Zhou (2012) describes this as a nascent system of deliberation emerging within 
China’s authoritarian system. Mai and Francesch-Huidobro (2015) use the perspective of 
collaborative municipal networks to show that local authorities create vertical and horizontal 
linkages with public and non-state actors to mobilize resources in the formulation of urban 
climate policy.  
The contribution of this thesis is to add a new dimension to the literature on municipal 
environmental policy networks in China (e.g. Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). The thesis 
does so by applying traditional theoretical perspectives of policy networks to urban decision 
making dynamics. This perspective is used to highlight resource interdependence, conflict, 
negotiation, and structures of power as important factors determining policy making outcomes 
(Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 1996). It is also an approach that draws 
attention to insights of state-group dynamics in relation to the structure of political economies, 
and the considerable leverage that economic stakeholders often exercise over political decision 
makers (Levy & Newell, 2005; Newell, 2008).  
In this thesis, these perspectives reveal previously unexplored aspects of mutual dependence of 
political and economic interests in urban planning in China. It also uncovers the way in which 
decision making arrangements cater to the priorities of local elites (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; 
Sorensen, 2006; Khan, 2013). The case study of Rizhao demonstrates that decision making 
interactions cannot simply be described as neutral spaces for deliberation where actors have 
equal opportunity to pursue environmental and social objectives. Rather, inclusion of 
stakeholders in urban planning consultations and meetings is structured by political and 
economic interests and the urban political economy. Further, a policy network perspective 
reveals how conflicts of interest and uneven structures of power influence decision making 
outcomes. The thesis shows that in urban planning processes, the interests of local economic 
stakeholders (such as large industrial units and developers) usually are aligned with those of 
the top leadership (the Mayor and the Mayor’s Office). In case of conflict, these interests are 
prioritized while concerns of other actors (such as departments in charge of the environment, 
forestry or tourism, local academia, or residents) are overlooked. This tendency is illustrated in 
conflicts over land use, size of industrial activities, impacts of pollution, and concerns with 
ecological protection. The results also confirm the long-standing observation in the literature 
on state-group interactions that policy decisions dominated by economic and political elites are 
unlikely to generate radical change (Richardson & Jordan, 1983; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). This 
thesis demonstrates that formation of political-economic alliances, in combination with an aim 
for consensus in planning negotiations, creates a bias in favor of protecting status quo. In this 
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context, this implies reproduction of planning decisions that allow for continuation of urban 
high carbon paths of growth (Khan, 2013).  
Further, this thesis argues that policy discourse theory offers a perspective that explains why 
certain interests are more strongly articulated than others in China’s energy policy. The policy 
discourse literature shows that narratives and framing play an important role in environmental 
policy by conditioning problem solutions and emphasizing specific aspects of environmental 
issues (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 1997; Marston, 2004; Feindt & Oels, 2006). Unpacking the way 
in which environmental policy is socially constructed can reveal how policy options are 
associated with political, social and economic agendas (Ibid). This thesis demonstrates that 
Chinese policy documents frame climate change issues an issue of industrial policy and 
technological development. Local decision makers reproduce these priorities by shaping 
climate agendas as industrial or technological programs. Moreover, this thesis argues that 
China’s current climate policy narratives place industrial units and technology entrepreneurs as 
the mains agent delivering environmental protection solutions. As a result, other fundamental 
social or political issues that are interconnected with low carbon challenges are made invisible.  
Beyond planning, there are many other ways in which government authorities and other actors 
seek to address climate change issues. Bulkeley and Castan Broto (2012) observe that while the 
number of municipalities that have used a planned approach to climate mitigation is limited, 
there is a rapidly proliferating number of urban climate initiatives carried out under less 
institutional forms. Municipal authorities are dealing with the climate change challenge by 
seeking answers outside the formal mechanisms of government administration, through 
informal forms of cooperation with other actors (Hoffmann, 2011). The second research sub-
question moves beyond the formal structures of planning to recognize other forms of climate 
interventions emerging on an urban level in China. 
1.3.2 Sub-question 2 
How have different modes of urban climate governance contributed to climate mitigation in 
cities in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
The second research question explores the various strategies that municipal authorities and 
other actors adopt to address the climate change challenge on an urban level in China. Bulkeley 
and Kern (2006) identify four modes of climate governance that are used by city governments: 
traditional governance approaches (governing through authority); emission control of activities 
in the public sector (self-governing); provision of low emission public services and 
infrastructure (governing through provision); and strategies that support low carbon activities 
of other actors (governing through enabling, through information dissemination, persuasion and 
partnerships). This thesis uses these categories as a framework to map out urban emission 
reduction strategies employed in China.  
However, in identifying urban climate projects, measures other than government actions and 
policies are considered. The sample of initiatives considered in the comparative study includes 
non-public efforts, such as low carbon demonstration projects and campaigns led by companies 
and NGOs. This is a focus that recognizes the importance of informal responses to climate 
change (Hoffmann, 2011; Bulkeley & Castan Broto, 2012; Castan Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). 
Moreover, explicit focus is directed towards the way in which collaborative arrangements allow 
actors to reach across jurisdictions and geographical scales (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley, 
2005; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005).  
This thesis demonstrates that Chinese municipal authorities engage in all four modes of 
governance to realize local climate action. Governing through authority – the adoption of local 
regulation, plans and standards – is relatively common. The case study of Rizhao shows that 
use of a local policy requirement for solar water heaters had a strong effect on adoption. The 
comparative study demonstrates that other municipal authorities have adopted similar 
construction requirements, as well as new spatial planning strategies, and sector-based emission 
reduction plans. Yet, numerous guidelines imposed by higher levels of government limit the 
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room for independent municipal policy making. Local authorities to a large extent focus on 
devising strategies for implementation of central targets and creating alternative versions of 
central level schemes. This can leave cities “tinkering on the margin” of national policy 
(Schreurs, p.344-346, 2008), rather than prioritizing independent policy development. 
Further, this thesis shows that Chinese municipalities use delivery of public services as a way 
to support local energy saving and emission reductions. However, delivery of urban 
infrastructure is to a larger extent managed by companies. The comparative study of the thesis 
demonstrates that public and private companies often deliver projects such as waste-to-energy 
plants, large scale renewable energy projects, and eco-city development projects. At the same 
time, this trend makes it necessary to question the extent to which company investments are 
based on balanced considerations of long term environmental and social objectives (Hodge & 
Greve, 2010). The sample of initiatives considered in this thesis includes many projects 
described as “low carbon”, which on closer scrutiny exhibit a limited use of renewables or 
energy efficient technologies, as well as construction of luxury environments.  
The thesis also demonstrates that municipal authorities in China act as enablers of local climate 
action. The case study of Rizhao shows that this takes the form of energy management 
activities, demonstration projects, promotion of energy measuring and monitoring, 
benchmarking activities and improvement of energy evaluation and examination systems. Both 
the case study and the comparative study suggest that municipal authorities perform enabling 
functions played by civil society in other countries, such as spreading information and 
awareness through environmental campaigns. Information sharing strategies led by civil society 
are instead characterized by technology development or technology intense demonstration 
projects. 
A key contribution of this thesis is to show that partnerships are common in local climate action 
in China. This is surprising, especially in the light of previous research predicting that 
sustainability partnerships in China are likely to be limited, due to the low level of pluralism in 
Chinese society and politics (Pattberg et al, 2012). The comparative study demonstrates that 
climate partnerships exist in a variety of forms, perform a range of functions, and are initiated 
by both public and non-state actors. Municipal authorities form partnerships with firms, 
academia and foreign organizations to facilitate technology or infrastructure delivery, access 
new ideas and planning designs, and create new funding arrangements. Companies form 
partnerships with other firms and with domestic and foreign academia to access information, 
skills and technology, to realize investments into large-scale energy infrastructure or 
demonstration projects such as low-emission buildings and eco-cities. Focusing on the links 
that are created through collaboration shifts attention from actors to networks where technology 
is developed, new designs are created, and climate policy evolves. 
At the same time, these linkages allow non-state actors such as firms, parastatal think tanks, 
research institutes and foreign organizations to participate in the design and delivery of local 
projects. This thesis argues that not all types of actors are included in these networks, which in 
particular refers to the absence of NGOs, communities or other social movements. All civil 
society organizations represented in the sample are either research organizations, think tanks or 
NGOs with a predominantly technical character.  
1.3.3 Sub-question 3 
How have partnerships contributed to introduction of climate policy and technology on an 
urban level in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
The third research question delves deeper into the dynamics of partnerships. This question 
investigates if and how collaborative arrangements contribute to introduction of new climate 
policy and technology on a local level in China.  
The conceptual foundation of this question is based on the literatures on transnational climate 
networks and on sustainability partnerships, which identify dissemination of information and 
21 
 
knowledge sharing as key functions of partnerships (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Glasbergen, 
2007; Andonova et al, 2009; Pattberg et al, 2012; Bulkeley et al, 2012). Studies of sustainability 
partnerships also show that development of new technology is an important reason for firms, 
universities, public actors, NGOs to form partnerships (Davies, 1999; Kolk et al, 2010; 
Glasbergen & Groenenberg, 2001). Further, capacity building, technology assistance and 
technology transfers are explicit objectives in the global partnership agendas promoted by 
international institutions, such as the UN and World Bank (UNDSD, 2015). 
The question also builds on research that explicitly link cross-sector and cross-border 
collaboration with climate policy innovation. Bauer and Steurer (2014) argue that climate 
partnerships contribute to policy innovation through diffusion of policy elements between 
actors and government levels. This thesis builds on their notion that collaboration and sharing 
of information through working groups and projects contributes to formulation of climate action 
strategies (Ibid). In the context of China, Schroeder (2008) shows that participation of Chinese 
NGOs in transnational networks contributes to absorption of elements of international climate 
policy into China’s climate politics. 
The contribution of thesis is to demonstrate that partnerships between local authorities and 
firms with foreign actors and academia facilitate introduction of climate policy and technology 
on an urban level in China. Introduction of technology is realized through two forms of 
interaction: technology transfers and joint research projects. This thesis shows that although 
technology transfers remains the most common mechanism for introducing new technology, 
research partnerships are becoming increasingly important. Technology development is taking 
place in networks made up of domestic research institutes, firms, universities and foreign 
partners. The rising level of skill and knowledge in these networks is making domestic research 
increasingly important in local adoption of emission reduction technologies. This is in line with 
the previous observation that sustainability innovation in Asia no longer simply aims to catch 
up with the “West”, but is creating independent trajectories of change (Berkhout et al, 2010).  
Finally, the thesis suggests that mechanisms through which policy practices are adopted on an 
urban level include multi-party demonstration projects, as well as collaborative problem solving 
that seeks solutions to urban issues. Through the former, policy practices are introduced through 
large-scale projects, such as eco-cities, which are designed by multiple actors. These projects 
allow for testing and sharing new ideas with the purpose of showcasing novel solutions. The 
thesis suggests that some of these new solutions are absorbed and replicated by companies 
through their efforts to be seen as high-tech pioneers. Through the latter mechanism, 
municipalities form partnerships with academic institutes, international organizations and 
foreign authorities in their pursuit for low carbon development solutions. Through dialogue, 
meetings and workshops, low carbon solutions are presented and debated, and in some cases 
pragmatically absorbed by local authorities. 
Each of the three research questions explores a specific aspect of China’s environmental policy 
and climate agendas, and the results illustrate different dynamics of each. However, the answers 
to the research questions are also used to draw conclusions regarding trends in China’s climate 
change governance. This relates to the principles that allow some actors to participate in climate 
agendas while others are left out, and the rationalities that structure this participation. By 
systematically searching for trends in the empirical material that is used to answer the three 
research sub-questions of the thesis (formulated as “how”-questions), the conclusions also 
encompass a discussion on “why” certain actors are empowered in governance networks while 
others are permanently excluded. 
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1.4 Research design 
The thesis adopts a mixed methods approach to match the competing needs of situating the 
processes of environmental governance in a specific case, while also making it possible to make 
generalisations in relation to environmental governance in China. The research strategy is to 
combine analysis of a sample of urban climate initiatives with an in-depth case study and 
member check interviews. This section provides an overview of the research design of the thesis 
(a full account of the research methodology is provided in Chapter 4). 
1.4.1 Research methodology 
Answering the first of the sub-questions (how non-state actors are included in environmental 
planning processes in Rizhao) requires information about local decision making processes in 
the case study city. Specifically, this includes data on what organizations have been involved 
in planning, how decisions have been made, what conflicts have emerged, and how these have 
been solved. This information was collected through interviews with urban planners, 
researchers and local officials who have been involved in Rizhao’s planning and policy making 
processes. Quantitative data about urban environmental development trends complemented the 
interviews.  
A second strategy to answer the first sub-question was to consider the framing of policy 
preferences in key planning documents and how policy discourse influences the inclusion of 
certain groups in urban environmental agendas. This was done by analysing and comparing the 
framing of low carbon development policy and energy policy in China’s national 12th FYP and 
Rizhao 12th FYP. The language use in these two documents was compared with information 
collected through the interviews, to find how discourses differ between groups, and with what 
implications for urban environmental policy.  
To answer the second sub-question (how modes of urban climate governance contribute to 
climate action), information from the case study and the comparative study was combined. The 
case study of Rizhao was used to identify modes of climate governance used in the city. This 
was done by mapping out energy saving and emission reduction strategies used in the city, 
policy instruments involved in these, key actors, and forms of collaboration involved in the 
initiatives. Energy programs were categorized according to the four modes of governance 
identified by Bulkeley and Kern (2006), with particular emphasis on how non-state actors have 
engaged in the programs. In the comparative analysis, information from 150 climate initiatives 
carried out in fifteen cities in China was collected. The initiatives were analysed to find what 
type of actors were leading initiatives, what form of collaboration was involved, and in what 
way leadership of initiatives was related to policy sector and governance approaches.  
The third sub-question (how partnerships have contributed to introduction of policy and 
technology on an urban level in China) was answered by relying on information from the 
comparative study. The 150 initiatives were analysed to discover how many involved 
partnerships, and how many involved introduction of new emission reduction technology or 
policy practices. The initiatives were analysed to find if and how these two aspects correlate. 
In using this comparative approach, the thesis draws inspiration from previous research that 
used large-n samples to analyse sustainability partnerships (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Pattberg 
& Stripple, 2008; Andonova et al, 2009; Bulkeley et al, 2012; Pattberg et al, 2012; Castan Broto 
& Bulkeley, 2013). It responds to the call to use quantitative approaches in order to achieve 
systematic knowledge on the role of partnerships in sustainability governance (Pattberg et al, 
2012).  
The results of all three questions were evaluated through member check interviews. These were 
carried out with individuals who have worked with low carbon policy and planning in various 
cities in China. The interviews focused on validating the results from the comparative analysis 
and the case study, in particular with regards to which actors participate in environmental 
governance, how they participate, and how solutions and ideas are shared.  
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1.4.2 Case study selection and comparative analysis 
The selection of the case study was based on identifying a city that in terms of development 
trends and environmental challenges is representative of the industrialized urban regions along 
China’s East coast. Many of the cities in this area have passed through similar development 
paths: rapid economic expansion, shift from the primary to the secondary and tertiary sectors 
and urban expansion. A number of urban regions in this area are also confronting environmental 
challenges associated with rapid industrialization and urbanization: water and air pollution, 
resource scarcities, and rapid conversion of agricultural and forest land into built up areas. 
Therefore, it becomes important to examine the strategies used by a mid-sized, medium income 
city confronting this type of challenges.  
A city likely to have experimented with new environmental governance arrangements was 
chosen as a case study. Rizhao has received a number of awards for its environmental efforts, 
including international recognition for its environmental governance through a UN-HABITAT 
award for green planning and a World Clean Energy Award for popularization of renewable 
energy. The city has been noted for its progress in international media (Biello, 2008), by 
international institutions (WWF, 2012) and in previous research on climate action in China 
(Bai, 2007a; Bai et al, 2010). The municipal leadership claims that its use of participatory 
models and innovative governance instruments contributed to its progress and to receiving this 
recognition (RMPG, 2009a). By choosing a city seen as an environmental best practice 
example, the aim was to identify how new roles for non-state actors and collaboration through 
partnerships is emerging on a municipal level in China.  
Another aspect that was important to the choice of case study is the delay between national 
level policy intentions and actual development in the vast and variegated regions of China. 
Descriptions of change in China often emphasize development in internationalized cities, which 
are leading in terms of policy development, integration into global markets and technological 
innovation (e.g. Lo & Leung, 2000; Lo & Tang, 2006; Baeumler et al, 2012; Mai & Francesch-
Huidobro, 2015). This thesis instead focuses on development that has taken place in a mid-
sized, industrialized city with a lower income level than the leading megacities, to shed light 
on what actions are possible for “average” urban regions in the country. The case study thus 
aims to make it more clear which policy guidelines are contributing to real change and which 
constitute empty policy rhetoric or single examples.  
The case study focuses on the time period between the 10th and 12th FYPs. The time period of 
the 10th FYP is when Rizhao Municipality decided to adopt its Eco-City Construction Plan, 
which placed environmental issues on the political agenda. Focusing on the 11th and 12th plan 
allows the case study to include information on implementation and results of energy saving 
and emission reduction strategies. The 11th FYP is a time period in which energy efficiency 
issues became an important topic in Chinese policy agendas, whereas the 12th FYP is when 
climate change first appeared in China’s policy documents.  
Information about the case study city was collected from various sources. Interviews were held 
with local officials, researchers, companies, and planners from central level institutions who 
have been involved in Rizhao’s environmental programs. Information was also collected 
through document review, which included local news articles, government websites, policy 
briefs, reports, and company websites. Quantitative data was collected from Rizhao Statistical 
Yearbooks and Shandong Provincial Yearbooks, including data on economic growth, social 
and environmental indicators, governmental spending, investment figures, and energy use 
trends.  
For the comparative analysis, 150 climate initiatives were selected from fifteen cities in China. 
The cities were selected based on the following criteria: being places where significant climate 
action has been carried out; and being places where partnerships are likely to emerge. The 
selection includes seven cities that were selected for NDRCs first low carbon pilot project, five 
cities from NDRC’s second round of selection, and three other cities that have gained the 
reputation of environmental forerunners. Ten climate initiatives from different sectors were 
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selected in each city. For each initiative, the following information was collected and filed in a 
database that was constructed as part of this study: (1) year the initiative was launched; (2) 
sector; (3) type of organization that led the initiative; (4) forms of cross-sector cooperation 
involved in managing the initiative; (5) functions performed by the initiative; and (6) new 
technologies or practices introduced through the initiative.  
Member check interviews were held with respondents that have worked with climate issues in 
multiple cities in China. These were performed at three points during the study: around the 
same time as the collection of the case study material, two years later in Hong Kong, and three 
years later in Beijing during the finalization of the thesis. The second and third rounds of data 
collection were performed to check generalizability of outcomes and validity of the results of 
the case study. They were also used to make up for limitations in the data collection of the case 
study, such as complementing interviews with industrial companies and industry associations. 
Finally, the results of the case study, comparative study and the member check interviews were 
drawn together to produce a conclusion regarding principles of non-state actor participation in 
environmental policy in China.   
 
1.5 Thesis structure 
This thesis is constructed around the argument that climate governance is a complex 
phenomenon involving interaction between actors from different sectors. Even in China, a 
country characterized by a hierarchical, semi-authoritarian political system and strong top-
down lines of control, the governance of climate change involves agency and authority of local 
authorities and non-state actors, as well as partnerships that facilitate horizontal mobilization 
of resources. This argument is presented in detail in the following eight chapters, which are 
organized as follows: 
Chapter 2 presents a review of theories on environmental policy, urban climate 
governance and sustainability partnerships. The argument of the chapter is that governance 
through networks, and inclusion of local authorities and non-state actors in network 
arrangements, play an important role in responding to environmental challenges. The chapter 
elaborates on the introductory discussion on the shift from “government” to “governance”, 
showing how a variety of actors participate in environmental governance and how that 
interaction shapes environmental policy. A network perspective explains how groups intervene 
in formulation of environmental policy making, while a discourse perspective explains how 
groups with different interests shape environmental policy options through discursive struggles. 
The chapter demonstrates the importance of local action in climate change responses and 
discusses how municipal governments engage in climate action through different governance 
modes.  
Chapter 3 presents an overview of the literature on climate governance in China. The key 
argument of this chapter is that despite the continuing strong role of the central government in 
China, participation of a diversity of actors characterizes environmental policy making and 
climate action. The chapter shows that various actors take part in policy making and planning 
processes, on both a national and local level. It also demonstrates that research organizations 
and green NGOs engage in processes of discursive contestation that shape environmental 
policy. The chapter explains how scholars previously have interpreted these changes as a 
transition to environmental governance in China. Further, the chapter discusses the different 
types of strategies that municipal authorities develop in adopting independent low carbon 
agendas.  
Chapter 4 presents the methodology of the thesis. The methodology is presented by 
discussing the information required to answer the research questions and how this information 
was collected. The chapter begins by explaining the philosophy behind the research, which has 
guided the methodology. The selection of case study is motivated, along with an introduction 
to the case study city, data collection methods and data analysis. The comparative study is 
25 
 
described, including sample selection, data collection methods and data analysis method, 
followed by a presentation of the method used in performing member check interviews. Finally, 
methodological challenges and ethical considerations involved in carrying out the research are 
discussed. 
Chapter 5 presents results from the case study, showing how stakeholders and experts 
participate in decision making processes in Rizhao. In this chapter, a policy network 
perspective is used to explain urban planning dynamics in Rizhao. The chapter argues that 
planning arrangements in Rizhao favor priorities of economic stakeholders, which are aligned 
with those of the city’s political leadership. The chapter also shows how conflict of interest and 
uneven access to decision making characterize environmental planning processes, and how 
decision making outcomes protect status quo. Secondly, a policy discourse perspective shows 
how the interests of some actors are more strongly represented than that of others in China’s 
energy policy. The chapter demonstrates that national and municipal policy discourses 
strengthen the agency of industrial actors while making others marginalized. At the same time, 
through the involvement of external advisors in local planning, alternative narratives come to 
compete with local development priorities.  
Chapter 6 presents results from the case study, demonstrating the mix of governance 
modes used in energy saving and emission reduction strategies in Rizhao. The argument of 
this chapter is that the municipal government in Rizhao has combined the governance strategies 
of regulation and provision with “soft” policy tools to realize local climate action. The chapter 
shows how regulation is used to promote renewable energy technology, and that public service 
provision, public led and through private sector collaboration, is another way in which 
municipal authorities can engage in climate action. The chapter demonstrates that municipal 
authorities combine traditional approaches with enabling strategies, such as information 
sharing, promotion of energy efficiency and partnerships with the function of demonstration 
and policy implementation. The case study also shows that energy saving targets in industrial 
units in the city have been realized through a diversity of strategies that involves bottom-up 
formation of inter-organizational linkages. 
Chapter 7 presents results from the comparative analysis, illustrating the importance of 
partnerships in climate action in cities in China. The key argument of the chapter is that non-
state actors play a key role in climate projects and that cross-sector partnerships perform a range 
of functions in local mitigation efforts. The chapter shows that municipalities use regulation as 
a tool to support local climate action, while provision of low emission services and 
infrastructure often is delegated to companies. The chapter indicates that climate partnerships 
are common in China, in particular partnerships with the purpose of technology development 
and demonstration. These partnerships create networks of cross-sector linkages through which 
actors mobilize information, funding and technology. The chapter also suggests that 
partnerships contribute to introduction of climate policy and technology. This is realized 
through technology transfers, research partnerships, large scale demonstration projects 
involving a multiplicity of actors, and joint problem solving efforts incorporating ideas of 
academic organizations and foreign partners.  
Chapter 8 presents results from the member check interviews, tying together the insights 
from previous chapters by identifying a rationale behind participation in environmental 
policy in China. The chapter addresses the question of why certain groups are able to influence 
decision making processes and climate projects in China. Accounts from the member check 
interviews demonstrate that two key groups are seen as legitimate actors intervening in 
environmental issues: economic stakeholders and experts. The explanation for this tendency is 
sought in theories of technocracy as a fundamental ideology that has shaped China’s political 
system. According to technocratic principles, professionalism and skill are characteristics that 
legitimize inclusion into China’s political system. The thesis proposes that the concept of 
techno-economic rationality explains how participation in environmental policy is available for 
actors possessing economic resources and technical capacity. 
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Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of the thesis. In conclusion, participation of local 
authorities and non-state actors, as well horizontal interactions between sectors, contribute to 
urban climate mitigation efforts in China. However, participation in environmental policy is 
not open for all actors, but structured by techno-economic rationalities. This creates 
fundamental theoretical implications for the way in which policy networks and partnerships are 
produced in the political system in China. The thesis also identifies theoretical perspectives that 
merit further exploration, including legitimacy issues of current climate policy arrangements, 
and how rationalities of climate governance can be understood through the concept of 
governmentality. 
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2 Theories of climate governance  
 
This chapter explains a broad change in global environmental politics, from a focus on 
government as the locus for climate change action, to consideration of the multiple forms of 
actors and processes that intervene in formulation and delivery of environmental policy. This 
shift from “government” to “governance” has shaped the last decade of climate change 
governance in China, but in unexpected ways. To understand the nature and impact of this 
change, this chapter provides an account of key changes implied in this shift, particularly 
through the rise of network governance, local action, and partnerships. The key argument of 
the chapter is that local authorities and non-state actors exert influence over formulation and 
implementation of climate policy, which creates new opportunities for action but also new 
channels for and distributions of authority.  
The chapter begins by defining and discussing the concept of governance, starting from the 
conceptual shift that occurred around the 1980’s when nation states were perceived to lose their 
monopoly over public policy (section 2.1). Theories that emphasized broader notions of societal 
steering incorporated activities taking place outside traditional state borders and encompassed 
non-state actor agency. Theories of environmental policy evolved in a similar manner, from a 
dominating emphasis of regulation and control measures, towards collaborative decision 
making strategies, partnerships, voluntary agreements (VAs), and participatory approaches. In 
responding to the climate change challenge, complexity arises out of the need to tackle the issue 
at multiple levels and across multiple policy sectors. Climate governance therefore involves 
activities that transcend scales, administrative boundaries, and borders. 
Networked governance arrangements have important implications for the way in which public 
policy is created. Section 2.2 shows how influence over decision making in networks is exerted 
through a variety of channels. According to policy network theory, decision making takes place 
through interaction between civil servants, committees, working groups, professionals, and 
experts. Negotiation and bargaining, conflict of interest and structures of power are crucial 
elements explaining decision making interactions and outcomes. Top-down lines of control 
over environmental policy have also been questioned by studies based on a constructivist 
perspective. Theories of preference formation show that power over policy making lies in the 
ability to articulate issues in a way that make certain narratives dominant and others sidelined. 
In environmental policy making, the ability of certain groups to frame policy issues creates 
potential to make conflicts of interest invisible and empower some actors at the expense of 
others. 
The perceived, relative erosion of state power is associated with growing importance of sub-
governmental units (section 2.3). Municipalities can use different strategies to address climate 
change. This includes taking action through traditional authoritative strategies, by adopting 
local regulations, imposing guidelines for public activities or providing low emission 
alternatives in public service. However, the need to find more effective ways to engage non-
state actors in local climate action has also made municipal authorities turn to enabling 
strategies that rely on “soft” policy tools, such as spreading information and promoting certain 
types of behavior. One important enabling strategy is partnerships (section 2.4). Partnerships is 
one specific manifestation of network governance and a concept which originally grew out of 
observations of policy arrangements in Europe. In governance through partnerships, cross-
sector relationships are formed to pursue public objectives through horizontal cooperation. 
Partnerships exist in a number of forms, and can perform a range of functions, such as rule 
setting, sharing information and resources, developing or transferring technology that 
contribute to local climate action.  
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2.1 Environmental governance 
The concept of governance implies that nation states have lost authority over formulation and 
implementation of public policy to local government agencies, private actors, NGOs, 
transnational organizations, and citizen groups (Pierre, 2000; Pierre & Peters, 2000). In this 
thesis, governance is defined as “the complex process through which a plurality of social and 
political actors with diverging interests interact in order to formulate, promote and realise 
common objectives” (Torfing et al, 2012, p. 14). This definition emphasizes that non-state 
actors contribute to the formulation and realization of public goals, even though government 
authorities often play a key role in these processes. The definition also highlights the importance 
of interaction in formulation and implementation of public policy, and the role of heterogeneous 
actors that represent different interests in these processes. 
This section provides a detailed account of the shift from government to governance, which 
was introduced in Chapter 1, starting from a discussion on the concept of governance. The 
section shows how a shift from regulation to more interactive approaches has taken place in 
environmental policy. Finally, the section shows why concepts such networks, multi-level 
governance, and transnational governance explain the nature of emerging responses to the 
climate change challenge.  
2.1.1 The concept of “governance” 
As discussed in Chapter 1, global trends that emerged around the 1970s affected the ability of 
national governments to independently formulate and implement public policy. Apart from the 
factors already mentioned, a wave of privatization shifted responsibility over delivery of public 
goods to the private sector in the global North. In the 1980s, many OECD nations adopted 
market based reforms of public activities, such as “professional management” strategies, along 
with private sector tools that valued output over procedure, competition, and cost cuts (Hood, 
1991).  
In the 1990s, increasing complexity of governance arrangements in the European Union 
contributed to the establishment of new levels and sources of political authority. Debates 
emerged on how to understand policy making processes in the context of Europeanization, 
through which decision making powers originally fixed within nation states shifted to 
supranational authorities. A similar tendency occurred due to regionalization, a process through 
which the appropriate level of policy making was increasingly perceived to be located on a 
regional level – a phenomenon which some authors interpreted in terms of “denationalization” 
of space (e.g. Brenner, 1999; Newman, 2000). Rhodes (1994) described the erosion of central 
government power due to both privatization and loss of regulatory functions to supranational 
bodies as a “hollowing out of the state”. 
Around the same time, questions emerged on how the shift of authority from nation states to 
international institutions influenced democratic and legitimate decision making. This incited 
debates regarding what standards or rules of action should be set for governance processes of 
multilateral institutions. In the realm of environmental policy, these discussions culminated in 
the adoption of the Aarhus treaty in 1998. This framework spelled out guidelines for 
accountability, transparency, public participation and access to justice in international decision 
making processes (UNECE, 1998). Subsequently, these ideas came to be epitomized through 
the concept of “good governance”, which represented the idea that governance processes within 
and beyond the state should meet certain criteria of transparence, adherence to rule of law, 
efficiency and effectiveness, access to participation and equity, and absence from corruption 
(UNESCAP, 2000).       
These developments had important implications on a theoretical level, as they contributed to a 
reinterpretation of state power and of state-society relations. Conceptions of societal steering 
shifted from a focus of government activities towards ideas about “coordination of social 
systems”, in which public actors collaborate with corporate organization, civil society and 
transnational organizations through partnerships and networks (Pierre, p.3, 2000). The concept 
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of governance came to represent these new processes of steering and conditions of ordered rule 
(Rhodes, 1997). In analyzing the meaning of the term, Stoker (p.17, 1999) defines 
“government” as the formal institutions of the state and its monopoly over coercive power. The 
activities of both government and governance aim towards creating conditions for ordered rule 
and collective action; the outputs of governance are therefore the same of those of government. 
The distinction lies in the new processes through which these outputs are realized (Ibid). 
Since the 1990s, use of the governance concept became ubiquitous, leading to a divergence in 
definitions between different fields of literature. In an overview of governance definitions 
published in 1999, Kooiman finds that most definitions are based on rules or qualities of 
systems, cooperation to enhance legitimacy, as well as processes, arrangements and methods 
of steering (Kooiman, 1999). Kjaer (2004) builds on Kooiman’s findings to identify definitions 
of governance in three fields of political science: public policy, international relations, and 
comparative politics. In the field of public policy, the emphasis is on a plurality of actors 
involved in shaping common goals, blurring boundaries between actors, and self-organizing 
networks (Ibid, p.5). Within the literature on international relations, governance describes how 
organizations respond to problems of a global nature (Ibid, p.5). In the field of comparative 
politics, the concept focuses on the nature of state-society relations of political systems in 
different nations (Ibid, p.6). In all three fields, definitions involve actors and processes outside 
“government” and “the role of networks in the pursuit of common goals” (Ibid, p.4-5). Notably, 
all three fields also underline the nature of relationships between the state and actors from other 
sectors and their efforts to define and realize common objectives.  
As observed in Chapter 1, governance can also be interpreted as a broader concept that 
encompasses all forms of steering, on all levels of society. This conceptualization was 
important in theories of international politics and global governance. Rosenau and Czempiel 
refer to a phenomenon that incorporates informal and formal mechanisms on a micro and macro 
level: “governance is thus a system of rule that is as dependent on intersubjective meanings as 
on formally sanctioned constitutions” (1992, p.4). This is a constructivist view which 
recognizes that agency and power take a range of forms, and that rule systems emerge on both 
a micro and a macro level.  
Empirical observations of development in Europe around the 1990s also contributed to the 
emergence of the concept of network governance. As with the conceptual and empirical shift 
from government to governance, network governance represented a new analytical paradigm 
used to “make sense of the new and emerging reality of pluricentric and interactive governance” 
(Torfing & Sorensen, p. 331, 2014). Once attention was directed to the phenomenon, it was 
found that Northern and Western Europe was “swamped” by governance networks that linked 
together public, private and civil society actors at a local, regional and transnational levels. The 
linkages were used to mobilize actors in different sectors in formulation and implementation of 
policy, spread information, and coordinate action (Ibid).  
Network governance involves interdependent, autonomous actors, who interact through 
negotiations that facilitate self-regulation, and contribute to the production of public purpose 
(Sorensen & Torfing, 2007). A key assumption is that governments are dependent on other 
societal actors for resources and delivery of various activities. Steering of society is expressed 
as “directed influence of social processes”, rather than as direct control of actor’s behavior 
(Kickert et al, p.2, 1997). Network governance is seen as particularly effective in dealing with 
complex, conflict ridden policy problems, as it facilitates collaboration among public and 
private stakeholders. “Wicked problems”, issues that are ill-defined and complex, are thought 
to be especially suited for cross-sector collaboration in problem solving efforts (Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2004). This makes theories of network governance relevant in studies of 
environmental governance in general, and in studies of climate governance in particular.  
Partnerships is one expression of network governance. Partnerships can be seen as a way of 
tackling legitimacy deficits and finding more effective ways to solve social problems and 
sustainability challenges (Pattberg et al, 2012). Partnerships are defined as “collaborative 
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arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and civil 
society) are involved in a non-hierarchical process, and through which these actors strive for a 
sustainability goal” (Glasbergen et al, p. 2, 2007).2  This type of governance strategy can 
contribute to solving sustainability issues that public actors on their own have difficulty to 
address. By drawing on the strengths of actors in different sectors, it is seen as a form of 
governance better suited to dealing with complex, cross-sector challenges, such as complicated 
environmental issues.  
2.1.2 Evolving views on environmental policy  
The shift from government to governance is reflected in studies of environmental policy and 
politics. In these literatures, the shift is expressed as increasing attention towards non-regulatory 
policy tools, voluntary or information based policy strategies, and involvement of the private 
sector and civil society in environmental issues. Meadowcroft (p.481, 2005) articulates this 
change in environmental politics as “new modes of governmental intervention, the role of 
institutions outside government in ordering social relations and the fragmented and 
multilayered character of contemporary authority”. This process of change is described in this 
section.  
In the 1970s, environmental issues were viewed as single problems of environmental 
deterioration. Typical interventions were environmental protection legislation and end-of-pipe 
measures in single sectors. The early literature on environmental policy asked the question of 
what national governments can do to deal with environmental challenges, such as deforestation 
and industrial pollution. Use of either regulation or market instruments was the answer to this 
question. For example, in a review of environmental policy from 1975, economic or regulative 
instruments are the two key alternatives available for policy makers (Oates & Baumol, 1975). 
This is a state-centric approach to environmental policy, in which non-state actors and sub-
national authorities are objects of regulation rather than actors leading change. An observation 
in a review of environmental policy instruments performed in 1976 depicts this dichotomy, and 
the conflict between legislative and economic tools: 
Although the box of policy tools has been significantly enriched by a number of clever techniques 
[e.g. effluent charges] proposed by economists and other policy analysts over the last fifteen years 
or so, legislators and administrators show little interest in the new instruments and continue to rely 
largely on methods (primarily of the regulation/enforcement variety) whose shortcomings have been 
repeatedly pointed out (Majone, p.589, 1976) 
Around the 1980s, a shift occurred towards preference of market based tools, referred to as 
New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPIs) at their time of emergence. These tools 
represent a belief that environmental issues exist because of market failure, which economic 
instruments can solve. They include taxes, subsidies, property rights, tradeable permits (cap-
and-trade/emission permits) and direct financial incentives (e.g. for providers of renewable 
energy). The use of market instruments continued to increase in the early 1990s due to various 
reasons, such as dissatisfaction with the effects of regulation, arguments about economic 
efficiency, and normative views of reduced state interference (Jordan et al, 2003). Another 
reason for their popularity was that these instruments should create flexibility for companies 
and cost effectiveness in addressing environmental concerns (Jeanrenaud, 1997).  
Another environmental policy instrument introduced around the end of the 1980s was 
information tools, which aim to spread knowledge about environmental issues, new 
technologies and practices through education, training and campaigns. Other examples are 
labelling, billing and metering, which are related to market instruments in aiming to affect 
consumer choices. Environmental impact assessments were also introduced as a new instrument 
                                                 
2 This means that collaboration between actors from the same sector do not fall under this collaboration (this 
specification can be made clear by using the term inter-sectoral partnerships) (Huijstee et al, 2007). 
31 
 
that creates a bridge between environmental policy and other policy sectors (e.g. industry and 
land use and infrastructure) (Knoepfel, 1997). 
The increasing complexity of environmental challenges in the 1990s made issues difficult to 
either “regulate away” or delegate to market forces (Dryzek, 1997). There was a sense of 
“crisis” related to the inability of current policy approaches to curb pollution, mobilize 
sufficient resources into environmental protection and address problems of a global nature 
(Dente, 1995). Moreover, the emergence of contested and controversial environmental issues, 
such as genetically modified food, came to portray environmental challenges as fundamentally 
social agendas (Berkhout et al, 2003). This realization uncovered previously unquestioned 
uncertainties regarding facts and knowledge in environmental policy. It pointed to the 
inadequacy of economic and legal instruments to manage “technically defined environmental 
problems” (Ibid, p.6). Further, it demonstrated the need to frame environmental policy agendas 
through social and political processes involving not only bureaucrats and engineers, but also 
NGOs, social groups, and the broader public.  
Around the same time, collaborative, inclusive and deliberative forms of environmental 
governance gained recognition, along with a higher emphasis on process and participation (Arts 
et al, 2006; Backstrand et al, 2010). Concepts introduced into environmental policy included 
collaborative decision making, partnerships, and voluntary agreements (VAs). Process oriented 
approaches became important in environmental policy making, such as focus groups, multi-
criteria mapping, participatory budgeting, public inquiries and policy dialogues, area-based 
environmental policy, community based environmental planning, citizens’ juries, and 
consensus conferences (e.g. Marchi & Ravetz, 2000; Kamieniecki & Kraft, 2012). Around the 
same time, linear approaches to environmental planning and the ability of administrators to 
create effective long-term policy based on forecasting and analysis, were questioned. Non-
linear and open-ended processes for long-term environmental policy design were developed, 
based on interaction, learning, and awareness of risk and uncertainty. These approaches have 
also been described as “reflexive” environmental policy (Voss et al, 2009).  
Policy instruments used specifically to address climate mitigation and adaptation have 
developed and diffused in recent years (Huitema & Jordan, 2014a; Massey et al, 2014). 
Examples include an emission trading system and new financing mechanisms to support 
development of carbon capture and storage (CCS) (Boasson & Wettestad, 2014), new energy 
taxes, feed-in tariffs for eco-plants, green certificates for trading in renewable energy, 
electricity bill labelling, and climate funds (Schaffrin et al, 2014). A survey of climate change 
programs adopted by UN members in between 2007 and 2012 suggested that countries in the 
global South have begun to adopt new climate change policy strategies, with the most rapid 
increase in adoption taking place in Latin America and Asia (Dubash et al, 2013). However, 
evaluation of emerging climate policy points to limited levels of innovativeness and 
effectiveness. Haug et al (2008) observe that most climate policy developed in Europe 
continues to be based on the traditional regulation/market dichotomy, which voluntary 
approaches have been ineffective, and that lack of monitoring is associated with weak 
implementation.  
The development and adoption of climate policy is explored in the literature on policy 
innovation, which evolved out of studies on policy diffusion. One of the earliest studies in this 
area is that of Walker (1969), which observed that US states with similar socioeconomic 
contexts copy each other in adoption of new policy. Walker introduced the concept of “policy 
innovation”, defined as the adoption of policy that is new in any particular constituency 
(Walker, 1969, p.881).3  Recent studies have used these theoretical approaches to analyse 
                                                 
3 There is some controversy related to this conceptualization, as a common understanding of innovation is the 
development of something that is entirely new to the world (e.g. Rogers, 2003). However, by this understanding, 
policy innovation would become so rare that the phenomenon could hardly be studied, and the literature on policy 
innovation thus often adheres to Walker’s concept definition. Other researchers followed this direction of research 
by explaining the diffusion of policy elements between US states (Gray, 1973; Mintrom, 1997; Shipan & Volden, 
2008) and between countries (e.g. Simmons & Elkins, 2004). Sophisticated theories explain how learning, economic 
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climate policy innovation (CPI) (Jordan & Huitema, 2014a; Massey et al, 2014). For example, 
the adoption of climate adaptation policies in Europe has been argued to be attributed to external 
drivers, such as extreme weather events (Massey et al, 2014) and CPI in American states is 
primarily caused by internal factors (Matisoff, 2008; Krause, 2010). In the global south, internal 
drivers such as energy security appear to be strong drivers of adoption of new climate policy 
approaches (Stadelman & Castro, 2014). 
2.1.3 Climate governance: Multi-level responses and multi-actor processes 
Theories of multi-level and transnational governance have a strong traction in studies of 
responses to the climate change challenge. This section explains why this is the case.  
First, greenhouse gases mix equally in the atmosphere, while costs are socialized at the global 
level, and effects are felt at the local level. This makes global climate change the “quintessential 
multiscalar environmental problem” (Andonova et al, p. 2009). Further, greenhouse emission 
activities are embedded in consumption and production activities that cut across policy 
domains, geographical scales and administrative jurisdictions (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). 
Responsibility for climate change is also distributed across groups, sectors, countries and 
generations (Bulkeley et al, 2014). As a result, responses to climate change require multiple 
levels of decision making (local, regional, national and supranational), as well as the 
engagement of actors from both the public sector and from the private sector and civil society 
(Bulkeley & Newell, 2015; Huitema et al, 2016). 
Multi-level governance is a concept often used to explain how climate change governance 
stretches across jurisdictions and government levels (e.g. Bulkeley et al, 2003). According to 
Hooghe and Marks (2001b), multi-level governance is comprised of two related sets of 
processes. The first (Type I) is negotiation of authority and competencies between different 
levels of government. The second (Type II) consists of multiple overlapping and interconnected 
horizontal spheres of authority operating at multiple scales, within multiple jurisdictions. 
Climate change governance often involves both types, as it incorporates informal steering 
strategies dispersed across a variety of actors (Bulkeley & Kern, 2009). This includes parallel 
processes of policy making of international and supranational institutions, national and sub-
national governments, and initiatives brought about by green movements (Andonova et al, 
2009). It also involves public sector dependence on private actors for leadership and policy 
implementation, which creates hybrid governance arrangements and new divisions of roles and 
responsibilities (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). The concept of multilevel governance indicates 
that no single level is dominant in determining policy outcomes (Bulkeley et al, 2003). 
Actor collaboration in climate change strategies not only spans across government levels, but 
also across geographical scales. The conceptualization of global climate change governance 
involves recognition of new forms of spatial hierarchies that move beyond the dichotomy of 
national/international levels, and introduce the possibility to “jump” levels (Stripple & 
Bulkeley, 2014). One expression of this tendency is the way in which city engagement in 
climate action involves strategies to access information and resources and engage in policy 
processes located beyond the territorial bounds of the city (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Bulkeley 
& Betsill, 2005). This includes vertical, intragovernmental interactions, in which struggles for 
competencies and discursive aspects that define urban challenges take place. It also includes 
political struggles carried out in coalitions and institutions that stretch across nested scales and 
involve not only public actors, but also other stakeholders (Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005).  
Transnational governance, or transnational governance networks, is another concept used to 
understand global climate change responses. According to Betsill and Bulkeley (2004), 
transnational networks exist in at least three forms: epistemic communities, transnational 
                                                 
competition and imitation contribute to policy diffusion, while being influenced by, for example, geographical 
proximity or strong leadership (Simmons et al, 2007; Berry & Berry, 2007; Shipan & Volden, 2008). Another part 
of the literature focuses on assessing the probability that a jurisdiction will develop new policy practices, which is 
influenced by factors such as available resources and motivation of policy entrepreneurs (Berry & Berry, 2007).   
33 
 
advocacy coalitions, and global civil society. Epistemic communities are networks of experts 
creating policy discourses around scientific issues on an international level. Transnational 
advocacy networks are made up of policy makers, international NGOs and other actors that 
share information to alter values and debates in which policy is created. Global civil society is 
made up of international green movements clustering around the climate change issue. The 
formation of transnational networks can be explained by actors’ need to access and exchange 
resources, gain recognition, promote interests, and create legitimacy of climate policy options 
through informal international connections (Ibid).  
Transnational municipal networks (TMNs) is a form of transnational network led by city 
authorities. TNMs are made up of autonomous members (cities), cooperating in a non-
hierarchal fashion, and adopting decisions that are implemented by members (Kern & Bulkeley, 
2009). They carry out a number of functions, including information dissemination, project 
funding, benchmarking and certification activities, and seeking to influence other actors (Ibid). 
TMNs are used by cities to promote leadership in technology development, as well as to shape 
discursive aspects of climate policy through norm setting (Toly, 2008). TMNs allow cities to 
participate directly in the formulation of climate policy taking place on a supranational or 
international level by disseminating knowledge, lobbying national governments, facilitating 
implementation, and contributing to policy initiatives (Bulkeley et al, 2003). Transnational 
networks can also be led through a mixture of public, private and civil society actors. These 
range from formal initiatives involving collaboration between states, international 
organizations, businesses and NGOs, to loosely coupled, bottom-up initiatives led by, for 
example, grassroots movements, communities or NGOs (Bulkeley & Newell, 2015).  
2.1.4 Concept definitions: Policy networks, governance modes, and partnerships 
For the purpose of clarity, this section provides definitions of key concepts and relation between 
them: policy networks, governance modes and partnerships. While these concepts are used 
broadly in the governance literature, this thesis uses specific definitions of each concept in order 
to avoid conceptual confusion or overlaps. 
Policy networks 
Network governance is a concept that refers to both formulation and delivery of public policy 
in non-hierarchical, pluralistic settings (Torfing & Sorensen, 2014). As discussed above, this 
concept emerged through observations of the increasingly interactive nature of policy processes 
in the global North, in particular in the European Union. This thesis uses the concept of policy 
networks to refer to interactions involved in policy making processes. Governance networks is 
interpreted as a broader term, which encompasses policy implementation strategies led by non-
state actors and formulation of informal, collective goals. The activities of policy networks, on 
the other hand, always involve public actors (although this involvement may be indirect, for 
example by setting the terms of a policy process), and result in some form of public policy. The 
understanding is derived from the early literature on policy networks, which focuses on the 
nature of state-group interactions in formulating public policy (see section 2.2).  
The understanding of the concept of environmental policy discourse is based on Hajer’s (1995) 
research on policy discourses and advocacy coalitions. Hajer (Ibid, p. 44) defines 
environmental discourse as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities”. Hajer shows how groups of actors adhere to 
specific sets of problem definitions and assumptions, and how these groups use language to 
shape and mobilize certain policy options. In this thesis, analysis of how groups of actors use 
discourses to promote environmental policy agendas is understood as one way to reveal 
dynamics of policy networks. In the section below, the literature on environmental discourses 
and preference formation is presented as part of the policy network literature, as it is understood 
to represent one way of explaining group interactions that are part of policy making processes. 
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However, as is explained below, this perspective highlights other factors than those emphasized 
in the literature on state-group relations.  
Governance modes 
Modes of governance is a concept that captures steering strategies, constellations, interactions, 
and mixtures of participation of private, public or civil society actors in governance processes 
(Treib et al, 2007). The concept has a somewhat different meaning in different studies, but most 
understandings are based on steering constellations or processes, as well as instruments, that 
are used for governing.  
For example, in Kohler-Koch and Eising’s (1999) account of network governance in Europe at 
the end of the 1990s, modes of governance are used to distinguish between ideal type categories 
of state-groups interactions in policy making, such as corporatism and statism. In this account, 
networks are seen as an alternative mode to these ideal types, which can function as an 
extension of the more traditional governance modes. Backstrand et al (2010) links the 
emergence of new modes of environmental governance with a “deliberative turn” in 
environmental politics, and see modes as representing less hierarchical forms of steering that 
may contribute to more inclusive, and effective governance forms. New modes of 
environmental governance are in particular represented through multi-stake participation in 
decision making, networks, and partnerships (Ibid).  
As observed by Huitema et al (2016), a number of “choices” shape climate change governance 
in different political contexts. These choices include: precisely what problems to address, at 
which level to tackle it, when to tackle it, what principles to base interventions on, and which 
governance mode to use. Here, governance mode refers to different instruments, such as 
regulation, market principles, or trust and collaboration, as well as engagement in climate issues 
using a hierarchical approach, bottom-up strategies, or networked arrangements (Ibid). Huitema 
et al (2016) also note that private action is a preferred mode of climate adaptation action, which 
is associated with issues of shared responsibilities between public and private actors. In a review 
of evaluations of climate policy, Haug et al (2008) use a similar understanding of the concept.  
In this thesis, references to governance modes rely on the definition used by Bulkeley and Kern 
(2006), which is developed to capture complex interplays between actors on different levels, 
new power dynamics and institutional arrangements. The four modes identified by the authors 
are closely related to the ideal state types discussed above (in particular authority/hierarchical, 
and enabling/networks), but is different in its recognition of provision and self-governing as 
distinct steering strategies. This framework is discussed in detail in section 2.3.  
(Sustainability) Partnerships 
One expression of networked governance arrangements is partnerships. The concept of 
partnerships became influential after the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) 
in 2002. For institutional organizations, such as the World Bank and the UN, sustainability 
partnerships are conceived as initiatives led by states or international institutions that contribute 
to mobilize resources, transfer technology, build capacity, and share knowledge in the pursuit 
of sustainability (UNDSD, 2015). This conceptualization remains centered on traditional forms 
of government, as it assumes a central role of formal institutions. On the other hand, 
partnerships can be conceived as representing a shift towards less hierarchal modes of solving 
problems where non-state actors contribute to formulation and delivery of public policy 
(Glasbergen et al, 2007).  
The UN conference on the environment in 1992 marked an emphasis on societal deliberation 
that was followed by emergence of cross-sector cooperation in policy making and delivery of 
sustainability goals (Glasbergen, 2007). This was followed by the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002, which explicitly placed partnerships on the sustainability 
agenda as a key implementation tool (Huijstee et al, 2007). Since then, partnerships have come 
to be seen as a mode of sustainability governance that draws on the strengths of actors from the 
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public, private and civil society sector. Sustainability partnerships have been perceived as a 
response to broad development trends – globalization, liberalization and privatization – 
resulting in new institutional arrangements (Huijstee et al, 2007). From this perspective, 
partnerships represent a hybrid governance mode that shifts authority over decision making or 
provision of collective goods to non-state actors.  
This thesis uses Glasbergen’s (2007) definition of sustainability partnerships: “collaborative 
arrangements in which actors from two or more spheres of society (state, market and civil 
society) are involved in a non-hierarchal process through which these actors strive for a 
sustainability goal” (Ibid, p. 2). Partnerships are understood as an enabling governance mode, 
according to Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006) definition. The concept is distinctive from that of 
policy networks, as partnerships can be formed entirely without involvement of public actors, 
and activities of partnerships do not necessarily result in public policy. As a result, partnerships 
have a broader variety of functions that policy networks. Apart from setting formal rules (which 
is not a common function of partnerships), partnerships are also used to implement policy, to 
disseminate information, develop new technology and products, and build capacity. This is 
discussed in detail in section 2.4. 
 
2.2 Policy networks 
This section explains how theories of policy making have conceptualized the influence of 
organized interests over public policy, and the relevance of this influence for environmental 
policy. In the literature on policy networks, this influence is explained in terms of 
interdependent interactions and negotiations. However, negotiations over open conflict is not 
the only way in which different interests influence policy outcomes. This section also discusses 
how more subtle forms of authority over policy options is also exerted over environmental 
policy through contestation over discourses.   
2.2.1 The roots of interaction based policy making  
Below, a brief contextual background to the literature on policy networks is provided. This 
introduction explains the emphasis in policy network studies on bargaining and negotiations 
with organized interest groups, as well as their influence over public actors.  
From linear to chaotic views of policy processes 
Early models of policy processes usually included some version of the steps of setting an 
agenda, specifying policy alternatives, choosing between options, and implementing the 
decision. This is a view associated with Weberian (1946) top-down, linear, state centered 
steering models. Policy making was also perceived as rational and scientific (Easton, 1965). 
Hoppe (1999) refers to Lasswell (1971) as the first standard-bearer of scientific policy making 
and the idea that public policy should follow robust scientific principles.  
However, linear policy models came under criticism as early as 1959, when Lindblom famously 
referred to policy making as the science of “muddling through”. Lindblom saw the “rational” 
model as impossible to use due to complexity, lack of time, resources, and limited information 
of bureaucrats. Policy makers often instead decide that a policy approach is appropriate based 
on the feeling that it is normal, or “good” (p.81, 1959). Further, implementation always affects 
policy in some way, which means it cannot and should not be separated from policy making 
(Lindblom, 1980).  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s many other researchers pointed to aspects of policy making 
and implementation that defy the idea of a linear process of events. Pressman and Wildavsky’s 
(1984) Implementation: How Great Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland shows 
how policy in the United States seldom is implemented as decision makers intended and that 
the design of policy cannot be separated from implementation. Bureaucrats and administrators 
resist policy goals and seek resources for self-invented policy directions (Bardach, 1977). 
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Through professional knowledge and long duration in the same position, administrations have 
substantial opportunity to influence policy making (Lipsky, 1980). Bureaucrats act as “policy 
entrepreneurs” with ability to take policy development in their own directions, independent of 
the political leadership (Kingdon, 1984). Policy making has thus come to be seen as a chaotic 
process influenced by various actors where the distinction between policy making and 
implementation is artificial.  
State-group interactions 
Interest group studies, the first body of literature directly focusing on state-group interactions 
in policy making, took off around the 1920s, flourished around the 1930s-40s and returned as 
a third wave of research around the 1970s (Almond, 1983). These studies are the precursors of 
policy network literature, and are based on similar assumptions about bargaining and structures 
of power. 
Two dominant theoretical models were corporatism and pluralism. Corporatism is understood 
as systems in which organized interest groups are given mandate by the state to hold a 
monopoly position over negotiation with public actors. One of the most well-known definitions 
of corporatism is attributable to Schmitter (1979), who viewed these as based on compulsory, 
non-competitive participation of organizations with a monopoly on state interaction. Studies of 
corporatist systems aimed to find how state-group interactions respond to changes in the 
socioeconomic and political environment and produce policy strategies to cope with these (e.g. 
Katzenstein, 1985; Stewart, 1992).  
In pluralist systems, social organizations are allowed to compete on a (supposed) equal basis 
for influence. The theoretical concept was developed at a time when free participation and 
multiple sources of information in policy making was seen as a preferable alternative to 
totalitarianism, and interest groups were seen as an intermediary between states and citizens. 
The pluralist model often proved difficult to apply in reality, in part because the assumption of 
competition based on an equal distribution of power was not met. Studies of public-interest 
group interactions in the United States showed that congressional sub-committees, interest 
associations and government bureaus often had mutually supportive relationships and that most 
decisions took place within this closed group, or “iron triangle”. Rather than being 
characterized by open competition, iron triangles display difficulty of access, limited or no 
negotiations and conflict, and rigidity over time (Ripley & Franklin, 1984).  
Similarly, decision making processes in the UK were shown to be based on interaction between 
departments and “clients” (Richardson & Jordan, 1982; Richardson & Jordan, 1983). Rather 
than being characterized by free competition, decision makers had a set of “go-to” interest 
groups – a phenomenon described as sectorization or clientilism. Departments fought for issues 
in alignment with clients against the rest of the “government machine”, and some interest 
groups were powerful enough to veto policy options (Richardson & Jordan, p.257, 1983). 
Decision makers avoided radical, innovative policy options and aimed at seeking consensus, 
making it difficult to bring about reform (Ibid, p. 265). All these observation made the pluralist 
model an inappropriate explanatory tool for decision making processes.  
2.2.2 Policy network theory 
An alternative to seeing policy making as taking place through negotiations between public 
actors and a set number of interest groups is to view decision making as taking place in 
networks. This section presents the key components of the policy network literature, as well as 
its relation with environmental decision making in cities.  
The literature on policy networks developed out of studies of the British political system, in 
parallel to theories of governance that emerged around the same time. Rhodes and Marsh (1992, 
p.198) trace the origin of policy network theory to the literature on sub-governments, which 
highlights power imbalances such as elitist interactions in iron triangles. The literature on policy 
networks sees public actors working through networks to steer society, looking specifically at 
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how policy is shaped through these. The concept of “networks” thus incorporates essentially 
all state-interest group relations and interactions involved in policy making.  
The policy network literature grew out of the observation that rather than being shaped by 
political leaders or in parliament, policy grows out of continuous interaction between civil 
servants, committees, working groups, professionals and experts (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992). 
These actors and groups exist in all policy fields, from agriculture, environment and health 
issues to national security and economic policy (Ibid). Policy networks are made up of “sets of 
formal and informal institutional linkages between governmental and other actors” that are 
structured around shared interests (Rhodes, p.1246, 2007).  
The idea of policy making taking place in networks is related to a number of concepts. One 
important term is the notion of “issue networks”, which is based on observations of the 
American political system after the 1950s (Heclo, 1978). Issue networks consist of “masses of 
intermediary, issues-conscious groups” (Ibid, p.268), activities of local and sub-local 
government, private and semi-private organizations and their involvement in shaping policy 
debates. Issue networks are characterized by open access, a variety of societal actors, lack of 
central authority, and difficulties in reaching consensus. The concept points to the way in which 
policy issues are shaped by groups and debates that occur outside closed systems of power, 
such as iron triangles.  
Another key concept in the policy network literature is “policy communities”, which can be 
traced back to Richardson and Jordan (1979). Observations of policy making in the UK showed 
that decision making is carried out by interest groups that are closed off to the general public, 
which is characterized by fragmentation and interpersonal connections rather than formal 
structures (Richardson & Jordan, 1985). The concept of policy communities refers to sub-
groups consisting of public actors and interest groups which share problem definitions and 
values. Conflicts that play out within these communities determine the direction of policy 
development.  
A third key concept is “advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier, 1988). Advocacy coalitions are made 
up of coalitions of actors that adhere to a similar set of beliefs regarding a policy issue. Within 
an advocacy coalition, sets of values and assumptions are associated with certain policy options 
and these only change slowly over time. Policy coalitions may form either through bargaining 
or because of converging interests, and the influence of professional groups, or “epistemic 
communities”, plays a central role in these (Haas, 1990).  
Typologies and characteristics of policy networks 
Sophisticated systems of classification and categorization have been developed to understand 
structures, dynamics and outcomes of policy networks (Jordan, 1981; Atkinson & Coleman, 
1989; Knoke, 1990; Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Jordan & Schubert, 1992; van Waarden, 1992; 
Knoke, 1996). One of the first systems focused on state capacity and degree of mobilization of 
interest groups to differentiate between different types of policy networks (Atkinson & 
Coleman, 1989). These two aspects were chosen to understand differences between reactive 
and anticipatory industrial policy, as well as their relationship with policy failure.  
Subsequent typologies of policy networks have included structural characteristics, functions of 
network linkages and aspects such as conflict and balance of power. For example, Rhodes and 
Marsh (1992) created a system of classification based on number of participants, type of policy 
interest (professional/broader range), frequency of interaction, consensus/ conflict, and 
distribution of power and resources. This typology illustrates the difference between a policy 
community and an issue network, where the former is characterized by a smaller number of 
participants, narrower policy topics, consensus among members, hierarchies, and balance of 
power. Rather than seeing this as an all embracing typology (for example it was developed to 
fit the context of the UK), this points to the need to recognize the variety of inclusion and 
interaction in policy processes.  
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In a similar typology, Jordan and Schubert (p.12, 1992) point to three criteria that describe 
policy making interactions: degree of institutionalization or stability; scope of policy making 
(sectoral/trans-sectoral), and number of participants. At the same time, the authors argue that 
there are only two basic types of relationship between interest groups and the state that are of 
key relevance: competition or cooperation. Another ambitious model includes as much as seven 
dimensions: actors, function, structure, institutionalization, rules of conduct, power relations, 
and actor strategies (van Waarden, 1992). The most basic dimensions refer to the number and 
type of actors participating in policy making processes, commonly interest groups, professional 
associations and public actors. Function refers to the way in which state-group linkages are 
used, for example to channel information or exchange resources. Structure refers to size of the 
network, degree of centrality, intensity or interaction, clustering, and so on. The seven 
dimensions are used to categorize existing forms of policy networks (e.g. clientilism, pluralism, 
iron triangles). In recognition of the complexity of this model, three dimensions are pointed out 
as particularly important: number and type of actors, function of linkages and balance of power 
(Ibid, p.49).  
Issues of power and legitimacy 
The use of typologies to describe and understand network structures and functions has not 
convinced all scholars. It has been observed that the concept of policy networks originally 
evolved as a metaphor, and as such, is descriptive but not particularly useful to understand 
policy making processes or outcomes (Dowding, 1995). It has instead been argued that 
differences in policy outcome lies not in structural characteristics but in coalition and 
bargaining possibilities, power balance and resources, which condition ability to overrule 
interest groups. Analysis of network interactions should therefore be based in analysis of power 
resources (Ibid, p. 146). 
Access to resources and power is a central theme in the policy network literature. According to 
studies in the UK, policy networks are created because actors in different sectors need to access 
resources, such as money, information and legitimacy. Semi-institutionalization of linkages 
occurs in order to regularize interactions and avoid conflict (Smith, 1997). Key characteristics 
of decision making in policy networks is bargaining, resource interdependence, and continuing, 
game like interaction (Rhodes, p.43-46, 1996). Negotiations in networks are thought to be based 
on exchange of authority on part of the government, and views of “legitimate spokespeople” 
from those in charge of service delivery. Power dependence is key to understanding network 
dynamics (Marsh & Rhodes, p.1245, 1992). Economic position and knowledge are identified 
as two resources that create access and influence in policy networks, that is, resources often 
held by producer groups and professionals with whom public actors frequently develop 
common interests (Rhodes & Marsh, p.199, 1992).  
The idea that decision making processes are based on resources and power relations is not 
unproblematic. On the one hand, non-state actor participation in policy making is seen as 
normatively positive from a democratic perspective. This argument is made in relation to 
inclusive, participatory, or deliberative policy making processes. The principle of deliberative 
policy making derives from Habermas’ idea of deliberative democracy.4 The basic idea is as 
old as the concept of democracy itself, but experienced an upswing in Europe around the 1990s 
(Elster, 1998). Public participation in decision making can, according to such theory, increase 
the level of democracy and effectiveness of decision making in several ways, including 
openness and access (input criteria), deliberation (process), efficiency and effectiveness 
(output), and transparency (Papadopoulos & Warin, 2007). Public participation in 
environmental decision making can make “experts” more responsive to the public, make the 
public more environmentally “aware”, anticipate and manage conflict and distribution of public 
                                                 
4 Deliberative democracy has been defined as “collective decision making with the participation of all who will be 
affected by the decision or their representatives”, characterized by rational and impartial debate (Elster, p.8, 1998). 
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“bads”, and make policy more implementable (Ibid). Participatory environmental planning can 
also be better at addressing issues of equality and justice (Chu et al, 2015). 
The debates on deliberative and participatory environmental governance make up a vast 
academic literature, the details of which are beyond the scope of this thesis. In short, it can be 
commented that there are problems associated with public participation in environmental policy 
making. For example, it is not clear how models of deliberation are to fit alongside existing 
institutions, in what way they will be more effective and democratic, and how manipulative and 
discursive power is handled in deliberative contexts (Hajer & Kesselring, 1999; Owens, 2000). 
It has also been shown that even in environmental policy settings where deliberative or 
participatory approaches have been used explicitly, issues of contestation and power are evident 
(Holmes & Scoones, 2001). Further, a key problem is that most policy processes in network 
settings aim to include stakeholders and organized interests, rather than ordinary citizens 
(Andersen & Burns, 1996). 
The fundamental legitimacy issue of policy networks is that they shift decision making 
authority from democratic institutions and elected governments to administrators, professionals 
and experts, which raises questions relating to equity, accountability, and democratic legitimacy 
(Bogason & Musso, 2006). Actors that are included in decision making processes are likely to 
be groups with access to resources, sub-elites that can impose their own norms on the policy 
process (Ibid, p.8). Voters and parties are absent from the scene, whereas stakeholders, local 
politicians, planners and public employees suddenly take on roles of influence. Rhodes and 
Marsh (p.200, 1992) refer to Lowi in describing the impact of institutionalized interest group 
politics: “policy networks destroy political responsibility by shutting out the public; create 
privileged oligarchies; and are conservative in their impact because, for example, the rules of 
the game and access favor established interests”. As stated by Rhodes & Marsh (p.200, 1992), 
“the legitimacy of networks is not political but resides in the claims to superior expertise and/or 
to increased effectiveness of service provision”. 
In particular, the private sector plays an active role in policy networks on a global, national or 
sub-national level, and enjoys material, organizational and discursive power over these. 
Companies often have strategic resources to affect agenda setting, policy formulation and 
implementation. Coen (p. 198, 2005) has referred to Europe’s bargaining system as “elite 
pluralism” to describe the extensive influence that the private sector has over environmental 
decision making processes. The process through which non-state actors, in particular private 
organizations, have gained influence over policy making processes has also been referred to as 
“privatization of environmental governance” (Cashore, 2002). A critical political economy 
perspective suggests that political elites are influenced by interests in key economic sectors 
(Levy & Newell, 2005; Newell, 2008). Further, coalitions between political and economic elites 
actively influence policy in directions that protect high-carbon systems (Geels, 2014). 
Local decision making through policy networks 
On a municipal level, policy making and planning negotiations in networks occur outside the 
formal arrangements considered necessary for accomplishing democratic processes (Aars & 
Fimreite, p.240, 2005). In informal policy networks, participants tend to be self-selected, while 
participation often is exclusive and closed off to the general public. When policy with major 
social implications are worked out through such arrangements, “lines of accountability are 
stretched” (Ibid, p.241). A local decision making network must meet certain criteria to be 
assessed according to principles of accountability, such as publicity, transparency, and 
participation of popularly elected leaders or the network in some other way being granted 
authority by an elected leadership (Ibid, p.245). Case studies on a municipal level show that 
even in networks created by public actors, such conditions are not met and accountability is 
questionable. Even if urban planning networks are built around existing political organizations, 
the networks withdraw authority from democratic institutions. Further, politically strong or 
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resourceful actors tended to be included, potentially at a disadvantage to public actors and 
interests with weaker representation (Ibid; Sorensen, 2006).  
In informal municipal policy networks where interests are competing on the basis of power 
rather than formal mechanisms of representation, outcomes are likely to favour certain 
stakeholders. Environmental decision making in such settings has a high risk of being marked 
by the influence of urban elites (Khan, 2013). Distribution of power in an informal policy 
making network is likely to reflect deeper distributions of power in society, which is often based 
on imbalances (Ibid). The choice of selection of participants is usually not based on a 
democratic process, but a perspective of what needs to be considered to reach consensus and 
for outcomes to be implementable. The interdependence of actors in networks and the search 
to reach consensus makes this form of policy making less able to seek out radical options, and 
more likely to protect status quo. This makes it more difficult to generate socio-environmental 
change required, for example, for low carbon development (Ibid).  
The key implication of these theoretical observations is that inclusion of stakeholders in local 
policy processes with a bearing on the environment may influence decisions in favour of the 
interest of certain groups. Structure of power, the nature of conflicts, and interdependence of 
actors are important aspects to consider when trying to understand how policy making 
interactions influence decision making outcomes.  
2.2.3 Environmental policy discourse  
The view of conflicts of interest and negotiation in policy networks is based on an idea of 
openly competing, defined priorities. This is based on the assumption that actors have 
predefined interests which are negotiated based on relative positions of power. Another way to 
think about decision making processes is to consider the influences that shape the framing of 
policy problems. This section shows that power struggles also play out through contestation 
over construction of meaning and that mobilized interests affect environmental policy through 
problem formulations (Hajer, 1995; Dryzek, 1997).  
Many policy debates focus on “what tools are there to attack better these problems” rather than 
considering whether policy questions have been correctly framed in the first place (Keeley & 
Scoones, p.3, 1999). An alternative approach to understanding policy processes is to assume 
that preferences are not fixed and that problem framing is a matter of debate. The literature of 
preference formation and policy discourse uses such an approach by assuming that structures 
of power are related to language use.   
The theoretical foundation of the preference formation literature is social constructivist ideas 
about the construction of meaning. Language can be understood as a neutral medium that 
transfers knowledge between humans in a non-additive fashion. Most positivist research is 
based on this understanding (Wetherell, 2001). The understanding that underpins social 
constructivist literature is that discourses create reality in terms of shaping conventions and 
institutions (Ibid). Social constructions were introduced as a concept by Berger and Luckmann 
in 1966 with the publication of The Social Construction of Reality, in which the authors argue 
that individual conceptions over time are cemented into identities, which eventually translate 
into societal structures (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). It has similarly been argued that problems 
are socially constructed through definitional “claims making” activities (Spector & Kitsuse, 
1977). These activities define the reality of problems, which conditions the nature of available 
solutions. 
A common operationalization of power is based on identifying the prevailing side in a conflict 
related to decision making. A well-known definition is based on the idea that A has power over 
B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do (Dah, 1957). In 
1974, Lukes noted that actors might not know what their real interests are, as someone more 
powerful might be manipulating their preferences. Lukes suggested that actor A may be able to 
affect actor B by shaping preferences so that B cannot see alternatives in his/her interest. B’s 
interests have been black boxed, whereas A’s options are viewed as natural and unchangeable. 
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This definition of power is relevant to policy making processes, where power can be understood 
as ability to articulate problems in a way that makes certain narratives dominant and other issues 
sidelined (Marston, p.vi, 2004). Collective sense making can be understood as a struggle where 
different societal actors and groups aim to shape narratives to their own advantage (Hajer, 
1995). 
The “mobilization” of a discourse is key to making a policy option legitimate and normalized, 
which at the same time creates influence for certain groups of actors: 
By seeing policy as discourse, analytical attention is turned to the webs of power underlying the 
practices of different actors in the policy process, as well as the discursive and non-discursive 
practices which are invested in policy negotiation and contestation. Thus linguistic and textual 
styles, classificatory systems and particular discursive formations can be seen to empower some 
and silence others (Keeley & Scoones, p.5, 1999) 
Discourses are important in environmental policy. This is, firstly, because environmental issues 
tend not to be self-evident. They reflect socio-cultural preoccupations, are characterized by 
complexity, and draw on multiple areas of knowledge (Hajer, 1995; Feindt & Oels, 2006). For 
this reason, environmental problems are socially constructed and represented with symbols, 
narratives, storylines and emblems. Secondly, changes in policy language conditions the 
approach towards problems and available solutions, and dominant discourses tend to become 
intertwined with practices and capacities that shape planning directions (Marston, 2004; Feindt 
& Oels, 2006). The preference formation literature shows that changes in belief systems is a 
primary force behind environmental policy change, rather than rational debates or sector-based 
power struggles. Belief systems are made up of sets of unchallenged core beliefs and associated 
policies believed to best protect these (Munro, 1993). Belief systems change only slowly and 
over time, as a result of changes in the external environment, for example deterioration of the 
natural environment. Groups with different interests negotiate options by adhering to these core 
beliefs in the mid to short term.  
Environmental policy narratives are often related to “scientific” debates. These tend to occupy 
a major role in defining and neutralizing policy options, relying on the aid of metaphors and 
narratives that carry scientific authority (Keeley & Scoones, 1999). At the same time, 
perceptions of environmental issues are not developed through neutral processes, but grow out 
of struggles between coalitions that involve political authorities, science communities, 
businesses, media, and environmental organizations (Fischer & Forester, 1993; Hajer, 1995; 
Fischer, 2006; Allan & Hadden, 2017). In environmental policy, experts are often expected to 
identify “facts” that guide the policy process, and tackle problems with correct information, 
efficiency, “neutrality” and “objectivity” (Keeley & Scoones, p. 7, 1999). Networks of experts 
attach authority to knowledge, which in turn conditions policy making and make epistemic 
communities able to present environmental discourses as scientific fact (Litfin, 1994).  
Policy responses to climate change are similarly shaped by knowledge and technology, where 
expert networks and scientific advice play a central role (Miller & Edwards, p.5, 2001). For 
example, in research on global climate change, modelling is used as basis of international policy 
dialogues where scientists and policy makers are engaged in mutual construction of knowledge 
(Shackley & Wynne, 1995). Construction of information is subject to negotiations that go in 
both directions, where scientists directly affect which data will be collected and thereby what 
information is available to policymakers (Ibid). At the same time, recent public debates on 
climate change are reconfiguring these positions. Increasing politicization of climate change 
issues and public scrutiny on scientific “facts” places pressure on the self-evident authority of 
scientific arguments, calling for a need to question the boundaries between science and society 
(Berkhout, 2010).  
The extent to which scientific experts are able to exert direct authority over political decision 
makers is debated. Haas (2004) argues that there are specific conditions under which 
representatives of scientific communities can “speak truth to power”. Experts must, first of all, 
provide “usable knowledge” – knowledge with credibility, legitimacy and political saliency. 
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Further, an epistemic community should produce knowledge in isolation, to make sure that 
scientific fact is not “tainted” by political processes. In these situations, “epistemic 
communities are the transmission belts by which new knowledge is developed and transmitted 
to decision-makers” (Ibid, p.587). Contrary to this observation, Juntte et al (2009) observe that 
scientific “evidence” is not powerful per se, but only when mobilized by powerful institutions 
or constellations of actors. For example, administrative factions make use of new scientific 
findings to defend pre-defined positions, or claims of uncertainty can be used to justify 
technocratic interventions on behalf of particular interests. Juntte et al (Ibid, p.211) state that 
“in order to understand the notion of power, and its role in the policy-evidence relationship, it 
should be understood as vested in interaction between certain actors and enacted, rather than 
allocated a priori”. It has also been observed that decision makers draw on knowledge in 
different ways when creating environmental policy (Dunlop, 2014). This includes instrumental 
use, where expert knowledge is used in a direct fashion to inform policy decisions. It includes 
reliance on knowledge to inform conceptual debates, which shapes the policy environment and 
conditions available options. Further, knowledge can be used politically or symbolically, to 
legitimate pre-determined policy preferences. Dunlop (Ibid) observes that the first of these 
forms is most common in policy fields characterized by uncertainty, where epistemic 
communities play a particularly important role. 
The concept of authoritative expertise is widely applicable to groups that exercise influence 
over policy making through their claim to knowledge - this goes beyond a narrow 
understanding of scientists that are active as policy advisors (Cross, 2013). In a globalized 
world, epistemic communities exercise considerable authority over not only public actors, but 
also non-state actors (such as transnational networks and multinational corporations) that are 
part of dominant science-policy configurations. Cross (Ibid) observes that epistemic 
communities are a major vehicle through which knowledge translates to power. Cross also 
identifies circumstances, observed in the literature, in which authority based on knowledge is 
likely to be especially persuasive. This includes political contexts of high uncertainty and 
limited knowledge, settings where experts have direct access to decision makers, involvement 
in technical decision making (rather than shaping political beliefs), issues involving natural 
systems, and policy objectives in alignment with existing goals. Further, it is important to 
notice that these groups are most effective when working in synergy with government actors; 
part of the epistemic community may even exist inside government authorities.  
Gough and Shackley (2001) similarly demonstrate that green NGOs that are part of epistemic 
communities exercise authority over international environmental policy. This is realized 
through at least three strategies involving formulation of problems and solutions: by suggesting 
novel policy strategies (often an avenue preferred by think-tanks and NGOs with a research 
profile), contributing to knowledge building (often done in cooperation with purely academic 
organizations), and campaigning (usually chosen by traditional green movements). The success 
of such strategies hinges on the way in which NGOs are able to become part of epistemic 
communities clustered around international climate policy, such as the IPCC. Gough and 
Shackley (Ibid) observe that some of these green movements have reframed their agendas from 
overtly ethical or social framings, towards approaches more compatible with science-technical 
framings (“respectable politics”), which lend them greater leverage over policy framing 
processes. 
This thesis addresses how professional organizations or NGOs are able to exercise influence 
over rule-setting activities, as well as local policy and project design, by drawing on epistemic 
authority. Haas (2017) proposes that the concept of “epistemic authority” captures why 
organizations (such as states) attach legitimacy to environmental solutions proposed by experts. 
Haas (Ibid, p.1) draws on Weber’s conceptualization of rational-legal power to argue that 
scientific advisors enjoy a form of authority that rests on perceived legitimacy of expertise, 
impartiality, and reason. Taking this thought further, Alasuutari and Qadir (2013) suggest that 
the concept of “epistemic governance” describes societal steering in most modern societies. 
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Drawing on theories of framing and Foucauldian notions of governmentality, they explain how 
political processes regularly involve invoking knowledge and sources of expertise (“facts”), or 
shared norms as fundamental parts of building policy agendas. Epistemic communities can 
build authority and reinforce their own claims to knowledge by repeatedly presenting similar 
diagnoses and explanations for policy related phenomena. Not only are organizations 
representing scientific understanding of a policy issue placed in authoritative positions, but 
once a paradigmatic understanding of reality is created, it becomes very difficult for other 
groups or actors to propose policy directions that criticize these widely-embraced 
interpretations. This also allows widely accepted norms with a positive association (such as 
“sustainability”) to become labels that can be used to justify any political agenda by appealing 
to paradigmatic understanding of what is “good”. The authors propose that this 
conceptualization of power and steering provide a new layer of understanding to contemporary 
governance processes. This perspective can also be used to throw further light on network 
governance arrangements in relation to climate issues in China. 
 
2.3 Urban climate governance 
This section discusses the role of municipal authorities in climate mitigation policy and action. 
The section departs from the point of view of cities as sub-national unit with a main function 
of implementing central government policy. This is followed by an overview of incentives and 
barriers that municipalities face when attempting to address climate change. Finally, the 
concept of urban governance modes is introduced, along with a discussion of different strategies 
that cities employ in seeking to respond to the climate change challenge. 
2.3.1 Cities as implementers or policy makers? 
According to traditional views of political systems, sub-government units are part of a 
“cascade” model, in which national governments pass on goals and targets for local 
implementation. Municipal authorities carry the responsibility of realizing national policy goals 
and generating social support for these initiatives at a local level.  
This traditional view of governance remains relevant, as various types of regulations and policy 
related to energy use and emission reductions are determined by national governments. This 
includes overall policy frameworks and legislation, energy pricing and taxation, policy and 
standards for energy efficiency and renewable energy, and R&D support frameworks (Colliers, 
1997). On the other hand, the cascade model has been criticized for making invisible how local 
governments adopt their own initiatives and take a lead in climate action (Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2003). Municipal authorities often generate and apply new climate policy approaches, which 
can diffuse to other locations (Schreurs, 2008). It has been demonstrated that climate policy 
and legislation is created through bottom-up processes through which practices become norms, 
and norms eventually are embedded in laws; a process described as lawmaking from “below” 
(Osofsky & Levit, 2007). The first emission reduction target to be adopted by a government 
entity was that of the city of Toronto, which a few years later was followed by thirty other cities 
(Patton, 2007). Municipal leadership in climate policy development is of particular importance 
where national or federal governments fail to shoulder this responsibility. Developing policy 
on a local level can also be a way to by-step complicated policy making processes on a national 
level and possibly realize more rapid implementation (Linsroth & Bell, 2007).  
Nevertheless, Huitema et al (2016, p.13) observe that climate issues sometimes are “placed in 
the lap” of local governments, even when their capacity to address these issues are limited. This 
points to the continued need for national or federal governments to guide regulation and support 
diffusion of successful initiatives. 
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2.3.2 Drivers and barriers of urban climate action 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are various barriers for municipal authorities to adopt climate 
change agendas. This section presents some of these obstacles, as well as the motivation for 
municipalities to engage in climate agendas.  
Climate change tends to be seen as a global, rather than a local issue. Municipalities may feel 
that the issue does not fall under their jurisdiction (“not on my turf”) or that the time frame for 
addressing the issue extends beyond their mandate (“not in my term”) (Bai et al, 2009). Such 
attitudes can lock municipal authorities into inaction while more pressing local problems are 
dealt with. A number of institutional aspects may also act as barriers to climate action, such as 
lack of human resources, technical capacity or funding (Betsill, 2001). Other institutional 
aspects include inefficiency of bureaucratic procedures, policy clashes with higher levels of 
government and aversion towards radical policy options (Burch, 2010). Climate change tends 
to be seen as a marginal policy issue, and political will to adopt radical climate change programs 
can be limited (Collier & Lofstedt, 1997). Climate change issues usually fall under the 
jurisdiction of environmental departments, which tend to have a weaker influence over 
development policy than, for example, departments in charge of economic and industrial issues 
(Kern & Alber, 2008). Many cities have failed to form specific units to manage climate change 
and to adopt systematic emission reduction plans, and instead pursue projects on an ad-hoc 
basis (Ibid). Intragovernmental interactions may be characterized by conflicting priorities, lack 
of support from higher levels of government, slow progress, ineffective communication 
channels, limited information sharing, and unevenly distributed skills (Leck & Simon, 2013). 
Well-resourced larger urban regions tend to have better capacity and connections to pursue 
climate agendas, which is not effectively shared through horizontal or vertical linkages (Ibid).  
Another crucial barrier is the perceived need for urban growth and the way in which emission 
reduction is seen as hampering economic development. Framing climate strategies from the 
perspective of generation of co-benefits is a way to localize the climate change issue and at the 
same time justify public spending to the public. “Issue bundling” is a strategic way to link 
climate policy with other local agendas, such as air pollution, waste management, transport 
development or infrastructure improvement, as well as aims of improving quality of life and 
“livability” (Betsill, 2001; Bai, 2007b). Local concerns function as “hooks” used to legitimize 
climate agendas (Betsill, 2001). It has also been noted that certain policy combination can create 
win-win outcomes, even when independent policy options on their own may not seem desirable 
(Viguie & Hallegatte, 2012).  
A common co-benefit of climate action is generation of cost savings, which tends to be seen as 
“good business” (Kousky & Schneider, 2003). Energy saving is a critical motivation and 
interventions related to energy efficiency (especially in buildings) have been among the most 
common climate action strategies (Kern & Alber, 2008). Cities that have realized emission 
reduction through their participation in ICLEIs climate programs have often realized savings 
on energy fuel costs (Betsill, 2001; Kousky & Schneider, 2003). Somewhat surprisingly, 
municipal authorities tend to be more concerned with framing climate agendas as agendas with 
co-benefits, rather than to actually measure and assess these outcomes (Kousky & Schneider, 
2003). This highlights the importance of framing climate change as a local issue in order to 
engage municipal leaderships (Lindseth, 2004). 
One motivation for city leadership is the wish to “lead by example”, which can be connected 
with personal interests or priorities of specific individuals in local government (Collier & 
Lofstedt, 1997; Betsill, 2001; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Gustavsson et al, 2009; Bulekely & 
Betsill, 2013). A “race to the top” describes a trend where municipalities aim to be seen as 
leading in sustainability policy (Schreurs, 2008). “Policy entrepreneurship” was identified as 
an important factor behind placing climate issues on municipal agendas in pioneering cities. 
However, in order for urban climate agendas to become institutionalized and last beyond 
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individual mandate periods, institutionalization and a broader engagement within the political 
system is required (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).  
2.3.3 Modes of urban climate governance  
This section lays outs the theoretical framework that is used to study urban climate governance 
modes in China. Bulkeley and Kern (2006) have identified four modes of urban governance 
used by city governments, which includes both traditional and new governance approaches. 
Bulkeley and Kern (Ibid) argue that the focus on modes of governance shifts the focus from 
formal roles of authorities to the multiple forms of action possible on a city level. The sections 
below present and discuss these four modes of urban climate governance, beginning with 
traditional governance through authority.  
Governing through authority 
Governing through authority means that municipal actors adopt binding plans and regulations 
to influence urban energy use and emission of greenhouse gases. This includes ordinances, 
targets, and standards (e.g. for adoption of renewables or fuel standards), procurement policy 
(e.g. green electricity), local carbon taxes, congestion charges, limits on car use, and strategic 
planning or zoning (e.g. for renewable energy or public transport) (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; 
Kern & Alber, 2008). 
The extent to which municipal governments can adopt binding plans and regulations is 
dependent on the degree of autonomy granted to them by the national government. Generally 
speaking, local governments often exercise influence over land use planning, transport planning 
and services and energy infrastructure, but competencies vary between countries (Colliers, 
1997). For example, in Sweden, municipalities traditionally have a large influence over 
planning and a long history of urban energy management (Collier & Lofstedt, 1997). 
Governments of states in Germany similarly have a relatively high degree of autonomy and a 
broad range of responsibilities, whereas municipal governments in the UK traditionally have 
relatively limited autonomy (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).  
Bulkeley and Kern (Ibid) suggest that that use of regulation to support climate action cities in 
Europe is infrequent. They attribute this tendency to the difficulty to reach political consensus 
on “hard” decisions, concerns regarding public opinion, and that regulation may conflict high 
higher level regulation; “softer” forms of governing are therefore often preferred. Contrary to 
this observation, a review of policy evaluations of climate policy in 2008 demonstrated a 
preference for regulative approaches in Europe (Haug et al, 2008). This was explained in terms 
of perceived difficulties in adopting financial instruments and ineffectiveness of voluntary 
agreements (Ibid).   
Climate action through self-governing 
Self-governing is defined as the capacity of a municipal government to govern its own activities 
(Bulkeley & Kern, p.2242, 2006). Self-governing is in many countries in Europe and the US 
the most common mode of urban climate governance (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Kern & Alber, 
2008). This can be explained by municipal governments having the greatest freedom to control 
its own activities, which does not require coordination or compliance of other actors. Many 
municipalities begin their climate action by looking at the public sector and considering how 
emissions can be reduced by altering day to day activities, such as switching to LED lighting 
in public buildings (Betsill, 2001).  
Common strategies of self-governing include energy conservation in public buildings, 
demonstration projects or procurement of renewable energy and green fleets for public 
employees (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2008). Self-regulation can be a way for 
municipal governments to demonstrate cost savings or feasibility of energy saving and emission 
reduction action to other actors. There are many examples of cities in which self-governing has 
contributed to considerable reduction of emissions, for example through improved energy 
efficiency in buildings, which at the same time contributes cost savings in municipal budgets 
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(Kern & Alber, 2008). At the same time, public sector energy consumption only accounts for a 
limited share of total energy consumption in most cities, so this type of strategy is on its own 
not enough to drastically reduce emissions (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).  
Climate governance through provision  
Governing through provision refers to “the shaping of practice through the delivery of particular 
forms of service and resources” (Bulkeley & Kern, p.2242, 2006). This involves providing low 
emission and low energy consumption solutions as part of public service. As with adopting 
policy and regulation, the extent to which municipalities can provide infrastructure and services 
is determined by their autonomy. Investments in public services are relatively straightforward 
if a municipality has ownership in local utility companies. Municipal authorities in charge of 
provision of energy systems (heat, gas and power) and waste services can combine these 
systems to gain more efficient solutions through, for example, combination of waste 
incineration and district heating schemes. Common provision strategies includes provision of 
clean energy services, green public transport and waste services (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Kern 
& Alber, 2008).  
A problem related to provision of urban infrastructure is that decisions regarding large projects 
often need to be approved by higher levels of government. The form and extent of collaboration 
as well as extent and type of funding that can be granted to cities from regional and central 
governments makes considerable difference to the possibility to adopt local strategies. Again, 
this is related to the problem of “fit”, and the question regarding which level of government 
decisions are most appropriate (Bai et al, 2009). Further, collaborative relationships between 
different levels of government are crucial in ensuring effective implementation and preventing 
uncoordinated or mismatched action of infrastructure planning. This requires genuine 
collaboration and cooperation which unfortunately may be difficult to realize in practice (Leck 
and Simon, 2013).  
Public investment into emission reduction infrastructure is particularly difficult to realize in 
developing countries. Municipal governments in developing countries often lack financial or 
technical resources or autonomy to invest in large scale solutions such as energy infrastructure 
(Holgate, 2007). Romero Lankao (p.532, 2007) describes this as a paradox of local climate 
governance, as “more responsibilities are delegated to local authorities, but they [the municipal 
government] lack the resources to undertake effective policies”. In many cities in developing 
countries, investment into climate change adaptation is a much more pressing issue than 
mitigation. Urgent action is needed to improve conditions for large populations that are 
vulnerable to hazards such as storms, floods, droughts and landslides (Parnell et al, 2007; 
Satterthwaite, 2008).  
Moreover, in many cities the provision of services and infrastructure has been privatized. This 
is associated with fragmentation of delivery, which makes it more difficult for municipalities 
to exercise influence over, for example, urban energy systems (Monstadt, 2007). In countries 
where local governments traditionally played a strong role in provision of public goods, control 
has slowly eroded (Wollmann, 2004). Further, urban infrastructure used to be seen as a public 
good provided for all – an invisible and taken for granted element of the urban fabric. The shift 
to provision by private actors has in many places lead to deepening lines of division between 
high quality systems catering to elite and limited access for the urban poor (Graham & Marvin, 
2001). This creates new challenges that are related with issues of accessibility and equity. 
Provision can also refer to distribution of incentives to non-state actors to encourage certain 
actions. For example, municipal authorities can provide grants (e.g. for investment into 
renewables), investment support (for large scale projects such as wind farms), and subsidies 
(e.g. for use of renewables or public transport) (Kern & Bulkeley, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2008; 
Bulkeley et al, 2009). National governments can also provide funding schemes to support local 
action and help municipalities that lack resources to follow the best practice of climate action 
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pioneers (Kern & Alber, 2008). Sweden, the Netherlands and Canada have developed national 
funding programs for climate investments and implementation of climate plans from which 
municipalities in need can apply for grants or loans (Ibid). Economic incentives used to 
incentivize energy efficiency upgrades or use of renewable energy in buildings is especially 
common and a type of support often provided by local government (e.g. Parker & Rowlands, 
2007; WWU, 2016).  
Climate governance through enabling 
The governance mode of enabling refers to “the role of local government in facilitating, 
coordinating and encouraging action through partnership with private and voluntary sector 
agencies, and to various forms of community engagement” (Bulkeley & Kern, p.2242, 2006).  
The use of enabling strategies become increasingly relevant when the three other governance 
modes are difficult to use. As mentioned above, municipalities are often reluctant to use 
regulatory tools to promote climate action, and not all municipalities are able to issue binding 
regulations. Self-regulation is straight forward, but not sufficient on its own due to the limited 
share of energy consumption attributable to public activities. Provision as a governance strategy 
is difficult or impossible to use in cities where service and infrastructure provision has been 
delegated to private actors. Enabling strategies based on promotion, voluntary participation and 
partnerships are therefore gaining momentum (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006).  
Enabling schemes can be directed towards civil society and the broader public. Such schemes 
include education campaigns promoting, for example, renewable energy sources, sustainable 
lifestyles and recycling (Kern & Bulkeley, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2008; Bulkeley et al, 2009). 
Public information campaigns is a policy tool used by national governments since the 1940s, 
to varying degrees of effectiveness (Wess & Tschihart, 2007). Climate action campaign have 
also been launched by an extensive number of international organizations and local movements. 
As discussed further in the section on partnerships below, municipal authorities can collaborate 
with civil society to promote awareness and engagement in local climate action.  
Some cities aim to engage stakeholders by setting up climate action committees and task forces 
(Anguelovski & Carmen, 2011). Committees are used to involve residents in planning 
processes, while task forces often are made up of representatives from industry and research 
organizations that contribute to formulation of emission reduction and adaptation strategies 
(Ibid). These engagement strategies sometimes explicitly target socially marginalized groups, 
aiming either to improve their conditions as part of climate agendas or to directly involve 
individuals from these groups in shaping and delivering climate programs (Ibid; Boyd & Ghosh, 
2013). For example, community-based adaptation is a form of stakeholder engagement strategy 
that often aims to engage poor or socially marginalized populations in efforts to reduce 
vulnerability to climate impacts, while at the same time aligning development strategies with 
local priorities.  
Enabling strategies can also be aimed explicitly towards the private sector. These often have 
the purpose of convincing companies to adopt energy saving and emission reduction activities. 
One way to do this is to spread information about sustainable production, for example by 
providing training, guidelines, benchmarks and best practice examples. An example is the 
Better Business Pack (BBP) toolkit used by the government in the UK, which uses a step-by-
step guidance on key environment-related issues (purchasing and supply chain, waste, transport 
and utilities) to help companies SMEs reduce costs, increase revenue and improve their 
environmental performance (Friedman et al, 2000). Another example is the Toronto Region 
Sustainability Program (TRSP), in which municipal authorities provide technical assistance, 
risk evaluations and training on pollution prevention in companies, in combination with cost-
sharing schemes (Granek & Hassalini, 2006).  
Convincing the private sector to adopt climate friendly practices can be a question of framing 
emission reduction from a perspective of economic opportunity. Win-win perceptions of 
48 
 
sustainability action have gained ground in parallel with the diffusion of ecological 
modernization discourse and is been reflected in corporate efforts to create a positive 
environmental public image (Levy, 2005). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs with 
a focus on environmental performance are commonplace today and a basic requirement for 
most large firms. At the same time, it has been argued that CSR programs have inherent limits. 
Although they may help companies achieve environmental gains in terms of improved 
production processes or design, overall negative impact may increase due to rising sales and 
business growth as a result of an improved public image (Dauvergne & Lister, 2012). Many 
companies have developed products and services that appeal to climate-conscious costumers, 
but considerable barriers usually exist to scale-up emission reduction innovations, and CSR 
programs tend not to be radical (Kolk et al, 2010).  
Instead of relying only on information sharing, persuasion and voluntary action of non-state 
actors, public authorities can engage organizations from the private sector or civil society in 
partnerships. This type of strategy is discussed in detail in the following section.   
 
2.4 Climate action through partnerships  
This section debates the way in which partnerships are understood as a new form of governance. 
Whether or not this is a development that contributes to benefits or risks is also briefly 
discussed. The section presents forms in which sustainability partnerships exist, as well as the 
range of functions they perform.  
2.4.1 Partnerships as form of sustainability governance 
Partnerships are to some extent seen as an empirical reflection of a reality where companies 
have emerged as centres of political power and green movements as centres of social and 
economic capital, which make them indispensable in public issues (Glasbergen et al, 2007). 
However, partnerships are also associated with positive normative connotations and risks 
related to legitimacy and accountability, as is discussed in this section. 
Sustainability partnerships can be seen as a tool for solving environmental issues that public 
actors cannot solve on their own, by acting as “self-organizing and coordinating alliances” 
responding to societal problems (Glasbergen, p.2, 2011). They also represent governance based 
on consultation, collaboration and mutual adaptation, and constructive dialogues that exclude 
hierarchies (Glasbergen et al, 2007). The advantage of partnerships is understood as one of 
collaborative advantage: actors can access resources that they do not have on their own 
(Glasbergen et al, 2007). This refers broadly to political authority provided by public actors, 
moral authority by civil society, and market principles by the business community. Another 
advantage is that partnerships can address environmental issues where governments have failed, 
redefine dialogues and enlarge moral debates, thereby creating a larger space for certain 
sustainability discourses (Glasbergen, 2011). Forming partnerships with communities can 
empower socially excluded groups and highlight issues of justice and inclusion, while aligning 
climate agendas with local social and environmental development priorities (Castán Broto et 
al, 2015a; Castán Broto et al, 2015b). This makes partnerships an instrument that can further 
the drive for sustainable development.  
The statements above also point to a normative perception, in which networked government 
arrangements such as partnerships are seen as filling a participatory deficit and constitute a step 
towards a more pluralistic, deliberative political system (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). There are 
three policy deficits that partnerships can address and improve (Forsyth, 2010). The first is a 
regulatory deficit, suggesting that non-state actors can provide norms about acceptable 
behaviour in formulation of policy. The second is an implementation deficit, pointing to how 
collaboration can be used as a way to tackle implementation failure. The third is a participation 
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deficit, which indicates that partnerships can improve opportunities for inclusion of otherwise 
marginalized stakeholders in policy making processes (Ibid).  
On the other hand, it has been questioned whether the transfer of authority from elected officials 
to hybrid arrangement meets democratic criteria in terms of legitimacy and accountability, or 
whether they are accepted implicitly on basis of their output legitimacy (Peters & Pierre, 2010). 
A fundamental difficulty with partnerships is that they transfer authority over public issues to 
non-state actors. At the same time, partnerships are difficult to hold accountable. Backstrand 
(2008) proposes that three dimensions can be used as basis for evaluating accountability of 
climate partnerships formed in transnational networks: participation (representation of 
stakeholders), transparency, and monitoring mechanisms (Backstrand, 2008). According to 
these criteria, public-private partnerships (for example the CDM) display the most advanced 
accountability mechanisms. By contrast, governmental and private-private partnerships have 
accountability deficits in terms of availability of monitoring mechanisms, public information 
disclosure, and participation by societal stakeholders. Transgovernmental partnerships appear 
to pave the way for increased business influence, power inequalities and skewed representation 
of stakeholders, expressed through elitist and technocratic multilateral cooperation (Ibid).  
Transnational partnerships have further been criticized for exhibiting participatory gaps and 
uneven access to decision making processes (Benner et al, 2004). A review of transnational 
sustainability partnerships suggested that participation of nation states was heavily 
overrepresented, businesses  somewhat overrepresented and NGOs underrepresented, while 
participation often was exclusive (Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). Many of the climate partnerships 
formed through the CDM mechanism, for example, have failed to consider viewpoints of local 
communities and local NGOs, whereas priorities of international NGOs and firms have been 
dominating (Forsyth, 2010). Partnerships have been criticized for empowering businesses, 
increasing power imbalances and the influence of elites. When companies form alliances with 
NGOs and governmental agencies, they often have significant leverage over other actors (Levy, 
2005). While there is space for civil society and consumers to shape programs in partnerships, 
there is a risk that NGOs become captured by states or private interests (Liverman, 2004). This 
makes it important to closely examine trends in participation in partnerships, which is part of 
the aim of this thesis.  
2.4.2 Forms of sustainability partnerships 
As mentioned above, partnerships consist of collaborative arrangements with actors from two 
or more spheres of society involved in a non-hierarchical process, with the purpose of striving 
for a sustainability goal (Huijstee et al, p. 77, 2007). Conditions that should be fulfilled for a 
governance arrangement to be considered a partnership includes cross-sector interaction, a 
public policy objective, and network structure, that is, a non-hierarchal organization rather than 
top-down steering (Pattberg et al, p.3, 2012). According to this definition, sustainability 
partnerships exist in various forms and constellations, involving collaboration between 
companies, public authorities, NGOs and research organizations, working with regional, 
national or global issues and operating under more or less institutionalized forms (Huijstee et 
al, 2007). Partnerships have been organized into different typologies based on varying criteria, 
such as degree of engagement, type of goal, type of function and type of participating actors 
(Ibid). Common constellations, based on types of participating actors, are discussed below.  
Public-private partnerships 
One common view of partnerships is of collaborative relationships between public and private 
actors for the purpose of provision of public goods. This can be seen as a natural continuation 
of, or alternative to, privatization trends and the habit of contracting out public services to the 
private sector. This has also, however, been described as a language game that transforms new 
public management into something more discursively appealing (Hodge & Greve, 2005). These 
observations refer to public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an organizational and financial 
model that allows the public sector to take advantage of private funding, for example in the 
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form of joint ventures or joint development projects (Ibid). In this thesis, PPPs refer to this type 
of public projects delivered on a contractual basis, such as long term infrastructure contracts 
(Hodge & Greve, 2007).  
Glasbergen (2007) distinguishes between public-private partnerships initiated by public actors 
(usually extensions of public policy in which alliances with companies are sought to enforce 
agendas) and partnerships initiated by private actors (where public authorities may be one of 
many stakeholders). An example of the former are partnership schemes launched by either 
national or local governments with the purpose of involving companies in energy saving and 
emission reduction schemes. This may, for example, take the form of advisory boards and 
working groups made up of representatives from public and private sector that determine goals 
and priorities related to emission reductions. It may also tale the form of benchmarking 
activities, investment forums aimed to support renewable energy solutions, or joint promotional 
campaigns (Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2008). An example of the latter is the 
HSBC's Climate Change Partnership, initiated by a private banking and finance organization, 
which has enrolled a number of stakeholders from the public sector and civil society (The 
Climate Group, 2016).  
Public-civil society 
Public actors form sustainability partnerships with actors from civil society to, for example, set 
environmental agendas, collect expert opinions, develop policy directions, and engage in public 
education programs. Another example is environmental campaigns run in collaboration with 
NGOs (Bulkeley et al, 2009). Large environmental organizations, such as the WWF, often have 
multiple partnership programs involving collaboration with public agencies (WWF, 2016). 
Public actors working with environmental issues together with civil society can gain advantages 
of achieving closer contact with grassroots movement and communities. Further, participatory 
urban planning in relation to climate adaptation that involves collaboration with communities 
can tie adaptation efforts to local development needs (Castan Broto et al, 2015a, Castan Broto 
et al, 2015b). Environmental movements are particularly important in their higher ability to 
highlight aspects of equity or environmental justice in sustainability initiatives (Castan Broto 
& Westman, 2016).  
Private-civil society 
When actors from the private sector form partnerships with civil society, it can be seen as a 
supplement to government policy (Glasbergen et al, 2007). This constitutes a radical shift from 
green NGOs taking an antagonistic standpoint towards companies, to seeing them as a 
cooperation partner. This trend has been described as a new “social realism” (Glasbergen & 
Groenenberg, p.2, 2001) or a “market based environmentalism” (Hartman & Stafford, p. 185, 
1997). These kinds of partnerships do usually not involve trading economic gains for ecological 
principles, but rather framing environmental issues as a business opportunity (Hartman & 
Stafford, 1997).  
Greenpeace cooperating with the German company Foron in promoting GreenFreeze, an ozone 
safe hydrocarbon, is one example of this (Hartman & Stafford, 1997). McDonald’s 
collaboration with the Environmental Defense Fund in improving ecological soundness of 
practices is another (Ibid). The advantage for the company lies in promotion, improved 
reputation and gaining a competitive advantage, while the NGO can gain greater impact in their 
campaigns (Glasbergen & Groenenberg, 2001). Private-civil society collaboration may involve 
licensing agreements, sponsorships, consultation or exchange of ideas, joint research or 
development, co-option of competitors, or promotion of new products and movement into new 
markets (Hartman & Stafford, 1997; Sagawa & Segal, 2000; Glasbergen & Groenenberg, 
2001).  
These “green alliances” may also have the purpose of influencing policy making in relation to 
sustainability issues, in particular by influencing sustainability standards (Arts, 2002; Pattberg, 
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2005). The Forest Stewardship Council, which emerged out of a WWF initiative directed 
towards companies, is one example of this. From a business perspective, this may result in more 
efficient regulation, while input from an NGO guarantees legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
(Ibid).  
Transnational networks & hybrid arrangements 
One important context in which climate partnerships have been studied is as part of 
transnational networks. Engagement in transnational climate networks took off after the signing 
of the Kyoto Protocol, when the three first transnational municipal networks were established 
in the global North. The networks originated in Europe and the US in the 1990s and were 
originally led by municipalities. By the 2000s, many of the networks had established national 
and regional campaigns, mobilized the private sector and grassroots movements, and spread to 
the global South (Bulkeley, 2010). A decade later, the movements had grown in number and 
size, spread into the global South, and gained support by national governments.  
Partnerships formed through transnational networks can be categorized according to what types 
of actors initiate and participate in the network: public (for example networks led by sub-
national governments), hybrid (networks where actors from multiple sectors participate) or 
private (for example company led movements that aim towards setting industrial standards) 
(Andonova et al, 2009; Bulkeley et al, 2012). A survey of transnational climate networks 
identified multiple forms of leadership and participation (Bulkeley et al, 2012). In this selection, 
initiatives were led by nonprofit organizations (44%), companies (18%), national authorities 
(17%), regional authorities (12%), local governments (7%) or international organization (12%) 
(Ibid). Initiatives led by non-state actors were more often private, whereas the majority of 
projects started by public actors were hybrid. The strategies for forming partnerships seemed 
associated with the type of legitimacy an organization aims to gain. For example, private 
companies are more likely to seek legitimacy from the public sector, thereby forming 
partnership with government organizations. The study also showed that hybrid initiatives were 
characterized by a higher level of institutionalization than those led by public actors or NGOs 
(Ibid).  
As discussed above, climate initiatives carried out on an urban level often involve partnerships 
(Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Kern & Alber, 2008). A survey of climate interventions carried out 
on basis of experimentation in cities across the global North and South found that about half 
involve some form of partnership, involving either vertical or horizontal collaboration (Castan 
Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). The majority of initiatives in this sample were led by local municipal 
authorities (66%), with a smaller share led by private actors, public actors on other levels, and 
civil society. The most common form of partnership was led by a government authority with 
participation of actors from either the private sector or civil society. Governments more often 
act independently, while it is more common for NGOs to seek partnerships with governments 
in order to access resources or institutional support. On the other hand, private actors are more 
likely to collaborate with other private actors, and overall, private initiatives were more 
common in Asia. The study also showed that traditional forms of steering, such as use of 
regulation, was less likely to be used in initiatives led through partnerships (Ibid).  
Partnerships led by international institutions 
The concept of partnerships that emerged out of the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) envisioned “new and positive partnerships between different 
stakeholder groups” to tackle critical global issues requiring an international response 
(Gardiner, 2002). This suggests a need for partnerships involving a variety of participants and 
constellations. However, research has shown that the sustainability partnerships that emerged 
out of the WSSD reflect rather than challenge patterns of authority (Andonova & Levy, 2003). 
The most common participants were traditional actors of global governance, such as secretariats 
of international institutions.  
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Initiatives in transnational networks are often “steered” by international institutions or national 
governments, in spite of being led by a multiplicity of actors. The concept of orchestration has 
been used to describe this phenomenon, defined as the “process whereby states or 
intergovernmental organizations initiate, guide, broaden, and strengthen transnational 
governance by non-state and/or sub-state actors” (Hale & Roger, p. 61, 2014). Two key forms 
of orchestrated partnerships are identified: intergovernmental institutions initiating schemes 
(e.g. UNEP Finance initiative now run by banks) or international institutions managing 
programs (e.g. the World Bank providing technical capacity for C40). According to this 
definition, around a third of all major transnational climate networks are orchestrated (Ibid). At 
the same time, partnerships initiated by international institutions may contribute to new 
governance arrangements emerging under the mandate of the leading organization, such as for 
example community based biodiversity management (Andonova et al, 2010).   
2.4.3 Functions of sustainability partnerships 
Partnerships can perform a range of functions, from “hard” rule making, to information 
dissemination, technology transfer and capacity building.5 Some of these functions are more 
common than others, as is discussed below.  
Agenda setting & policy making 
It is relatively rare for partnerships to engage in “hard” rule-setting activities. This is a function 
that traditionally belonged to nation states and that to a large extent remains the realm of 
national or lower level governments. Rather than setting hard regulation through partnerships, 
it is more common to use collaborative decision making to agree on non-regulatory policy and 
voluntary measures (Pattberg et al, 2012).  
Nevertheless, sustainability partnerships can be used to develop non-binding rules and to place 
sustainability issues on the political agenda. A study of transnational climate networks showed 
that most initiatives (around 70%) involved some form of rule setting function, such as setting 
targets, certifications and mandatory requirements (Bulkeley et al, 2012). These targets or rules 
are not backed up by the traditional type of authority associated with government, but instead, 
for example, with expertise, and they are often led by private actors or green NGOs. “Soft” 
policy tools such as information sharing also contribute to shaping practices and internalizing 
norms related to climate policy, which is an alternative form of steering (Ibid). Many private-
led partnerships are formed with government actors with the aim to influence or supplement 
regulation. These “policy influencing partnerships” include broad coalitions used by firms to 
create a united front against policy makers (Kolk et al, 2010).6  
 
 
                                                 
5 Bulkeley et al (2014) identify information sharing, agenda setting, implementation and capacity building, and rule 
setting (e.g. through standards and action programs as functions of transnational networks. Pattberg et al (2012) 
identify agenda setting, rule making and standard development, advocacy and lobbying, norm setting and 
information dissemination, knowledge production, implementation, planning, capacity-building and training, 
technology transfer, and service provision as functions of sustainability partnerships. Visseren-Hamakers & 
Glasbergen (2007) identify agenda setting, policy development, implementation, metagovernance (steering and 
coordination) and ensuring “good governance” (e.g. combating corruption). Andonova et al (2009) identify 
information sharing, capacity building and implementation, and rule setting. Backstrand (2008) identify advocacy, 
standard-setting and rule-making, implementation and service provision. Bulkeley et al, (2012) identify agenda 
setting, information sharing, capacity building, regulation, and forms of policy integration. 
6 Companies regularly engage in strategies to influence policy-making, though lobbying activities are normally not 
considered partnerships. This includes campaigning, participation in conferences and donation of funding to political 
action committees (Levy, 2005; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009; Kolk et al, 2008). A positive example is the active role played 
by the insurance industry in advocating for the use of precautionary principle (Jagers & Stripple, 2003). There are 
also less positive examples. For example, fossil fuel dependent sectors in the United States initially responded to the 
carbon emission challenge by forming lobbies to emphasize the uncertainty of climate change science and arguments 
against binding regulation (Levy, 2005; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009). 
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Policy innovation 
According to Bauer and Steurer (2014), climate partnerships can contribute to policy 
innovation. In this context, policy innovation is defined as “new instruments that have not been 
applied before in a sector, region, or local authority and changes in existing instruments that 
take climate change adaptation into account” (Ibid, p. 821). There are three ways in which 
partnerships contribute to policy innovation: through partner collaboration, scaling up activities 
beyond the partnership and by supporting national adaptation efforts. Collaboration and sharing 
information through working groups and projects can contribute to adoption and formulation 
of action plans and strategies, including, for example, specific infrastructure projects for climate 
vulnerability reduction. Scaling-up occurs when out-reach activities or information 
communication with other decision makers contribute to mainstreaming of policy, as well as, 
importantly, uptake into national policy (Ibid). 
Sustainable production and setting standards 
Standard setting is a type of rule setting function relatively often associated with partnerships. 
The FSC standards for sustainability certified timber is an example of civil society-private 
sector collaboration in standard setting, which has contributed to set new “rules of the game”, 
bringing a variety of stakeholders to the negotiation table, and creating consensus on technical 
issues (Pattberg, 2005). Private sector involvement in setting environmental standards may 
open up possibilities for adoption of new policy elements such as life-cycle assessments, green 
procurement or other supplier codes (Dauvergne & Lister, 2012).  
On the other hand, sustainability-certified products remain a niche market, which points to the 
limited success of the approach (Visseren-Hamakers & Glasbergen, 2007; Dauvergne & Lister, 
2012). Further, actors from the global North are overrepresented in international standard 
setting partnerships, such as the FSC (Dingwerth, 2008). In relation to sustainable coffee 
production, public-private partnerships have reproduced existing imbalances within the 
industry, for example by allowing consumer countries rather than producing countries to 
participate (Bitzer et al, 2008). While partnerships aim to promote sustainability aspects of 
production, some also focus on improving producer capacity or marketing for big brands, while 
benefits are unclear for producers (Ibid.).  
Another example is the voluntary ISOs, which are environmental management system 
standards set by a mixed private-public organization. The ISOs were expected to make positive 
contributions in sustainability through encouraging clean production and contributing to 
effective environmental regulations. This process has been criticized for being dominated by 
private interests and excluding participation of developing countries (Clapp, 1998). The 
standards were also expensive to implement and did not include aims for clean technology 
transfers (Ibid). Clapp (2005) argues that externally imposed regulations based on sanctions, 
rather than industry led, voluntary agreements, are needed to control activities of powerful 
TNCs.  
Dissemination of information & rising awareness  
Partnerships often aim to disseminate information and build knowledge. An analysis of 
transnational sustainability partnerships showed that the majority perform functions of 
knowledge dissemination, followed by planning and institutional capacity building and 
training, and to a lesser extent knowledge production, implementation, technology transfer and 
campaigns (Pattberg & Stripple, 2008). A survey of transnational climate networks suggested 
that the most common function was awareness rising and capacity building (Bulkeley et al, 
2012).  
Partnerships can be started by companies or academic organizations as a means to facilitate 
uptake of clean production strategies in industrial firms. These partnerships often take the forms 
of networks used to jointly formulate problems and share experiences to generate new ideas 
and solutions (Lehmann, 2006; Halila, 2007). Such industrial networks can create “free” and 
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“safe” spaces where managers can deal with uncertainty related to management of complex 
environmental issues (Svendsen & Laberge, 2005; Halila, 2007). Firm-firm networks also 
contribute to overcoming barriers related to lack of experience, financial or technical resources, 
and capacity for innovation that are more easily dealt with when companies pool resources 
(Luken & Navratil 2004; Lehmann, 2006; Loorbach et al, 2010; Hansen & Klewitz, 2012; 
Klewitz et al, 2012). This kind of network may be initiated and/or maintained by a third party 
actor or intermediary, including government agencies or semi-private actors (Hansen & 
Klewitz, 2012).  
Capacity building, technology assistance & research 
Capacity building through partnerships is realized by providing resources, such as finance, 
expertise, labor or technology, or monitoring (Andonova et al, 2009; Bulkeley et al, 2012). 
Capacity building and technology assistance are key objectives in the global partnership 
agendas promoted by international institutions, such as the UN and World Bank. Their 
involvement in local climate projects often takes the form of provision of technical, financial 
or managerial competence in specific projects. This collaboration is typical in traditional 
development assistance, where partnerships can be used as a tool for capacity building (Eaking 
& Carmen Lemos, 2006). Research partnerships are also used as a tool for development of 
emission reduction technology. Davies (1999) takes the Industry Cooperative for Ozone Layer 
Protection (ICOLP) as an example of the electronics industry working with the US 
Environmental Protection Agency along with other stakeholders to find solutions to reduce the 
emission of CFCs. Another example is the Local Governments Climate Partnership, an R&D 
project funded by the German Federal Environmental Agency and managed by the Climate 
Alliance (Kern & Alber, 2008). Research partnerships led by the private sector are often formed 
with universities or NGOs to fill the function of a knowledge gap or search for new technical 
solutions or develop and promote sustainable products (Glasbergen & Groenenberg, 2001; Kolk 
et al, 2010).  
 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
A few points in this chapter are central in the next chapter on climate governance in China. 
First, a key tenet is that climate agendas are formulated and delivered by a multiplicity of actors 
that collaborate across sectors, jurisdictions, and borders. Further, a number of groups and 
interests are involved in shaping environmental policy, and these processes involve both open 
conflict and discursive struggles. Municipal authorities play an important role, but often have 
to collaborate with companies and civil society to realize local climate action. Through 
partnerships, agendas can be realized by relying on the strength of partners, but this at the same 
time shifts authority horizontally from public authorities to other actors. The following chapter 
situates these observations in the literature on environmental governance in China. 
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3 Climate governance in China 
 
The kind of pressures that have contributed to changes in environmental policy interventions 
in the West, such as globalization and liberalization that shift authority up-ward, down-ward 
and horizontally, are also present in China. The argument of this chapter is that theories of 
governance networks and partnerships are relevant in this context and help explain ongoing 
processes of change.  
To begin with, this chapter engages with the question of why a network perspective is useful 
and interesting in explaining climate governance in China. To some extent, there is a conceptual 
conflict between seeing China an authoritarian monolith, or viewing it as a fragmented system 
crisscrossed with horizontal and vertical interactions. Section 3.1 presents traditional views of 
China’s hierarchical system, which have been challenged by contemporary studies of informal 
dynamics of policy interactions. 
To explain the competing and conflicting challenges facing municipal governments in China 
today, the political and institutional context of China’s climate efforts are presented in section 
3.2. This involves a discussion on overlapping economic, social and environmental concerns 
and a brief explanation of China’s political structure. To situate urban climate mitigation 
efforts, the section also outlines key energy policy and programs issued at a central level in 
China. Finally, the section discusses “new” environmental governance strategies and the 
components that these involve.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s policy making processes involve a range of organizations, 
including expert organizations, companies, and green movements. These groups exert influence 
over agenda setting, policy development and decision making on both a national and local level, 
as is discussed in section 3.3. Moreover, green NGOs and semi-governmental think tanks 
working from within the system have begun to discursively contest dominating environmental 
policy directions by acting as advocacy coalitions. This is creating alternative policy options 
that sometimes undermine the decision making monopoly of the top leadership.  
Municipal authorities are expected to take on an increasingly diverse range of responsibilities 
in relation to environmental protection and climate change mitigation (section 3.4). On the one 
hand, implementation of national energy programs falls on provincial and municipal 
government units. On the other hand, cities are expected to develop and experiment with new 
climate agendas. A range of urban low carbon plans and strategies adopted to date testify to the 
extent which this is already occurring. In section 3.4, low carbon agendas adopted by cities in 
China are discussed and the institutional framework for action on an urban level is presented.  
 
3.1 Network governance in authoritarian settings 
China is often described as a one-party, (semi-)authoritarian state with a powerful, central 
government that controls policy processes and a considerable share of society. If China 
represents almost an ideal type example of a top-down hierarchical state, it seems an unlikely 
context to study governance networks. This section demonstrates this paradox, as well as 
showing how it is resolved by network interactions that emerge within the authoritarian system.  
Authoritarianism is in essence the antithesis of democracy. Studies of the authoritarian nature 
of China’s political system therefore often point to the various factors that are seen to undermine 
democratic performance (Kalathi & Boas, 2003; Ambrosio, 2008; Stockmann & Gallagher, 
2011). China’s political apparatus is not only authoritarian, but also a remnant of a 
Leninist/Maoist communist system, which historically exercised a very high degree of political 
control over society (Oksenberg, 2001).  
The top-down character of China’s political system has implication for its environmental 
management. In describing China’s response to climate change, Gilley (2012) resorts to the 
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concept of authoritarian environmentalism, which he defines as a system where authority is 
concentrated in few executive agencies seeking to improve environmental outcomes. Gilley 
(Ibid, p.289) states that “consistent with authoritarian environmentalism, the political response 
to climate change in China has been “centered on the top-down, regulatory powers of the central 
state”. Gilley proceeds to describe the activities and guidelines issued by various leading groups 
and commissions, as well as the top-down system of implementation, as “decidedly 
authoritarian”, and concludes that the merit of authoritarian systems is an ability to produce 
rapid, centralized responses to environmental pressures. In an article on environmental 
governance in China, Liu et al (2012) argue that current, mono-centric planning processes are 
a key weakness in China’s efforts to tackle complex socio-ecological change. They describe 
the traditional core of China’s environmental governance system as based on command-and-
control regulation, which has derived from the planned economy and its hierarchical political 
system.  
Nevertheless, previous research also shows that vertical and horizontal linkages between actors 
are crucial in sustainability agendas even in authoritarian settings.  Bai et al (2009) argue that 
vertical and horizontal connections are essential in up-scaling successful sustainability 
innovations in Asa. The authors use the case study of Rizhao to highlight how vertical 
connections between city and provincial level government contributed to the success in 
mainstreaming solar water heaters. In studying sustainability experiments in Asia, Berkhout et 
al (2010) highlight that sustainability innovation activities are located both outside of developed 
countries and outside of leading firms. Relying on examples from Asia, the authors suggest that 
sustainability innovations are the result of interactions and learning taking place through 
collaboration between public and traditional actors, but also less expected actors, such as 
environmental movements, cooperatives, and consumer groups. These heterogeneous actor 
networks are important in introducing new social and technological solutions that contribute to 
broader trajectories of change. Further, the authors observe that local and global linkages are 
crucial in building capacities for innovation, and allowing centres of expertise to accumulate in 
the global South (Ibid).  
Moreover, over the past decades China has shifted from a highly centralized, politically 
controlled government apparatus to a more decentralized system where resources and decision 
making power are distributed further from the political core. The concept of “fragmented 
authoritarianism” describes how bureaucratic units have gained influence over policy making 
processes, resulting in negotiation and bargaining within the political system (Lieberthal, 1992). 
Dumbaugh and Martin (2011) describes political power in China as diffuse, complex and 
competitive, and the party leadership cannot always dictate policy directions. Bureaucratic 
offices, local officials, research bodies and think tanks, universities and companies feed 
proposals into policy processes (Ibid).  
These trends are reflected in environmental policy processes. This has led Mol and Carter 
(2006, 2007) to argue that China is experiencing a transition from environmental government 
to governance. Reliance on administrative approaches caused the type of criticism of 
inefficiency common in Western Democracies in the 1980s and 1990s, and produced similar 
responses in terms of diversification of actors and instruments involved in environmental policy 
processes. Yet, Mol (p.39, 2006) observes that “the state apparatus in China is of over-arching 
importance in environmental protection and reform. Its crucial role in this sphere is likely to be 
safeguarded for some time to come because of both the nature of the contemporary Chinese 
social order, and the characteristic of the environment as a public good”. 
Drawing on network governance studies in Europe, Mai and Francesch-Huidobro (2015) use a 
governance network perspective (“collaborative municipal networks”, CMNs) to analyze 
public-interest group interactions in climate policy processes in Guangzhou in Southern China. 
CMNs are understood as complex processes of interaction among a plurality of state and non-
state actors with the objective of achieving (environmental) goals through knowledge transfer 
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and resource exchange while maintaining municipal autonomy (Ibid, p.52). The interactions 
are manifested in collective decision making. This definition highlights aspects of interaction 
in environmental governance discussed in Chapter 2, such as a plurality of state and non-state 
actors involved in decision making. The authors argue that information is passed through webs 
of informal ties outside the aegis of state structures, and that non-governmental actors must be 
recognized in local governance processes. The underlying principle is that public actors 
participate in networks to access resources (funding, investment, information, access and 
political support) and enhance capacity (Ibid).  
These studies demonstrate that a governance network perspective can capture informal 
interactions that occur in environmental policy making and implementation in China. 
Moreover, Mai and Francesch-Huidobro refer to this as a “grossly overlooked” and 
understudied topic, pointing to the need for further studies using this approach (Ibid, p.29). This 
thesis builds on this emergent field of literature, but emphasizes aspects that previously have 
not been explored. This includes structures of power and conflict in policy networks and their 
connection with the political economy, partnership constellations and the way in which these 
introduce new technology and policy elements in cities, and trends of participation relating to 
which actors are included in networks, and on the basis of which principles.  
 
3.2 Political and institutional context 
China is a vast country that embodies contrast and variety. To better understand contemporary 
climate change challenges of Chinese cities this section provides an overview of broad 
development issues and ongoing reform programs aiming to cope with these. The section also 
describes the institutional structure of the central government, as well as key energy policy 
issued by the central government. Finally, further detail on China’s “new” environmental 
governance strategies are discussed.  
3.1.1 Current development challenges 
To situate urban development strategies in China, this section gives an overview of ongoing 
reform processes, energy and environmental trends, and the overlapping challenges that 
materialize in urbanizing regions.  
Ongoing processes of reform 
China’s efforts to improve environmental management are taking place in a broader quest of 
ongoing reform. Since Deng Xiaoping introduced his opening up and reform policies in the late 
1970s, China has gradually opened up its markets and transitioned towards a capitalist 
economy. Since then, incomes have increased rapidly, from $193 per capita in 1980 to $7,593 
in 2014 (World Bank, 2015). The economy has shifted from the primary to the secondary and 
tertiary sector, the share of private enterprises in the economy has increased dramatically, the 
population has moved in to the cities from the countryside, and millions of Chinese citizens 
have enjoyed improvements in education, health care, and a higher quality of life.  
In the publication Governance of China President Xi Jinping outlines his development vision 
of the country: China is to shift to a sustainable model of economic growth and a “moderately 
prosperous society” (Xi, 2015). The economy will steer away from heavy industries, 
infrastructure investments and exports, towards a growth model based on domestic 
consumption, an expanding tertiary sector, and innovation driven growth. Governance of China 
provides little information on President Xi’s ideas about governance – what models of steering, 
tools, type of participation, institutions, or modes of collaboration will China need to realize 
these goals? However, some indications are provided. The publication recognizes that 
institutional reform is an integral part of the country’s broader reform agendas (Xi, 2015). 
Constructing a system based on the rule of law, which involves checks and balances and 
enhanced supervision to make sure that power is “caged” by the system, is emphasized as 
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another important step. It is necessary to build a political system based on justice, equality, and 
democracy (Ibid). 
The current direction of political, economic and social reform is outlined in a milestone 
document issued at the Third Plenum of the National People’s Congress in 2013. This document 
points to overhauls of China’s judiciary, financial and tax systems, land ownership and hukou 
(residence registration) system, as well as plans for improving social security, education and 
health and the environment. It is a document that recognizes the need for fundamental change 
in order to revitalize the economy, create a stable society and, ultimately, maintain the control 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC).  
Most of the ideas of this reform program are not new. The plans echo the comprehensive 
agendas of political and economic reform launched and implemented under the leaderships of 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Under the draconian leadership of Xi Jinping, the country’s reform 
agenda has taken a new turn. While continued effort is directed towards opening up the 
economy and adjusting legislative and administrative systems to a more liberalized 
environment, political reforms have stalled, or even began to reverse (Shambaugh, 2016). In 
this environment, freedoms of civil society and media are becoming increasingly restricted, 
raising question marks regarding the possibilities of continued social reform.  
Energy & emission trends 
At the climate negotiations in Paris in 2015, China presented their Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDC), which aim for carbon dioxide emissions to peak by 2030, 
carbon dioxide emission intensity to be lowered by 60%-65% from the 2005 level, and the share 
of non-fossil fuels to increase to 20% (NDRC, 2015). The recently adopted 13th FYP (2016-
2020), adopted in 2016, aims for the share of non-fossil fuels to reach 15%, a 15% reduction of 
energy intensity, an 18% reduction in carbon intensity, and an energy use cap equivalent of 5 
billion tons of standard coal (NDRC, 2016).   
The ambitious goals are in part related to the rise in energy use and emission trends in China 
over the past decades. In 2010, China claimed the position as the world’s largest energy 
consumer (IEA, 2010). In between the years 1990 and 2010, total energy consumption tripled, 
from 863 million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) to 2634 Mtoe (IEA, 2011). This growth was 
primarily driven by economic restructuring towards heavy manufacturing industries, dominated 
by iron, steel and cement, and infrastructure investments (Rosen & Houser, 2007; UNDP, 
2010). Out of China’s increase in emissions between 2002 and 2007, around 60% was created 
through capital investments, with large construction projects acting as a key driver of emission 
growth (Li et al, 2012). Social and economic development will continue to fuel energy 
consumption, especially through rising power demand and an expanding transport sector 
(Baeumler, 2012; IEA, 2015). China’s energy demand is expected to reach twice the size that 
of the United States by 2040 (IEA, 2015). 
China’s energy use continues to rely extensively on coal, which creates large carbon dioxide 
emissions. In 2006, China surpassed the United States and became the world’s largest carbon 
dioxide emitter (NEAA, 2007). In between 2000 and 2006, 58% of the global increase in carbon 
dioxide emissions were attributable to China (IEA, 2007). By 2030, coal consumption will 
account for 80% of China’s energy related carbon dioxide emissions (IEA, 2015). In the same 
year, energy related carbon dioxide emissions are expected to reach over 10 Gt – two and a half 
times the size of estimated emissions of the United States (IEA, 2015). This means that China 
is expected to account for three quarters of the growth of global emissions in the decades until 
2030 (IEA, 2013). Generally speaking, the developed coastal regions of the country have higher 
per capita emission levels that the comparatively less developed inland, with the exception of 
fossil fuel exporting regions, such as Inner Mongolia and Ningxia (IEA, 2007; UNDP, 2010). 
Abundant endowment of coal has been both bliss and curse to China’s development. It has 
powered the country’s economic and industrial expansion, and continues to account for a large 
share of national energy supply. It is, however, associated with many problems. Coal mining is 
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water intense, and many of the regions that are rich in coal are water scarce, placing high stress 
on water supplies. An increase in extreme weather would acerbate China’s water dilemma: 
scarcity in the arid north and floods in the southern provinces (Zhai, 1999; Varis, 2001). 
Thermal production through coal combustion causes emissions of both carbon dioxide 
emissions and Sulphur dioxide, which cause air pollution and contribute to acid rain. Fossil fuel 
reliance is also a problem from the perspective of diminishing domestic resources. China 
became a net coal importer in 2007, and the share of imports is expected to continue rising 
(IEA, 2007). The same goes for oil, as most domestic fields in use have reached or passed peak 
production (IEA, 2007). China’s government has attempted to diversify imported energy supply 
and seek preferential access to resources in exporting countries, a policy known as “Going Out”. 
In line with this policy, Chinese oil companies are investing in foreign oil resources in an 
expanding row of countries (e.g. Sudan, Angola, Nigeria and Kazakhstan). Simultaneously, oil 
and gas import pipelines are being built from Central and South East Asia.  
Contemporary urban challenges 
China exhibits highly uneven patterns of development across its diverse regions. Economic 
growth, social change and technological innovation is to a large extent concentrated in urban 
areas, especially along the East coast, while the countryside and the Western inland experience 
slower development. Urban regions account for a large, and increasing, share of the population. 
By the end of 2012, the share of the Chinese population living in cities reached 52.6%, “marking 
a historic turning point in the nation's urban-rural population structure”, as over half the 
population became city dwellers (Yang, 2013). By 2030, China’s urban population is expected 
to increase to around one billion, making up around 70% of the population (World Bank, 2014).  
China’s cities are facing complex development challenges that involve balancing delicately 
between conflicting concerns. Urbanization is shaping new lifestyles, values and ideas, as well 
as new consumption patterns and new modes of housing and transport. Rapidly growing urban 
populations are placing heavy pressure on urban infrastructure and public services. Rising 
incomes have been followed by growing inequalities and a deepening rural-urban divide (Yao 
et al, 2004). Ageing populations contribute to rapidly climbing costs in the health care sector 
and social welfare systems (Flaherty et al, 2007). The provision of social services is especially 
problematic for the migrant worker population, which according to China’s registration system 
(“hukou”) only can access the social welfare system in their registered birthplace.  
City regions in China are facing numerous environmental challenges. Urban expansion is 
intimately associated with urban sprawl and loss of agricultural land, which in combination 
with water and soil pollution poses threats to food security (Bai et al, 2012; Chen, 2007; World 
Bank, 2014). Formerly agrarian lands are being lost, fragmented and transformed into built up 
land at a rapid pace (Lin & Ho, 2003; Deng et al, 2009; Su et al, 2011). Many cities suffer from 
traffic congestion and severe air pollution (Wang & He, 2015). Polluted air has been cited as 
posed to become one of China’s greatest health threats, with lung cancer and cardiovascular 
disease on the rise (Watts, 2012; Huang, 2013; Hu et al, 2015).  
China’s urban regions account for a large share of energy use and energy related carbon dioxide 
emissions (Baeumler et al, 2012; Oshita et al, 2015). Khanna et al (2016) and Oshita et al (2015) 
estimate that the share or carbon dioxide emission attributable to urban regions is 58% of the 
national total. Urban emissions are to a large extent emitted by the industry and power sectors, 
which account for an unusually large energy share in Chinese cities, followed by the built 
environment and the transport sector (Dhakal, 2009; Dhakal, 2011; Minx et al, 2011; Baeumler 
et al, 2012; Oshita et al, 2015). According to the China Urban Research Centre, by 2030, energy 
consumption attributable to cities is expected to reach around 80% of national total energy use 
(CURC, 2009a). Chinese planners and policy-makers have, as a result, placed cities at the heart 
of national low carbon efforts. A key reason for this is that much of the energy saving and 
emission reduction targets must be implemented by local governments: provinces and cities. 
Moreover, the central government has adopted a national low carbon pilot program in which 
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cities act as arenas of experimentation, where new policy and technological solutions may be 
identified and up-scaled.  
3.2.1 Central government institutions 
In spite of (and perhaps because of) it’s geographic and population size, China has a centralized 
political system, with key policy making taking place at a national level. This structure is 
important as institutions of the central government are mirrored by provincial and municipal 
arrangements. 
The highest legislative body of the Chinese State is the National People’s Congress (NPC), 
authorized to formulize and revise the country’s constitution, enact and revise basic laws, and 
annually development plans (NPC, 2004). When the NPC is not in session, legislation is 
enacted by the NPC Standing Committee, which exercises the power of the highest state organ. 
The political branch of the system consists of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which has 
been China’s ruling party since the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949. China’s 
highest executive power is the State Council, which exercises control of administrative 
legislation, economic management, and social administration (China State Council, 2005). 
Operating under the State Council is a number of ministries and commissions responsible for 
different political, social and economic areas, including a range of institutions in charge of 
environmental and energy related issues. During the 2000’s, most of the power to influence 
energy policy has resided with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a 
central commission with responsibility for macroeconomic management. The NDRC is in 
charge of formulation of China’s national Five Year Plans (FYPs), which determine the goals 
of national development. The policy decisions of the NDRC have a major impact on energy 
and environmental issues, as socioeconomic development strategies tend to involve holistic 
approaches of economic restructuring that incorporate issues of sustainable development and 
resource conservation.  
Various other ministries are involved in issues related to energy, which fall under their 
respective areas of jurisdiction. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology is in 
charge of industrial development strategies, which includes energy conservation strategies and 
recycling economy programs. The Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (MoHUrD) is 
responsible for urban planning and energy conservation in the construction sector. The Ministry 
of Environmental Protection (MEP) is in charge of pollution control and environmental 
standards. The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) functions as a market 
regulator that oversees reform and competition in the power sector. Exploitation of fossil fuels 
is governed by the Ministry of Land and Resources and hydropower falls under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Water. Energy taxes and fees are dealt with by the Ministry of Finance and 
the State Bureau of Taxation and energy trade is the responsibility of the Ministry of Commerce 
(MOFCOM). The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of matters relating to rural energy and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) is in charge of government led research and 
development. 
Despite repeated efforts, China does not have a central unit responsible for energy issues.7 In 
2008, an attempt at streamlining energy management led to the creation of the National Energy 
Agency (NEA), replacing the NDRC Energy Bureau. The National Energy Council (NEC), a 
high level think tank, was formed at the same time. NEC holds responsibility for energy 
development plans and NEA for managing energy industries, drafting energy policy and 
negotiate international agreements (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Although NEA’s mandate exceeds 
that of the NDRC offices, issues related to authority, autonomy and resources inhibit the agency 
                                                 
7  In the early 2000s, energy supply shortages, rising oil imports, and growing concern with environmental 
deterioration gained urgency, and the government established the Energy Bureau to operate under the NDRC and 
hold overall responsibility for energy policy making (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). However, due to its low administrative 
rank, the bureau lacked power and effectiveness. To counter this issue, the National Energy Leading Group (NELG), 
under direct control of the Premier Minister, was created in 2005 (IEA, 2007). Coordination issues persisted and 
powerful stakeholders continued to resist NELG’s policy making efforts (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). 
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from fulfilling its responsibility, and the NDRC continues to hold the main power over energy 
policy (Ibid). The central government department of climate change, established in 2008, is 
also placed under the NDRC. 
3.2.2 National energy policy  
A brief overview of national energy policy and regulation is presented in this section, in order 
to understand the policy framework within which urban action takes place. A number of central 
government schemes are implemented by municipal authorities, making these programs 
important to local energy saving activities.  
Environmental Legislation 
After the establishment of the People’s Republic in 1949, the expansion of environmental 
legislation occurred at a slow pace, due to the focus on reconstruction and growth and the 
priority attached to industrial progress (Chen, 2009). In 1973, the government held its first 
National Conference on Environmental Protection, which placed environmental issues higher 
on the agenda (Economy, 2004). With the reform processes introduced by Deng Xiaoping, the 
effects of economic expansion on the environment began to be seriously recognized in the late 
1970s. This awareness has also been associated with global environmental debates and China’s 
attendance at the UNEP 1972 Stockholm Conference (Beyer, 2006).  
In 1978, the State’s Responsibility for the Protection of the Environment was added to the PRC 
Constitution, making environmental protection a basic obligation of the state. In 1979, the 
National People’s Congress enacted the Environmental Protection Law, through which 
government institutions at all levels were assigned responsibility to protect the environment 
(Ma & Ortolano, 2000). As environmental issues have grown in importance, environmental 
authorities have gained authority, while environmental laws and regulation have gained in 
sophistication (Jahiel, 1998).  
In 2005, a Renewable Energy Law was adopted to promote the use of renewable energy, 
improve the energy structure and contribute to sustainable development. The adoption of a 
revised Law on Energy Conservation (2007) and a Circular Economy Law (2007) made energy 
conservation in the industrial and construction sectors key policy goals. An Environmental 
Impact Assessment Law with provisions on public participation was adopted in 2003. Mol 
(2009) sees these pieces of legislation as evidence of the rapid modernization of China’s 
environmental policy.  
In 2015, a strengthened Environmental Protection Law was issued, with a principal aim to 
strengthen control of industrial emissions and air pollution. This piece of legislation was 
followed by high expectations, as it among other provisions threatened polluting companies 
with considerably higher fines and posed that local government can be held accountable for 
environmental damage. Pressure on the industrial sector is thus increasing through stricter 
environmental legislation. During the 13th FYP, an expected 1.8 million workers will be laid 
off in the coal and steel sectors as China steer away from energy intense, emission intense 
industries. The central government has promised to allocate 100 billion RMB to help identify 
new work opportunities for laid-off labor and continue “unwaveringly” on the path to 
sustainable development (Hua, 2016). 
FYPs and the cadre evaluation system 
In 2004, the NDRC released China’s Medium and Long term Plan for Energy Conservation, 
which detailed how energy targets were to be integrated into the FYPs. In the 11th FYP (2006-
2010), energy intensity and emission reduction goals were for the first time made into binding 
targets (Yuan, 2011). Out of 22 targets, 8 were designated binding, out of which half were 
related to energy and the environment (Ibid). The 12th FYP (2011-2015) included 24 targets, 
out of which eight were related to resource use and environmental protection and seven were 
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binding (NDRC, 2011). The binding targets included a 16% reduction in energy intensity and 
a 17% decrease in carbon emission intensity below 2010 levels by 2015 (NDRC, 2011). 
The FYP targets are enforced through China’s cadre evaluation system. This assesses local 
leader performance through report cards with points for performance in different areas. 
Officials can be encouraged with promotion, bonuses and public recognition for meeting 
targets, or salary deductions and demotions at failure. The degree of priority is divided into 
three levels: soft, hard and veto (Wang, 2013b). Soft targets are low priority objectives, mainly 
contributing “bonus points”. Hard targets are mandatory goals, and failing these may lead to 
career breaks. For veto targets, failure automatically results in some form of punishment (e.g. 
public criticism or legal punishment) and exclusion from promotions (Golding, 2011). The 
cadre assessment is carried out yearly, based on statistics collected by various government 
departments. Reaching 60% of the points is considered “passing” performance (Wang, 2013b). 
Energy conservation has become a political issue through its upgrade to a “hard” performance 
evaluation target. In Shandong Province, a new point system was adopted in 2008 (China 
Knowledge Net, 2008). The criteria contained sixty indicators in eight groups comprising a 
total of 1000 points, where economic development remains the most important category. The 
category of “sustainable development” contains nine performance indicators, out of which 
some are related with energy and emissions issues: energy efficiency, energy use in relation 
with industrial expansion, and air quality. Failing to meet the energy efficiency requirement is 
considered a “serious” failure, leading to a deduction of 10 or 20 points from overall score 
(Shandong Government, 2008a). 
Political promotions are still more strongly linked to meeting economic goals rather than 
reaching environmental targets. Research has shown that spending on environmental 
infrastructure does not contribute to promotions; increase in GDP growth rate raises the 
probability of promotion by for Party Secretaries and Mayors, while increase in GDP scaled by 
environmental investments lowers the probability (Wu et al, 2013). Another study confirms 
that the main factor behind mobility in political ranks is the ability to generate revenue and 
economic performance (Bo, 2002). Top political leaders do what they can to promote the local 
economy, as “economic growth and political promotion are closely related” (Qi et al, p.380, 
2008).  
Industrial restructuring  
A central policy strategy with a large impact on energy use and emission reduction is structural 
reform. This have been a key goal China’s recent and current FYPs and a strategy to reduce 
consumption of natural resources and decrease environmental deterioration. As part of this 
strategy, the service sector is expected to grow, while heavy manufacturing and infrastructure 
investment dependent growth is to decrease. The government supports this shift by supporting 
the service sector and strategic industrial sectors, such as new energy industries and 
“environmental friendly industries”. Policy support includes preferential taxes and subsidies 
for strategic sectors, such as tax reductions for energy conservation projects (2008), and 
beneficial tax policies for energy service companies (ESCOs) (IEPD, 2013).  
Energy efficiency programs & standards 
A program supporting the implementation of the FYP targets is the Top 1,000/10,000 Energy 
Consuming Enterprises Program. This program was initially introduced as the Top 1,000 
Program in the 11th FYP planning period. The aim was to improve the energy efficiency of the 
country’s largest 1000 enterprises and shut-down small, inefficient coal plants (IEPD, 2013).8 
                                                 
8 However, the continued need for coal power generation has required investments into new plants that will be active 
decades into the future. The operation of these coal plants over a normal economic lifetime accounts for locked-in 
carbon emissions of over 85 Gt until 2035 (IEA, 2013). This is an amount larger than the total locked-in emissions 
of the United States over the same period. The IEA estimates that around 44 Gt of carbon emissions is locked into 
industrial equipment until 2035 (IEA, 2013). This is approximately equivalent to the total size that global emissions 
are allowed to reach in 2020, for global temperatures not to rise above two degrees (UNEP, 2010). 
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Due to the success of the program (150 Mtce saved and 70GT of small, inefficient coal plants 
phased out), the program was expanded into the Top 10,000 Program in the 12th FYP (IEPD, 
2013). Energy efficiency in China’s largest energy consuming units has been improved by 
introducing energy saving quotas and mandatory energy audits. Implementation has been 
backed up by financial rewards for energy saving retrofits, managed by China’s Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) and the NDRC. The effect of low carbon measures during the 12th FYP has 
been estimated as a reduction in the pace of growth of emissions to the lowest level of the 
decade (300 Mt), largely due to energy intensity improvements (Chai & Zhang, 2010; IEA, 
2013).  
China has also introduced energy efficiency standards in the construction sector. Codes for 
thermal design were introduced for the first time in 1986 (Yao et al, 2005). Minimum energy 
efficiency standards are set at a national level, but provinces and cities are allowed to set higher 
standards. According to law, energy conservation standards must be met for both residential 
and commercial buildings (Ibid). China has green building standards with higher requirements 
for resource use (energy, land, water, and materials), environmental protection and living 
environment. In comparison with Europe or the US, less effort is directed towards energy 
efficiency retrofits, and more on supporting green practices in new projects. 
Renewable energy policy & clean coal technology 
China’s 12th FYP included a target to reach 11% of primary energy produced by non-fossil 
sources: hydropower to reach 260 GW, wind power 100 GW, and solar power 10 GW (NDRC, 
2010). Large scale investments into hydropower capacity took place under the 12th FYP, but 
major hydropower projects have run into political difficulties related to the displacement of 
enormous amounts of people, severe ecological impacts, previous large scale disasters, water 
scarcity and potential regional tension related to impacts on downstream nations (Fish, 2013).  
Major efforts have been directed towards increasing manufacturing capacity of solar cells and 
wind turbines, as well as to increase installed capacity. Many large scale projects have been 
completed in the Western and Northern provinces, but these are criticized for being poorly 
planned and not integrated into grids (Bloomberg, 2016). Research into bioenergy has 
proceeded rapidly, and a number of large scale biomass plants have been launched. Solar, wind, 
bio-power and thermal power have been supported by R&D support (e.g. innovation funds and 
low interest loans), guaranteed grid access, subsidies, tax benefits, beneficial terms of 
investment (e.g. preferential loans and low land costs), feed-in tariffs and promotion through 
rural electrification programs (Cherni & Kentish, 2007; Wang et al, 2010).  
Effort to develop cleaner coal power technologies involves investment into supercritical and 
ultra-supercritical power plants that use less water and generate more power. China is at the 
same time becoming a world leader in the development and deployment of carbon capture and 
sequestration technologies. The GreenGen plant outside of Tianjin led by China Huaneng is 
China’s first large scale integrated gasification combined cycle power plant. The second phase 
of this project aims to reach near zero emission power production (Hsu, 2010). During the 12th 
and 13th FYPs, research into clean power technologies is encouraged trough publicly financed 
research projects.  
3.1.2 “New” environmental policy approaches 
Mol and Carter (2006, 2007) argue that China is experiencing a transition to environmental 
governance, which is driven by the modernization of the political system. This is expressed 
through decentralization and a shift away from a hierarchical command-and-control system, 
greater independence of local authorities and SOEs, stronger rule of law, increased role of 
markets in allocation of resources, a strengthened civil society, and greater freedom for media 
to report environmental damage (Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol & Carter, 2007; Carter & Mol, 
2013). Key environmental policy trends are presented in this section.  
As illustrated by Table 1 below, China began introducing environmental impact assessments 
and economic instruments in the 1970s, followed by voluntary tools and information 
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instruments in the 1990s. The government is attempting to step back from its monopoly position 
in allocating resources while allowing markets to play a greater role. Market based tools are 
increasingly used to manage environmental problems, for example through subsidies on natural 
resource being removed and beneficial taxes for green industries being introduced (Mol, 2009). 
As shown by Table 1, a few policy tools based on information dissemination have been used 
since the 1990s, including environmental labelling and clean production standards, eco-
industrial pilot park schemes, and rewards for companies with a high environmental 
performance. 
Table 1: Key industrial environmental policies and programs in China 
Name of program/instrument Year Instrument type 
Concentration based pollution discharge limits 1979 Administrative/Regulatory 
Environmental Impact Assessments 1979 EIA 
“Three synchronization program” (pollution control) 1979 Administrative/Regulatory 
Pollution Levy System 1979 Economic 
Ecological damage compensation control 1989 Economic 
Environmental labelling 1991 Information/Voluntary 
Sulphur dioxide emission fee 1992 Economic 
Cleaner production 1993 Information/Voluntary 
ISO 14001 1997 Information/Voluntary 
Emission trading 1999 Economic 
Environmental information disclosure (selected firms) 2003 Administrative/Regulatory 
Award of national environmental friendly enterprise 2003 Information/Voluntary 
Eco-industrial park pilot program 2003 Information/Voluntary 
Source: Shi & Zhang, p.285, 2006 
Raising the capacity to domestically develop new technologies is another important new policy 
aim. China has adopted the target of becoming leading in innovation by the year 2049 (the 
hundredth anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Republic) (MOST, 2006). 
Environmental protection and energy efficiency technology was identified as strategic research 
areas during the 11th and 12th FYPs, and policy has been adopted to support this development, 
such as megaprojects, tax cuts for R&D investments, and green innovation funds. 
The central government has also begun to experiment with climate policy instruments. In 2015, 
plans to adopt a cap-and-trade system were announced. This was prefaced by piloting emission 
trading systems on a city level for a number of years and the nation-wide system is to be in 
place year 2017. There is an increased willingness to use market based tools such as tradeable 
discharge permit systems, green financing, and renewable energy funds. Other forms of low 
carbon policy support instruments, such as energy efficiency labelling in household appliances, 
have been in place since 2007 (Price et al, 2011). At the same time, in an international 
comparison of climate policy innovation, China stood out as an exception by being more prone 
to introduce legislation than other instruments (Dubash et al, 2013). 
Another key policy objective is promotion of energy management in the industrial sector. In 
2009, China published its first energy management standard, which was revised and improved 
in 2012 in order to be compatible with ISO standards (Oshita et al, 2015). Strategies such as 
development of guidelines, certification schemes, guidelines for audits and training programs 
were key policy strategies in the implementation of the Top 10,000 Enterprises Program. A 
new set of actors became relevant in applying these schemes, including energy service 
companies and national and provincial energy conservation centres (Price et al, 2011). 
Benchmarking and dissemination of information is also used as a strategy for improving energy 
efficiency in the construction sector (Ibid). 
Climate action through partnerships 
At China’s Sixth National Environmental Conference in 2006, one of President Hu Jintao’s key 
points was the need for a shift from administrative management towards new management 
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approaches (EPA, 2006). An international task force was assembled to evaluate China’s 
progress in the development of environmental governance, which called for planning 
coherence, as well as increased participation of the business sector and civil society (Ibid). This 
emphasis on participation has not translated into an explicit support of sustainability 
partnerships. Nevertheless, this section raises a couple of examples that indicate that 
partnerships are relevant in sustainability agendas in China.  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, PPPs formed for the purpose of delivering public service and 
infrastructure projects are encouraged. There are risks to this approach, however, such as lack 
of transparency, corruption, and failure to make partners follow contracts (Jong et al, 2010). 
There are also examples of private-state co-regulation in development of standards or business 
practices. For example, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), China State Forest 
Administration and the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) have signed agreements 
with Walmart to develop environmental policy and programs in cooperation with its 10,000 
supplier units (Dauvergne & Listner, 2012). This involves shaping higher standards of product 
safety, transparency in the supply chain, promotion of forest management certificates, and 
development of green supermarkets.  
A study of business supply chain partnerships in the Pearl Delta Region showed that many 
companies use private-private partnerships in order to meet environmental standards, revise 
environmental standards, provide training, develop sustainable products or provide data for 
environmental reporting (Cheung et al, 2009). These partnerships are formed between 
businesses, but many involve partners from government units or NGOs. Motivations to join 
these partnerships include aims to improve environmental performance, meet environmental 
guidelines, create dialogue and build trust, build a green image, as well as to reduce costs and 
increase revenues (Ibid). Similarly, Chinese companies that compete in global markets and 
cooperate with foreign firms need to meet international environmental standards. An example 
is the Chinese petrochemical firm Petrochina, which upgraded its environmental performance 
as a result of an international cooperation project (Seymour et al, 2005).  
There are examples of international institutions cooperating with China, leading to the 
formation of local partnerships. For example, China is one of the founding members of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is the financial instrument under the UNFCCC 
providing technology transfers for climate action. Through the GEF, almost 150 sustainability 
projects have been sponsored in China (GEF, 2016). These projects are implemented through 
partnerships focusing on different policy areas, such as biodiversity, technology innovation or 
development of the legal system (Ibid). Another example is the CDM mechanism, through 
which partnerships for technology transfers for emission reduction are supported and funded 
(UNFCCC, 2014b). Another common form of partnership is international collaboration in eco-
city projects. This is often required since experience in integrated design and management is 
lacking on a local level (Baeumler et al, 2012).  
Partnerships are also forming between Chinese and foreign NGOs. A network of Chinese 
NGOs, China Civil Climate Action Network (CCAN) has been established to work with 
international NGOs on information sharing and policy development (CCAN, 2015). CCAN is, 
for example, cooperating with Green Peace, WWF and the Nature Conservancy. CCANs C+ 
Initiative builds on the WWF project to improve transparency of emission data and accounting. 
The Corporate Carbon Strategy Program is an example of a partnership between an 
international organization and Chinese academia. This program, initiated by The Climate 
Group and Chinese Society on Sustainable Development aims to engage manufacturing 
companies in awareness-raising related to emission reductions and function as a platform for 
communication about corporate strategies (AGI, 2009). 
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3.3 Policy making and planning  
Over the past decades, decision making on a central and local level in China have acquired 
characteristics of consultation and deliberation. This change has contributed to an increasing 
level of influence of non-state stakeholders over national and regional policy making. This 
section explains mechanisms of participation in policy making of non-state actors on a central 
and local level. The section also shows how energy and environmental policy discourse have 
shifted throughout China’s different leaderships and how advocacy coalitions promote or 
contest environmental policy options.  
3.3.1 National policy making  
The increased involvement of non-state actors in policy making in China can be traced back to 
former President Jiang Zemin’s call for “consultative democracy” in 1991 and the 17th Party 
Congress (2007) specification that all national policies must be deliberated in the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (He & Warren, 2011). One explanation for this is 
that administrations in China do not have enough resources and information to rely on 
“command” and therefore have to resort to deliberation. Factors that drive this change include 
market based development, the increasing size of the middle class and their rising political 
demands, as well as social issues, such as inequalities. Deliberation can be used to manage 
rising social demands and it has therefore been describes as a tool to “co-opt dissent and 
maintain social order” (Ibid, p.281). He and Warren (Ibid, p.271) refer to this phenomenon as 
“authoritarian deliberation”, defined a system in which “problems of governance in complex, 
multi-actor, high-information, high-resistance environments may provide elites with incentives 
to rely on deliberation in the absence of democratic empowerments”.  
The conversion of government departments into companies has been followed by a shift of 
power, knowledge and expertise from bureaucracies to enterprises, which has left many policy 
making institutions “paper tigers” (Rosen & Houser, 2007). Large corporations (in particular 
SOEs) have a pronounced influence over agenda setting and often have their own policy and 
research institutes that are regularly consulted (Meidan et al, 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). At 
the same time, the state also maintains control over the SOEs. As ownership of SOEs is 
exercised by the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
top-positions within the SOEs are appointed by the Ministry of Personnel (MOP) that broadly 
represents the interests of the CPC (Rosen & Houser, 2007). For example, national oil firms 
have campaigned fiercely for protection from market based price setting, which removes their 
cost burdens and allows a high production to continue (Ibid). In 2008, an attempt to create a 
new energy ministry was resisted by a number of large energy SOEs, apparently because the 
centralization of power would have limited their scope of influence (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). 
Private business have gained power since they were accepted in the CPC and accepted as 
consultative bodies, although they have not moved far towards deliberate political mobilization 
(Tsai, 2007). 
Key think tanks and research centres are regularly consulted in environmental policy making 
processes. Dumbaugh and Martin (2011) observe that these organizations in part were 
established to provide officials with professional advice, analysis and assessments in complex 
policy issues. Organizations that tend to be involved in energy policy are the Development 
Research Centre, operating under the State Council, and the NDRC Energy Research Institute 
(CAS) (Meidan et al, 2009). As these institutions are based directly under the State Council and 
the NDRC, they operate in line with the political inclination of the upper leadership. Academic 
institutes and universities (e.g. Tsinghua University and Beijing University) are often involved 
as well (Meidan et al, 2009). Although the universities are formally independent, CPC agendas 
influence their research by providing funding and guidance for their activities (Meidan et al, 
2009).  
The position of semi-independent research organizations and think tanks is debated. It has been 
argued that central level think tanks are in a strategic position to influence policy directions by 
67 
 
working from within the system (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012). For example, in the 
formulation of energy policy under the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, the 
Development Research Centre of the State Council and the NDRC Energy Research Institute 
were instrumental (Median et al, 2009). Government owned NGOs (GONGOs) have, on the 
other hand, been described as social groups co-opted by the government in order to perform 
functions on behalf of the state (Wu, 2003). These groups have sometimes, unintentionally, 
gained positions of influence over environmental policy, as a form of stand in for green 
grassroots movements, but often remain vessels of the party (Ibid).  
Green NGOs only emerged in the 1990s in China, but some environmental organizations are 
now important in mobilization of public opinion (Ho, 2007). Environmental NGOs are among 
the most powerful in China’s emerging civil society and the number of environmental 
organizations registered as “social organizations” has grown quickly (Cui, 2008). A number of 
environmental NGOs have begun to take an active stance in policy processes. In recent years, 
some organizations have engaged in campaigns and lobbying, and in some instances, blocked 
policy options (Meidan et al, 2009). Other organizations have provided open letters calling for 
more stringent law enforcement, better information disclosure, and public participation, as well 
as openly opposed projects (Zhan & Tang, 2013). Green NGOs have contributed to climate 
campaigns, such as the Green Commuting Network program run by China Association for NGO 
Cooperation (CANGO) and Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), which have encouraged 
public transport and restricted car use (Schroder, 2011). As mentioned in Chapter 1, China’s 
new Environmental Protection Law (2015) recognizes green NGOs as important actors, 
especially through their potential to protect public interest (Xinhua, 2014). 
At the same time, activities of green organizations and media are tightly controlled by the 
government (Ho, 2007). Many green movements have a weak grassroots connection, poor 
organizational capacity, lack of local funding, difficulties related to legal registration, and avoid 
sensitive political issues such as consequences and victims of pollution (Lu, 2007; Zhan & 
Tang, 2013). Following on Diamond’s categorization of types of activities that NGOs can 
engage in (express ideas; exchange information; achieve collective goals; make demands on 
the state; improve the functioning of the state; and hold state officials accountable), Tang and 
Zhan (2008) find that only the first three are usually available to Chinese environmental NGOs. 
The most common activities are educational programs and non-controversial nature 
conservation projects; NGOs operating with foreign funding are particularly careful of avoiding 
sensitive projects (Zhan & Tang, 2013). In recent years, the room to spread information through 
online forums has been limited and the websites of some environmental NGOs shut down (Zhan 
& Tang, 2013).  
Pressure from the public is indirectly contributing to placing environmental issues higher on 
the political agenda (Lo & Leung, 2000). The unearthing of scandals, such as soil pollution that 
caused injury and death, creates anger and frustration in the population (He, 2014; China Daily, 
2016). Environmental related “mass incidents” (which is how the communist party chooses to 
describe protests and demonstrations) have been increasing with about 30% every year since 
around 2005 (WCT, 2012; Zhang, 2014). Environmental issues are cited as the leading cause 
behind civil unrest and a main factor behind demonstrations and public uprisings. Growing 
environmental awareness of the expanding middle class is thought to contribute to this trend 
(Duggan, 2013; Bloomberg, 2014).  
Finally, foreign organizations are involved in shaping policy on a national level. An example 
is capacity building for the establishment of China’s emission trading scheme, which among 
other elements has involved bilateral cooperation between GIZ and the NDRC through 
knowledge and experience exchange, for example through workshops (GIZ, 2016). Chinese 
NGOs are participating in international conferences, which can function as platforms for 
information sharing in relation to policy development (Schroder, 2011). Chinese organizations 
participating in transnational networks can, moreover, introduce new climate policy elements 
into Chinese politics (Schroeder, 2008). Sharing of scientific information (knowledge and 
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arguments) between international and domestic epistemic communities, and informal 
information sharing with political decision makers, are mechanisms through which this is 
realized (Ibid).  
3.3.2 Local policy making  
Similar shifts towards deliberation and consultation have occurred in decision making 
processes on a local level. Reforms to introduce “deliberative” elements into China’s political 
processes began already in the 1990s. One national initiative was the introduction of a public 
hearing system put into operation in 1996 (Zhou, 2012). In 2008, the State Council issued a 
regulation that requires all county and city governments to hold public hearings as part of the 
decision making process of key social policies (Ibid). National guidelines on public 
participation were issued by the State Council in 2010, which identifies processes for presenting 
arguments and encourages open debates. These guidelines have led to an increase in local elite 
deliberation as part of policy processes, citizen discussions on the internet, public consultations, 
limited experimentation with participatory budgeting and an increase in deliberation in village 
politics and elections (He & Warren, 2011). Mol (2009) argue that stipulations on public 
involvement in policy, such as public hearings, has resulted in greater awareness and influence 
of citizens over local environmental issues. 
Three key forms of “deliberation” are often used in local planning (He, 2006). The most 
common element is consultative meetings between public authorities and different kinds of 
stakeholders. These meetings are normally based on a three-stage procedure: local leaders 
announce the function of the meeting, the participants express their opinion, and the local 
leaders answer questions. After these three steps, discussions ensue, which normally end up in 
a decision. This decision is normally not based on voting, but rather the discussion aims for 
consensus. This often requires multiple rounds of deliberation. Citizen evaluation meetings and 
residential/village representative assemblies are other channels through which deliberation can 
be used, although these are not as common. Finally, there are village or residential assemblies, 
which in some contexts can make collective decisions on issues such as land use (Ibid.).  
Building on these observations, China has been described as an authoritative nation in which 
an “immature deliberative democracy” is taking shape (Zhou, 2012). Public hearings have been 
used to illicit public opinion on various policy issues, such as education fees, firework 
regulation and tax income thresholds (Ibid). Collaboration between citizens as part of public 
hearings can result in network formation, for example between public hearing participants, 
media representatives, local advocacy groups or activist lawyers, creating opportunities for 
more effective influence over local decision making processes (Ergenc, 2014). “Participation, 
networking and knowledge sharing enable participants to engage with local politics” (Ibid, p. 
211). At the same time, these proceedings are inherently state led and non-transparent, allowing 
government actors to use deliberative “tools” to ensure legitimacy and social stability (Zhou, 
p.13, 2012).  
Some scholars have taken this argument even further and ask if China can govern in a way 
“consistent with the values of deliberative democracy”? (Leib & He, p.2, 2006). Leib and He 
(Ibid) describe China as an authoritarian system at a macro level with democratizing practices 
at a micro level, for example in villages. They observe that the CPC has allowed historical 
consultative elements of local councils to remain and allowed them to continue developing. 
This functions as a mechanism to preserve local security and stability, support local problem 
solving, and act as a ’valve’ to release pressure in China’s fast moving economic machine; a 
form of moderate democracy which avoids radical and substantial political reform (Ibid, p.7). 
Emerging debates on social media, in particular blogs and microblogs, are also identified as 
new spaces where deliberative practices are emerging (Tang, 2014). Citizens are using media 
and social media as new communicative resources where social and political conflict is played 
out. In combination with deliberative practices of grassroots democracy, such as social protest 
and local elections, as well as improved “participatory capacity and reasoning competency”, it 
has been argued that deliberative capacity and institutions are improving (Ibid).  
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Further, communication and cooperation between central and local levels of government is used 
in negotiation of energy related target setting, reporting and relation building (“guanxi”) 
(Harrisson & Kostka, 2012). This is necessary in order to ensure that targets are possible to 
meet. For example, energy efficiency targets are set by the NDRC at differing levels for 
different provinces, as industries in different parts of the country have very different potential 
and capacity to improve their performance. This requires top-down negotiations and bottom-
up feedback processes along with continuous communication and re-evaluation of goals and 
implementation (Ibid). However, these vertical negotiation processes tend to be marked by high 
levels of opacity and many are carried out outside formal administrative procedures. In an 
account of networking between government levels, Xia (2008) argues that local branches of the 
Provincial People’s Congress (PPC) engage in network strategies to increase 
institutionalization and expand their power. Its structure has developed into complex 
institutional interlinkages, which mitigate pressures both for hierarchal control (by the state) 
and democratic reform (from society).  
Mai and Francesch-Huidobro’s (2015) account of climate agendas in Chinese cities shows that 
network connections exist both in horizontal and vertical intergovernmental and 
intragovernmental interactions. Intragovernmental vertical networking is used as a tool to 
access climate incentives by securing national level support. Local leaders view pilot projects 
as strategies to make the city act as a testbed, and as projects associated with prestige that are 
valued by higher levels of government. Recognized pilot projects receive funding, which is an 
important aim for forging vertical linkages. Intragovernmental horizontal networking is a 
strategy to coordinate government departments. Many authorities are networking within the 
space of the state apparatus to access information or resources, and there is considerable 
fragmentation and conflict between departments. Key elements for successful coordination are 
political significance of the problem, political will to address it, and political authority granted 
to leading authorities.  
By mapping intergovernmental networking within the nongovernmental space, Mai and 
Francesch-Huidobro (Ibid) show that local governments actively encourage participation of 
non-state actors, for example to generate legitimacy. Networking in the nongovernmental space 
can facilitate innovation transfers, awareness rising, and promote the use of green standards. In 
Hong Kong, interaction with non-state actors is an essential element in policy making, and the 
nongovernmental space makes up a “diversified platform for knowledge management” (Ibid, 
p.139). Innovation transfers, diffusion of information and mainstreaming of policy elements are 
recognized as important functions of collaboration with representatives of civil society.  
3.3.3 Environmental policy discourse 
Environmental development challenges have been understood and framed in different ways 
over the past decades of development in China. This section shows that energy issues primarily 
are perceived from the perspective of energy efficiency and energy saving, but also that semi-
governmental think tanks and NGOs are engaging in discursive contests over construction of 
meaning in China’s environmental policy.  
Development themes used in Chinese policy documents vary with the political leadership. 
Some are attached to particular leaders, whereas some remain part of policy rhetoric for 
decades. One development slogan that has been central since the 6th FYP is that of 
“modernization” as a key path to development (Beyer, 2006). An example of a slogan attached 
to a specific leadership is the “three represents” (economic production, cultural development 
and political consensus) promoted by China’s “Third Generation” leadership (1992-2003) 
headed by Jiang Zemin. Major discourses of the “Fourth Leadership” (2003-2012) under Hu 
Jintao include a “moderately prosperous society”, a “harmonious society” and a “scientific 
outlook on development”. The concept of a harmonious society points to the need to resolve 
economic and social challenges through non-confrontational measures, such as deepening 
regional disparities, poverty and unemployment, and environmental issues (Zheng & Tok, 
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2007). The policy rhetoric of the Hu Jintao administration has been described as more 
“reformist”, through its focus on social equity and balanced growth (Meidan et al, 2009).  
The concept of “sustainable development” was introduced into policymaking in China after the 
country’s participation in the UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992. 
Sustainability has since then featured prominently in the FYPs. The concept is often 
compounded with other political slogans in Chinese policy documents, such as harmonious 
development and scientific outlook on growth. During Hu Jintao’s leadership, other related 
concepts were introduced, such as the promotion of a cyclic economy and a “conservation 
minded society”, which are often compounded with the sustainability concept.  
Policy targets related to environment and energy issues have been framed differently under 
different leaderships. Around the 1980’s, Chinese planners started to realize that with the 
current speed of economic expansion, natural resources would not meet the demands of future 
growth (Zhiping, 2010). The government therefore adopted energy security as a key policy 
objective and began to target inefficient energy use, especially in the industrial sector (Meidan, 
2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). A strategy of “equal treatment to development and conservation 
with immediate emphasis on the latter” was adopted, placing energy conservation and energy 
efficiency as parallel policy goals (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Promotion of renewable energy 
sources first appeared as a policy goal in the 8th FYP (Cherni & Kentish, 2007).  
In the 1990s the country’s energy intensity began to drop and China became a net oil importer, 
and the government shifted its policy focus to the question of energy supply (Meidan, 2009). 
Key energy related policy aims during the 11th and 12th FYPs have been identified as resource 
supply security, economic efficiency, social equity and environmental protection (Ibid). 
Throughout the 2000s, energy security has been an overarching concern, often coupled with 
strategies of energy efficiency and energy conservation (Qi et al, 2008). By contrast, climate 
change goals are a relatively recent addition in Chinese policy documents (Ibid). The concepts 
of “low carbon” and “climate” were only introduced into the 12th FYP, and have not yet been 
recognized as a key social issue or as norm. One expression of this situation is that green NGOs 
in China prefer to frame climate issues as one of energy saving rather than climate change, to 
make them more accessible (Schroeder, 2008).  
As mentioned above, environmental NGOs in China have relatively limited interest in policy 
advocacy (Lu, 2007). As observed by Schroder (2008), green NGOs only engage in climate 
change strategies that they believe contribute to positive solutions, rather than engaging directly 
in criticism. Nevertheless, as GONGOs and environmental NGOs have gained legitimacy in 
China, they have increased their capacity to influence environmental policy discourse (Zhan & 
Tang, 2013). The central government apparatus is becoming increasingly fragmented, creating 
political opportunity and social space for environmental NGOs to contribute to policy phrasing 
(Ibid, p.11). Environmental NGOs can explore the spaces that opens up through conflict 
between levels of government, or between government and societal interests. Environmental 
NGOs with independent sources of funding and strong connections to the party have become 
more able to express policy demands – at the same time, association with the political system 
restricts the type of policy demands that can be raised (Ibid). In Hong Kong, environmental 
NGOs have created discursive legitimacy for contested policy options (e.g. electric vehicles) 
and professional organizations contribute to knowledge building as well as to promotion of 
innovative solutions (Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). 
Semi-governmental think tanks that are working from within the political system – “embedded 
in the environmental state” – also act as advocacy coalitions that promote certain environmental 
discourses in a non-confrontational manner (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012). Coalitions 
working with climate issues have been identified in research in Guangdong Province. These 
GONGOs were originally formed out of affiliated government agencies that advised or assisted 
the formulation of climate policy. As such, the organizations are “expertise oriented 
professional associations” (Ibid, p.13) with core activities consisting of research on energy 
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conservation, low carbon development and the recycling economy. The organizations have 
gradually gained economic, political and organizational independence and broadened their role 
into information sharing, delivering services, and facilitating learning and supporting 
government-business collaboration. In their role as technical experts, their advice is considered 
reliable and necessary in realizing new policy targets. The GONGOs have been crucial in 
introducing the concept of a recycling economy into local policy discourse and in shifting 
attention from the narrow concept of energy efficiency to the broader concept of “low carbon 
development” (Ibid).  
The advocacy coalition model has been used to explain policy contention related to economic 
benefits and environmental concern (Han et al, 2014). In the policy process related to a large 
hydropower project, contesting discourses were shaped not only by local and central public 
agencies, but also by corporations, media, environmental groups and academia. This account 
showed how coalitions were created around shared belief in a policy option, and how 
conflicting narratives came to shape policy decisions over a decade. Social entities without 
direct economic stakes in the project played an important role in debating potential 
environmental implications, and resorting to rule of law and rights based activism to appeal to 
the legitimacy of their cause. However, senior officials exercised disproportionate power over 
this discursive process, indicating that political leaders continue to hold strong influence over 
environmental policy objectives.  
 
3.4 Urban climate governance 
This section demonstrates that the broad responsibilities of municipal governments in China 
makes them relatively well placed to lead low carbon development (Liu & Salzberg, 2012). 
Systems of funding and institutional responsibilities in relation to environmental protection and 
public service provision of municipal governments are outlined. The section also presents 
ongoing experimentation with urban low carbon strategies and the results these have yielded so 
far.  
3.4.1 Institutional divisions and responsibilities  
This section contains a brief outline of the institutional divisions that structure activities of 
municipal authorities. This is followed by a short description of the municipal system of 
budgeting.  
Institutional divisions in Chinese cities 
The top leadership in Chinese cities consists of a Party Secretary and a Mayor. These two 
positions are generally reached by passing through a political promotion system. The Mayor is 
appointed through nomination, followed by election and confirmation by the local People’s 
Congress, and the Party Secretary is appointed by a higher party organization. A cloudy overlap 
exists between the institutional responsibilities of local commissions and party affiliations, but 
it has been observed that where jurisdictions coincide, the CPC committees tend to be more 
influential (BBC, 2012). Officially, the functions of the local party congress include examining 
committee work reports, reporting to higher party levels and “passing resolutions on major 
issues in the region” (People’s Daily, 2010). 
Administrative divisions on a municipal level reflect those of the central government. 
Municipal branches of the NDRC (DRCs) are responsible for drafting development plans, 
approve major industrial and infrastructure projects, promote industrial restructuring and 
support technology development. The municipal Economy and Information Technology 
Commission (EITC) is in charge of enterprise support policies, the Bureau of Commerce for 
trade policy and the Bureau of Finance municipal tax collection. The Construction Committee 
(the local branch of MoHUrD) is responsible for spatial planning, resource use in the 
construction sector, and monitoring and promoting buildings standards. The Municipal 
Transport Bureau is in charge of providing public transport. The Municipal Environmental 
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Protection Bureaus (EPBs) are local branches of MEP that monitors pollution standards, 
ecological zones and promote environmental protection.  
The central government encourages provincial and municipal governments to set up climate 
change leadership groups, usually made up of staff from departments working with related 
issues, such as energy conservation and environmental protection, often from DRCs and EITCs. 
Since the NDRC’s adoption of a National Climate Change Programme in 2007, many local 
governments have set up this type of groups. Responsibilities of the groups include 
implementation of national climate change policy, as well as to design and coordinate province 
level action in the areas of energy saving and pollution reduction (Qi et al, 2008). 
By placing climate policy under the remit of Development and Reform Commissions, the issue 
becomes associated with industrial energy consumption and economic structural reform, rather 
than environmental issues. In cities that have not yet adopted specific climate mitigation 
agendas, energy saving and renewable adoption policies are also frequently adopted by 
departments responsible for industry and construction policy. This means that local 
environmental protection bureaus (EPBs) often hold responsibility over eco-city building, but 
not climate action programs. In recent years, the administration of EPBs has shifted away from 
rigid, hierarchical systems towards greater independence in determining local priorities, 
strategies and financing arrangements (Lo & Tang, 2006; Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009). The 
government is attempting to further strengthen the authority of environmental units and 
improve coordination between authorities working with environmental issues. At the same 
time, the status of EPBs remains weak and implementation is affected by limited institutional 
capacity, in terms of both resources and authoritativeness in relation to other departments (Lo 
& Leung, 2000; Liu et al, 2012; Kostka, 2014; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). Balme 
(2011) explains the difficulty of local implementation of climate related policy as one of 
conflicting priorities related to fundamental clashes of objectives.  
Tax collection and municipal funding 
Ongoing processes of political and fiscal decentralization have increased the autonomy of 
provincial and municipal governments (Caulfield, 2006; Cai & Treisman, 2007, Liu & Tao, 
2008; Liu & Salzberg, 2012). Today, municipal authorities in China are in charge of urban 
spatial planning, economic development strategies, and provision and funding of public 
services and infrastructure: electricity, transport, water and wastewater, and waste management, 
education and health, and enforcement of environmental protection legislation (Saich, 2008).  
Since 1994, China has a tax sharing system that divides authority of tax collection between 
government levels. Unfortunately, decentralization of responsibility has not been accompanied 
with equal capacity to raise funds, which has left municipalities with a low ratio of revenue to 
expenditures. The easiest way for cities to generate off-budget funds is through land 
concessions, which creates a disproportionate willingness of urban governments to invest into 
land development strategies (Liu & Salzberg, 2012). Liu and Salzberg (2012) estimate that 
through China’s tax sharing systems, subnational governments receive approximately 50%, 
whereas the funding responsibilities are approximately 70% of the total burden.  
This leaves municipal governments permanently underfunded and pressed to search for 
additional financial resources. A popular strategy of developing land to generate municipal 
revenues has contributed to rapid expansion of development of commercial property, also 
known as “construction binges”, resulting in the emergence of ghost towns and inefficient and 
irregular land use (Caulfield, 2006; Qi et al, 2008). The need for off-budget funding also 
contributes to support of expansion of major enterprises that contribute to the local economy 
by increasing the tax base (Liu & Salzberg, 2012). According to previous studies, taxes, fees 
and dividends from SOEs are a primary source of local government revenue as well as source 
of funding for local projects, which means that it is in the interest of the authorities to maintain 
key businesses in the urban area (Qi et al, 2008; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015).  
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Many local authorities in China face large debts while migration into cities places considerable 
pressure on service and infrastructure provision (Wei, 2015). In response to this problem, the 
Chinese leadership introduced a new budget law in 2014, with the aim to improve transparency 
and efficiency of local government spending, and increase trade with bonds and debt (Yu, 
2014). Another central government strategy to mobilize funding is to encourage new financing 
and cooperation models, such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) and build-operate-transfer 
schemes (BOTs). A fund of 180 billion RMB ($27 US billion) has been set up by the central 
government to encourage such projects, and in 2015 local governments planned to invest 8.7 
trillion RMB ($1.3 US trillion) into 6,650 PPPs in the areas of transportation, environmental 
protection, public service and infrastructure (Zhong, 2015). Public-private partnerships is seen 
as a way to mobilize financing for public infrastructure investment, such as in the transport, 
water and waste sectors (Choi et al, 2010; Stewart et al, 2014; Zhong et al, 2008).  
3.4.2 Cities as arenas of policy experimentation 
This section discusses the space for municipal authorities to engage in climate action, and the 
way in which this space is used to develop low carbon agendas. The section touches on central 
government led approaches as well as bottom-up initiatives.  
Environmental and low carbon model cities 
In 2008, the Ministry of Construction in cooperation with the international NGO WWF 
launched a pilot low carbon city project in Shanghai and Baoding (IEPD, 2012). In 2010, the 
NDRC followed this up by launching a low carbon pilot province and cities program.9 The pilot 
started out with five provinces and eight cities that were expected to prepare low carbon 
development plans and policies, restructure the economy, collect emission data, and promote 
low carbon lifestyles. In 2013, it was reported that some form of low carbon development had 
taken place in all the pilot cities as projects in different sectors (Xinhua, 2011).  
This pilot based strategy was preceded by a number of similar initiatives. The central 
government has developed standards for environmental model cities, which are to represent 
models of transformation to “resource saving” and “environmental friendly” models of 
development. These schemes were first introduced in 1992, when the Ministry of Construction 
introduced the National Garden City program. In 2003, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection launched a similar program for eco-counties, eco-cities and eco regions. This 
included a set of criteria, such as having an approved eco-city construction plan, independent 
environmental agencies, and exceeding energy saving targets (Zou et al, 2011). The Ministry 
of Construction initiated an Eco-Garden City program in 2004, which combined criteria from 
the model garden and model eco-city requirements (Zou et al, 2011). China’s 12th FYP (2010-
2015) set a goal of establishing 100 model cities, 200 model counties and 1000 model districts, 
under these green/new energy themes (Li et at, 2012).  
A separation must be made between eco-city building plans, which are comprehensive plans to 
shift urban development in a more sustainable direction, and eco-city projects, which are 
spatially contained developments located within or outside a city. Regarding eco-city projects 
encompassing entire cities, the Chinese Society for Urban Studies (CSUS) found in 2011 that 
276 out of China’s 287 cities had adopted low carbon or eco-city goals, and that more than half 
had begun to implement these (Li et al, 2012). Shenzhen was approved as China’s first low 
carbon demonstration city in 2010. The city was thus the first to adopt a low carbon 
development plan and an indicator system for low carbon projects (Baeumler et al, 2012).  
 
 
                                                 
9 China’s definition of a “low carbon city” is a city that has an energy consumption of up to 60% of the national 
average and display “low energy consumption, low carbon emissions and low pollution” (CURC, p.105, 2009a). 
The 60% energy consumption criteria is a measure that is relative against the average development levels of cities 
in China, rather than an absolute indicator of levels that need to be reached to be considered a low carbon city. 
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Urban low carbon schemes 
Low carbon strategies of Chinese cities have varied greatly, depending on economic 
development level, geographical location, economic structure and other factors. For example, 
Hangzhou has adopted a low carbon development plan involving strategies in a number of 
sectors, including buildings, transportation, lifestyles and the environment. Guiyang has 
adopted a ten point plan, which includes low carbon industry, adjustment of the energy 
structure, low carbon transport, buildings and forestry. Baoding has created a profile as an eco-
technology centre, which is leading in manufacturing of PV, wind, biomass, and solar thermal 
technology. Several municipal authorities, including Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and 
Chongqing, have adopted energy conservation standards in the construction sector that are more 
stringent than national policy (Yao et al, 2005). 
A common strategy has been to move heavy industries out of central areas, which has occurred 
alongside a transition towards a modern service sector (Li et al, 2012). Implementation of 
energy efficiency targets in the industrial sector has contributed to a steady reduction of carbon 
emission intensities in many cities (Wang et al, p.6202, 2012). Many cities have launched eco-
city projects, low carbon industrial parks, low carbon transport programs, tree planning 
campaigns, green construction schemes and large scale renewable energy projects. A broad 
trend is a shift from regulation and single sector energy policy towards more complex and 
integrated strategies and use of emission accounting (Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). 
Examples of municipal low carbon strategies are listed in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Examples of climate strategies and policy adopted at a municipal level in China 
City Low carbon programs 
Tianjin 
Collaboration with Singapore and Japan in developing low carbon demonstration 
zones, for example Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city SSTEC. 
Increased deployment of clean energy (e.g. waste-to-energy), increased afforestation 
and support of environmental industries.  
Acknowledged by the UNEP for its low-carbon economy development centre.   
Hangzhou 
Adopted a low-carbon plan under the 12th FYP that focused on buildings, 
transportation (public transport expansion and bicycle sharing), lifestyles, environment 
and society. 
High commitment to retrofitting. 
Establishment of an industrial park for clean energy and renewable energy business. 
Chongqing 
Large scale adoption of wind power, waste-to-energy technology, use of biomass in 
rural areas, and investments into hybrid vehicles. 
Establishment of a financial service centre (in order to shift economic structure towards 
services) and a renewable energy hub. 
Baoding 
Shift from textile and automobile manufacturing to a hub for renewable energy use and 
production (solar PV, biomass, solar thermal and energy efficiency).  
Establishment of Baoding Industry High Tech Development Zone in 1992 and 
adoption of an industrial cluster model similar to Silicon Valley (“Power Valley”). 
Shenyang 
Adoption of a low carbon plan extending from industrial makeup to buildings, 
transport, land use and lifestyles.  
Expansion of public transport and support of low emission vehicles. 
Kunming 
Local policies for renewables, such as regulation, funding mechanisms, low-interest 
loans, tax exemptions, municipal investments, and support for R&D and education. 
50% of all buildings to have solar water heaters and solar PV. 
Sources: Baeumler et al (2012) and municipality websites 
Many Chinese cities have adopted plans for provision of low carbon public service and 
infrastructure. After decades of shifting from bicycling to motor vehicle transport, some 
municipalities have developed non-motorized transport plans as part of their low carbon 
strategies, and aimed to improve conditions and safety for pedestrians (Mehndiratta, 2012). 
Cities have adopted integrated transport plans, improved BRT systems and combined these with 
bicycle schemes, and restricted car use (Oshita et al, 2015). There has been a rapid growth of 
investment into municipal waste-to-energy plants, in spite of environmental issues associated 
with these (Zhang et al, 2010).  
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Energy sector investments is a challenge for municipalities, as cities tend to have limited control 
over electricity systems. Large SOEs are in charge of more or less all of China’s power grids 
and pricing policies are primarily set by the central government (Oshita et al, 2015). Alternative 
pricing policies, contracting and allowing for competitions with electricity providers have been 
piloted to a limited extent on a local level (Ibid). On the other hand, the use of systems such as 
district heating systems and combined heat and power systems have increased rapidly in urban 
regions (Gong & Werner, 2014). 
A common way to promote the development of a circular economy and clean production is 
through the local establishment of eco-industrial parks (Fang et al, 2007). China’s Circular 
Economy Promotion Law supports use of industrial by-products as well as other industrial 
resource conservation strategies (Ibid). The MEP (at that time SEPA) has supported eco-
industrial parks since the 19900, and in the early 2000s around a thousand enterprises had 
launched industrial recycling projects (Ibid). Local governments play a key role in these 
projects in planning and providing industrial development parks.  
One way of experimenting with low carbon growth is to use eco-city projects to test and 
demonstrate alternative technologies and designs. Eco-city projects in China have attracted 
considerable attention, in particular because of the many high-profile, ambitious projects that 
have been launched (e.g. Sino-United Kingdom Dongtan Eco-City in Shanghai, Caofeidian 
International Eco-City in Tangshan, Sino-Swedish Wuxi Low Carbon Eco-City, Sino-Finland 
Mentougou Eco-Valley in Beijing, and the Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-City (SSTEC) 
(Baeumler et al, 2012). China’s most famous eco-city project is probably the Sino-Singapore 
Tianjin Eco-City Project (SSTEC). The project is an international collaboration project between 
China and Singapore and features a long list of KPIs for indicators such as carbon emission 
intensity, proportion of green buildings, waste generation and recycling, green transport and 
renewable energy use. Another famous example is Wuxi Taihu Lake New City, a low carbon, 
eco-city developed by the municipality under a framework agreement with MoHUrD. The eco-
city project is based on 62 KPIs, covering land use planning, green transport, energy and 
resource efficiency, ecological environment and green construction (Baeumler et al, 2012).  
The eco-city projects aim to exhibit progressive urban planning, infrastructure and 
technologies, such as zero-emission buildings, organic farms, and complete waste and water 
recycling. However, the projects have been criticized on various grounds. One issue is that 
many projects have been launched with tremendous fanfare, and eventually been abandoned 
before much development has taken place (Kaiman, 2014; Shepard, 2015). Dongtan eco-city 
in Shanghai, Caofeidian eco-city in Tangshan and Mentougou in Beijing are examples of this. 
Tianjin eco-city still stands mostly empty, and currently does not live up to eco-standards much 
higher than a regular European city in terms of energy sources, public transport or green space 
(Shepard, 2015).  
Other weaknesses are a focus on city-greening rather than integrated planning solutions, lack 
of comprehensive management systems, lack of awareness, and public participation (Baeumler 
et al, 2012). It has been argued that eco-cities in China are used by local authorities to attract 
investment and government funding (Shepard, 2015). These large scale technological intense 
projects are also criticized for representing “eco-topias”, in which lifestyles, habits, routines 
and citizens are completely ignored (Sze, 2014). Sze (Ibid) argues that power, politics and 
people are forgotten in techno-fetishist quests where sustainability is left in the hands of 
engineers.  
Caprotti (2014) questions the potential of Chinese eco-cities to act as frontiers of sustainability 
innovation and paths to a low carbon future. This argument relates to the spatial delimitation of 
these projects and the inherent limits of creating ecological enclaves situated outside heavily 
polluting, resource consuming industrial clusters. Chinese eco-cities are also spatially exclusive 
in being locations that promise ecological soundness for its inhabitants only (Capriotti et al, 
2015). Caprotti (2014) criticizes the definition of “eco” in eco-cities in China, which usually 
communicates potential of GDP generation and sophisticated technologies to local 
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governments, high-end developers and high-tech corporations. Not only do most eco-cities in 
China fail to live up these fancy expectations, but they are based on indicators that exclude 
social considerations (and often built by poor, socially excluded migrant workers). Moreover, 
the ideal of man-nature harmony on which Chinese eco-cities is based refers to settlements that 
are “stable, quiet and politically disengaged” (Ibid, p.15); Capriotti doubts whether these 
constructions create spaces where communities can flourish or even form at all.  
 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has provided insights into dynamics of environmental policy in China, which 
provides the foundation for the methodology and analysis of this thesis. The key premise that 
is central in the coming chapters is that within China’s fragmented authoritarian system, 
informal interactions contribute to formulation and delivery of environmental policy. Apart 
from central government institutions, these interactions predominantly involve local 
authorities, think tanks, businesses and foreign actors. Further, local authorities draw on these 
interactions to intervene in policy processes or projects related to local climate action. 
Questions that emerge from this literature review and that guide the coming chapters are: how 
are these interactions affecting urban policy processes? In which particular urban climate 
programs are non-state actors involved, and what responsibilities do they take on? How 
common are partnership arrangements in climate action, and what roles are transferred to non-
state actors through these arrangements? Finally, what do these observations tell us about 
principles of participation in environmental policy in China? 
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4 Methodology 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the methodology underpinning this thesis and the specific 
methods used in the research. The thesis adopts a mixed methods approach to answer to the 
requirement of providing detailed information about governance mechanisms on an urban level, 
as well as creating a broader understanding of urban climate governance in China.  
Building on the insights from Chapter 2, the methodology adopts the following understanding 
of environmental governance. Public intervention in environmental issues has evolved from a 
focus on traditional tools of government, towards voluntary and collaborative approaches 
(Glasbergen, 2007; Backstrand et al, 2010). This shift is associated with public policy being 
created through horizontal interactions in networks that span across the public-private-civil 
society divide (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Kickert et al, 1997; Pierre & Peters, 2000; Torfing & 
Sorensen, 2014). Climate governance involves multiple actors interacting across sectors, as 
well as across jurisdictions, scales and borders (Bulkeley, 2005; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; 
Bulkeley & Kern, 2009; Bulkeley & Newell, 2015). This indicates a need for the methodology 
to focus explicitly on activities of both public and non-state actors, as well as dynamics of 
interaction, in both formulation and delivery of climate policy.  
In accordance with the literature presented in Chapter 3, the methodology recognizes the 
following specifics of environmental policy in China’s political system. The central 
government plays a key role in formulating overarching policy guidelines, but a diversity of 
actors are involved in policy making processes (Lieberthal, 1992; He & Warren, 2011; Meidan 
et al, 2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). Policy discourses are shaped and contested by actors other 
than the central government (Zhan & Tang, 2013; Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012; Han et 
al, 2014; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). Although traditional environmental policy 
instruments remain important, central and local authorities are experimenting with new policy 
strategies, and to some extent, collaborative approaches are emerging (EPA, 2006; Mol & 
Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009; Cheung et al, 2009; Dauvergne & Listner, 2012). These trends suggest 
that to capture current climate governance strategies in China, it is necessary to focus on how 
authorities, companies, academic organizations, and green movements approach the climate 
issue and produce different types of initiatives and responses. 
This chapter explains how the methodology of the thesis is based on these theoretical 
considerations. The first section (4.1) presents the philosophy behind the research strategy and 
explains how this connects with the overall research design. Section 4.2 explains the rationale 
of the case study selection, data collection methods, and data analysis used for the case study 
material. Section 4.3 presents the methods used in the comparative analysis of the thesis, the 
selection of cities and climate initiatives, collection of data and method of analysis. Section 4.4 
presents the strategy and data collection method of the member check interviews used in the 
thesis. Finally, section 4.5 discusses issues related to validity and generalization, and 4.6 raises 
ethics considerations involved in the research. 
 
4.1 Research strategy 
The research question of this thesis is: How have municipal authorities and non-state actors 
participated in climate mitigation action in cities in China during the period of the 10th to 12th 
FYPs (2001-2015)? 
The literature review indicates that this question requires an understanding of processes of 
governance that extend across sectors, jurisdictions, and scales. To answer the question, it is 
necessary to delve into mechanisms of planning, as well as processes of policy implementation, 
and capture a variety of cross-cutting activities and interactions. This requires in-depth study 
of strategies and discourses related to policy processes, and information on climate 
interventions and programs in a specific case. At the same time, to build a broad understanding 
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of which aspects best explain current climate governance trends in China it is necessary to gain 
insight into the dynamics of multiple cases.  
The thesis therefore uses a multi-method approach that combines the strengths of qualitative 
and quantitative research. The reason for this is that qualitative methods enable insights into 
how governance processes unfold in particular contexts of urban development. At the same 
time, systematic comparison of categorical data in a database allows for an overview of 
governance trends. Within the social sciences, use of mixed method approaches is a common 
strategy used to achieve benefits of both qualitative and quantitative designs (Tashakkori & 
Teddlie, 2003). Mixed method approaches are particularly common in inter-disciplinary 
research, such as sustainability studies, which deal with multiple processes and dimensions; 
these tend to best be captured by combining different forms of data (Kemper et al, 2002).  
The qualitative research of this thesis builds on a case study approach that relies to a large extent 
on data collection through interviews. The justification for this strategy is that qualitative data 
collection is considered appropriate for studies that aim to understand complex phenomena, 
while interviews are a suitable method for creating rich descriptions (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
2003). The advantage of case studies is that they provide rich sources of qualitative information 
and are suitable for providing descriptions of mechanisms and processes (Gerring, 2006). 
Further, case studies are useful where the purpose of research is to grasp how activities on a 
micro level tie in to broader perspectives, such as global networks or structures and actions of 
and in nation states (Ibid). Yin (2003) proposes that case studies are useful for research that 
requires thick descriptions and detailed exploration of phenomena such as actor perceptions, 
motivations, or interactions. Therefore, case studies are an appropriate strategy for research 
based on “how” questions, which is the case in this thesis. Further, case studies are appropriate 
for studies where the purpose is to produce generalizable theories (analytic generalizations), 
rather than empirical results that needs to be transferable to other settings. This makes case 
studies a suitable research design for this thesis, which aims to contribute to the theoretical 
understanding of governance processes in China.  
Flyvjberg (2006) elaborates how case studies can be used as a suitable research strategy both 
to test and develop hypotheses and theories. He points out, firstly, that knowledge in the social 
sciences is inherently context-bound. The context-dependent nature of case studies can be seen 
as a strength of the approach, rather than a weakness, as it helps create more nuanced 
understandings of reality. Social research tends not to be neither predictive, universal, nor 
context-independent. This makes the strengths in producing practical, in-depth, context-related 
knowledge particularly important. Flyvjberg (Ibid) explains, secondly, that case studies can be 
an appropriate research strategy for both testing and producing theories. That is the case as one 
in-depth, well executed case study can be used to “falsify” paradigmatic theories, but also 
because entirely new insights frequently are generated through case study based research. For 
example, generalizable theories can be produced through case studies that are selected on a 
particular logic (for example, extreme cases, critical cases, or paradigmatic cases).  
Finally, Flyvjberg (2006) observes that the purpose of case studies is not to reduce all findings 
to one universal framework or theory, but to allow the findings to encompass both conflicting 
and ambiguous views and angles. This allows case studies to represent multi-faceted insights 
of complex processes and dynamics. In his words (Ibid, p.238), the narrative is the result, rather 
than “conceptual closure” pointing to a clear-cut set of variables. The question of whether a 
case study is an appropriate research strategy for a project is fundamentally problem-driven: 
what type of information is required to answer the research question. In this thesis, the research 
questions emphasize “how” governance processes are realized in cities in China. Conflictual, 
ambiguous, context-based narratives are an essential part of the answer to such a question. As 
a result, this thesis is to a large extent based on an in-depth case study and exploratory, semi-
structured interviews.  
Many previous studies of urban climate action have used case studies to generate detailed 
accounts of governance modes, network interactions and partnerships (Collier & Lofstedt, 
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1997; Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Holgate, 2007; Romero Lankao, 2007; 
Gustavsson et al, 2009; Simon & Leck, 2013; Mai and Fracesch-Huidobro, 2015). Bulkeley 
and Kern’s (2005; 2009) research on transnational climate networks draw on information 
collected in six case study cities in the UK and Germany to generate thick accounts of modes 
of urban governance. Bulkeley & Betsill (2005) use the case studies of Newcastle upon Tyne 
and Cambridgeshire to show how actors work through linkages across scales and levels in 
attempts to shape local climate discourses. Holgate (2007) uses two case study cities in South 
Africa to identify drivers of and barriers to local action, including partnerships and relationships 
between government levels. Simon and Leck (2013) similarly use two case study cities in South 
Africa to illustrate the role of intra-governmental collaboration in municipal climate efforts. 
Romero Lankao (2007) use a case study to identify institutional barriers to action in Mexico 
City.  
Nevertheless, numerous studies of climate partnerships and governance networks use a large-n 
design to systematically explain patterns of governance, including interaction in transnational 
networks and in climate partnerships (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Backstrand, 2008; Pattberg & 
Stripple, 2008; Pattberg et al, 2012; Andonova et al, 2009; Bulkeley et al, 2012, Castan Broto 
& Bulkeley, 2013). A quantitative approach allows for greater possibilities of generalization 
and insights into trends. Pattberg et al (p.7, 2012) state that large-n studies and database research 
on sustainability partnerships can “put into perspective individual, intensively studied cases, 
thus making sense of the relevance of particular partnerships within the overall universe of 
partnerships”. Previous large-n studies on sustainability partnerships and climate networks 
clarify trends of participation and leadership, partnership function, association between 
partnership type and accountability, or partnerships and innovation. As stressed by Gerring 
(2006), in-depth analysis can be complemented with database research as a strategy to explain 
trends and patterns beyond mechanisms in a single case. 
The large-n approach in this thesis employs a database to explore climate governance trends 
across multiple cities in China. Although the database contains 150 initiatives, it contains 
almost exclusively qualitative data; it can therefore be seen as a hybrid between a purely 
qualitative and quantitative approach. Nevertheless, some of the benefits of quantitative 
research are gained by using a qualitative database to complement the results of the case study. 
As noted by Tashakkori and Teddlie (p.33, 2003), one of the fundamental benefits of using a 
mixed methods research design is that it allows the researcher to ask a greater variety of 
questions. That is, while qualitative research tends to be better at exploring an unknown topic, 
quantitative research is better at testing and confirming theoretical propositions. In this thesis, 
the case study of Rizhao is used in an exploratory way, to generate thick descriptions of policy 
making processes and climate governance modes. In the case study, it is possible to ask 
questions about how and why certain processes occur the way they do. Subsequently, the trends 
that were indicated by the case study are tested by investigating governance patterns in 15 cities 
in China. Moreover, mechanisms that were indicated by the database analysis were explored 
further by relying on information collected through member check interviews. This allowed for 
analysis of, for example, actor motivations or perceptions that normally would be difficult to 
capture using a purely quantitative database research design. In this way, the case study, 
qualitative database and member check interviews provide complementary methodological 
strengths.       
Each research sub-question emphasizes one aspect of the phenomenon that is explored. Each 
question also requires different forms of data, and these needs have guided the development of 
the methodology. The sections below discuss the specific research strategy of each sub-
question.  
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4.1.1 Research sub-question 1 
The first sub-questions is: How have non-state actors participated in environmental planning 
processes in Rizhao during the 10th and 12th FYPs (2001-2015)?  
The focus of the first question is on processes and mechanisms involved in urban decision 
making arrangements. The primary research strategy has been to hold interviews with 
individuals involved in planning and policy making in the city. This approach draws inspiration 
from studies that use interviews as a data collection method to create insights into processes of 
urban planning related to climate issues. For example, Burch (2010) uses interviews as a data 
collection method in order to identify how actors in Canadian cities shape local environmental 
policy, as well as the institutional and conceptual barriers that arise in this process. Holgate’s 
(2007) study of policy making interactions in cities in South Africa uses interviews with 
officials and non-state actors to determine which factors influence formation of local climate 
policy. Another example is Tang and Zhang’s (2006) exploration of NGO involvement in 
environmental policy processes in China, which employs interviews as the key method of data 
collection.  
Interviews in this study were held with urban planners, researchers and local officials who have 
been involved in the city’s planning and policy making (further detail is provided in section 
4.2.3). The process of identifying these individuals involved contacting the central level 
planning and research institutes involved in drafting plans in the city (CAUPD and CAS), as 
well as reviewing key planning documents to identify which local organizations were in charge 
of key planning documents. The first respondents were questioned about other organizations 
and individuals involved in planning processes to make sure all relevant organizations were 
contacted (this strategy draws inspiration from the logic of snowball sampling). The interviews 
aimed to identify who participates in planning processes, what conflicts are encountered in 
planning, how conflicts are resolved and how decisions are reached. The interviews were 
complemented with document review of the city’s policy statements, local media websites, 
government websites, and previous research on environmental policy in Rizhao. The interviews 
were also complemented with quantitative data collection from Rizhao and Shandong 
Provincial Yearbooks (on urban environmental development trends, including data on pollution 
emissions, green space and built up land) to support (or contrast) the information shared by the 
respondents. 
A second strategy used to answer the first sub-question was to consider how policy preferences 
are framed in key planning documents, and how environmental discourses influence the 
inclusion of certain groups in urban climate action. As discussed in Chapter 2, metaphors, 
storylines, and narratives are important elements of environmental policy discourse (Hajer, 
1995; Dryzek, 1997). Revealing how environmental narratives are built on belief systems, and 
how certain narratives are promoted by discourse coalitions, helps to indicate how policy 
language is connected with social and political interests.   
Discourse analysis connects detailed analysis of text with broader ideologies and environmental 
development trends. In this thesis, the analysis aims to show how “neutral” policy objectives in 
China are associated with socio-political priorities, drawing inspiration from theories of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). CDA is a theory and method used to study relations between 
discourse and social developments (Jorgensson & Phillips, p.60, 2002). According to 
Jorgensson and Phillips (2002), CDA builds on a number of assumptions. The first is that 
discourse is an important social practice that contributes to the constitution of the social world 
(p.61, Ibid). Secondly, discourse is a form of social practice that constitutes the social world 
and at the same time is constituted by other social practices (p.62, Ibid). Third, CDA “engages 
in concrete, linguistic textual analysis of language use in social interaction (p.62-63, Ibid). This 
allows the theory to also be used as a method of analysis for social relations. Fourth, CDA 
assumes that discursive practices “contribute to the creation and reproduction of unequal power 
relations between social groups” (p.63, Ibid). This means that discourses can be used by groups 
to further particular interests, and that discourse analysis can reveal patterns of power relations. 
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As pointed out by Dijk (1993), a key principle of CDA (which he also refers to as socio-political 
discourse analysis) is that it can reveal relations between dominance of elite groups, power, and 
inequalities by understanding how these are produced in text and spoken language. In 
particular, CDA focuses on “the role of discourse in the (re)production and challenge of 
dominance”, where dominance is defined as the “exercise of social power by elites, institutions 
or groups, that results in social inequality” (Ibid, p.238). The purpose of CDA is to find how 
structures and properties (style, rhetoric, and meaning) of text and talk contribute to this 
reproduction. A central form of power that is revealed through such analysis is “power over 
minds”, rather than direct power over actions. That is, by reproducing discourses, groups can 
use text and speech to make certain social orders appear natural and self-evident. This is 
achieved by continuously shaping knowledge, beliefs, norms and understandings of social 
issues (Ibid).  
Access to discourse can be expressed by, for example, certain groups having monopoly of 
formulation over text. Dijk (Ibid) raises the example of company managers being in charge of 
executive board meetings and business reports, but also over broader news and media, and 
political discussions. Through such access, groups or actors are able to reproduce discourses, 
thereby cementing power relations. In this thesis, this type of access to discourses is studied by 
considering which actors have access to decision making processes and policy formulation in 
Rizhao. Dijk (Ibid) observes that access to discourse also is expressed as control over context. 
In this thesis, this dimension is explored by considering how existing problem formulations are 
reproduced in formal policy documents by being transferred across government levels. The 
underlying assumption is that reproduction of energy policy formulation in municipal planning 
documents is strengthening the role of certain groups of actors. Analysis of policy documents 
is used as a means to deconstruct how policy formulations associate energy challenges with 
agency of a certain group of actors. Moreover, the analysis of interview transcripts aims to 
reveal whether groups and actors use alternative discourses to challenge these power relations.  
In this thesis, China’s 12th FYP and Rizhao’s 12th FYP were subjected to textual analysis to 
find how energy policy goals are related to environmental and energy narratives. The language 
use in these two documents was compared with information about green development agendas 
shared by respondents in the interviews, to find how the discourses differed between groups 
and with what implications for environmental policy. The strategy of combining thematic 
analysis of text with detailed study of word use in interviews builds on the systematic 
approaches used by Dryzek (1997) and Hajer (1995), who have deconstructed language use of 
politicians, media, scientists, and green movements to understand how these groups create 
representations of environmental issues. The thematic analysis in particular builds in Dryzek’s 
categorization of environmental narratives and policy framing, which he connects with broader 
belief systems. More recently, the discourse analysis approach has been applied in studies of 
environmental policy in China. This thesis draws inspiration from such studies, for example 
Francesch-Huidobro and Mai’s (2012) deconstruction of environmental policy framing of 
GONGOs in Guangzhou. Also, it builds on the recognition that economic and social narratives 
are used by discourse coalitions in China to dispute and debate contested issues (Han et al, 
2014). 
Thematic analysis of policy documents fills the function of complementing data collection 
through interviews. The interviews with respondents in Rizhao aim to reveal actions, as well as 
overt motives and conflicts between actors and groups in the city. The analysis of interview 
transcripts allows to build an understanding of interactions between actors in planning 
processes, including details on strategies and actor interests. By contract, the analysis of formal 
documents provides insights into other dimensions of policy making on an urban level. The 
deconstruction of language use in national policy documents is performed in order to reveal 
that certain power relations between groups are determined even before urban planning 
processes begin. Therefore, the way in which policy preferences are formulated in formal 
documents dictates the room for manoeuvre of groups and actors on a city level.  
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Governance trends identified in the case study and the comparative analysis were evaluated 
using member check interviews with individuals who have worked with climate action in a 
number of cities in China. Member check interviews are performed by returning to the 
participants of a study and asking them to evaluate the conclusions of the research. This can be 
realized through focus group or repeated interviews. Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe this 
method as a crucial strategy for ensuring credibility of research results. Gerring (2006) 
describes it as a strategy of testing generalizability and validity of case study conclusions 
through interviews with key respondents (“experts”). In this study, the second and third rounds 
of interviews extended beyond the original respondents to include individuals involved in urban 
environmental planning in other cities China. These interviews aimed to assess information 
relating to the nature of involvement of local stakeholders and external “experts”, green 
development motives and environmental planning conflicts in environmental policy in China. 
The insights were used to tie together the results of the case study and the comparative analysis 
into a broader conclusion regarding principles of participation of non-state actors in 
environmental policy in China, which is discussed in Chapter 8.  
4.1.2 Research sub-question 2 
The second sub-question is: How have different modes of urban climate governance contributed 
to climate mitigation in cities in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)?  
To answer this question, information from the case study and the comparative study was 
combined. The first approach used in the case study builds on the studies of Bulkeley and Kern 
(2006) and Kern and Alber (2008), which are used as the theoretical basis for the concept of 
governance modes. Bulkeley and Kern’s (2006) study uses six case study cities in Germany 
and the UK, where interviews were conducted with local officials. In this study, the focus was 
on strategies used by local authorities in addressing climate change and how these can be 
categorized into four different governance modes. Kern and Alber’s (2008) article uses the 
same framework to discuss and categorize urban climate programs and initiatives that have 
been carried out in OECD nations.  
Building on this theoretical approach, the case study of Rizhao was used to identify modes of 
climate governance in the city’s low carbon development programs. This included mapping out 
the city’s energy saving and emission reduction schemes and identifying actors involved in 
each of these, as well as forms of collaboration and policy instruments used in each. However, 
in order to progress beyond initiatives introduced by local authorities, projects led by other 
actors were also included. The identification of informal climate initiatives builds on the studies 
of Bulkeley and Castan Broto (2012) and of Castan Broto and Bulkeley (2013), which consider 
any purposive intervention with an explicit purpose to reduce greenhouse gases or adapt to 
climate change. Building on this strategy, the case study in this thesis also considers initiatives 
led by private organizations, civil society, or through partnerships that aim towards energy 
saving or increased adoption of renewables (for example development of energy saving 
technology led by companies or low carbon campaigns led by semi-governmental 
organizations).  
As in Bulkeley and Kern’s study (2006), information about Rizhao’s energy saving and 
emission reduction activities was collected using interviews conducted with officials of 
municipal departments, local companies, and local researchers (further detail is provided in 
section 4.2.3). The interviews explored the involvement of different actors in local energy 
programs, as well as strategies and instruments involved in these programs. This information 
was complemented with a document review of Rizhao’s policy and planning documents, 
websites of local government and of local companies, government reports, and previous 
research. Quantitative information was also collected from Rizhao and Shandong Provincial 
Yearbooks, including data on energy use, energy sources and energy efficiency, public 
transport, investment figures, and government spending on environmental investments. 
Further information about which actors initiate and manage climate projects in cities in China 
was collected in the comparative study. The research strategy of the comparative study builds 
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on the abovementioned research of Bulkeley and Castan Broto (2012) and Castan Broto and 
Bulkeley (2013), which use a database design to explore what actors are leading climate 
experiments in cities, as well as what partnerships constellations are being employed. This 
quantitative approach to analysing forms and functions of climate partnerships has also been 
used by Andonova et al (2009) to create a typology of collaborative arrangements in climate 
networks, and of Backstrand (2008) to assess legitimacy and accountability of different 
partnership arrangements. Pattberg et al (2012) use a similar strategy to create a categorization 
of forms and functions of sustainability partnerships.  
In this thesis, the comparative analysis was based on information from 150 climate initiatives 
carried out in fifteen cities in China. Data about these initiatives was collected through an online 
search of local government websites, local media websites, company websites, and websites of 
international organizations. The information was used to construct a database of initiatives 
including systematic information in the type of actor leading initiatives, forms of collaboration 
were involved, policy instruments used, and how type of actor initiating and leading project 
was related with policy sector. This data was analysed to find how different forms of leadership 
and collaborative arrangements are related with type of initiative, sector, and initiative function.  
4.1.3 Research sub-question 3 
The third sub-question is: How have partnerships contributed to introduction of climate policy 
and technology on an urban level in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
Inspiration behind the development of this question was in particular drawn from Bauer and 
Steurer’s (2014) study of climate policy innovation through partnerships. This study shows how 
partnerships can contribute to diffusion of climate policy, as horizontal and vertical 
collaboration leads to sharing of policy elements.  
The research approach of the last sub-question is intimately connected with that of the second 
question. The database approach described above was the key strategy to answer this question. 
The database on climate initiatives include information about introduction of new policy or 
technology. The 150 climate initiatives were analysed to find how many of these involved 
partnerships, what forms of collaboration was used, and what function was performed by 
initiatives involving partnerships (rule setting, public service provision, technology transfer and 
technology development, information sharing and demonstration). The initiatives were also 
analysed to find if and how partnerships contribute to adoption of new emission reduction or 
energy saving technology and policy elements, and in which way innovation is related to 
partnership constellation.  
Data from the member check interviews was used to evaluate the results of this question, as 
well as to provide further information about the mechanisms suggested by the result. This 
included, for instance, examples that explain how policy is diffused through problem solving 
dialogues and technology that is developed in multi-stake demonstration projects. This 
qualitative approach allowed for comparison with the diffusion mechanisms suggested by the 
study of Bauer and Steurer (2014), which included collaboration, up-scaling and support by the 
national government.  
 
4.2 Case study  
This section presents the research methods used for the case study of the thesis. The logic 
behind the case study selection is explained, a brief introduction of the case study city is 
provided, and data collection methods and the procedure used for the data analysis are 
presented.  
4.2.1 Case study selection 
The prefectural city of Rizhao, located in Shandong Province, is a mid-sized, medium-income 
city that has followed the development trajectories typical of cities in Eastern China, such as 
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rapid population growth, GPD expansion, and economic restructuring towards the secondary 
sector (see Figure 1 and 2). Rizhao was selected for two reasons: as a case representing the 
processes of urbanization in the East coast of China, and as a city pioneering environmental 
action.  
The cities along the heavily industrialized coast represent a particular style of urban low carbon 
development in China. 10  These urban areas have experienced rapid economic growth, 
urbanization and industrialization, and now confront serious environmental degradation, such 
as air and water pollution, increase in built up land and loss of agricultural and forest land, and 
resource shortages. These cities are still undergoing relatively strong economic development 
and are tasked with the challenge of shifting this growth away from heavy, polluting industries 
towards clean, hi-tech and service industries. Many of the cities are still experiencing high rates 
of urbanization and are grappling with strategies to redirect infrastructure investment and urban 
planning towards models that place less pressure on environmental systems. Cities in other 
parts of the country are facing different types of challenges. For example, urban areas in the far 
west have only recently embarked on paths of industrialization, while areas in the north are 
stagnating rapidly. This thesis singles out the urban areas of the East coast, and chooses Rizhao 
to represent the development trajectories experienced in this region.  
In terms of demographic and economic development, Rizhao is representative of trends of the 
rapidly growing urban region in Eastern China. Figure 1 and 2 below illustrate Rizhao’s rapid 
GDP growth since the 1980s and a population growth that picked up between the 1970s and 
evened out in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 1: Rizhao GDP (100’000 RMB)              
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
 
 
Figure 2: Rizhao total population (10’000 people)              
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbook 
 
An aspect that is important to the choice of case study is the delay between national level policy 
intentions and actual development in the vast and variegated regions of China. Descriptions of 
change in China often emphasize development in relatively internationalized cities, which are 
                                                 
10 Within China’s political and administrative system, cities are ranked according to four different levels: cities 
directly under the central government, sub-provincial cities, prefecture-level cities and county-level cities. Out of 
these categories, most academic research referring to “cities” includes the three higher levels, collectively referred 
to as prefecture-level and above cities (PL&A cities). In 2012, China had 656 cities, out of which 290 were PL&A 
cities. The cities of the two top categories are often loosely referred to as Tier I cities, while provincial capitals are 
referred to as Tier II cities, and other PL&A cities as Tier III cities. The tiers are a colloquial term not based on the 
administrative divisions. 
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leading in terms of policy development, integration into global markets and technological 
innovation. Accounts of progress based on observations of development in cities like Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou overlooks the extent to which these arenas are used as the country’s 
face of progress. Mai and Francesh-Huidobro’s (2015) study of Guangzhou, Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong, suggests that an expanding nongovernmental space contributes actively to local 
climate action, through transferring information and innovations, and in building legitimacy 
around policy options. However, the engagement of green NGOs in climate policy in Hong 
Kong cannot be used as indication that civil society is becoming a political force in small cities 
on the mainland. 
To grasp the roles of and interaction between local authorities and non-state actors in urban 
climate governance, this thesis focuses on development in a medium sized, industrialized city 
with a lower income level than China’s leading megacities. Through this strategy, the aim is to 
make it clear which policy guidelines are contributing to real change on a city level and which 
constitute empty policy rhetoric, as well as which changes are being realized through activities 
taking place outside leading megacities. This thesis proposes that studying climate strategies in 
a mid-sized urban region provides more information about the way in which municipal 
authorities in “normal” cities engage in climate action under conditions of limited connections 
and resources.  
The second reason for choosing Rizhao as a case study is that it has actively engaged in 
environmental protection, eco-city construction and pursued low carbon development. Rizhao 
has received a number of awards based on its environmental performance, including the 2007 
World Clean Energy Award (WCEA) in “Policy and Law-making”, making it the only city in 
China to have received this recognition (RMPG, 2009a). In 2008, the municipality joined the 
Climate Neutral Network and was recognized as a “trailblazer” on route to zero emissions 
(UNEP, 2008). Rizhao received the UN-HABITAT award in 2009 for green planning. The 
municipal leadership claims that its use of participatory planning models and innovative 
governance instruments contributed to its progress and to receiving this recognition. After 
receiving the award, the city leadership stated the goal of becoming a carbon-neutral city 
(RMPG, 2009a).  
Media has noted the greening credentials of the city (Biello, 2008). Similar observations are 
expressed by international institutions (WWF, 2012) and in previous research on popularization 
of renewable energy sources in China (Bai, 2007a). Domestic awards include the China Human 
Habitat Environment Award, Top Ten Green City of China, National Model City for 
Environmental Protection, National Ecological Model City, National Garden City, National 
Sustainable Development Experimental Zone, National Sanitary City, National Pilot City of 
Circular Economy and National Ecological Demonstration Zone (RMPG, 2009a). Rizhao 
ranked first among the prefecture-level cities of Shandong Province in the assessment of urban 
environment comprehensive treatment for six years in a row and has been listed among the ten 
best cities in China for air quality (Feng & Xi, 2009; RMPG, 2009a).  
These achievements suggest that Rizhao engages in development of urban climate policy and 
programs and that the case study should provide information about roles and strategies of public 
and non-state actors and configurations of collaboration in these activities. The municipality’s 
adoption of climate programs and low carbon development goals suggest that public authorities 
are developing independent strategies for climate action. The case study aims to clarify the 
nature of these agendas and the strategies used to reach these goals.  
4.2.2 City introduction 
Rizhao is situated on the East coast of Shandong Province, China’s third largest province in 
terms of population and GDP. It is located in a coastal area which functions as a national centre 
for heavy industry and manufacturing. The region has allegedly been home to the prehistoric 
cultures of Dawenkou and Longshan, and has passed under the rule of the Dynasties of Xia, 
Shang, Qin, Han and Tang (RMPG, 2011a). The municipal government claims that the town 
86 
 
Liangcheng, situated in Rizhao prefectural area, is one of the oldest city regions in the Asia, 
dating back to 3500-2500 B.C. (RMPG, 2011a).  
After the establishment of China’s People’s Republic in 1949, Rizhao was placed under the 
administrative offices of the cities of Yishui, Jiaozhou and Linyi. Rizhao was awarded county 
city status in 1985, recognized as a prefectural level city in 1989, and divided into districts and 
counties in 1992. As a prefectural level city, Rizhao administrates four county-level divisions, 
made up of two districts and two counties: Donggang District, Lanshan District, Ju County and 
Wulian County, further subdivided into 54 administrative offices and 3014 villages (RMPG, 
2010). 
 
Figure 3: Map over Rizhao prefectural area        
Source: Rizhao Municipal Government (2010) 
At the time of the upgrade to prefectural status in 1989, Rizhao was facing various development 
challenges, such as lack of urban infrastructure and service provision and increasing 
environmental deterioration. The municipal government described the situation as follows: 
Rizhao was under-performing in comparison to most other neighbouring cities in China. 
Characterized by low per capita incomes and poor living conditions, the city lacked planning 
capacity and sufficient infrastructure and services. For example, in the entire city… there existed 
only 49 km of road, public green space per person was less than 3m², and waste and sewage 
treatment plants and other pollution controls were almost non-existent (RMPG, p.4, 2009a) 
As many other cities in China, Rizhao’s leadership responded to these issues by adopting of a 
set of urban development strategies in line with national growth policies, emphasizing 
industrialization as the foundation for socioeconomic improvement. Over the past decades the 
city experienced robust economic expansion, especially since the early 1990s. Rizhao relied on 
the primary sector until the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s so called “opening up and reform” 
programs at the end of the decade. The share of production within agriculture dropped 
consistently since the 1980’s, along with expansion of both the secondary and tertiary sector, 
although the increase in service industries declined in the last decade at the expense of industrial 
growth (Figure 4).  
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Figure 4: Rizhao Economic Structure              
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
 
Rizhao’s seaside location played an important role in its economic development strategies. 
There are two harbours in Rizhao, the central port and the port in Lanshan district, both 
strategically located for imports. The importance of the ports were noted as early as in Rizhao’s 
6th FYP (1980-1985) and the central port was put into operation in 1986 (Chinaports, 2010). 
Figure 5 illustrates the rapid growth of the city’s industrial sector, which took off in the early 
1990s and gained speed in the early 2000s.  
 
 
Figure 5: Rizhao industrial GDP (10’000 RMB)              
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
Rizhao’s industry makes up an essential part of the urban economy, especially the heavy 
industry located around the two ports. In 2006, twenty years after its construction, the loading 
capacity of Rizhao’s central port reached 100 million tons, and in 2010, the capacity had 
expanded to 200 million tons (RMPG, 2010; IMIW, 2013). The central port is listed as one of 
China’s major sites for handling imports of ore, nickel, wood-chips, soybean, grain, and cement 
(Chinaports, 2010). Rizhao is endowed with one of China’s largest ore berths and the city has 
become a base for national steel production, as well as for pulp and paper and petrochemical 
products (Ibid). Other major industries include the power sector, mechanical industry and 
metallurgy, building materials and electronics, textiles, biological pharmaceuticals and soybean 
products (CCPITRZ, 2010). By 2008, there were 38 major industrial enterprises by the port, 
accounting for 53% of the industry in the city (Chinadaily, 2009). 
Over the past decade, by far the largest share of investments in the city have been directed 
towards the manufacturing sector, as shown by Figure 6. Although the second largest sector, 
real estate, has expanded sharply in recent years, it still made up less than a fourth of the size 
of the manufacturing sector in 2010. Within the manufacturing sector, the largest investments 
have been directed towards a number of high-resource consuming industries, including paper 
and pulp, petroleum processing, transport equipment manufacturing, metallic product 
manufacturing and chemical industry.  
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Figure 6: Rizhao total fixed asset investment by sector (2002-2010) (10,000 RMB)       
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
As a result, a substantial share of Rizhao’s GDP, tax generation and employment is attributable 
to large industrial units. In 2013, Rizhao Steel Company reported sales income of 45 billion 
RMB and paid over one billion RMB in taxes (Rizhao Steel, 2013). In 2012, Rizhao Huaneng 
Coal Plant (the fourth largest plant in the province) had a production income of almost 50 billion 
RMB and paid profit tax of almost three billion RMB (Zhang, 2012a). The economic clout of 
these companies dwarf the economic capacity of the local government, which in 2010 reported 
total revenues of 5.5 billion RMB (Rizhao Municipal Yearbook, 2010).  
Over the past three decades, Rizhao Municipal Government has invested in infrastructural 
improvements, including upgrades of roads, water infrastructure, waste and sewage 
management, piping for natural gas and heating, and parks and market squares. The municipal 
government cites that in 2010, urban sewage treatment rate reached 91% and domestic waste 
treatment rate 98% (RPM, 2011). Average disposable income has expanded steadily along with 
GDP growth, as shown by Figure 7.  
 
Figure 7: Rizhao average disposable income (RMB)        
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
At the same time, many of the economic activities in the city have had a negative effect on the 
urban environment. As described in an interview with a local academic, Rizhao was established 
as a prefectural level city in 1989, at this time the ecological basis was “healthy” (Interview 
with local policy advisor, Rizhao, 2013.05.22). In 2000, the power plant was established, 
followed in 2002 by the pulp mill and other large industrial projects Consequently, the quality 
of air and sea water was affected, and the local environment “perceptibly deteriorated” (Ibid). 
Air and water pollution is caused by the industrial sector, which is both resource-intense and 
emission-intense (Wang et al, 2009). Expansion of built up land, especially residential and 
industrial zones, caused arable land and forest areas to decline, contributing to loss and 
fragmentation of natural habitats and biodiversity, primarily in the urban fringes (Wang et al, 
2009). Data from Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks shows that since the early 2000s, the area of 
built up land in the urban region has approximately doubled (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8: Rizhao growth of built up land         
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
 
4.2.3 Data collection  
The main method for data collection were semi-structured interviews. The interviews were 
complemented with review of media and policy documents and quantitative data collection 
from Rizhao and Shandong Statistical Yearbooks. Using semi-structured interviews as a key 
method for data collection is common in case study research. It was used as method for data 
collection in most of the case studies on urban climate action listed in the introduction of this 
section. It is also common to combine semi-structured interviews with other data collection 
methods. For example, Mai and Fracesch-Huidobro’s (2015) study of municipal governance 
networks in China uses three case study cities in China to illustrate mechanisms of municipal 
collaborative networks in climate action. This study combines interviews with analysis of 
quantitative data. 
Interviews: Selection of respondents and data collection strategies 
The interviews in Rizhao were carried out between January and July 2013. They included 
sixteen respondents from the public and private sector and academia. The aim was to speak 
with individuals with insight into the city’s energy saving and emission reduction policies, as 
well as into the city’s environmental decision making processes. This includes representatives 
of municipal authorities (the environmental protection bureau, development and reform 
commission, construction committee and economic and information technology commission), 
researchers at local universities, representatives of private companies (a paper and pulp 
company, chemical factory and solar technology firms), and researchers and planners who have 
participated in drafting plans and policy in Rizhao but are based in institutions in other 
locations.  
The interview questions were tied to key factors explored in the study, such as the nature of 
participation in policy making and planning, the nature and implementation of energy 
programs, participation in energy policy, key environmental and energy challenges. The reason 
for using semi-structure interviews was to allow respondents to elaborate freely and encourage 
descriptions based on their respective experience and knowledge about development in the city. 
The semi-structures format allowed the interviews to be tailored to the different roles of the 
respondents. Follow-up questions were used to explore questions were the respondents 
demonstrated particular insight. Questions proceeded from general to specific, and from less 
sensitive to more sensitive topics. Information about the respondents are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3: List of interviews in Rizhao  
 Date Sector Position Organization Knowledge of topic 
1 2013.03.13 Acad. 
Local academics 
(Group interview) 
Local university  
Working with research and teaching into 
environmental issues at university in Rizhao 
2 2013.03.13 Acad. Teacher/researcher Local university  
Working with industrial recycling research in 
Rizhao 
3 2013.05.22 Acad. Senior engineer Local university 
Working with environmental research and 
teaching, policy advisor in Rizhao 
4 2013.05.08 Gov. Manager Rizhao EPB 
Working for Rizhao’s municipal department 
responsible for environmental issues 
5 2013.05.14 Gov. Engineer/Planner Rizhao DRC 
Working as planner for a municipal 
department in Rizhao 
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6 2013.05.13 Gov. Dept. Director Rizhao CC 
Working with energy saving in buildings at a 
municipal department in Rizhao 
7 2013.05.09 Gov. Dept. Director Rizhao EITC 
Working with promotion of recycling 
economy at a municipal department in Rizhao 
8 2013.03.11 Private Company Director 
Paper/pulp 
company 
Working as director at a company that has 
adopted large scale industrial recycling 
systems 
9 2013.03.12 Private Company Manager Chemical factory 
Working as manager at a factory that has 
adopted large scale industrial recycling 
systems 
10 2013.05.19 Private General Manager PV company 
Working as manager at a company producing 
PV products in Rizhao 
11 2013.05.21 Private Sales Manager 
Solar heater 
company 
Working as manager at a company producing 
solar water heaters in Rizhao 
12 2013.04.19 Acad. Assistant Professor 
University 
(Beijing) 
Working as researcher, lecturer, planner, 
involved in Rizhao’s planning 
13 2013.03.22 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Urban planner 
Planning 
institute 
Working as urban planner involved in 
Rizhao’s planning (CAUPD) 
14 2013.05.08 Acad. Researcher 
University 
(Beijing) 
Working as researcher involved in Rizhao’s 
transport and spatial planning 
15 2013.05.17 Acad. Professor 
University 
(Nanjing) / 
Research org. 
Working with environmental research, was 
involved in drafting Rizhao’s eco-city plan 
(CAS) 
16 2013.05.17 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Dept. Director University (Jilin) 
Working as research into Rizhao’s urban 
development and ecological protection 
 
Collection of complementary data  
Complementary quantitative data was collected from Rizhao Statistical Yearbooks and 
Shandong Provincial Yearbooks, as well as from company websites and websites run by 
industry organizations and industrial alliances. This information was collected to support 
information collected through interviews, and included socioeconomic data (population, GDP, 
income, etc.), data on municipal environmental and energy trends (pollution, energy use, size 
of green space), infrastructure (transport, water), government budget (income and spending per 
sector), and (fragmented) company information (e.g. year of establishment, sales income, 
investment, taxes, registered number of staff energy consumption, economic savings through 
energy retrofits, awards for energy conservation). The quantitative data is summarized in Tables 
4 to 6 below. 
Table 4: Quantitative data collected from Rizhao Statistical Yearbooks 
Data Availability 
Socioeconomic: Population 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: GDP 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: GDP growth (cap) 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: Average disposable income 1989-2010 
Socioeconomic: Economic income/sector 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: Economic size/sector 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: GDP industry 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: Total exports/imports 1978-2010 
Socioeconomic: Total FDI 1990-2010 
Socioeconomic: Fixed asset investment/sector Varying 
Infrastructure: Length of highways 1978-2010 
Infrastructure: Length of water-pipes 1993-2010 
Transport: Public transport (passenger total) 1993-2010 
Transport: Public transport vehicles 1993-2010 
Transport: Private vehicles 2002-2010 
Energy: Total energy consumption/sector 2007-2010 
Energy: Total industrial energy consumption/sector 2005-2010 
Energy: Total industrial energy consumption/source 2006-2010 
Environmental: Population density 1993-2010 
Environmental: Water use/cap/day 1993-2010 
Environmental: Green area/cap 1993-2010 
Environmental: Urban built up area 2002-2010 
Environmental: Polluted water emissions 2002-2010 
Environmental: COD emissions 2002-2010 
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Environmental: Sulphur dioxide emissions 2002-2010 
Environmental: Dust emissions 2002-2010 
Government income per source 2002-2010 
Government spending per sector 2002-2010 
 
Table 5: Quantitative data collected from Shandong Provincial Yearbooks 
Data Availability 
Energy: Electricity consumption/10’000 RMB 2005-2010 
Energy: Total industrial energy consumption of enterprises over 
designated size/10’000 RMB 
2005-2010 
Energy: Household electricity consumption 2009-2010 
Energy: Industry electricity consumption 2009-2010 
 
Table 6: Quantitative data from websites of companies and industrial alliances   
Information 
Registered assets of major industrial units 
Year of establishment of major industrial units 
Production income of major industrial units 
Amount tax paid by major industrial units 
Energy consumed by major industrial units 
Energy savings through retrofits realized by major industrial units 
Size of state support (subsidies and awards) for retrofits 
Size of investments into green technology by major industrial units 
Registered assets of major green-tech units 
No. staff employed by major green-tech units 
Year of establishment of major green-tech units 
 
Further information was collected from government websites and news websites. The 
municipal government website (Rizhao.gov.cn) contains information (in Chinese) on news, 
local policy guidelines and implementation, websites of municipal government departments 
(EPB, EITC, DRC, etc.), environmental and energy achievements and projects. Key news 
websites include Rizhao News Web (the official news-site of the CPC committee of Rizhao 
Daily), Rizhao News (the online version of Rizhao TV and Radio Station), Dazhong Web (a 
Shandong-based site established under the State Council Information Office) and Qilu Network 
(the online version Shandong’s TV and Radio Stations).  
4.2.4 Data analysis 
To find how non-state actors have been included in environmental planning processes and how 
planning arrangements influenced environmental development, the information from the 
interviews was analyzed. The structure of the analysis followed the aspects identified as 
important in influencing policy outcomes in policy network studies. This refers to number and 
type of participants, consensus/conflict, and structures of power (Jordan & Schubert, 1992; 
Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; van Waarden, 1992; Dowding, 1995; Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Khan, 
2013). 
The analysis proceeded according to the following steps. The first step consisted of going 
through the interview transcrips to identify the key planning documents with an influence over 
the environment in Rizhao. This was followed by identifying which actors have been involved 
in drafting key policy documents, and determining what principle has been used in including 
these actors. The interview transcripts were then studied in detail to identify any planning 
conflict related to the urban environment, which actors were involved in these, and what their 
views were. The next steps consisted of determining how planning conflicts were resolved, 
what interests and development agendas influenced decision making, and which actors are able 
to pursue their interests in case of planning conflict. The last step consisted of considering how 
planning processes influence environmental development in Rizhao, for example in terms of 
resource use, environmental protection and spatial planning. 
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To find how new modes of urban climate governance have contributed to urban climate action 
in Rizhao, the collected information was analyzed as follows: 
 Identification of key energy saving and emission reduction policy and programs in 
Rizhao in relation to environmental protection, energy conservation and use of 
renewables in the industrial and construction sector, and emission reduction schemes 
in the transport and waste sectors. Climate programs are defined as projects with an 
explicit goal of energy conservation, increased use of renewables, enhanced carbon 
sinks or carbon fossil management (Solow et al, 2004). 
 Identification of the role of actors from the public, private and civil society sector in 
each scheme, as well as nature of collaboration with other actors.  
 Identification of policy instruments used in each program, as well as roles of actors, to 
identify mode of governance (authority, provision or enabling). 
 Determine (wherever possible) energy use and environmental trends associated with 
climate schemes, as well as establishment of new companies, development of 
environmental technology and expansion of the new energy sector. 
To find how partnerships have contributed to climate action in Rizhao, the collected case study 
information was analyzed as follows: 
 Identification of whether energy saving and emission reduction schemes involved 
cross-sector collaboration and the actors involved in these. 
 For schemes involving partnerships, form (actor constellation) and function (rule 
setting, service provision, demonstration, and information sharing and technology 
development) was determined.  
 To find whether partnerships contribute to innovation, each initiative was studied to 
find whether it had resulted in technology or policy development, as well as the 
mechanisms involved. 
Policy discourse analysis 
To answer the second aspect of the first sub-question, the language use in national and 
municipal policy documents was analyzed and compared with key environmental policy 
priorities presented through interviews. The textual analysis focused on China’s 12th FYP and 
Rizhao’s 12th FYP, which are the main documents outlining the development agendas and 
policy guidelines on a national and municipal level. These documents were selected because 
they are comprehensive planning documents that determine overall development direction of 
the city in terms of economic structure, urban form, resource consumption, and environmental 
protection efforts.  
The aim of the textual analysis was to find how environmental policy preferences are related 
with broader policy priorities. The assumption was that by deconstructing language use and 
framing of energy and environmental agendas in key policy documents, it would be possible 
to reveal how these agendas build on certain problem definitions and assumptions (Dryzek, 
1997). Dryzek (1997) studied such belief systems by analyzing how different environmental 
policy discourses have been advocated by groups with diverging interests and underlying 
assumptions about problems and solutions over the past decades. To capture the essence of 
these different narratives, Dryzek created a taxonomy of environmental discourses, where 
“environmental problem solving” is a dominating narrative based on dealing with 
environmental issues through pragmatic public policy (Ibid, p.15). Three forms of problem 
solving are widely applied: administrative rationalism, democratic rationalism and economic 
rationalism. Another narrative that has gained enormous traction is the sustainability discourse. 
This concept was introduced through the 1987 UN Report Our Common Future, which 
combines traditional development concerns with environmental protection. The sustainability 
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concept has been hugely popular, because of its promise that economic development can be 
achieved while maintaining a healthy natural environment.  
Another influential environmental discourse is ecological modernization. The theory of 
ecological modernization explains how industrialized nations cope with ecological 
deterioration by perceiving science, technology and market forces as key solutions to 
environmental issues (Mol, 1997). The concept represents the idea that capitalist society can 
transcend into an environmentally sustainable future through reliance on far sighted leaders 
and firms that profit on environmental friendly technology (Dryzek, 1997). The discourse 
portrays environmental issues as positive-sum games in which economic growth and 
environmental solutions may be reconciled (Hajer, p.26, 1995). The ecological modernization 
discourse was widely embraced because it allows societies to have it all: continued 
industrialization and social progress without harm to the natural environment (Gibbs, p.10, 
2000). In 2005, Meadowcroft referred to ecological modernization as the strongest claim to a 
“general theory” in contemporary environmental politics (p.482). Although the concept now is 
used to a lesser extent, this thesis argues that the concept is relevant in explaining current 
technology centered energy policy in China.  
Drawing inspiration from theories of CDA, it was assumed in this thesis that analysis of 
language could be used to reveal how some groups are empowered, while others are 
marginalized (Jorgensson and Phillips, 2002). The method used for textual analysis of the two 
policy documents was thematic analysis. The qualitative data analysis and research software 
Atlas.ti was used to perform co-occurrence runs of codes in the documents. The process of 
analysis followed the steps proposed by Braun and Clarke (2006), as is explained below. 
The first step consisted of familiarization with data. The two FYPs and interviews carried out 
in Rizhao were read multiple times and initial ideas were noted down and compared with ideas 
from previous studies of environmental policy discourses. The second step consisted of 
generating initial codes and applying these to the FYPs and the interview transcripts. The theory 
guiding these creation of these initial codes were Dryzek’s (1997) environmental narratives 
(administrative rationalities, carrying capacity, environmental protection, market rationalities, 
ecological limits), political slogans in China (beautification, circular economy, environmental 
industry development, harmonious development, livable city, resource conservation, resource 
efficiency, scientific development, technology and innovation, three represents), and previous 
studies of environmental and energy policy in China that have identified specific discourses as 
especially important (energy security, modernization, energy efficiency, conservation, 
sustainable development) (Beyer, 2006; Cherni & Kentish, 2007; Zheng & Tok, 2007; Qi et al, 
2008; Meidan et al,  2009; Tsang & Kolk, 2010). 
The next step consisted of refining the codes into themes. The most commonly appearing codes 
were clustered together and arranged into themes. When creating themes, adjustments had to 
be made to adjust codes based on Dryzek’s environmental discourse theory to the political and 
language context. In particular, it turned out that discourses such as “sustainable development” 
or “ecological modernization” were interwoven with Chinese policy slogans (such as “scientific 
outlook on development”). To tackle this issue, complex concepts were broken down into 
components, such as “industrial upgrading”, “resource conservation”, “technology innovation” 
and “resource efficiency”. After repeated reviews of the policy documents and transcripts, the 
large number of codes was narrowed down to a smaller number of themes that were most 
commonly used in the policy documents: market measures for resource saving/environmental 
protection, administrative measures for environmental protection, industrial upgrading for 
resource saving and environmental protection, technology and innovation, and ecological and 
environmental protection.  
Next, specific searches were made to find connections behind themes. Using Atlas.ti, the 
themes were analyzed by using a code co-occurrence explorer. A co-occurrence explorer 
analyses to what extent codes are occurring in proximity to each other in the documents, for 
example by being mentioned in the same sentence or paragraph. The explorer calculates how 
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often different codes are mentioned in proximity to each other and represents the occurrence as 
a fraction (for example, out of all the references to “energy”, a third are made in relation to 
“technology and innovation”). The co-occurrence explorer was used to find to what extent 
references to “energy”, “environment”, “ecology”, “low carbon” and “climate” policy 
connected with the coded themes. In particular, the co-occurrence explorer was used assess 
connection between “low carbon” and “energy” with the themes “industrial upgrading”, 
“technology innovation”, and “ecological protection”.  
Finally, co-occurrence between themes in the municipal and national FYPs were compared with 
interview transcripts.  The last step of the analysis consisted of finding how language use in the 
formal policy documents differed from language use in the interview transcripts. The themes 
in the policy documents were, in particular, compared with the way in which planners from 
central research institutes presented environmental issues and solutions. Any systematic 
differences in the way that environmental issues were framed was identified. For example, this 
includes tendencies of different actors to refer to environmental agendas as policy issue 
associated with economic development strategies, industrial policy, technology innovation, or 
ecological protection.    
4.2.5 Case study limitations 
Several challenges emerged in the research process of this thesis, especially in the first data 
collection phase. This includes limited access to data, including both qualitative and 
quantitative sources. It also includes sources of bias in the data collection, as presented in this 
section.  
Participation in interviews 
In the case study, a crucial barrier was the difficulty of securing participation of key respondents 
in interviews. This problem was most pronounced in Rizhao’s private sector, as most 
companies did not agree to participate in interviews. Upon being contacted, the companies 
asked about permission from the top level of the municipal government, required in order to 
certify that the questions asked were approved by the local authorities. This issue is common 
in China. In a political climate where information is not shared freely and trust depends on 
personal connections, it is often difficult to ensure participation in research projects.  
In the interviews that were carried out, there was a tendency of unwillingness of local officials 
and company representatives to share information. In absence of this information, a bias was 
created through a larger share of the information collected from planners and academics. 
Further first-hand information from industrial units and other firms would have been helpful in 
order to completely understand their role in planning and realization of local climate programs.  
To handle these issues, one strategy was to employ the thesis author’s position at China 
Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD) during the course of the data collection. As 
CAUPD were involved in the city’s planning, the institute had personal contacts in Rizhao and 
were used as a reference to gain trust from respondents. This was helpful in acquiring interviews 
from planners, researchers and government representatives. It was not, however, enough to 
convince industrial units to participate in the study. As a result, none of the city’s high energy 
consuming units (e.g. the power plant and the steel factory) participated in the interviews.  
To deal with this shortcoming, information about the private sector was collected from other 
respondents, news articles and company websites. Another strategy to deal with this problem 
was to carry out member check interviews with representatives of the private sector in 
Shandong Province. Interviews with a steel company, two paper and pulp firms, Shandong Iron 
and Steel Industry Alliance and an industrial paper research institute were held in 2016. During 
the interviews held in 2016, the author of this thesis worked at the Science and Innovation 
Office of the Embassy of Sweden in Beijing, which by many actors is seen as a legitimate point 
of contact and collaboration. This helped to create access to the type of respondents that 
declined to participate in the study during the data collection in 2013.  
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Lack of quantitative data 
Regarding quantitative data, the case study lacks information that would have been useful, such 
as urban energy use (over a longer time span), emission data (none was available) and energy 
use and emissions of sectors other than industry (e.g. energy use of buildings and residential 
energy consumption). Other quantitative data that would have been useful is information of the 
green technology sector in Rizhao (number of firms, size of profit and incomes). The data 
obtained in China’s statistical yearbooks has been suggested by previous researchers and in 
interviews in this study to be unreliable. To deal with this problem, the quantitative data was 
not used in this study as basis for the analysis, but primarily as supportive information to 
indicate environmental development. The focus of the analysis is planning processes, 
governance mode and partnerships, where energy data would have been of much use but is not 
crucial to uncovering mechanisms involved in policy processes. 
The difficulties in use of ethnographic observation 
At the outset of the field study, the methodology of the case study was to include interviews 
with “the public” and ethnographic observation to get an understanding of how residents in 
Rizhao are involved in environmental programs in the city. One plan was to perform surveys 
with households to investigate drivers behind adoption of solar water heaters on buildings. 
These methodological approaches were abandoned during the time spent in Rizhao. The 
researcher spent several months in the city, speaking to people in shops, taxis, public transport, 
restaurants, tourist destinations, and on the streets. These discussions involved the purpose of 
the research project: Rizhao’s environmental agendas. Broadly speaking, nobody was aware of 
these efforts. Several individuals suggested that perhaps the wrong city had been chosen 
(“perhaps you should go to Zibo instead”)? Most people had no idea about the widespread use 
of solar heaters. Almost nobody had heard of the concept low carbon (“you mean coal? The 
pollution here is terrible”). Perhaps the most discouraging moment was a focus group with a 
number of local environmental researchers, out of which nobody was aware of the city’s climate 
projects.  
This discovery was interesting in itself, as it points to the dominant top-down approaches used 
in Rizhao’s environmental policy. Even though municipal policy documents (RMPG, 2009a) 
emphasize participatory approaches, this was not reflected on the ground. This does not prove 
that such strategies were not used at all, but at least their traction in the population is low. While 
many individuals express interest in the environment, and concern with local environmental 
degradation, there is no sense of opportunity to affect these trends or recognition of government 
effort in this area.  
 
4.3 Large-n study 
This section presents the methodology of the comparative study of the thesis. This involves 
rational behind the selection of cities and initiatives, the method of data collection, as well as 
the method for data analysis.  
4.3.1 City selection  
For the comparative analysis, 150 climate initiatives were selected from fifteen cities in China. 
The cities were selected based on the criteria of being places where significant climate action 
has been carried out, and being places where new models of cross-sector cooperation are likely 
to emerge. The sample was chosen with the aim of representing leading examples, or flagship 
projects, of climate action on a city level.  
The selection includes seven cities that were selected for NDRCs first low carbon pilot project 
(Baoding, Chongqing, Hangzhou, Guiyang, Shenzhen, Tianjin, and Xiamen). In 2010, the 
NDRC launched a low carbon pilot province and cities program, with the purpose of finding 
and supporting practical experiences of low carbon development that may be up-scaled in other 
cities (NDRC, 2013). The pilot cities were expected to prepare low carbon development plans, 
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formulate new policies, introduce systems for collection of GHG emission data and promote 
low carbon lifestyles. Since these seven cities have been part of the low carbon pilot scheme 
since it was launched, they can be expected to be at the forefront of experimentation with urban 
low carbon solutions in China.  
Five cities were also selected from the NDRCs second batch of pilot cities, which were added 
to the program in 2012 (Beijing, Guangzhou, Kunming, Shanghai, and Qingdao). This includes 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou: cities that are leading in economic growth and that have 
been included in China’s emission trading pilot scheme. For geographical variation, Kunming 
from the southern Yunnan Province was selected from the second batch, along with Qingdao, 
located in Shandong Province on China’s east coast. Finally, three cities that are not included 
in the pilot program, but that have been described as forerunners in terms of climate agendas, 
have been included in the sample (Rizhao, Shenyang and Wuxi). The idea was to include cities 
that have pursued low carbon agendas (seemingly) independent from the central government 
pilot program. Rizhao has received UN-HABITAT’s award for green planning in 2009 and a 
World Clean Energy Award for the popularization of renewable energy sources in 2007. Wuxi 
is engaged in an international Low Carbon Future Cities (LCFC) project, is known as a centre 
for clean-tech production and has launched several ambitious low-carbon, eco-city projects. 
Shenyang is engaged in the ICLEI network, through which it as adopted a four-step program 
for realizing low carbon development.  
The selection displays variation in terms of socio-economic performance, economic structure 
and geographical location. A limitation is that Western China is not represented. The reason for 
this is that the relatively well-known climate projects in China are concentrated along the 
densely populated, high income East coast. Figure 9 shows the locations of the ten cities 
selected for this study, and Table 7 provides a summary of the cities included in the study. 
 
Figure 9: Map showing selection of cities used for comparative analysis 
Table 7: List of cities selected for comparative analysis 
City  Province Population1  
(2013, million) 
GDP / capita 
(2013, CNY) 
Primary / secondary / 
tertiary sector (%) 
Chongqing Chongqing 30 42 167 8 / 50 / 42 
Shanghai Shanghai 24 90 000 1 / 37 / 62 
Beijing Beijing 21 92 857 1 / 22 / 77 
Tianjin Tianjin 14 102 642 1 / 51 / 48 
Guangzhou Guangdong 13 118 615 2 / 34 / 64 
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Shenzhen Guangdong 11 131 818 0 / 43 / 57 
Baoding Hebei 10  29 000  13 / 55 / 32 
Qingdao Shandong 9 89 000 4 / 46 / 50 
Hangzhou Zhejiang 9 92 666  3 / 43 / 52 
Shenyang Liaoning 8 89 500 5 / 52 / 43 
Kunming Yunnan 7 48 857 5 / 45 / 50 
Wuxi Jiangsu 6 134 500 2 / 52 / 46 
Guiyang Guizhou 5 41 800 4 / 41 / 55 
Xiamen Fujian 4 75 500 1 / 48 / 51 
Rizhao Shandong 3 50 000 9 / 52 / 39 
1 CK, 2014 
4.3.2 Initiative selection  
From each city, ten climate initiatives were selected. Climate initiatives are defined as projects 
with an explicit goal of either of the following: energy conservation, increased use of 
renewables, enhanced carbon sinks or carbon fossil management (e.g. CCS). This is based on 
five categories for climate mitigation strategies identified by Solow et al (2004).  
The process of selecting the initiatives consisted of two steps. The first was to identify 
initiatives described as successful “climate” or “low carbon” projects through a systematic 
search of municipality websites, municipal or provincial news websites, websites of companies 
or local organizations, and international media. If less than ten such projects could be identified 
(which was the case for most cities), the second step was to identify projects that are described 
as having the aim of energy conservation, increased use of renewables, enhanced carbon sinks 
or other carbon fossil management. This was done by systematically searching the same 
websites as above. The initiatives have been carried out within the administrative boundaries 
of the cities included in this study, although a couple of initiatives are broader projects that have 
been implemented in multiple geographical locations.  
Certain types of climate efforts are centred outside of city regions, while others are more likely 
to be located in cities. China’s investments into large scale renewable projects, for example, are 
to a large extent occurring outside urban areas. This includes large hydropower projects, as well 
as wind farms and solar power generation projects in the Western regions. China’s investments 
into bio-power is to a large extent based on use of agricultural and forest waste, which is 
collected and used outside of cities. Energy efficiency schemes in the industrial and 
construction sectors are, on the other hand, to a large extent concentrated in urban regions, as 
are most eco-city construction projects, retrofit schemes, waste-to-energy plants, and energy 
technology research centres. This means that there is a certain bias related to what type of 
initiatives are included in the selection, and that patterns of leadership and partnership are likely 
to differ in energy projects located in rural regions.  
4.3.3 Data collection method and materials  
The initiatives were collected as records in an Excel database. For each initiative, the following 
information was collected and filed: (1) year the initiative was launched; (2) sector; (3) type(s) 
of organization that led the initiative; (4) partnerships involved in the initiative; (5) functions 
performed by the initiative, and (6) new technologies or policy/planning practices introduced 
through the initiative.  
Year of launch 
Most of the selected initiatives have taken place in the 2000s, with the majority launched 
between year 2005 and 2015. In this sample, the largest amount of initiatives per year was 
introduced between the years 2010 and 2011. This peak may be associated with the launch of 
NDRSs low carbon pilot scheme in 2010. The earliest project selected in this study was 
launched in 1998 (a waste-to-energy plant in Hangzhou) and the latest in 2015. The year of 
launch of the initiatives is shown by Figure 10. 
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Figure 10: Year of launch of urban climate initiatives selected for comparative analysis 
Sector 
The initiatives were categorized into the following sectors: industry, energy, construction, 
transport, land use/forestry, eco-city/eco-community projects, and waste. The division is based 
on the categorization of climate projects used by the World Bank (2010), with the additional 
category of climate change information dissemination projects, understood as projects 
specifically aiming to spread information about climate change issues and low carbon 
development. The initiatives were selected with the aim of identifying initiatives from different 
sectors in each city. Most of the initiatives were carried out in the industrial and energy sectors, 
with the least number of cases in the waste sector and related to low carbon information 
dissemination (Table 8).  
Table 8: Share of initiatives per sector of selected initiatives 
Sector Number of initiatives (%) 
Industry 32 (21%) 
Energy 27 (18%) 
Construction 20 (13%) 
Transport 19 (13%) 
Land use/Forestry 19 (13%) 
Eco-City 14 (9%) 
Dissemination 10 (7%) 
Waste 9 (6%) 
 
Leadership 
Type of actor leading the initiative was organized according to the following categories: 
municipal authority, company, civil society (local academia/local NGO), national or provincial 
authority, and foreign/international organization, and PPP. When determining leadership of the 
initiatives, the first step was to determine actor in charge of initiation and management of an 
initiative. As is discussed further in the Chapter 7, the question of leadership involves multiple 
aspects. Many of the initiatives that are initiated and managed by companies or local authorities 
are often in some way directed by higher level government policy guidelines. The issue of 
leadership becomes more complicated by the fact that many initiatives are managed by more 
than one actor, where actors take on different roles (e.g. financing, contracting, managing, 
designing or planning). Type of cooperation involved in the management of the initiatives, as 
well as a detailed account of different roles of different actors, is discussed in Chapter 7. Apart 
from “leading” actors, any other actors involved in the initiative were also listed in the database.  
The most common actor in charge of initiatives in this sample is municipal authorities. As 
shown by Table 9, just over half of the initiatives (52%) in this sample are led primarily by a 
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municipal authority, with the second largest group being companies (36%) and the third largest 
civil society (10%).11 
Table 9: Actor type leading selected climate initiatives 
Actor type  Number of initiatives (%) 
City authority 77 (51%) 
Company 53 (36%) 
Local Academia/NGO 11 (7%) 
International organization 5 (3%) 
National or provincial authority 2 (1%) 
PPP 2 (1%) 
 
Municipal authorities include Planning Bureaus, Construction Committees, Development and 
Reform Commissions, Transport Bureaus, Environmental Protection Bureaus, Industry and 
Information Technology Commissions or Science and Technology Commissions. The 
municipal departments are in charge of projects within their respective areas of jurisdiction, 
such as planning bureaus being in charge of spatial plans and urban form, construction 
committees in charge of energy saving schemes in buildings and development and reform 
commissions in charge of broad emission reduction schemes.  
Companies in the sample include state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (58%), private companies 
(36%) and a few companies registered as public-private hybrids (6%). 12  SOEs include 
municipal firms formed out of previous departments, as well as large units that operate on a 
provincial level, in all of China and overseas. Private companies are primarily companies 
specialized in environmental technologies.  
Initiatives led by local academic organizations or NGOs are heavily dominated by semi-
governmental research institutes and think tanks. This includes local branches of China 
Academy of Sciences or China Academy of Science and Technology, as well as municipal 
research and design institutes. There is one university-led initiative, and only one initiative led 
by an organization listed as an NGO (China Sustainable Transport Centre). However, both of 
these organizations participate in these initiatives in role of researcher/technical advisor. In 
Chapter 7, this category of leadership is referred to as domestic academia, as all of the actors 
in this category have a research/technical profile. None of the initiatives is led by local 
communities. This confirms the weak role of independent civil society in China and the way in 
which “expert” organizations have a much stronger representation than community-led 
organizations or political movements in urban environmental projects. 
In this sample, 4% of the initiatives are primarily led by foreign or international organizations, 
which include foreign firms and research institutes, international NGOs, multilateral 
institutions and bilateral cooperation partners. This indicates that in spite of China’s increasing 
participation in global forums and cooperation with international organizations, the influence 
of international organizations on a municipal level remains limited. The cities selected for this 
study were chosen because they were likely to have a higher degree of internationalization than 
the average in China. This means that if international organizations have a weak representation 
here, it is probably even smaller in other urban areas. However, as will be further discussed in 
Chapter 7, participation of foreign organizations through partnerships is relatively common.  
Only one per cent of the initiatives is directly managed by national or provincial authorities. 
This seems to indicate that higher level government authorities rarely are directly in charge of 
                                                 
11 This share is similar, but lower, than that which was found in a study of climate experiments carried out in one 
hundred global cities (66%)(Castan Broto & Bulkeley, 2013). 
12 These are companies based on private and public ownership. Initiatives led by such companies are listed as 
company-led. The initiatives that are listed in the study as PPPs are initiatives that are led by a company and a 
municipality.  
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municipal climate projects in China, and that municipal authorities play a strong role in local 
action. Yet, consideration of the way in which local initiatives are shaped by higher level 
guidelines points to the strong influence of central and provincial government over local action.  
Function 
Defining the function performed through the climate initiatives follows on research of 
sustainability partnerships discussed in Chapter 2. A range of functions have been listed in 
previous research, out of which many studies conclude that “soft” functions (e.g. raising 
awareness, sharing information and knowledge) are most common. Glasbergen et al (2007) 
identify common functions as raising awareness, dissemination of information, providing 
technology assistance, and developing sustainable products. Pattberg et al (2012) identify a 
longer list: agenda setting, rule making and standard development, advocacy and lobbying, 
norm setting and information dissemination, knowledge production, implementation, planning, 
capacity-building and training, technology transfer, and service provision. Backstrand (2008) 
identifies advocacy, standard-setting and rule-making, implementation and service provision. 
Andonova et al (2009) identify information sharing, capacity building and implementation, and 
rule setting. This thesis categorizes initiatives into the categories of rule setting, provision of 
services/infrastructure, provision of incentives, information/ demonstration, technology 
development/capacity building, and clean production.  
Bulkeley and Kern (2006) define rule setting as introduction of some sort of binding rule, 
including local policy, regulations and spatial plans. Rules are contrasted with what in the 
governance literature is referred to as “soft tools”, that is, non-binding policy that influences 
actors in other ways than binding regulation. In the comparative analysis, the category of rule 
setting includes both hard and soft tools: construction requirement, emission control zones, 
emission reduction plans, such as comprehensive industrial emission reduction action plans, or 
low carbon transport plans. Provision of public service and infrastructure includes public 
transport, waste and energy infrastructure. Infrastructure in the form of single or multiple 
buildings through low carbon construction projects is not included in this category. Information 
dissemination includes exhibitions, campaigns or similar awareness-raising activities. 
Demonstration projects include low carbon buildings and districts. Eco-city projects involve 
spatial planning, provision of infrastructure, technology development, information 
dissemination and demonstration. In this study, these projects are categorized as demonstration 
projects, as a key function of eco-cities often is to try out and show-case new planning and 
technology solutions.  
The principle of “technology transfer” builds on the logic that developing countries need to 
access technology in developed countries in order to speed up sustainable development 
trajectories and achieve leap-frog development. The UN and the World Bank (2015) sees 
technology transfers as an important aspect of sustainability partnerships. It is also an aspect 
that has been raised in the academic literature (e.g. Pattberg et al, 2012). Capacity building is 
defined as initiatives that explicitly aim to improve knowledge or tools, for example through 
staff training or development of new policy toolkits. 
Introduction of new policy and technology 
To investigate if and how partnerships contribute to new technology or policy, any “new” 
energy saving and emission reduction technology or policy practice was listed in the database. 
Deciding whether a technology or policy is new is inherently difficult, as it requires 
comparisons of both time and place. The literature on policy innovation generally accepts that 
adoption of “new” policy is a result of diffusion of policy elements from other administrative 
jurisdictions or other policy domains, and rarely something entirely new. This study relies on 
this understanding and uses Bauer and Steurer’s (2014) definition of new climate policy. This 
was developed in the context of finding how climate partnerships contribute to policy 
innovation. This definition is “new instruments that have not been applied before in a sector, 
region, or local authority and changes in existing instruments that take climate-change 
adaptation into account” (p. 821, Ibid). Technology is similarly accepted as new if it is adopted 
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for the first time introduced in a city. Initiatives that may be expected to eventually produce 
new technologies or practices (e.g. research centres) are not counted below, as the outcome of 
such efforts is unknown. 
In this study, a technology or policy is accepted as new if it is self-reported in a city as 
introduced for the first time, according to available information and the best knowledge of the 
researcher. This is a generous approach to innovation, in part adopted out of necessity. 
Determining if and where the technology or policy really has been used in a city before is a task 
that is outside the scope of time and resources of this thesis. It is possible, therefore, that 
technologies or policies are promoted as new in the name of promotion. There is a risk that the 
results over-estimate the number of new technologies or policy elements, which is taken into 
account in the discussion of the results. 
4.3.4 Data analysis 
The data analysis was carried out in the following steps: 
 Determine how many of the initiatives were carried out by each type of actor.  
 Determine how many initiatives in each sector were carried out per type of actor, by 
creating a cross tabulation table. Correlation between actor type and sector was tested 
using Pearson’s Chi-square test.  
 Determine function of the initiatives. Determine correlation between leadership and 
initiative function, by cross-tabulation of initiative function per type of leading actor. 
Correlation between actor type and function was tested using Pearson’s Chi-square test.  
 Determine how many initiatives involved partnerships, as well as form of partnership 
(actor constellation and roles of different actors), and function of these initiatives.  
 Determine which initiatives involved policy or technology innovation, as well as how 
many of these involved partnerships. This was followed by testing correlation between 
partnership form and introduction of new technology and policy or planning practices 
using Pearson’s Chi-square test. 
 
4.4 Member check interviews 
To validate the information about trends indicated by the case study and comparative analysis, 
interviews were held with twenty individuals with experience from working with climate issues 
in other cities in China, and with twenty individuals working with environmental policy in 
Hong Kong.  
Eleven of the interviews were carried out in Beijing during the same time period as the case 
study. The information collected during these interviews used similar questions are those used 
in the case study. The questions focused on the role of cities in climate action, barriers and 
drivers of action, conflicting interests of different groups involved in climate action, and the 
role of policy instruments and planning in supporting low carbon development in cities. 
Information about the respondents are summarized in Table 10. 
A further eleven interviews were carried out in between January and July 2016. These 
respondents were selected from different sectors: academia, national government authorities, 
international development organizations and NGOs, industrial units, consultancy firms and 
industry alliances. All respondents had several years of experience in working with 
environmental and climate issues in cities in China. The questions in these interviews aimed to 
check the validity of the results from the case study and comparative study of the thesis, and to 
provide further information about participation in policy making and planning and the role of 
non-state actors in these processes. Information about the respondents is summarized in Table 
10.  
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Table 10: List of member-check interviews 
 Date Sector Position Organization Knowledge of topic  
 
PILOT 
2012.12.06 
Acad. Lecturer/Researcher University 
Research on urban development in 
China 
17 2013.01.08 Gov. Science Councellor Embassy 
Work with energy policy and 
innovation in cities in China 
18 2013.01.25 Gov. Project manager Int. Environmental org 
Work with urban low carbon policy 
in China 
19 2013.01.29 Acad. Research Scholar Int. research org. 
Research into energy development in 
China 
20 2013.03.06 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Low carbon planner 
National planning 
institute 
Drafting low carbon plans in China 
21 2013.03.07 Acad. 
Director of Energy/ 
Climate Change 
Research 
Int. environmental org. 
Working with climate change policy 
in cities in China 
22 2013.03.08 Gov. Senior Research Fellow 
National policy 
research org. 
Central government research into 
climate change policy 
23 2013.04.10 Private 
Eco-city planner/ 
Consultant 
International planning/ 
consultancy firm 
Involved in drafting low carbon and 
eco-city plans in cities in China 
24 2013.04.18 NGO Research Assistant Int. environmental org. 
Involved in working with low carbon 
policy and programs in cities in 
China 
25 2013.04.24 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
City Planner 
National eco-/low 
carbon city research 
centre 
Drafting municipal low carbon and 
eco-city plans 
26 2013.05.24 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Urban Planner 
National Planning 
Institute 
Involved in drafting the low carbon 
plan of Tianjin 
27 2013.05.27 Private Eco-city planner 
Semi-governmental 
planning/consultancy 
firm 
Involved in drafting the low carbon 
plan of Wuxi 
28 2016.03.04 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Program officer 
Provincial industry 
alliance 
 
Representative of interests of the iron 
and steel industry 
29 2016.04.17 Acad. Researcher Research organization Research into environmental policy 
30 2016.04.19 Private Director Steel company Director of leading steel company 
31 2016.05.02 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Eco-city planner 
Central government 
institute 
Insight into central government 
environmental policy 
32 2016.05.05 NGO Project leader 
Domestic NGO 
 
Activist working with environmental 
issues 
33 2016.05.22 
Gov./ 
Acad. 
Researcher  
 
Industrial research 
institute 
Representative of industrial paper 
research institute 
34 2016.05.28 Gov. Program officer 
Central government 
department 
Insight into central government 
environmental policy 
35 2016.06.13 Private Consultant/Planner 
Planner 
 
Insight into eco-city planning 
36 2016.06.13 Private Manager 
Paper and pulp 
company 
Manager of leading paper company 
37 2016.06.18 Private Vice Director 
Paper and pulp 
company 
Vice director of leading paper 
company 
38 2016.06.20 Gov. Director Local EPB 
Director of municipal environmental 
office in Shandong 
 
In addition, twenty interviews were held in Hong Kong in June 2014. Information from these 
interviews was used to throw further light on the findings of the thesis. The benefit of 
performing interviews in Hong Kong is that researchers, policy makers, company managers 
and activists operate in an environment with a higher degree of freedom than on the mainland. 
The respondents are able to talk more freely about political issues to an extent that is impossible 
in Beijing. The respondents in Hong Kong provided information about environmental planning 
and policy and energy challenges in Hong Kong that also were used as a contrast to the 
mainland. Information about the interviews is summarized in Table 11. 
Table 11: Information on interviews in Hong Kong 
Number of interviews 20 
Dates 2104.06.01-2014.06.27 
Respondents per sector Academia: 9 Government: 3 Companies: 3 NGOs: 5 
Respondents per gender Male: 15 Female: 5 
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4.5 Generalizability and internal validity 
The case study and the comparative analysis of this thesis are associated with different issues 
in terms of generalizability and validity. These issues are discussed in this section, addressing 
the qualitative and quantitative approach in turn. 
In research based on case studies, generalizability to a larger population is usually difficult. As 
observed by Gerring (2006), case studies trade the advantages of thick descriptions for 
limitations in terms of generalizability of results, and they are in general not so good for 
providing information about a broader trends, structures and phenomena. Nevertheless, Gerring 
(2006) notes that in the intensive study of one case, the purpose remains to shed light on a larger 
number of cases, that is, the population to which the case study belongs. Even though only one 
example is selected, it is part of a population, which is the focus of what the case study aims to 
understand. The selection of a case study should therefore be based on striving for some level 
of generalizability. 
In this case the results of the case study only aim to be representative of industrialized cities 
along China’s East coast, as Rizhao is chosen as a “typical case” of this population of cities. 
The extent to which results from the case study of this thesis (the city of Rizhao) apply to these 
depend on how homogenous this population is with regards to the aspects under study – that is 
planning processes and modes of climate governance. China’s centralized political system 
replicates administrative divisions and responsibilities across government levels and the 
influence of the central government is exerted in a similar manner. From this perspective it can 
be assumed that planning and policy making processes, as well as implementation strategies 
for central level guidelines, are likely to be similar to other cities in the region. At the same 
time, individual motives and bottom-up strategies in planning processes and partnerships can 
be expected to differ between cities, as well as the particular forms of linkages that are formed 
with actors in other jurisdictions.  
This concept of internal validity derives from quantitative research where it refers to causal 
validity - that is - assuring the identified effect of the independent variable on the dependent 
variable (Kemper et al, 2002). For qualitative research, this is interpreted as ability to produce 
believable descriptions, convincing accounts or explanations of what is observed and a high 
likeliness of these being true to real life (Curtis et al, 2000). One common strategy for securing 
validity is to use triangulation, that is, multiple types of evidence in the form of multiple sources 
of data, as well as multiple forms of data, which may be either qualitative or quantitative 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000; Gerring, 2006). In the case study of Rizhao, this is done by 
combining interviews with document review and quantitative data collection. Another way 
strategy to improve validity of results is to use member checks (Ibid), which is also used in this 
study.  
Finally, a key strategy for realizing greater generalizability of the case study was to combine it 
with a quantitative approach. This allows for trends indicated by the case study to be tested 
systematically. However, the database study in itself needs to deal with issues of 
generalizability and validity. Regarding generalizing the results of the comparative analysis, 
there are limitations in the extent to which the results can apply to other cities in China. To 
begin with, the cities are chosen to be flagship cases, suggesting that the amount of activity, 
multiplicity of actors and forms of collaboration in climate action is likely to be less in other 
cities. Also, the West and South of China are not included in the sample, and the results are 
probably not applicable to the contexts of this region. Further, groups with poor online visibility 
(e.g. NGOs) may be underrepresented in the study, as the information was collected online. 
Organizations without an online presence were thereby left out of the sample. As green NGOs 
in China often are blocked from the internet, their activities are naturally under-represented in 
the sample. International NGOs do not suffer from this issue, but domestic organizations might 
be more active in climate action than is suggested by this study. Community organizations are 
not represented in the same, and it is not clear if this is because lack of online presence or an 
actual lack of initiatives. Some actors (e.g. municipal authorities) probably also have more 
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interest than others in reporting their achievements online. This problem is recognized and 
further discussed in the conclusions of the thesis.  
Another issue related to generalizability is that not all actors report initiatives in terms of 
“climate action”. This makes the search for climate initiatives fragmented, as initiatives with 
other key purposes, such as energy conservation, are included in the sample. For example, eco-
city initiatives do not have the primary purpose of emission reduction, although they do have 
the explicit purpose of resource conservation, increased use of renewables and increased size 
of carbon sinks (green space). If most actors had explicitly launched initiatives in the name of 
climate action, the sample would probably be more homogenous. The problem with this 
fragmentation is that the analysis of the initiatives adopted a broader focus on environmental 
or sustainability agendas, and that leadership and partnership models naturally vary between 
different forms of projects. It becomes more difficult to reach conclusions about “climate 
action”, as trends tend to be sector-based.   
Regarding the validity of the comparative study, this relates to the strength of correlations or 
causal relationships between variables. A key problem in establishing correlations in the 
comparative study is that adoption of new technology and policy is likely to be over-estimated 
due to the reliance on self-reported data. It is unclear whether the correlation between different 
forms of partnership and adoption of new solutions is affected by this. Another issue is that the 
small number of initiatives performed by civil society and foreign actors makes it difficult to 
draw conclusions about these groups. For example, there are not enough observations to tell if 
initiatives launched by this type of actor is associated with initiative sector or function.  
 
4.6 Research ethics  
The key data collection method of this thesis was interviews.  As in all research involving 
information collection through interaction with individuals, research ethics were considered. 
The key aspects in this study were consent, voluntary participation and participation under 
anonymity. 
Each respondent that was invited to take part of this project was first contacted via email or 
telephone. The aim of the research was explained to the respondent and they were asked if they 
wanted to participate in the project. Any respondent that did not wish to participate was 
excluded from the data collection process. All interviews except one were conducted through 
face-to-face meetings. At the beginning of these meetings, the purpose of the project was 
explained to the respondent in further detail. The respondents were informed that participation 
was voluntary and that all information would be anonymized. This information was shared 
through a written consent form, which the respondents signed before the interview. One 
interview was held over the telephone, in which case all information was shared orally. This 
respondent agreed over the telephone to participate in the project.  
All of the interviews in this study were performed by the author of the thesis. As a young, 
female, Western researcher, the positionality in relation to the respondents is important. Age, 
gender and ethnicity of the researcher probably influenced the interview responses (this is 
known as “interviewer effect”). The respondents most likely understand that a researcher from 
a Western country asking for information about environmental performance is interested in a 
certain type of information, and respond accordingly. For example, positive examples may be 
highlighted (e.g. strong environmental performance) and negative examples glossed over (e.g. 
planning conflicts or the impact of company activities on the environment). In a political and 
social culture where sensitive information normally is not shared with strangers, respondents 
probably only share what he or she feels is “politically correct”. In China, the relationship-
culture (“guanxi”), in which collaboration and communication builds on personal relation, 
strengthens this tendency. The way to deal with this issue was to collect information from 
representatives of different sectors (triangulation of sources) and from different sources 
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(complementing interview information with information from documents and quantitative 
data).  
Another issue related to positionality of the researcher is that the first round of interviews were 
performed when the researcher represented a Western university (UCL) and during the second 
round of interviews, the researcher was working for the Embassy of Sweden in Beijing. Both 
these organizations are associated with status and “scientific” legitimacy. The way in which 
this affected the research process is unclear. It is possible that it was easier (than for a Chinese 
researcher) to access information due to positive connotations. It is also possible that it was 
harder, due to being seen as an outsider. It also may be that respondents felt obliged to share 
information due to associations with authority. The way to handle this issue was to highlight 
the voluntary nature of participation. 
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5 Participation in planning processes in Rizhao 
 
China has a saying: ‘Out of two bad things, choose the one which is less bad’. We cannot please all 
the industries in the South area and also protect the environment and develop the tourism industry 
… (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19) 
 
Rizhao is trying to establish itself as a tourist destination. Central to its promotional strategy is 
a long stretch of white beach in the centre of the city, part of which has been developed into a 
water sports area. The city waterfront is an attractive site. Unfortunately, it is located next to a 
gigantic industrial zone with a large steel plant and paper mill. When the ocean winds blow 
inland, the city centre is suffocated by industrial emissions. The activities of the industrial 
cluster effectively ruin the city’s efforts to create a beautiful holiday resort. Shutting the 
factories down would, on the other hand, undermine the urban economy. The dilemma 
epitomizes Rizhao’s balancing act between reducing its reliance on heavy industries and 
creating alternative paths of growth. Inevitably, conflicts of interest arise in this process. 
This chapter focuses on environmental planning processes in Rizhao with the purpose of 
understanding how stakeholders, local and external experts, and the public are involved in 
decision making processes. The chapter aims to answer research sub-question 1: 
How have non-state actors participated in environmental planning processes in Rizhao during 
the 10th and 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
Two theoretical perspectives are used to investigate the research question. The first looks at 
decision making from a policy network perspective (section 5.1). This approach assumes that 
policy making and planning can be explained by considering (resource) interdependencies, 
conflicts of interest, and structures of power. Using this theoretical perspective, this chapter 
argues that groups with access to economic resources have significant leverage over decision 
makers, as the leadership relies on these actors to provide continued economic expansion. 
Although other voices are heard during the planning process, priorities of actors representing 
growth agendas are much more likely to be considered. This also means that decision making 
is tilted in favour of local elites and that decision making arrangements contribute to protection 
of status quo. In making this argument, the discussion ties into studies that show how decision 
making in informal policy networks build on structures of power and favour economically and 
politically strong actors (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Khan, 2013).  
The second perspective used in this chapter is a policy discourse approach (section 5.2). This 
approach assumes that the way in which policy preferences are formulated conditions low 
carbon policy options available in planning processes. Further, policy discourses are not 
neutral, but favour agency of certain groups over others – in this case industrial units and clean-
tech entrepreneurs. Alternative low carbon development paths are rendered invisible through 
the dominating focus on industrial upgrading and technology innovation. Local decision makers 
use the decision making space set through central level discourse to pursue win-win agendas 
that can be linked to low carbon development. At the same time, the inclusion of planners from 
central level research organization in local planning processes creates opportunities to introduce 
elements of alternative policy discourses on an urban level. In this way, policy targets such as 
long term sustainability and ecological protection gain stronger recognition of local decision 
makers.  
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5.1 Planning from a policy network perspective 
This section argues that a policy network perspective explains the dynamics of policy making 
and planning processes in Rizhao. It demonstrates that decision making processes are 
characterized by conflict, uneven ability to influence decision making, and interdependence 
between economic and political interests. This has key implication for policy outcomes and the 
possibility to incorporate low carbon development aims into local planning objectives.  
5.1.1 Key planning documents 
Three key planning documents are studied in this chapter. As on a national level, the most 
important urban planning document is the municipal five-year plan (FYP). The municipal FYP 
contains detailed socioeconomic development goals and strategies, as well as environmental 
goals and guidelines. This includes targets for resource conservation and ecological protection, 
as well as pollution emission, and energy saving targets for industry, transport and construction. 
Since the 12th FYP, this document also contains guidelines for climate mitigation activities. The 
department in charge of the FYP is Rizhao Development and Reform Commission (DRC).  
Another important planning document is Rizhao Master Plan, which determines urban spatial 
planning. Rizhao Planning Bureau, an authority under Rizhao Construction Committee (CC) 
(the local branch of MoHUrD) is responsible for Rizhao’s spatial plan. Rizhao Construction 
Committee is also in charge of resource use in the construction sector, as well as monitoring 
and promoting buildings standards.  
Rizhao Eco-City Construction Plan (2001-2020) is a document that details a long list of 
socioeconomic and environmental targets in various policy sectors. The eco-city plan is the 
responsibility of Rizhao Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB), the local arm of MEP. As 
explained in Chapter 3, eco-cities recognized by MoHUrD are built according to certain 
standards and central guidelines. If a city meets the targets, it can receive the label “Eco-City” 
and receive centrally distributed economic incentives as a demonstration city. While Rizhao’s 
Eco-City Construction Plan contains performance indicators related to resource use (such as 
water consumption and popularization of “clean” energy sources”), the document emphasizes 
traditional environmental protection strategies, such as pollution prevention and clean-up of 
polluted areas. Due to the relatively early date of adoption, the document does not include a 
climate change mitigation or adaptation strategy.  
In creating an international profile, Rizhao Municipality has drawn considerable attention to 
the early adoption of an eco-city building plan and the way in which this document placed 
environmental issues on the political agenda. However, the empirical material demonstrated in 
this chapter suggests that key decisions with a bearing on Rizhao’s environmental and energy 
profile are made when drafting the FYP and the municipal Master Plan, rather than the 
comprehensive environmental planning document. This chapter addresses the decision making 
processes involved in drafting all three documents in order to capture how emission reduction 
agendas are influenced by broader planning strategies.  
The FYP, Master Plan and Eco-City Construction Plan are city-wide, trans-sectoral plans 
spanning a number of policy fields (sector-based energy policy schemes are discussed in depth 
in the following previous chapter). These plans have considerable impact on the city’s ability 
to pursue energy saving or emission reduction targets as decisions about the size and structure 
of urban industry, special lay-out and environmental targets are key factors determining urban 
energy use and emission profile.  
5.1.2 Policy network structure 
Building on studies of policy networks (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; van Waarden, 1992; 
Richardson & Jordan, 1992) as well as more recent studies using an informal policy network 
perspective to understand local planning processes (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Sorensen, 2006; 
Khan, 2013; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015), this section considers the number and type of 
actors involved in policy making and principles of inclusion in decision making processes.  
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Number and type of actors involved in planning 
When drafting municipal FYPs, there is a strong top-down influence through the transfer of 
guidelines from higher levels of government. This transfer occurs through adoption of goals 
and quantitative targets into key policy documents, which are delegated to municipal 
departments by their provincial counterparts. This process ensures that overall planning 
directions are determined by higher level government authorities. 
Apart from the direct transfer of targets and policy guidelines from higher levels of government, 
the provincial government affects decision making in other ways. One way is to make decisions 
in areas of strategic importance. An example relates to expansion of the port industries. Because 
Rizhao’s port is of logistic and economic importance to the entire province, expansion of the 
port was demanded by the provincial government: “the port serves the entire region, so the 
development path had been decided on a higher level. The water way is a much cheaper 
transport than by land, so therefore it is needed, logistically, for the region” (Interview with 
central planner, Beijing, 2013.05.22). Another example relates to the development of the 
tourism industry. This agenda is not only a municipal priority, but a development strategy that 
has been promoted by Shandong Provincial Government based on the fact that few cities in the 
region have beaches (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.05.13).  
Many of the details of municipal plans are left in the hands of municipal authorities. In drafting 
Rizhao’s 11th FYP, a number of organizations were involved in the planning process. One set 
of organizations participated in “consultative meetings”, which included key authorities and 
industrial units (e.g. Rizhao DRC, Rizhao Planning Bureau, REITC, Rizhao Steel, Yatai Senbo, 
Rizhao Port)(Interview with local policy advisor, Rizhao, 2013.05.22). The consultative 
meetings involve discussions between primarily departments and stakeholders. The procedure 
follow the process described by He (2006): local leaders announce the function of the meeting, 
the participants express their opinion, and the local leaders answer questions. Discussions ensue 
with the aim of reaching consensus. Other organizations were asked to provide written advice, 
which primarily included departments not directly in charge of planning, as well as relevant 
academic organizations (Ibid).  
Rizhao’s two most recent Master Plans (1992, 2006), were drafted by the central planning 
institute China Academy of Urban Planning and Design (CAUPD). CAUPD is a semi-
governmental planning institute that works with developing urban spatial plans, infrastructural 
and engineering plans for authorities on a provincial and local level. The organization carries 
out independent academic research, but is administratively operating under MoHUrD. The 
formal function of the organization is to carry out research, oversee local urban development 
and provide advice to local planning bureaus. CAUPD was invited by Rizhao municipal 
government to provide planning advice for Rizhao as early as 1992, because the leadership felt 
they needed external expertise to create a good spatial plan (Interview with urban planner, 
Beijing, 2013.03.22). The organization was invited again in 2006, because of its previous 
experience in Rizhao’s local conditions.  
When CAUPD is asked to provide a municipal master plan, the organization is delegated 
responsibility by the municipal Planning Bureau. In drafting Rizhao 2006 Master Plan, CAUPD 
cooperated with Beijing Forest University and Tsinghua University during the planning 
process. The process involved rounds of meetings as well as consultations with a number of 
organizations, including local authorities, companies, and local academia. The organizations 
were invited to provide opinions, and in the case of companies, provide information about their 
planned economic and physical expansion (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 
2013.03.22). As explained by two of the urban planners from CAUPD involved in drafting 
Rizhao’s 2006 Master Plan:  
The government will find universities and research institutes to take part of this planning. They will 
normally delegate the actual planning to experts, who will point out where all the main locations of 
different land functions will be (e.g. industry, treatment plants, accommodation, tourist areas, etc.). 
After there is a lay-out of the plan, the government will convene a meeting to get opinions from local 
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bodies, such as universities, research organizations, industry, the heads of different government 
departments, etc., and they will say what their opinions are  
(Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22) 
 
[The planning process] included companies from the ports, from the development zones, also 
together with the planning team, representatives from different government sectors such as water, 
transport, environment, etc. The main purpose of this was to share everyone’s views on the plan, 
and to learn about the economic situation of the companies and their projected expansion. This is 
necessary in order to know how much more space they are going to need if they grow, if they will 
attract more companies; it is a questions of industrial development (Interview with central planner, 
Beijing, 2013.05.08) 
The meetings are also used to resolve issues of planning overlaps where responsibilities are 
blurred, incorporate demands of local stakeholders, and solve conflicts that arise in the planning 
process (Interview with local policy advisor, Rizhao, 2013.05.09). In case of overlaps between 
the plans, departments cooperate to make sure the documents are streamlined. As explained by 
one of the CAUPD planners involved in drafting Rizhao 2006 Master Plan: 
We have to consider each other’s plans and provide ideas if they clash. Normally they won’t clash 
too much, as they are different areas; the FYPs are mainly economy and growth, we are urban spatial 
planning. The eco-city plan and the master plan do have common ground, but they are fairly 
streamlined (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22) 
The recreational area along the coast in Rizhao was designed by foreign firms. International 
design institutes were invited to participate in a process of competition for the best design 
through online applications. American EDSA Design and German TZ Design participated in 
creating the final design of the coastal area. Their involvement was limited to the design of this 
specific area, and they did not take part in deciding on location and function of other parts of 
the city.  
The drafting of Rizhao eco-city plan was delegated by Rizhao EPB to the research organization 
China Academy of Science (CAS). CAS is a national, semi-governmental institution that 
conducts research and national surveys, and functions as a think tank that provides policy advice 
for the central government. CAS is headquartered in Beijing, but has over thirteen branches and 
a hundred research institutes across China. It is an important organization in technological 
research and development in various scientific disciplines. CAS was invited to participate in 
Rizhao’s eco-city planning for the same reason as CAUPD: to provide “expert” advice in the 
planning process (Interview with eco-city planner, Beijing, 2013.05.17).  
The drafting of Rizhao’s eco-city plan was carried out by Rizhao EPB and CAS, with input 
provided from various local stakeholders. A planner from CAS involved in drafting the 
document describes the process as follows: 
We worked mostly with the EPB, since they were the ones we had signed the contract with. But 
during the planning process, we visited many other departments. We spoke with the agricultural 
department, the urban planning department, industrial representatives, the fisheries, etc., to find 
out what their thinking is, their viewpoints about the situation, and also to find out about the 
advantages and disadvantages about the development about Rizhao. They know a lot more than us, 
so we wanted the first-hand material. Also, after the plan came out, we also asked many times for 
their comments and tried to work out amendments according to their views (Interview with central 
planner, Beijing, 2013.05.17) 
Table 12 below lists Rizhao’s key planning documents, organization responsible for drafting 
the document, organization that actually drafted the document, and the organizations involved 
in meetings and consultations that were part of the planning process.  
Table 12: Key planning documents and planning organizations in Rizhao 
Name Year Responsible  Drafting Meetings and Consultation 
Rizhao 
11th FYP 
2006- 
2010 
Rizhao DRC Rizhao DRC Rizhao DRC, Rizhao Planning Bureau, Rizhao 
EBP, Rizhao Environmental Monitoring 
Station, Rizhao Statistical Bureau, Rizhao 
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Marine Economy Office, economic 
stakeholders (Rizhao Steel Co, Yatai Senbo 
Co, Rizhao Port Co., etc.) Local universities 
Rizhao 
2nd 
Master 
Plan 
2006 CC Planning 
Dept. 
CAUPD, 
Beijing 
Forest U., 
Tsinghua U. 
Relevant government departments (Water 
Bureau, EPB, Transport Bureau, etc.), 
stakeholders (primarily companies from ports 
and development zones) 
Rizhao 
Eco-City 
Plan 
2001- 
2020 
EPB CAS Relevant departments (agricultural department, 
the urban planning department, etc.), economic 
stakeholders (industrial representatives, 
fisheries, etc.) 
 
The mechanism for determining which organizations participate in planning meetings of the 
FYP, Master Plan and eco-city plan is described as informal, but relatively predictable. It is 
informal in the sense that no official rule exists to determine which organizations should be 
included. It is predictable in the sense that key departments and large companies tend to always 
participate in meetings, and a number of government authorities and academic organizations 
are usually consulted but will not normally participate directly. The planning process is closed, 
as only selected organizations are invited to meetings. Although organizations from different 
sectors were consulted during the process in Rizhao, many were only asked to provide an 
opinion when documents were already drafted. This gives a comparatively large influence to 
planning experts who are in charge of outlining the document drafts, as well as to the 
organizations present during meetings. 
Building on Mai and Fran Mai & Francesch-Huidobro’s approach (2015), the structure of 
decision making networks are represented diagrammatically below. To illustrate decision 
making interactions in Rizhao, the decision making space within the city is represented as a 
circle made up of the public, private and nongovernmental space (Figure 11). 
 
     Figure 11: Decision making space on a municipal level in Rizhao 
The decision making space is distributed over three administrative levels (municipal, provincial 
and central government), which allows the decision making space to be represented as a 
diagram of a cone shape (see Figure 12). Organizations (authorities, companies, institutes) are 
represented as boxes in the diagram. Figure 12 outlines interactions in the decision making 
processes of Rizhao 11th FYP, Master Plan and Eco-City Construction Plan.  
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Figure 12: Decision making interaction in Rizhao 11th FYP, Master Plan & Eco-City Construction Plan 
 
Figure 12 shows that policy making and planning processes in Rizhao involve interaction 
between authorities on a municipal, provincial and central level. In the drafting of all three 
plans, a provincial authority provided either direct or indirect guidelines. In the formulation of 
the master plan and the eco-city plan, research organizations based in Beijing played a key role. 
These interactions are illustrated by vertical lines in the diagram. Horizontal linkages have also 
been created, to access information or opinions. The process of formulating all three plans 
involved consultation with local authorities and economic stakeholders, and to different 
degrees, input from academic organizations and the public. These interactions are illustrated by 
vertical lines in Figure 12.   
According to Mai and Francesch-Huidobro (2015), accessing information is an important 
motivation for municipal authorities to form links across levels and sectors. This case study 
corroborates their research. In Rizhao, two of three key plans involved the creation of 
intragovernmental linkages to access expert advice. In one case, a higher level planning unit 
also created horizontal linkages with academic institutions to access further expertise. Local 
policy makers also draw on expertise from higher levels of government. For example, the 
formulation of Rizhao’s second eco-city plan is based on its provincial counterpart. An official 
at Rizhao EPB states that they are waiting for the provincial unit to complete their plan so that 
they can receive support and guidelines when it is done (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 
2013.05.08).  
As in Mai and Francesch-Huidobro’s (2015) study, considerable effort is directed to coordinate 
policy making through horizontal, intra-governmental communication. Opinions and 
standpoints of various municipal units were considered in all three plans examined in this case 
study. However, the network structure differs from their study in a couple of significant ways. 
Mai and Francesch-Huidobro’s (Ibid) research of Southern Chinese cities points to a greater 
representation of professional and civil society organizations in municipal networks. The case 
study of this thesis highlights participation of economic stakeholders and a complete absence 
of NGOs. An explanation is that the studies conducted in Hong Kong, Shenzhen and 
Guangzhou focused on networks in specific sectors (construction and transport). As the 
documents in Rizhao are transsectoral plans, it is natural that they involve a greater number of 
general rather than specific policy interests. Formation of specific climate policy may have a 
higher representation of professional and civil society groups and a weaker representation of 
economic stakeholders. Another plausible reason is that civil society have a stronger 
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representation in Hong Kong, Shenzhen and Guangzhou than in this comparatively small city 
in Shandong Province.   
Public participation 
Regarding public pressure and the influence of citizen participation on decision making in 
Rizhao, the interviews suggest that this influence is very limited. Where it is expressed at all, it 
is either in an indirect fashion, or introduced into planning processes in a way that has little 
impact. A couple of respondents suggest that public pressure was one of the reasons that the 
local government adopted green development agendas. A local academic states that “the strong 
demand of the citizens was an important factor that pushed the government to pay attention to 
the [pollution] issues” (Interview with local researcher, Rizhao, 2013.05.17). A policy-maker 
believes that [the government] started introducing the recycling economy systems because the 
people of Rizhao were opposed to the pollution and “people were putting big pressure on the 
government to solve this issue” (Interview with local researcher, Rizhao, 2013.03.13). Another 
local researcher similarly states that “the public is becoming increasingly able to influence the 
government. The public pressure to handle pollution is growing” (Interview with local 
academic, Rizhao, 2013.03.13). Other respondents observe that the municipal leadership began 
to tackle pollution issues because they are themselves local residents who care about the 
environment, and because they want the local population to stay and work in the city. 
On the other hand, neither of the respondents clarifies how public demand is articulated, and 
how pressure is exerted by the public towards the government. There is a lack of formal 
mechanisms for the public to translate their opinion into consequences for the local leadership. 
Limited measures exist to incorporate public opinion into environmental planning. There have 
been no public consultations or similar elements of direct participation. The main strategy is to 
allow selected individuals to express their opinion on existing drafts. The researcher from CAS 
that was involved in drafting the eco-city plan describes the process as follows: 
Not so much public participation. We asked some people some questions and went to some schools 
to ask questions, but this in uncommon in China. It is not like in Western countries where this is 
common - it is not so popular here… a plan of a smaller city is likely to have more ability to take 
into account people’s ideas, but it was not really possible in this case 
 (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.05.17) 
Similarly, the CAUPD planners confirm that the public was involved to a limited extent in 
drafting the spatial plans. One of the planners states that “there are not really any people 
involved. We did a survey but it didn’t really include a lot of people or affect the process much” 
(Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19). Another planner describes the procedure 
for public involvement as follows:  
The public participated at three key points. The first was a survey period where surveys were used; 
the second was meetings between key enterprises and government departments; the third was in the 
planning stage, when results were presented to the public on the internet and a planning department 
under the construction committee used the ideas in project groups. Looking practically at these 
three strategies, the first one did not have that much impact, because the sample was too small. The 
second and third were comparatively effective (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22) 
The method of submitting drafts on the Internet for public reflection allows some input, but in 
the form of comments on existing drafts. Key debate takes place in meetings between 
enterprises, government departments and external advisors, where the public is not represented. 
5.1.3 Environmental planning conflicts 
Understanding whether policy making processes are marked by cooperation or conflict is seen 
as important in the policy network literature (Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; van Waarden, 1992; 
Richardson & Jordan, 1992). Aligned or clashing interests can produce coalitions or bargaining 
possibilities, which influence decision making outcomes.  
This case study shows that a number of conflicts between environmental and economic 
priorities emerged during planning processes in Rizhao, namely in relation to pollution and land 
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use. Industrial activity is the main source of air and water pollution in Rizhao. There are 
differences in opinion between municipal authorities, economic stakeholders, external planners 
and citizens on this issue. Many of these conflicting opinions have been raised during the 
planning process. 
A point of contention is the location of heavy industries in the urban area. Several large 
factories, including the steel plant and the pulp mill, are located in the central port zone. The 
activities of the factories create considerable pollution that affect the entire urban region. 
Planners from CAUPD suggested to move these industries out of the central city: 
There are two key issues with the location of the central port: The first is that their key products are 
coal and steel. In the summer the winds are normally blowing inland and this means that the 
pollution from the shipping will blow in directly over the city centre. The second is related to wood 
imports/wood-made products. These industries use up a lot of air and water and also create a lot of 
pollution. For both these reasons it would be better if the port was located in the south of the city, 
in one cluster (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19) 
In spite of the impact on air and water quality in the city centre, the steel plant has refused to 
move, arguing that their equipment cannot be shipped to another location, that contracts of 
operation give them right to stay, and that the company contributes to local employment 
(Interview with local academic, Rizhao, 2013.03.11). The same planner from CAUPD explains 
that the steel factory probably won’t move within a ten-year time frame, at which point the 
current planning period has already ended. According to the planner, “the local government 
will do what they can in this area, but it’s hard. The industrial areas have very serious pollution. 
The main one is the steel industry, and they have a lot of influence (Interview with central 
planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19). 
Another issue related to industrial pollution is the impact on water quality, which among other 
things affects the city’s tourism industry. The same planner explains: 
The last few years the blooming has been massive, the entire ocean is green and if you go swimming, 
you will become green. There is a big connection between this and industrial pollution. When the 
water has become like that it cannot be used for tourist purposes anymore  
(Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19) 
The CAUPD planners state that a meeting will, in theory, be arranged to invite groups that are 
opposed to planning suggestions. This particularly relates to populations who live right next to 
polluting factories. Possibly, this also includes farmers who live on land designated for 
development. Rizhao was a fishing and farming society not long ago and may have populations 
that lost their livelihoods due to industrial expansion. In practice, these opinions will normally 
not be seriously considered when making planning decisions:  
There are also people who do not want the factories, like the people (ex-villagers) who have to live 
right next to the factory. Maybe the government can deal with some pollution for the sake of the city 
development, but the people who live next to it don’t want it. This is an inequality issue. The 
government will have a meeting to allow for opposing opinions, but often these voices will not be 
considered (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22) 
One example concerns health impacts of the waste-to-energy plant. In a website used for 
communication with local leaders (“message board for local leaders” on People’s Net.com), a 
citizen expresses anxiety about the environmental and health impacts of the plant. The message 
points to villages near the projects, to the risk of emissions, and potential pollution of ground 
water. It notes that the location of the plant will lead to less settlement in the area, and as a 
result, lower value of houses and declining competitiveness of the industrial park. Nearby 
villages that rely on farming (of wheat, peanuts, corn, and apples) may be affected, and villagers 
have expressed a strong negative public opinion against the plans (RMW, 2015). The public 
response on the website is that the plant meets “current international most advanced 
environmental treatment technology standards” (RMW, 2015). There will be no polluted water 
discharge into water streams, and strict anti-seepage measures will be used to prevent leaching. 
Shandong Province Department of Environmental Protection is to make sure the project meets 
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all standards before and during operations, and monitoring is to be carried out in line with EIA 
documents (RMW, 2015).  
Another issue is scarcity of water. Shandong Province is water-scarce, and access to water is 
becoming problematic in the entire region. Previous studies have shown that Rizhao’s industrial 
sector is highly water consuming (Wang et al, 2009). One of the planners from CAUPD states 
that what Rizhao only has one main source of water, and that if the city continues expanding it 
will be necessary to ship water from a distant inland source (Interview with central planner, 
Beijing, 2013.03.22). The same planner explains that the pulp factory is a main problem – “there 
just isn’t enough ecological capacity to support a factory that uses this much water” (Interview 
with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22). The researcher from CAS involved in drafting 
Rizhao’s eco-city plan explains that the demand from different development interests directly 
conflicted both with each other and with available natural resources. From an ecological 
perspective, water shortages were identified as particularly problematic and was a focus area in 
the eco-city plan.  
Land use and protection of ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and mountain areas is 
another contested point. The main planning conflict is the question of whether to protect land 
areas, use them for agriculture or forestry, convert them for tourism purposes, or designate them 
for complete development into industrial, commercial or residential zones. As explained in 
Chapter 3, many urban regions in China are expanding rapidly and converting agricultural land 
into built up land at a fast rate. A key reason is that conversion of undeveloped land into 
developed areas is a quick way to generate income for municipal governments.  
It is common for municipal authorities to be in disagreement on these planning issues. There is 
a division of opinion between bureaus that promote economic issues and bureaus in charge of 
the environment, tourism, forestry and agriculture. The municipal tourism department and 
environmental protection bureau (EPB) have argued for the importance of improved pollution 
control, while industrial stakeholders and economically oriented authorities argue for the 
importance of continued industrial expansion.  
In particular, the priorities of municipal EPB and the development and reform commission 
(DRC) are seldom aligned. The EPB has ideas about enterprises, such as which ones pollute 
too much and use too much resources, and it is common for the EPB and the DRC to not be in 
agreement. Different municipal authorities (such as the forest department, the agricultural 
department, the tourism bureau, and the DRC), tend to have different opinions for “each piece 
of land” (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22). The same respondent states that 
“in cases where industry expands into protected zones, it should be the EPB that stops the 
expansion. But in cases where they have suggested that some coastal areas should be protected, 
the growth could still happen” (Ibid). The situation is described by the researcher from CAS as 
follows: 
There were a lot of contradictions. For example, industrial departments wanted to develop the 
chemical industries, the power plant and the manufacturing industry in Rizhao. So there were a lot 
of industries and we thought they were too heavy. The agricultural department wanted to expand 
their activity, but we thought that would not be simple because of the water shortages. The tourist 
department wanted to develop the area around a lake by the coast, but we thought that it was not 
ready for this (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.05.17) 
 
5.1.4 Balance of power 
Balance of power in decision making networks is an important aspect affecting decision making 
outcomes in the policy network literature (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992; 
Dowding, 1995). This case study shows that in Rizhao, ability to affect planning outcomes is 
not evenly distributed among stakeholders. Actors representing economic growth agendas have 
better opportunity to influence decisions of the top leadership. 
According to several respondents in Rizhao, the Mayor and the Mayor’s Office has the strongest 
influence over planning directions. Input from several organizations is considered during 
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consultative meetings, but the final decisions in case of conflict depend on the priorities of the 
municipal leadership. An academic from a university in Rizhao expresses that “if there are any 
contradictions between different units, the government is likely to spend more time researching 
the problem - they will try to find consensus and to consider as many ideas as possible, but in 
the end the plan is under the Mayor’s Office” (Interview with local academic, Rizhao, 
2013.03.13). One of the planners from CAUPD describes the situation as follows:  
When [planning conflicts] arise we will have a meeting and discuss the options. The planners will 
normally present a proposal and then the issue will be discussed until an agreement is reached… 
In the end, it is difficult to come to an agreement, we have to discuss for a long time. Planning 
decisions should be based on the opinion of the majority of stakeholders involved, but the Mayor’s 
Office has more influence over final decisions (Interview with urban planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19) 
Large industrial units play a key role in decision making due to their importance to the local 
economy. A planner from CAUPD states that the steel factory uses a lot of resources and is 
very bad for the environment “but it is still there because the economy needs it” (Interview with 
central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22). The same respondent points out that the income from the 
steel factory has a large impact on the local government’s potential to pursue environmental 
agendas. The share of municipal revenue that it generates is so large that when the income of 
the steel factory decreases, the municipal government’s ability to spend money on 
environmental agendas is reduced: 
In the financial downturn when the price of steel dropped, the entire economy in the city was 
affected. The government lost a lot of income, so they also did not have the budget room to spend on 
low-carbon solutions. In times of economic growth, the steel factory is doing well, the government 
has budgetary space, and then they think “now we can do some low-carbon spending” (Ibid) 
A local academic expresses that the consideration of environmental impacts is an important 
part of planning consultations. However, when it comes to actual decision making, economic 
arguments determine planning outcomes: 
When they do the plan, they do consider the environment. For example with water, they have to 
consider all areas of water use and resources: agricultural use, industry, and all sources of 
pollution. There should normally be research done in all these areas as a basis for the plan. But in 
my experience this will be a process of ‘in the day-time we research, in the night-time we vote’. 
Because in the end, even if there may be pollution, the government still needs to consider GDP, 
economic growth, factories (Interview with local academic, Rizhao, 2013.03.13) 
A group of actors with strong influence on planning processes are land or property developers. 
These firms have major leverage over land use decisions, as the large income that can be 
generated through investments into development of land systematically prevails in land use 
conflicts. One of the planners from CAUPD describes that regarding the decision to use an 
inland area for tourism or industrial purposes, the larger income that would be generated by 
industrial activities led to a decision in favour of industrial expansion: 
I had an idea that they begin to develop tourism projects in the inland, in an area in Wulian. This 
would allow for the tourist industry to spread from the coast and to the less developed inland. But 
instead, this area was developed for industry and used for industries related to those in the port 
industrial zone. The income from the industrial activities would be much bigger than that from 
tourism so it was hard to push this point. In the planning process… it was the government’s decision, 
but it might have been suggested by industrial interests (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 
2013.04.19) 
 
The same issue is mentioned in relation to decisions of whether to protect ecologically sensitive 
zones. As expressed by one of the CAUPD planners, “the steel industry is developing at a very 
fast pace and in Lanshan we suggested to keep some environmental zones, but the industry is 
developing too fast so we ended up losing them” (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 
2013.04.19). A similar development process is unfolding in Rizhao’s northern coastal zones, 
suggested to be protected due to ecological sensitivity. The same respondent states that “it 
started out as empty space a short time ago, so it is developing very quickly ... A lot of investors 
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are applying to develop there, so there is a lot of development pressure” (Ibid). Development 
interests and generation of GDP are key factors determining if the areas will remain protected. 
Although the decision to protect ecologically sensitive areas should be based on environmental 
considerations, the department in charge of spatial planning may receive instructions from more 
influential parts of the government that in charge of economic issues: 
Whether or not [the ecologically sensitive areas] will be developed will be decided by the Planning 
Bureau. So their position is very dangerous, ha-ha! The planning people also have people above 
them who will sometimes have guidelines. It is hard to say. They may say the GDP is very important, 
so we cannot keep the mountains. In the north, they already kept the mountains for a long time. But 
the industrial areas develop so fast, they are like a virus… (Ibid) 
 
 
Figure 13: Rizhao zones of industrial development and areas suggested for ecological protection (based 
on information shared by respondents) 
5.1.5 Insights derived from policy network theory 
Returning to the research sub-question of this chapter: what has been the effect of including 
non-state actors in municipal planning processes? First, local stakeholders and external advisors 
play important roles in shaping municipal plans, which in turn has considerable impact on urban 
environmental development. Second, conflict and balance of power, aspects highlighted in the 
policy network literature, explain dynamics of municipal planning processes.  
In Rizhao, a number of environmental planning conflicts have emerged. In order to deal with 
these, meetings are held with the purpose of reaching consensus, according to procedures 
described in previous research (He, 2006). However, final decisions are not necessarily so much 
a result of majority opinion, deliberation or collective agreement, as of certain organizations 
overruling others. There are a couple of reasons for this. Organizations directly involved in 
planning negotiations (key economic stakeholders and municipal departments) have a much 
stronger position than organizations only able to provide their opinion on existing plans (e.g. 
local academia and “the public”).  
Two network characteristics explain this situation: decision making interactions being closed 
or exclusive (rather than open for all) and inclusion in decision making being informal (rather 
than based on a formal principle of representation). A second aspect is the uneven ability to 
succeed in pursuing an opinion in case of planning conflicts. The Mayor’s Office overrules 
other municipal authorities, while economically strong departments and economic stakeholders 
(industrial units and developers) push their priorities ahead of departments in charge of, for 
example, environment and tourism. The tendency for the top leadership to form alliances with 
economic interests is illustrated in relation to conflicts about whether to protect or develop 
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sensitive land areas. In these conflicts, respondents describe the priorities of the Mayor’s Office 
and development interests as indistinguishable from each other.  
These observations suggest that this decision making context produces particular ways of 
dealing with conflict and consensus. On the one hand, the empirical material presented in the 
interviews demonstrate that a multiplicity of conflicts emerge in urban planning processes. In 
conflicts related to pollution, resource consumption and land use, different groups have 
diametrically different opinions. Lines of division exist between municipal departments, as well 
as between departments, economic stakeholders, external planners, and citizens. On the other 
hand, these conflicts are not equally represented in the decision making phase of planning 
processes. In the meetings where planning decisions are made, only some actors are able to 
participate (key departments and stakeholders), and during these meetings the emphasis is on 
reaching consensus. Rather than to seek ways to reconcile conflicting interests, consensus is 
reached by allowing dominating actors with aligned interests to exercise a disproportional 
influence over decision making. As a result, planning conflicts are not resolved, but rather 
glossed over and made invisible.  
The policy network literature provides further explanation to these phenomena. When actors 
are involved in a decision making processes without using a formal mechanism of inclusion, 
the choice of selection is not based on a democratic process, but on what needs to be considered 
to reach consensus and for outcomes to be implementable. As the distribution of power in 
informal decision making networks reflects deeper distributions of power in society, 
economically and politically powerful groups dominate planning processes, which allows for 
bargaining on uneven terms and outcomes that favour urban elites (Khan, 2013). Economic and 
political interests are interdependent on each other, implying that decision making is likely to 
reach results that are mutually beneficial for both groups. This explains the strong 
representation of economic interests in Rizhao’s planning processes, as well as decision 
outcomes in favour of these actors. He and Warren (p. 281, 2011) argue that deliberation in 
China is used as a tool to “co-opt dissent and maintain social order”. The observations of this 
case study suggests that this statement may equally be turned around to argue that deliberation 
is used by local interests as a tool to co-opt political decision making.  
A crucial implication in terms of environmental development is that this type of decision 
making arrangement displays limitations in producing radical change. One risk is of decisions 
being trapped in status quo, which in this case implies locking municipal development 
trajectories into current paths of growth (Khan, 2013). There is a long standing insight in the 
policy network literature that in settings where the influence of interest groups is strong and the 
aim is to reach consensus, it is difficult to bring about reform. As stated by Richardson & Jordan 
(p. 265, 1983), “when consensus is still the objective (which generally it is), then it is singularly 
difficult to build a consensus around radical policy change”. Or, as stated by Rhodes and Marsh 
(p.200, 1992), policy networks “are conservative in their impact because, for example, the rules 
of the game and access favor established interests”. These conclusions are not promising in 
relation to opportunities of creating socio-environmental change required for low carbon 
development.   
 
5.2 Planning from a policy discourse perspective 
The previous section discussed how insights into conflict and balance of power explain 
municipal policy making interactions. It is also possible to understand the dominant position of 
economic interests from a perspective of policy language and problem framing. This section 
shows how policy discourses of industrial upgrading and technology development are 
intimately associated with energy and environmental policy in Chinese policy documents. As 
a result, low carbon policy is framed as an issue of industrial development.  
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5.2.1 Climate policy as industrial development 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese policy documents contain multiple policy slogans 
introduced by several consecutive generations of political leadership. Most of these are stated 
as development goals at the beginning of the FYPs along with general declarations of 
development aims. For example, the document introductions of China’s 12th FYP and Rizhao’s 
12th FYP, refer to “three represents”, “harmonious development”, “modernization” and 
building a “moderately prosperous society”. To some extent, Rizhao’s 12th FYP contain 
terminology of social stability and harmony in relation to environmental protection. For 
example, the section on industrial development refers to “promotion of the harmonious 
development of man and nature” (Rizhao DRC, Ch.6, 2006). However, the salience of these 
political slogans in the rest of the documents is low.  
By contrast, references to the theme of “scientific outlook on development” are made 
continuously throughout both FYPs. These references are connected with a tendency to 
associate economic, social and environmental progress with industrial restructuring and 
upgrading, as well as with technological development and innovation. In Rizhao 12th FYP, it is 
stated in the beginning of the plan that a key expectation is a “significant change in development 
mode”, to be realized through “rapid technological innovation enhancing and accelerating the 
development of the green economy” (RDRC, Ch.1, 2011). This goal calls for “efforts to achieve 
the coordinated development of prominent industrial development to a modern industry … from 
high energy consumption, and resource-use to a clean, low carbon and circular economy mode 
of development” (RDRC, Ch.1, 2011). This statement shows how low carbon goals are phrased 
as an issue of industrial restructuring and upgrading, a perspective that is apparent throughout 
the remainder of the document.  
To gain further understanding of the association between energy and environmental policy 
priorities and industrial development objectives, the relationship between these concepts was 
assessed by measuring co-occurrence of the terms in the two FYPs (see section 4.3.5 for an 
explanation of the method of analysis). There are in total 115 references to energy, 98 references 
to environment and 70 to ecology/ecological issues in the two documents. Energy saving is a 
relatively mainstreamed policy issue that is integrated into various policy areas, such as 
industry, construction and traffic. However, by far the largest number of references to energy 
issues are made in relation to industrial restructuring/upgrading or technological innovation.  
As shown by Table 13, a fourth of the references to energy issues in the FYPs are made in 
relation to industrial restructuring and upgrading issues (Table 13 shows that out of all of the 
times that “energy” is mentioned in the FYPs, 26% are mentioned in the same sentences or 
paragraphs as discussions on industrial improvement programs). Another fourth of the 
references to energy issues are made in relation to technology development (Table 13 shows 
that out of all of the times that “energy” is mentioned in the FYPs, 24% are mentioned in the 
same sentences or paragraphs as discussions on renewable technology research or clean tech 
industry development).  
Table 13 illustrates how often references to “energy”, “environment” and “ecology” co-occur 
with references to in China’s 12th FYP and Rizhao’s 12th FYP Together, the themes of industrial 
upgrading and technology innovation account for half of the references to energy issues in the 
two documents (highlighted in red font in Table 13). The third most common theme, 
“ecological protection”, only occurs in 7% of the references to energy issues. References to 
market measures or administrative measures in relation to energy issues occurs in 5% each of 
the references to energy issues.  
Table 13: Co-variation between energy/environmental narratives in China’s and Rizhao’s 12th FYPs 
Theme  Energy Environment Ecology 
Ecological protection  0.07 0.10 0.07 
Market measures 0.05 0.09 0.05 
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Administrative measures 0.05 0.14 0.09 
Industrial restructuring/upgrading 0.26 0.18 0.09 
Technology & innovation 0.24 0.07 0.05 
 
The reason that references to energy issues occur so often in discussions on industrial policy 
and technology innovation is that most of the references are concentrated in a couple of chapters 
of the FYPs. The chapters on optimization of industrial structure contain by far the largest 
number. In the national FYP, energy conservation is mentioned as an element of progress in 
various industrial sectors, such as the automobile industry, building materials, iron and steel, 
and light manufacturing industries. As part of “strengthening the technical improvement of 
enterprises”, improving equipment and optimizing production processes, companies should 
“accelerate the elimination of backward technologies and equipment, and improve the overall 
level of integrated utilization of energy resources” (NDRC, Ch. 9, 2011). The chapter on 
development of a circular economy emphasizes technology upgrading, focusing on 
development and implementation of circular production methods and reduction of industries 
using backwards capacity (NDRC, Ch. 23, 2011).  
The national FYP also aims for the popularization of energy-saving technology and support of 
R&D in relation to new energy development and new energy industries. This is associated with 
new energy being identified as a strategic industry under the 12th FYP. The section on fostering 
and developing “strategic emerging sectors” speaks of promotion of leapfrog development of 
key industrial fields, which includes energy-saving and environment-friendly industries, new 
energy sources, new materials and new energy automobiles (NDRC, Ch. 10, 2011).  
In Rizhao’s 12th FYP, the largest amount of references to energy issues similarly appears in the 
chapter on building a modern industrial system, which aims to create a resource saving society 
through adoption of energy efficient equipment in strategic industrial sectors (RDRC, Ch.2, 
2011; RDRC). This chapter focuses in particular on the industries of steel, energy, chemical, 
petrochemicals, pulp and paper, and grain processing industries. Emission control is mentioned 
in relation to these industries, as well as the development of a circular economy and other types 
of industrial recycling projects. Investment into high energy consuming industries is to be 
restricted (RDRC, Ch.9, 2011). There is an overall emphasis on the construction of low 
consumption, low emission, and low pollution industries, expressed both in this chapter and in 
the chapter on building a “resource-saving, environment-friendly society” (RDRC, Ch.2, 2011; 
RDRC, Ch.9, 2011).  
As in the national FYP, Rizhao 12th FYP also contains many references to energy issues in 
relation to supporting the emergence of strategic industries, such as new energy vehicles, new 
materials and “smart” energy saving products. The city is to actively support the development 
of clean energy, such as wind, solar, biomass, geothermal and ocean energy, as well as support 
investments into hybrid and electric vehicles (RDRC, Ch.2, 2011). The city also actively 
promotes the development of “energy efficient, environmentally advanced technologies and 
equipment”, and the document presents plans to set up a marine energy research centre and the 
aim of becoming a renewable energy pilot city. 
References to low carbon, climate and emission reduction goals in the 12th national and 
municipal FYPs confirm that these policy goals are not established as mainstreamed policy 
targets. In total there are 26 references to climate change, ten to low carbon (development), and 
27 to greenhouse and carbon emissions. Most of the references are in the document 
introductions, where emission reductions are compounded with issues such as energy security, 
resource saving and sustainable development:  
Global issues such as climate change, energy security and food safety are becoming protruding… 
In transforming the economic development mode, the importance of building a resource-saving and 
environment-friendly society should be stressed to save energy, reduce greenhouse emissions and 
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actively tackle global climate change… through striking a balance between economic development 
and population growth, sustainable development will be enhanced (NDRC, Ch. I, 2011) 
The only other section where climate change and low carbon development are mentioned in 
relation to concrete policy goals is in the chapter on climate change in the national FYP. This 
chapter lists a number of ambitions, such as establishing binding emission targets, improving 
statistical monitoring, standardization and accounting procedures, establishing an emission 
trading system, low carbon product standardization, introduction of a product labeling system 
and improving international cooperation (NDRC, Ch. 21, 2011).  
The high level of similarity between municipal and national document illustrates the extent to 
which urban planning documents are based on their central government counterparts (as also 
discussed in section 5.1.2 above). There are some discrepancies in policy phrasing that point to 
the possibility for local planners to maneuver within the existing policy preference space. One 
divergence is a larger emphasis in Rizhao’s FYP on eco-city building as a political achievement, 
and of energy issues in relation to strengthening local infrastructure (e.g. improvement of power 
grids in rural areas).  
Another divergence is a stronger tendency in the municipal FYP to refer to the natural 
environment as a development asset, related to the aim of developing the tourism industry and 
marine economy. Rizhao’s FYP describes the city’s environmental conditions as an “ecological 
advantage” (RDRC, Ch.1, 2006). This notion becomes explicit in the section on “shaping the 
city brand”, which aims to “give full play to ‘blue sky, blue sea, golden beach’ and excellent 
environmental advantages to develop the waterfront … driving the development and 
construction of the city's tourism resources …so Rizhao can become a famous seaside tourism 
and leisure destination” (RDRC, Ch.4, 2006). The sections relating to development of park 
areas similarly refer to ecological advantages and development of the tourism industry. 
Interviews with respondents in Rizhao reflect that the municipal leadership adopted 
environmental protection agendas for the sake of the tourism agenda. Tourism is one of 
Rizhao’s economic development strategies and as part of building an attractive tourism 
destination, efforts to protect the natural environment have been improved (Interview with local 
official, Beijing, 2013.03.22). An underlying trend in these policy strategies is to frame 
environmental agendas as part of economic development strategies, either in relation to 
industrial development or city branding.  
5.2.2 Ecological protection 
In parallel with the emphasis on economic opportunity, the FYPs contain references to 
environmental agendas from the perspective of ecological constraints. The emphasis on these 
issues is considerably weaker. There are in total 19 references to ecological carrying capacities 
and ecological limits in the national and municipal FYP, most of these in the central government 
document.  
The key problem formulation is that China is confronting increasing “resource and 
environmental restrictions” incompatible with the current mode of development (NDRC, VI, 
2011). Chapter 18 (“Regional Development”) of the national 12th FYP emphasizes the need to 
concentrate urban migration, industrial development and economic development in areas that 
are suitable to development, with consideration of the resource environment. For example, it is 
necessary for “key development to take place in regions where resource capacities are relatively 
strong” (NDRC, Ch. 18, 2011).  
Rizhao’s 12th FYP does recognize the conflict between economic growth and a limited amount 
of environmental resources. This is pointed out in the document introduction as a key 
development issue: 
The city still has some contradictions and problems in economic and social development … due to 
economic growth, constraints in environment and resources will increase, there is contradiction 
between emission reduction targets and the goal to maintain rapid economic development; in 
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implementing a stringent land policy there is a contradiction between land supply and demand 
(RDRC, Ch. I, 2011) 
In the rest of the municipal plan, environmental capacity is mentioned only once, in relation to 
optimizing resource use between the prefectural area’s urban and rural regions and optimizing 
resource allocation by adjusting the industrial structure. Improving the capacity of 
technological innovation is thereby recognized in the same statement as the key solution for 
this development conflict, emphasizing the discourse discussed above.  
At the same time, the interviews of the case study suggest that the involvement of planners 
from central planning organizations and research institutes in municipal planning has shifted 
development narratives in this direction. Experts from organizations like CAUPD and CAS 
have a high status attributed to the “scientific” nature of their advice. In some circumstances, 
this lends greater consideration to issues such as ecological protection and resource 
conservation. A couple of examples from Rizhao illustrates this point.  
As part of drafting Rizhao Master Plan and Rizhao Eco-City Construction Plan, both CAS and 
CAUPD engaged in independent data collection related to urban pollution and resource 
consumption levels, and based planning suggestions in part on these outcomes. As described 
above, the planners from CAUPD found that their suggestion to move the steel factory out of 
the city centre was overruled by industrial stakeholders. The researchers from CAS were able 
introduce some environmental considerations into planning decisions. As mentioned above, 
CAS drafted the eco-city plan in cooperation with EPB and in dialogue with a number of 
stakeholders. Negotiations led to a number of compromises between CAS and EPB on the one 
hand, and the private sector and other municipal departments on the other hand. One was that 
the coal plant was allowed to continue operations but not to expand, and was asked to install 
pollution control equipment. Further, environmental standards of emissions from the steel plant 
and the pulp mill were raised (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.05.17).  
Protection against land development is an area where CAUPD has had some success. The 
conservation of Rizhao’s coastline was originally suggested by an individual from this 
organization during the drafting Rizhao’s 1993 Master Plan. A local official describes that a 
few decades ago, there was nothing along the coastline and government had no idea what to do 
with it (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.05.13). One of the CAUPD planners states 
that the local government originally wanted to develop the entire area, but the “expert advice” 
was to keep the coast (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.05.24). The beach was 
protected and is now key to municipal city branding schemes. The expert advice allegedly 
contributed to long-time preservation of the coastal area, in spite of development pressure from 
local stakeholders.  
A local official confirms this account of events. He states that while “a lot of people” wanted 
to develop this zone, the government didn’t “fall for the pressure of the profit of individuals” 
(Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.05.13). The CAUPD planner explains that their 
rationale for preserving the area, as well as mountain areas and wetland in the city, is for the 
sake of ecological sustainability and long term planning considerations. The contestation 
between these principles and local development interests are described as follows:  
We actually did an ecological study of the city, where we pointed out that some parts have to be 
preserved… We suggested that the wetlands in the north and the nearby mountain range should be 
protected from further development… There are some of the ecological areas that just must be 
preserved, both for the sake of ecological sustainability and for tourism purposes. This includes the 
wetland and mountain areas in the north of the municipal area. Keeping these areas is a 30-40 year 
planning consideration. But there is a lot of pressure to develop them now. I’m hoping we will be 
able to keep them in the next 20 years period (Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.04.19) 
Another example is the planning of a transport system that over a long term perspective may 
contribute to a lower emission profile. According to the CAUPD planners, this has been one of 
the considerations when trying to plan for the expansion of the city. Currently, Rizhao is 
experiencing relatively rapid spatial expansion, and the planners have considered how to 
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accommodate this growth in a way that allows for future transport solutions. The city is growing 
in a plus-shape, primarily towards the north and in the inland. This spatial lay-out will 
eventually cause a rise in energy consumption in the transport sector, as the population grows 
and private vehicle use increases. The CAUPD planner explains that the city currently is too 
small for BRT systems, subway or intercity railway, but the current spatial plan has been laid 
out so that space has been left for future construction of low carbon public transport solutions 
(Interview with central planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22).  
5.2.3 Black-boxing low carbon agendas 
Returning again to the research question of this chapter: what does a policy discourse 
perspective suggest about inclusion of stakeholders in environmental policy? The first insight 
relates to thinking of policy making processes from the perspective of dominant belief systems. 
An overarching tendency in China’s 11th and 12th FYP is to consider development issues 
through the perspective of backward technological development and over-reliance on heavy 
industry. The key solution to these problems is perceived to be industrial restructuring and 
technological innovation. These strategies are expected to redeem declining economic growth 
rates and allow China to become a leading nation in innovation. They also represent a broader 
faith in economic and scientific development as unquestionable paths to progress.  
The perspective of dominant belief systems explains why some policy options are seen as 
natural and self-evident, whereas others are removed from the policy agenda. As phrased by 
Owens and Cowell (p.15, 2011), “policies come wrapped in necessity”, making it appear that 
there are no alternative low carbon options, while obscuring how the government has mobilized 
one particular policy preference. However, the concept of sustainability is inherently vague, 
and the formulation of sustainability policy always involves making priorities and choosing 
between development visions (Meadowcroft, 2011). In the case of China’s energy policy, this 
priority is to support clean-up of heavy industries, development of new industries, and 
innovative activities of clean-tech entrepreneurs.  
Another insight relates to interpretations of Chinese environmental policy in accordance with 
Dryzek’s environmental discourse theory. While his framework guided the generation of codes 
and analysis of these policy documents, the results reveal how certain underlying assumptions 
and priorities are endemic to China’s political context. Some of the Chinese discourses are very 
similar to those in the “West”. For example, the notion of “sustainability” is deeply interwoven 
with economic development aims. Win-win policy options in relation to environmental agendas 
are emphasized in the national FYP, and even more so in Rizhao’s development agendas. 
Where the municipal development plan diverges from the national counterpart, it is mainly in 
the formulation of local economic growth strategies. Although the FYPs display similar 
dominating policy themes, the municipal documents have a greater tendency to view the 
environmental issues from a perspective of development assets. 
However, Chinese documents express a particular version of the “ecological modernization” 
discourse. Powerful narratives that emerge are those of “scientific outlook on development” 
and “harmonious development”. The first of these two embraces the notion that economic 
growth and environmental protection can and should be pursued in parallel, and that 
technological progress and continued industrial expansion are the ultimate solutions to both 
backward economic development and environmental deterioration. Development options that 
are encouraged under this banner include renewable energy technology development, clean-
tech industries, circular economy projects, and energy efficiency investments. The concept of 
“scientific outlook on development” implies that new paths of economic growth, based on 
technological improvement, are a viable solution to social, economic and environmental 
problems. The focus of energy policy in China’s and Rizhao’s 12th FYPs reflects these beliefs. 
Energy agendas are predominantly expressed as industrial upgrading schemes (such as 
encouragement of new technologies in iron and steel industries and promotion of strategic 
industries and industrial recycling projects), or as technology development programs (such as 
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development of renewable energy sources). Rizhao’s energy policy is heavily influenced by 
this tendency. Municipal energy strategies are to a large extent based on industrial energy 
conservation, support of emerging industries (eco-industries), and development of renewables 
(these programs are described in depth in Chapter 6).  
When combined with the discourse of “harmonious development”, the language use diverges 
from Dryzek’s ecological modernization terminology. The harmonious development discourse 
emphasizes well-being of natural and social systems, as well as social stability. At the same 
time, this is a discourse that undermines agency of social actors, by highlighting conformity 
rather than diversity in opinion and action. This tendency is reflected in the unilateral emphasis 
on technical and industrial issues in both policy documents. Mol (2006) has applied the 
ecological modernization concept in China and points to ongoing environmental protection 
efforts as political modernization strategies. He argues that it makes sense to think of these 
efforts in terms of ecological modernization. However, ecological modernization discourse in 
a “Western” context implies efforts of multiple institutions to respond to modern environmental 
problems. In Chinese policy documents, society largely remains a receiver of the state’s effort 
to build an environmentally and socially stable system. 
An important implication of these discursive practices is that the strong association between 
low carbon development and industrial modernization places some groups as leaders of low 
carbon development, in this case notably industries and technology developers. Communities, 
NGOs, media, citizens are made invisible (“black-boxed”) because they are not part of 
dominating industrial improvement schemes. A comparison with urban climate action in India 
serves as a thought experiment that illustrates this tendency. In an account of climate initiatives 
in Mumbai, Boyd and Ghosh (2013) show how a range of actors are mobilized in diverse forms 
of collaboration in climate action. Rag pickers, a poor and socially excluded group, are engaged 
in waste management with the parallel aim of reducing vulnerability to flooding. Fishermen in 
areas threatened by impacts of climate change are organized into a collaborative body aiming 
to find alternative livelihood opportunities. Environmental movements and local communities 
work together to develop rainwater harvesting systems. An individual is collaborating with 
local government agencies to improve energy conservation in buildings. These examples 
illustrate that alternative climate action, led by actors other than industry and technology 
developers, is possible. Policy preferences are not pre-existing, but contextually embedded and 
based on economic and political priorities and dominant belief systems.   
Another crucial consequence of these industrial-technical discourses is that they allows policy 
makers to opt for non-threatening, traditional1` approaches, rather than considering dramatic 
changes in social systems required to tackle socio-environmental concerns (While et al, 2004). 
The risk in uncritical application of ecological modernization discourse and related narratives 
lies in disproportional focus on technological innovation and industrial progress, while 
overlooking complex social and political contexts and the barriers to reconstructing institutions 
(Romero Lankao, 2007). Policy making and planning under the banner of ecological 
modernization – or in this case scientific outlook on development - may “legitimize the 
continuing instrumental dominion and destruction of the environment” and support 
undemocratic forms of government (Christo, p.228, 2000).               
The empirical evidence presented also provides further understanding of how external research 
institutes shape local policy discourses. Previous research in China has shown that GONGOs 
act as advocacy coalitions that introduce new concepts into policy discourse and build public 
recognition of certain environmental policy options (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012). This 
case study illustrates that inclusion of such organizations in local planning processes can shift 
debates in a direction that places stronger emphasis on long term sustainability concerns and 
ecological limits. The contribution is to show how policy preferences that are promoted by 
central advocacy coalitions travel across government levels and are reproduced in urban 
planning processes. 
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6 Modes of climate governance in Rizhao 
 
Rizhao has adopted the aim of becoming a carbon-neutral city. That is an ambitious goal. It is 
especially likely to be a challenge for an urban region with an economy heavily reliant on the 
industrial sector, which in turn depends on coal. As was demonstrated by the previous chapter, 
there are fundamental conflicts between the aim to protect the environment and to continue 
industrial development activities. This chapter investigates what has been done to place Rizhao 
on a low carbon development path. In doing so, the chapter aims to answer research sub-
question 2: 
How have different modes of urban climate governance contributed to climate mitigation in 
cities in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
This chapter presents the emission reduction and energy saving schemes adopted by Rizhao’s 
municipal government, and demonstrates that these involved a mixture of climate governance 
modes (6.1). Environmental regulation plays an important role and Rizhao Municipality used a 
regulatory approach to achieve popularization of renewable energy in the construction sector. 
This points to the continued importance of traditional modes of steering, as well as the potential 
for Chinese cities to use local binding requirements to generate change. Provision as a climate 
action strategy is illustrated by Rizhao’s investment into low carbon public transport. In 
delivery of major infrastructure projects, the municipality relied on partnerships with external 
SOEs. These companies provide economic and technical capacity that may be lacking within 
municipal institutions. To complement administrative schemes in the industrial and 
construction sectors, Rizhao has resorted to the governance mode of enabling. This involves 
training, audits and benchmarking, as well of promotion of energy conservation as “good 
business”. In interviews with local officials, respondents refer to the use of information based 
tools as crucial for companies to adopt green practices.    
Further, this chapter shows that formal partnerships as a governance mode is limited in Rizhao 
(6.2). The municipality has established partnerships with bilateral partners and “expert” 
organizations to access technology and information in demonstration projects in the 
construction sector. Public authorities also attempt to engage “owners’ representative groups” 
in retrofits of residential buildings. Nevertheless, an area in which partnerships play an 
important role is in development of energy saving and emission reduction technology. This 
involves top-down initiatives consisting of establishment of collaborative innovation platforms. 
It also involves bottom-up formation of collaborative arrangements that facilitate technology 
transfers and technology development.  
 
6.1 Climate action through regulation, provision & enabling  
This section demonstrates that Rizhao Municipality has relied on a mix of governance modes 
to deliver energy saving and emission reduction schemes. The city’s most well-known 
achievement – popularization of renewable energy in the construction sector – was realized 
through introduction of local regulation. However, the city used provision and a combination 
of incentives and information-based instruments to support energy saving in the industrial and 
construction sectors.  
6.1.1 Environmental regulation 
During the time period between the 10th and 11th FYPs, Rizhao did not have a specific policy 
strategy for controlling emission of greenhouse gases. Instead, the municipality focused on 
energy saving, promotion of renewable energy sources, and reduction of pollutant emissions 
(such as SOx and NOx) as separate policy strategies.  
Control of pollution emissions in Rizhao is a typical example of traditional environmental 
management. Emission control is regulated using maximum air and water pollution emission 
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levels set by the central Ministry of Environment and monitored by local EPBs. Units that 
exceed pollution standards are fined, and can be listed as transgressors on the municipal 
government website. In cases of repeated transgressions, heavily polluting companies can be 
denied expansion or be forced to shut down. In spite of increasing industrial activity, levels of 
air and water pollution were kept at a steady level or somewhat declined over the past five 
years, as shown by Figure 14: 
 
Figure 14: Rizhao pollution emissions (tonnes)                 
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
COD: Chemical oxygen demand, a proxy indicator for organic materials in water 
Smoke emission: An indicator for air pollution 
 
The enforcement of environmental legislation is associated with problems commonly 
encountered in traditional management of environmental issues. A local academic explains that 
Rizhao EPB has limited funding, which causes difficulties in monitoring due to lack of 
personnel, technical capacity and ability to collect reliable statistics (Interview with local 
academic, Rizhao, 2013.05.22). The same respondent makes the following statement: 
[The EPB] should know how much pollution is in the water and check how much every business is 
polluting. But actually, this doesn’t really work because they don’t have a way of controlling the 
individual pipes. There are a number of reasons why the water pollution control fails, and this is 
one of them. Another reason is that the EPB doesn’t have enough influence or funding to control all 
the factories… and another issue is that polluting factories should be fined, but the fines are often 
too small, and since the cost of new equipment is much higher, the factories often don’t care about 
the punishments (interview with local academic, Rizhao, 2013.05.22) 
The EPB fines are too low to incentivize factory upgrades, as investment into pollution control 
systems are expensive. A company manager in Rizhao notes that large scale systems such as 
water recycling equipment are very costly: “in order for other companies to adopt this kind of 
systems, they firstly need to reach a certain size. Secondly they must have a certain level of 
investment capacity” (Interview with company manager, Rizhao, 2013.03.19). Smaller units 
that exceed emission limits but cannot fund investment into new equipment thus continue 
polluting and pay the fines, or eventually shut down. In this sense, regulation is a rather blunt 
tool that does little to help industrial units innovate or adopt new practices.  
6.1.2 Solar water heater program 
The wide-spread adoption of solar water heaters is the Rizhao’s most well-known sustainability 
achievement. In 2007, the municipality estimated that up to 99% of households in the city centre 
and 30% in the suburbs used solar water heaters (RMPG, 2009a). The efforts to promote solar 
heaters in Rizhao began as early as 1992, making the city one of the first in China to engage in 
the issue. One reason for this is that the Rizhao Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB) took 
part of an international training program in the early 1990s. This highlighted promotion of 
renewable energy technology and environmental protection (Interview with policy advisor, 
Rizhao, 2013.03.13) 
In the early 1990s, solar technology products were not produced locally. The Mayor chose to 
support the local solar panel industry by providing subsidies to firms engaged in solar 
technology research: 
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The technological level of enterprises in Rizhao was comparatively low-end. We needed better 
technology in order to carry out the widespread adoption of solar energy here, and the technology 
was available on the international market. But, the international companies were not allowed on 
the domestic market, so we could not access it. So, the government instead decided to financially 
support the local market, so that they would reach a higher level of technological production 
(Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.03.15) 
The research support contributed to technological breakthroughs through reduced price levels 
and development of a simple model that can be attached to the top of buildings (Bai, 2007a). 
With a purchase price at the same level as electric heaters but operating for free, households 
save money by adopting solar heaters (up to 14,000 RMB over a period of 15 years) (Ibid). As 
a further economic incentive, solar heater installations are supported by the municipal 
government with a subsidy of 8 RMB/m2 (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.03.15).  
However, according to a local official at Rizhao Construction Committee, administrative 
instruments were more important than cost considerations in the mainstreaming of solar heaters 
in the city. Rizhao Municipality has adopted a local policy requirement through which any 
building blueprints that lack solar heaters fail to pass approval (Interview with local official, 
Rizhao, 2013.03.15). According to the official, most buildings had solar heaters installed as a 
result of these design requirements. The same respondent attributes the successful 
implementation to “a unique construction management system for hot water. In this system, the 
design, planning, and construction are all handled by the same department. This gives more 
power to the sector and we can enforce it on our own” (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 
2013.05.15). Other reasons for the mainstreaming success include political support. Increased 
use of renewable energy is viewed as a political achievement, and the Mayor’s Office strongly 
supports the policy. Officials in the outskirts of the prefectural area are less prone to prioritize 
this goal, leading to lower levels of adoption in the rural regions. Another reason is that the cost 
of houses in the outskirts of the city is lower and life-span shorter, making the addition of solar 
equipment proportionately more expensive relative to construction costs (Ibid). 
6.1.3 Transport & waste management 
Low carbon public transport and waste infrastructure in Rizhao has been provided both by 
municipal authorities and through public-private partnerships. Since the 1990s, Rizhao 
Municipality has increased the number of buses, leading to a steady increase in the number of 
total public transport trips (Figure 15). In 2014, the municipality invested in bus stops and bus 
cards operated through an electronic system, to make the ticketing and use more convenient 
(TBGJXW, 2014a). 
 
Figure 15: Rizhao public transport total passenger trips (10’000) 
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
In 2012, Rizhao Municipality invested in 40 new energy buses, followed in 2013 by the 
retirement of 50 polluting vehicles (TBGJXW, 2013). In 2014, municipal authorities invested 
one hundred million RMB into 150 new energy buses and electric charging stations (TBGJXW, 
2014b). This included hybrids (gas-electricity), pure electric buses, and buses running on gas. 
The total number of new energy buses in 2014 reached 290, accounting for half of the buses in 
the city (QLW, 2014). The motivation behind the investment was to improve air quality and 
reduce pollution, ease traffic congestion, reduce energy consumption, and contribute towards 
the long term protection of the urban environment (Ibid). The transport program was publicly 
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funded and managed. The decision to invest in new energy buses was made by the Municipal 
People’s Congress, Rizhao Financial Bureau provided funding, and management is handled by 
Rizhao Transportation Bureau (Ibid).  
In 2015, Rizhao Municipal Government signed a cooperation contract with China State 
Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) to implement 15 major infrastructure projects 
to a value of 36 billion RMB through a Public-Private Partnership (PPP). CSCEC is one of the 
largest infrastructure companies in the world, a Chinese SOE with extensive overseas 
operations. According to a media statement, the cooperation project between Rizhao 
Municipality and CSCEC aims to “broaden financing channels, improve infrastructure and the 
quality and efficiency of public service delivery … and enhance the city's comprehensive 
competitiveness” (People’s Net, 2015). The project will expand public transport infrastructure 
through construction of a rail line to the north of the prefectural area (People’s Net, 2015).  
In the waste sector, a waste-to-energy went into operation in 2015. The total investment reached 
350 million RMB, the plant has an incineration capacity of 600 tons, electricity generation 
capacity of 12 MW, and annual generation capacity of 72 million kWh (power for 40,000 
households) (QLW, 2015). The project is a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project between 
Everbright International and Rizhao Municipality. BOT-schemes are projects in which a 
company is granted a concession from another actor to finance, construct and manage a project. 
This project will be transferred to the municipality at the end of the concession period, at which 
point the company is to have recovered its investment and operating expenses. Everbright 
International is another gigantic SOE specialized in “environmental technology”, such as waste 
treatment (Everbright International, 2016). The project feasibility study and design work was 
undertaken by the Chinese Academy of Building Construction, and approved through an EIA 
conducted by the Environmental Science Research Institute in Shandong Province (RMW, 
2014).  
6.1.4 Energy conservation programs 
Energy conservation standards and targets in the industrial and construction sectors are 
administrative policy schemes adopted by China’s central government. However, this case 
study shows that local enforcement relies on enabling: training, benchmarking, auditing, 
activities and developing energy saving strategies in collaboration with companies. This section 
presents and discusses these strategies. 
Industrial energy consumption 
As already mentioned, central binding energy conservation targets were integrated into China’s 
national 11th FYP and raised in the 12th FYP. According to a “veto” system adopted by 
Shandong Province in 2006, failure of districts and enterprises to meet energy targets result in 
immediate exclusion from promotions, potential bans on company expansion, and dismissal of 
leading cadres (Shandong Government, 2008b). In 2012, Rizhao began to sign energy target 
liability contracts with all enterprises with an energy use above 5,000 tons standard coal (Tsc) 
(TPYY, 2012). 26 enterprises (24 industrial units and 2 transport companies) signed agreements 
to meet energy saving targets before 2014 (Ibid). The allocation of quotas was handled by 
Rizhao Development and Reform Commission (DRC) and monitoring was carried out by the 
DRC and Rizhao Quality Supervision Bureau (QSB). A municipal Energy Conservation Office 
under Rizhao Economic and Information Technology Commission (EITC) has the 
responsibility to promote clean production, enforce energy legislation and monitor key energy 
consuming enterprises, implement a statistical system and distribute energy saving funds 
(REITC, 2012).  
Industrial energy use accounts for around 70% of Rizhao’s urban energy consumption (Rizhao 
Municipal Yearbooks, 2007-2011). In 2009, industrial consumption of raw coal and coke 
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flattened out and even decreased slightly (Figure 16).13 This trend is explained by introduction 
of one million tons of bio-waste into the energy mix, efficiency upgrades and adoption of 
industrial recycling systems in the city’s key energy consuming units. 
 
Figure 16: Rizhao industrial energy use by source 2006-2010 (million tonnes standard coal)        
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
As industrial energy use accounts for a large share of total consumption, energy efficiency 
upgrades of key industrial units have a large impact on the urban energy profile. As illustrated 
by Figure 17, the energy efficiency of Rizhao’s key industrial enterprises displays the same 
inflection point as that of total urban energy consumption in 2009. In 2006-2007, Rizhao was 
one out of only three cities in Shandong province that failed to meet industrial energy efficiency 
targets (energy use per 10,000 RMB increased by 5.7% from the previous year) (CCG, 2007). 
However, in 2013 all key enterprises were on track to meet the targets, and four companies 
exceeded the required levels (Rizhao Steel, Rizhao Power Plant, Rizhao Port Group and 
Shandong Wuzheng Group) (SEITC, 2014). 
 
Figure 17: Rizhao energy efficiency of key industrial enterprises (Tsc/10,000 RMB) 
Source: Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks 
Data reported in Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks indicate that the economic resources of Rizhao 
Municipal Government are limited. It is impossible for municipal authorities to fund energy 
saving investments of local firms, which involve high initial capital costs (Interview with 
planner, Beijing, 2013.03.22). Figure 18 demonstrates the size of Rizhao Steel’s investment 
into environmental technology in relation to municipal spending on basic services and on the 
environment (Rizhao Municipal Statistical Yearbook; Rizhao Steel, 2011). The figure shows 
that in 2010, Rizhao Steel spent around ten times more on green technology than the total size 
of municipal spending on environmental investments. 
                                                 
13Data on energy consumption in Rizhao’s municipal statistical yearbooks is available from 2005. Other than the 
industrial sector, there is no disaggregated data on energy or electricity consumption available at an urban level. 
There are no (publicly available) data for carbon emissions for any sector. 
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Figure 18: Rizhao relative size of municipal spending and private investments into green technology 
(10’000 RMB) 
Due to the limited budget of the municipal government, economic incentives for industrial 
upgrading have instead been provided by higher levels of government. In 2011 Rizhao Port 
Group received funding from the Ministry of Transport for a number of energy saving projects 
(GLINFO, 2012). In 2011, China’s Ministry of Finance distributed 17 million RMB to Rizhao 
for the purpose of eliminating “backward production capacity” in the cement, alcohol, printing 
and dyeing industries (REITC, 2011c). In 2010, Shandong Government distributed Special 
Awards and Excellence Awards consisting of one million RMB or 50,000 RMB for units with 
outstanding energy saving contributions (REITC, 2011a; REITC, 2011b). In 2011, nine 
enterprises in Rizhao received this funding for investments with a potential of contributing an 
annual saving of 89,000 tons of coal (REITC, 2011c).  
Rather than setting rules or providing incentives, the role of the municipal government in 
implementing energy conservation policy has been to act as an enabler. Part of the liability 
energy contracts involves establishment of energy management systems, energy conservation 
audits and regular training sessions held by Rizhao EITC and Rizhao QSB. An official at 
Rizhao EITC states that their work involves energy management activities, demonstration 
projects of energy management, introduction of energy measuring and monitoring systems, and 
efficiency benchmarking activities. The office also helps companies improve energy evaluation 
and examination systems, organize and implement energy conservation projects, improve 
efficiency supervision systems, while supporting public awareness (Interview with REITC 
official, Rizhao, 2013.05.09). Regular interaction and collaboration around strategies to meet 
the targets is essential to implementation, according to the same official (Ibid).  
A factor that enhances effectiveness of energy efficiency programs is pressure from the market 
to step up competitiveness. Market pressures are an important motivation for companies to 
adopt energy saving and emission reduction equipment. An official at Rizhao EITC explains 
that companies “make money by switching to these technologies; as far as I know, most 
enterprises are following this development path” (Ibid). As explained by a company manager 
at a paper and pulp plant in Rizhao: 
The energy system was adopted primarily for economic reasons. For example, when the company 
chose to install the tree transportation line [which saves fossil fuels], that was because it is better 
than using trains or cars, based on economic considerations. Our type of factory cannot continue 
existing on a high-carbon model; it is too expensive (Interview with company manager, Rizhao, 
2013.03.11) 
In a media interview, a manager at Rizhao Steel similarly points to market pressures as a key 
motive behind adoption of energy conservation technologies: 
The steel industry has entered an era of limited profit… The implementation of energy 
conservation… is related to the company's future survival and development strategic choice and is 
the only way… the circular economy will undoubtedly open another door, which also helps the 
company to get rid of energy shortages (Rizhao Steel, second paragraph, 2011) 
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This citation shows how Rizhao Steel frames energy conservation as an economic opportunity 
and a necessary measure in the current context of high market pressures.  
Construction sector 
Energy saving standards is a key instrument used to control energy use in the built environment. 
Detailed requirements for energy saving in buildings were introduced by China’s Ministry of 
Housing and Urban Development’s (MoHUrD) regulations on energy conservation in the 
construction sector, adopted in 2005. These include financial punishments and denial of 
building licenses or blocking of funding for units that fail to meet standards (MoHUrD, 2005). 
These regulations were followed by a list of requirements issued by Shandong Provincial 
Government, which detail energy saving standards in buildings and implementation guidelines, 
such as denying licenses to projects that fail to meet minimum energy conservation 
requirements.14  
Energy saving standards enforced by Rizhao Construction Committee are set by Shandong 
Provincial Government. According to local guidelines, any construction that does not meet 
energy efficiency standards is considered a “failed project” and will not be granted building 
approval (RMPG, 2009c). Projects can be blocked by refusing to issue certificates or asking 
banks to block funding (Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.05.13). 15 In 2010, 40% of 
the buildings in Rizhao were reported to reach provincial energy use standards, contributing an 
annual energy saving of 207’000 Tsc (RPM, 2011).  
In 2012, Shandong Province adopted a target to reach over 50 million m2 of green buildings 
(Rizhao Fangdichang Wang, 2013). In response to the provincial target, Rizhao Construction 
Committee issued a guideline stating that real estate development projects above 80,000 m2 and 
single constructions over 10,000 m2 have to meet green building standards. The government 
estimated that by 2015, 30% of buildings would meet green building standards (RMPG, 2012b). 
Economic incentives from higher levels of government is provided in this sector as well. The 
central government rewards two-star and three-star green construction standard projects with a 
45 RMB/m2 and 80/m2 subsidy (RMPG, 2012b). On a provincial level, three-star green 
construction standard projects are provided a 50 RMB/m2 subsidy, two-star standards a 30 
RMB/m2 subsidy and one star projects with 15 RMB/m2 subsidy (Interview with local official, 
Rizhao, 2013.05.13).  
Introduction of green building standards places higher requirements on construction companies. 
In particular, high cost is a main barrier to green construction. An official at Rizhao 
Construction Committee concludes that regulation is not enough to support increased use of 
green building practices. The office therefore works with companies in developing green 
construction methods:  
When [real estate companies] try to build green, they have to use too much money; they don’t have 
the experience to do this in a cheap way yet. But this is a process… we are working on it. We do 
training and promotion, including training for all the big developers here. We need to do this for 
them to be aware of green construction and know how it is done (Interview with local official, 
Rizhao, 2013.05.13) 
The same official concludes that lacking knowledge and lacking funding are the two main 
barriers that need to be overcome for local developers to increase the use of green construction:  
                                                 
14 Shandong Auditing and Supervision Management of Energy Conservation in Construction (2005), the Application 
of New Wall Materials and Energy Conservation in Construction Management Regulation (2005), and New 
Standards of Energy Efficiency in Public Buildings (2005) 
15 Certification involves three steps: (1) Design stage. The RCC design department make sure it meets a number of 
standards, out of which energy savings is one; (2) Energy auditing to make sure that energy saving requirements are 
met by approving the building plans (3) Engineering plan converted to construction plans. This includes 
consideration of wall material, flooring, roofs, etc., and a report on construction (Interview with local official, 
Rizhao, 2013.05.13) 
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We all think that green construction is a good thing, but it is not that easy to do. It involves a large 
system that needs to change. Everyone needs to be aware of these issues, but the engagement of the 
developers is not high, for two main reasons. One is that they are not really able to do green 
construction, they still lack the knowledge. The other is investment. Doing green construction 
becomes too expensive, so we need to research how the developers can do this at a reasonable cost 
(Interview with local official, Rizhao, 2013.05.13) 
6.1.5 Supporting the growth of eco-industries 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, China’s central government encourages eco-industries through 
preferential taxes for “environmental friendly” enterprises. In line with national guidelines, 
Rizhao Tax Bureau introduced preferential policies for these industries. This includes 
preferential taxes and land policy for industrial recycling and “environmental friendly” projects 
(2007) and for investment into R&D projects (2011) (XHHJ, 2007; RMPG, 2011a, RMPG, 
2012a)16.  
Since the adoption of these policies, the high-tech sector in Rizhao has expanded. In between 
2010 and 2013, GDP generated from high-tech firms increased from 32 billion RMB to 48 
billion RMB (an annual average of 15% - about twice as fast as the provincial average) 
(Shandong Net, 2014). Rizhao currently hosts a large number of companies specialized in 
energy saving and environmental protection technology (see Annex A for a list of thirty 
environmental technology firms established in recent years). A few large firms were established 
in the early 2000s, but most companies formed after the introduction of preferential policies in 
2007. Many of these companies provide equipment and services related to industrial energy 
conservation, such as heat recovery and waste air/water recycling. For example, Kelin Shier 
Environmental Technology works with development, production and sales of ‘smart’ water 
boilers and other resource conservation equipment. Rizhao Haida Automatic Technology 
develops and provides computer controlled energy saving equipment, applications of Internet 
of Things and intelligent building designs. Many companies also work with solar power 
technology and the establishment of solar-tech firms has increased since the 2000s (Annex A 
lists the thirty largest companies involved in manufacturing and research into solar technology).  
Since 1991, Rizhao Municipal Government has also established one national-level and four 
provincial-level economic development zones to attract investment (RMPG, 2010).17 Rizhao 
witnessed a continual increase in FDI since the early 2000’s, almost doubling in between 2007 
and 2010, while exports and imports grew even faster (Rizhao Municipal Yearbooks, 2007-
2010). This growth is concentrated in the development zones, where a hundred international 
enterprises invested over the past decade (RCB, 2013). Exports and imports are to a large extent 
made up of energy-intense products like steel, auto-related products, chemical products and 
coal (Ibid).18 Nevertheless, Rizhao also received investments from high-tech companies in the 
fields of new energy and environmental technology. In an interview with a high-tech unit, a 
company manager cites preferential policies as a major reason why they established a branch 
in Rizhao:  
We decided to be located here because of preferential taxes. For the first three years there are no 
taxes, and then only half. They have also used land policy to support this direction of development. 
This works by judging the environmental performance of companies that apply for land use; a 
                                                 
16 The tax department has established rules to “ensure implementation of preferential policies … such as 
environmental friendly enterprises … For land policy, economic development planning for industrial recycling 
projects is carried out by ensuring that the cost of land shall be reduced for projects that meet policy priorities” 
(XHHJ, 2007). 
17 These include Rizhao Economic Development Zone, Lanshan Economic and Technological Development Zone, 
Rizhao High-Tech Industrial Park, Rizhao Industrial Equipment Park and Ju County Industrial Park (Shandong FAO, 
2014). 
18In 2013 (Jan to March), out of total exports 27% was steel, 14% “marine industries”, 13% auto-products, 6% 
chemical products, 5% clothing and 4% coal (Rizhao Bureau of Commerce, 2013). Main imports were iron ore 
(30%), soybeans (23%), coal (15%), palm oil (6%), copper products (6%), and wood (almost 4%). These numbers 
looked similar in 2012 (RCB, 2012; RCB, 2013). 
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company with high technology and no pollution is likely to get land cheaper than a normal factory 
with higher pollution and standard technology (Interview with company manager, Rizhao, 
2013.03.12) 
Rizhao High-Tech Industrial Park aims specifically to develop as a centre for energy-saving 
and environmental technologies (RMPG, 2011c; RMPG, 2011d). An example of this type of 
company that is operating here is China Building Technique Group Company. This firm is 
setting up a low carbon industrial base to promote energy-efficient construction technologies. 
The company’s research focuses on light building materials, PV, solar thermal storage, heat 
pumps and energy conservation (CBTG, 2012).  
6.1.6 Low carbon campaigns 
Finally, Rizhao Municipality uses traditional promotional campaigns to support low carbon 
lifestyles. These campaigns allegedly encourage “green” practices, establishment of “green 
communities”, and activities of social organizations, community committees, and individual 
citizens (RMPG, 2009a). The government spreads energy-saving information in televised 
campaigns, brochures, newspapers and online. To act as a leading example in resource 
conservation, Rizhao Construction Committee introduced energy auditing systems and energy 
use monitoring in public buildings, and set up an energy building monitoring centre (an 
example of self-governing) (RMPG, 2012c). This was coupled with a campaign to reduce 
resource consumption in public offices. The campaign encourages “every individual to develop 
a good habit of saving every unit of electricity, every piece of paper and every drop of water … 
every time when finishing work or leaving the work place, computers and other energy using 
equipment should be turned off, in order to make an effort to save” (Fan, 2012).  
A couple of parastatal associations led this type of climate campaign. Rizhao (Communist) 
Youth League collaborated with Rizhao Garden Department in establishment of a low carbon 
action fund. The fund supports planting a “low carbon forest” and construction of low carbon 
micro-environments made up of green roofs, green walls, office-greening projects, and flowers 
in homes, offices and balconies (RMPG, 2011h). Communist Youth Leagues are managed by 
the CPC for members between fourteen and twenty-eight years old. They are political 
organizations that promote the agenda of the CPC on a local level.  
Another example is Rizhao Municipal Women’s Federation’s campaign for “low carbon 
households”, based on a list of practical suggestions: using energy-saving lamps, turning off 
lights, unplugging plugs, reducing air-conditioning use, driving less often, and so forth (Fan, 
2010). The Municipal Women’s Federation is part of All China Women’s Federation, officially 
labeled an NGO, but an organization closely monitored by the CPC and interests closely aligned 
with the party. Rizhao Occupation and Technology School has also encouraged young 
volunteers to hold a public promotion event with the theme “promote low carbon life, build a 
green home” (Li, 2012). 
6.1.7 From regulator to enabler? 
What does this case study say about modes of climate governance in Chinese cities and the 
opportunities of urban climate action? The strategies employed in Rizhao suggest that 
governing through authority and provision is possible, but associated with challenges. The case 
study also suggests that local climate schemes involve enabling, and that interaction-based 
approaches are important in supporting energy saving in the private sector.  
Municipal authorities ruling through authority 
The case study presents a successful example of governing through authority. Rizhao’s solar 
water heater program is based on a building requirement adopted by the municipal government. 
This administrative policy had a strong effect on adoption, as has been seen with the use of 
such schemes elsewhere, for example building requirements in Barcelona (C40, 2011).  
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Unfortunately, there is no publicly available data on residential electricity to evaluate the effect 
of the exchange of electric water heaters for solar powered units. 19  Rizhao’s total urban 
electricity consumption is listed in Shandong Provincial Yearbook (2011) as 12,500 million 
kWh in 2010, with household use accounting for only around 8 million kWh, and the industrial 
sector for 10,600 million kWh. Household electricity thus accounted for only 0.06% of urban 
electricity consumption. A previous study on urban electricity use in China indicates that the 
largest share of residential electricity consumption is attributable to refrigerators, air-
conditioning, and lighting. Electricity used to heat water accounts on average for only about 
2% of annual household electricity consumption (Brockett et al, 2004). These figures indicate 
that electricity saved by switching from electric heaters to solar heaters accounts for such a 
small share of total urban energy use that the impact does not appear in aggregated data.  
Although Rizhao’s solar heater program may play a limited role in reducing urban carbon 
emissions, the initiative has gained considerable political attention. The motivation for granting 
Rizhao (the “solar-powered sunshine city”) the World Clean Energy (WCE) Award in 2007, 
stated that “in a nation known for its heavy dependence on coal, Rizhao represents an inspiring 
example of the mainstreaming of renewable energy sources” (Worldchanging, 2007). The 
Mayor responsible for initiating the scheme gained credit as a policy entrepreneur, confirming 
the political kudos attached to being seen as a climate forerunner (Collier & Lofstedt, 1997; 
Betsill, 2001; Kousky & Schneider, 2003; Schreurs, 2008; Gustavsson et al, 2009; Bulkeley, 
2010). Notably, the promotion of solar water heaters was not conceived as a “climate mitigation 
strategy” until Rizhao applied for the WCE awards in 2007. The opportunity to frame the city 
as a forerunner in climate action encouraged the municipal leadership to reimagine 
popularization of renewables from an issue of energy access in rural and low income 
households to a question of sustainability and climate engagement (Interview with researcher, 
2017.04.28, London).  
Reflecting on the possibility for Chinese municipalities to engage in climate action by adopting 
local regulation, the case study suggests that the status associated with environmental 
achievement may encourage other leaders to take similar measures. At the same time, the case 
study points to some limitations. First, it is necessary for the local leadership to perceive 
progress in sustainability development as beneficial. This is unlikely to be the case if and where 
climate policy conflicts with economic goals. Second, political support must be sustained for 
implementation to be effective. As shown in Rizhao, the solar heater requirement was 
overlooked in rural areas where enforcement was not prioritized. In a new mandate period 
where the issue is not seen as important, the requirement may be overlooked along with other 
environmental guidelines that are ignored. As stated by a Chinese professor in environmental 
law, “China’s green laws are useless” (Wang, 2010). 
Another problem is that the room for independent regulation is limited by the numerous 
requirements imposed by higher levels of government. The central government plays a key role 
in rule setting activities in relation to pollution control, energy saving targets and standards. 
The case study demonstrates that Rizhao’s municipal authorities spend considerable time and 
resources devising strategies for implementation of central targets. This leaves urban authorities 
to “tinker on the margin” of national policy (Schreurs, p.344-346, 2008) rather than spending 
time devising rules that may be more appropriate to the local context. 
Governing through provision 
Rizhao’s provision of a green bus fleet shows that Chinese municipalities use their influence 
over public services to provide low emission alternatives. This is also a clear example of how 
emission reductions are framed by reference to other urban issues: pollution, traffic congestion, 
and “long term protection of the urban environment”. In this way, local leaders turn the national 
concern of emission reduction into a local issue (Bai, 2007b). It can also be related to Harrison 
                                                 
19 The World Bank cites Rizhao’s energy use being cut by a third and emissions by half as a result of solar water 
heater promotion (World Bank, p.21, 2010b). It is unclear on what numbers or calculations this is based. 
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and Kostka’s (2012) observation of Chinese authorities’ use of issue bundling as a means to 
promote energy policy options.  
Investments into improved transport infrastructure and a waste-to-energy plant illustrate 
another phenomenon, namely financing of public services through company funding (PPPs and 
BOTs). In both examples, Rizhao receives access to economic and technical resources of large 
SOEs operating on a nation-wide and international basis. The projects are strategies through 
which the municipality can mobilize funding and knowledge lacking within the governmental 
organization.  
The importance of enabling 
The implementation of environmental regulation illustrates limitations associated with 
traditional modes of governance. Due to limited resources of municipal EPBs, monitoring of 
environmental regulation is not always carried out effectively. Punishments for failing to meet 
pollution levels are not enough to catalyze investments into environmental equipment or 
support development of new technology. In the case of small, heavily polluting industrial units, 
some factories are closed down. This is desirable in light of the central government’s aim of 
economic restructuring. However, this is not a strategy that can be used for all units in the 
industrial and construction sectors that fail to meet energy saving targets.  
Energy conservation targets in these two sectors are set by higher levels of government, 
meaning that municipal units have limited room to govern through authority. Municipal budgets 
are too limited to provide funding for required equipment upgrades. It falls on provincial and 
central authorities to distribute funding for energy conservation investments. To implement 
energy saving targets and standards, Rizhao Municipality instead resorts to enabling strategies. 
This involves knowledge dissemination through training, auditing and benchmarking, as well 
as persuasion that points to cost benefits. Local officials see these strategies as central in helping 
companies adopt low emission practices.  
The promotion of eco-industries is a combination of regulation and provision. The central 
government acts as regulator by introducing preferential tax policy for strategic industries. The 
municipality in turn provides preferential policies, such as lower land costs for high-tech 
investors. Municipal authorities also provide industrial clusters to facilitate high-tech 
investments. The support schemes contribute to an increased establishment of high-tech firms 
and foreign investment into prioritized sectors. Table 14 maps out Rizhao’s energy 
conservation and emission reduction actions according to mode of governance and actor in 
charge of the initiative.  
Table 14: Roles of actors in energy saving activities in Rizhao 
Sector 
Authority/ 
Regulation 
Self-regulation Enabling Provision 
Public 
Central/ 
Provincial 
Pollution regulation 
Industrial energy efficiency 
targets  
Energy saving standards in 
buildings 
Green construction targets 
Retrofit targets 
Economic and financial 
policy for eco-industries 
 
Energy saving 
awards 
 
 
Municipal 
Solar heater policy 
Green construction 
requirement for large 
projects 
Preferential policy for eco-
industries 
Energy auditing/ 
Monitoring in 
public buildings 
Training, 
auditing, 
benchmarking 
Campaigns 
Industrial zones  
New energy 
buses 
Private    
Waste-to-energy 
plant 
Inter-city 
railway  
135 
 
Eco-tech promotion is clearly a case of “good business” (Kousky & Schneider, 2003), as it 
contributes to local economic growth, employment and FDI. At the same time, it is not clear if 
and how an expanding eco-tech sector contributes to emission reductions in Rizhao. It is 
possible that local industrial units or construction projects use green technologies because they 
are produced and promoted in the city, but this is not certain. Nonetheless, Rizhao Municipality 
promotes eco-industrial growth as an achievement in terms of low carbon development 
(RMPG, 2009a). In other cities in China that are branded eco-tech hubs (e.g. Baoding and 
Dezhou), manufacturing of environmental and new energy products has increased. This 
development has received domestic and international attention and been referred to urban “low 
carbon” development (e.g. Baeumler et al, 2012). The question of whether or not this is the case 
is for now left unresolved – the issue is further discussed in Chapter 9. However, the 
development does underline the connection between sustainable development, economic 
growth, industrial expansion, and technological innovation discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
6.2 Climate action through partnerships 
This section shows that municipal led partnerships has been used to a limited extent to pursue 
low carbon development in Rizhao. A few examples are raised, including partnerships with a 
higher-level research institute and a bilateral partner in demonstration projects in the 
construction sector and with “owner representative groups” in implementing energy efficiency 
retrofits. On the other hand, the case study demonstrates that partnerships have been formed in 
a bottom-up fashion between companies and academic institutes in development of energy 
saving technologies.  
6.2.1 Demonstration projects 
Authorities in Rizhao have formed partnerships with a research institute and a foreign 
cooperation partner in the design of low emission demonstration projects in the construction 
sector. There are a couple of examples of this. One project is Rizhao Planning Exhibition Hall, 
featuring solar PV applications, LED lighting, ground source heat pumps, and natural cooling 
(RMPG, 2012d). This project was designed by Shandong Energy Research Institute (RMPG, 
2012d). A second project is a passive house, located in Rizhao Demonstration Area for New 
Building Materials. This design of this project received technical advice from the German 
Energy Bureau DENA (GIZ, 2015). A third example is a so-called “Energy Nexus Plus House”, 
for which the German development assistance agency GIZ provided advice through the project 
Nexus (GIZ, 2015). The plan is that this house will generate more energy than it consumes by 
relying on a combination of micro-generation technology, energy conserving devices, passive 
solar building design, insulation, and careful site selection (Ibid). GIZ will cooperate with 
Rizhao Construction Committee in the realization of this project, and the implementation will 
involve training of local real estate firms. One of the aims is to disseminate knowledge and 
experience in green construction, with the hope of spreading successful practices to other cities 
or through endorsement of MoHUrD. These examples illustrate that partnerships with research 
institutes and traditional development organization can allow municipal authorities to access 
new technology and designs by forming cross-sector, cross-border connections.  
6.2.2 Implementation of energy efficiency retrofits 
Rizhao Municipality strives to be leading in energy efficiency retrofits in buildings and has 
been successful in this area. In 2016, the central government recognized Rizhao Municipality 
as a “model city” for energy retrofits (QLW, 2016). At the end of 2011, Rizhao had received 
36 million RMB in funding from the central government to support energy saving in buildings. 
Rizhao Municipal Government used this support to subsidize energy saving retrofits (30 
RMB/m2 directly from the municipality and 45 RMN/m2 from the central government) (RMPG, 
2011e; RMPG, 2011f; RCC, 2014).  
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Energy efficiency retrofits in buildings is a kind of measure that cannot easily be managed only 
by public actors. The reason is that residential buildings belong to individuals who must be 
involved in decision making and enforcement. In Rizhao, energy retrofits of residential 
buildings is the responsibility of the energy office of Rizhao Construction Committee. It is to 
make sure that applications and proposed retrofits meet technical guidelines and standards 
(RCC, 2014). 20  However, implementation involves owners’ representative groups that 
participate in project promotion and decisions related to the use of funding and management. 
The groups are made up of individuals from property management centres who are to 
coordinate energy saving processes and solve problems in relation to funding (Ibid). This 
approach is adopted to tackle individual households that do not cooperate in retrofit programs 
and to improve the process of supervision (RMPG, 2012e).  
Further, Rizhao’s guidelines for energy saving in residential buildings stress that tenants must 
mobilize funds to finance the share of costs not covered by municipal and central subsidies. For 
this reason, it is important to “enthuse” tenants through promotion and campaigns to make them 
actively participate in energy saving work (RCC, 2014). The retrofit guidelines encourage 
“energy-saving propaganda” for tenants to understand the purpose of energy-saving, the 
economic and social benefits, and the relation with China’s energy saving policies (RCC, 
“Financing Plan”, 2014). The organizations carrying out retrofits are companies chosen through 
public tender processes.  
6.2.3 Technology development 
This section shows that partnerships with the function of innovation and technology 
development are prevalent in Rizhao. These partnerships are created both through top-down 
and bottom-up dynamics. In particular, bottom-up connections play an important role in in the 
introduction of energy saving and emission reduction technology in firms.  
Research partnerships though top-down dynamics 
To encourage innovation, Rizhao Municipality has established “government-led, business-
oriented” platforms for technology development. By the end of 2012, Rizhao boasted a long 
list of such platforms: two national enterprise technology centers, 22 provincial engineering 
technology research centers, five provincial academic workstations and a provincial key 
laboratory. These centers cooperate with “innovative pilot enterprises”, as well as with 
researchers from think tanks and universities (CAS, Chinese Academy of Engineering, 
Shandong Academy of Sciences, Tsinghua University, and Beijing University) in over 60 
projects at over 30 demonstration sites in Rizhao (Shandong Net, 2014). The centers emphasize 
participation of SMEs, which are supported by a provincial Technological Innovation Fund 
(Ibid).  
In 2010, total investments into Rizhao High-Tech Industrial Park where these platforms operate 
reached two billion RMB (RMPG, 2011d). In the same year, activities in the park generated 
142 patents and over one hundred kind of high-tech products (RMPG, 2011d). The platforms 
allegedly produced over 300 scientific and technological “achievements” (Shandong Net, 
2014). Although this is self-reported data, this suggests that activities in these innovation 
platforms contribute to introduction of new technology in Rizhao. 
Rizhao Municipal Government also uses public-private research partnerships to support the 
introduction of renewable energy in the industrial sector. Two large chemical industrial units, 
Jiahong Biotechnology and Jinhe Shenghua developed bio-waste to energy technologies in 
cooperation with Rizhao Environmental Protection Bureau (EPB). In the case of Jiahong, the 
company invited a consultant from the EPB, a previous professor from Rizhao Vocational and 
Technical College, to cooperate in the development of the enterprise’s environmental protection 
                                                 
20 The retrofits have taken the form heat metering devices, temperature control devices and heat exchange systems 
and improved insulation of windows, doors, facades and roofs (RMPG, 2011g; Shandong h 2014; RCC, 2014). In 
2014, it was reported that a total residential area of 1.2 million m2 would be completed by the end of the year (coal 
consumption would decrease by 30’000 Tsc per year) (Shandong Xinhuanet, 2014). 
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work. The project included joint research on technology to convert the waste product methane 
into electricity (Interview with policy advisor, Rizhao, 2013.03.13). There are further examples 
of public-private partnerships in development of solar power technology, such as the case of a 
local solar technology producer whose product development was supported by China National 
Lighting Research Institute (Interview with local company, Rizhao, 2013.05.21).  
Research partnerships though bottom-up dynamics 
Section 6.1.4 has already provided a discussion on the role of central government energy 
efficiency targets in promoting emission reduction practices in the industrial sector in Rizhao. 
This section discusses the strategies used by key energy consuming enterprises in reaching 
these targets. The focus on company strategy not only reveals that efforts differ depending on 
the characteristics of firms, but also that connections with other companies and academic 
institutes are forged in the search for new solutions. Four strategies used by ten of the key 
energy consuming firms are discussed below: technology transfer from foreign companies, 
private-academic partnerships, energy management through contracting, and internal research. 
These strategies are described below.  
The largest energy consuming enterprise in the city is Rizhao Steel, a private company that has 
achieved considerable energy savings through a combination of technology transfers, private-
academic partnerships, domestic contracting, and internal R&D. Rizhao Steel exceeded the 
energy saving targets of the 11th FYP and the 12th FYP by introducing large-scale industrial 
recycling systems. Several environmental projects were realized by contracting domestic 
enterprises specialized in thermal energy and metallurgical engineering. One contract signed in 
2007 led to the introduction of non-blast furnaces, and a wastewater and exhaust gas recovery 
system (BWK, 2014). The company invested over three billion RMB into the adoption of 
systems that generate power through exhaust gas recovery and heat transfer and storage 
capacity (Ibid). The factory’s iron waste recycling equipment was imported from France, and 
the technology to convert waste powder into cement was developed by Rizhao Steel in 
cooperation with China Steel Research Institute (Ibid). In 2011, Rizhao Steel claimed to reach 
a power production capacity of 3 Billion kWh, which allowed the firm to rely to 52% on its 
own electricity production, contributing annual savings of 370,000 Tsc (Rizhao Steel, 2011). 
In between 2011 and 2013, these measures allowed the factory to save around 465,000 Tsc 
(SETIC, 2014).  
Huaneng Rizhao Coal Power Plant is an SOE producing most of Rizhao’s electricity. It is also 
the second largest energy consuming unit in Rizhao. Most of the energy savings in the power 
plant have been realized through purchase of foreign and domestic equipment. Two of the main 
boilers, installed in 2000, were imported from the German company Siemens while the 
installation was designed by the Spanish firm Foster Wheeler (BBK, 2014a). Two supercritical 
units were put into operation in 2008, both manufactured by Shanghai Electric (China Huaneng, 
2010). The factory’s desulphurization equipment was imported from the infrastructure 
company Alstom (Zhang, 2012a). In 2011, 2012 and 2014 the plant upgraded its motor 
efficiency and its dust and noise control equipment (Zhang, 2012a; Zhai, 2014). The energy 
saving of the plant reached around 190,000 Tsc in 2010, and 465,000 Tsc between 2011 and 
2013 (Zhang, 2012a; SEITC, 2014). 
The third largest energy consuming unit in Rizhao is Shandong Binani Rongan Cement. The 
company was established in Rizhao in 2003, and is to 90% owned by the Indian conglomerate 
Binani Industries Ltd. and to 10% by Shandong Wingan Group. In 2008, a Sino-Indian research 
partnership between the company stakeholders increased production capacity of the factory and 
reduced energy use by 8 Kg coal/clinker. The collaboration project also led to introduction of 
a waste-to-heat cogeneration project that contributed a generation capacity of 12 MV, and 
research into the possibility of introducing bio-waste to energy systems in the factory (YJB, 
2015; BBK, 2015). In 2013, it was reported that 120 million RMB was invested into the waste 
heat to power project, which at that point contributed to reduction of 75,000 tons of carbon 
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dioxide emissions (HBGCH, 2013). In between 2011 and 2013, the factory’s energy saving 
reached around 22,000 Tsc (SETIC, 2014). 
Shandong Yatai Senbo Pulp & Paper is a private company that is part of a large international 
umbrella organization, Asia Pacific Resources International (APRIL). APRIL’s branches 
operate according to environmental guidelines above those enforced in cities in China, due to 
the sustainability policy of the organization. In 2010, Shandong Yatai pulp factory in Rizhao 
adopted an advanced industrial recycling system that enabled it to quit coal and supply bio-
waste based power to the grid. The recycling equipment was imported from leading European 
firms (AkzoNobel, Aquaflow, Purak and Finland Metal) that provided training in use and 
maintenance (APRIL ASIA, 2013). China United Cement Rizhao is a cement production firm, 
owned by the SOE China National Building Material Company Ltd. The SOE has a research 
department working with innovation related to energy saving technology, related to a 
nationwide strategy to eliminate inefficient cement kilns and introduce waste-to-power 
technology in all “dry” kilns (CNBM, 2014). The factory in Rizhao adopted a waste heat to 
power recycling system in 211 and saved over 20,000 Tsc between 2011 and 2013 (RMPG, 
2011b; SETIC, 2014). 
Rizhao Focal Electric is a company involved in coke manufacturing and electricity engineering. 
According to their company website, the firm engaged early in resource conservation, allegedly 
to choose a path of “scientific development” (Rizhao Focal Electric, 2008). The company 
cooperated with Shandong University in establishing an Engineering Technology Research 
Centre, self-proclaimed as the first private-academic collaboration focusing on coke and 
electricity engineering. The center has developed and improved production processes and 
technical equipment, trained staff, and produced six patented innovations (Ibid). In 2004, this 
led to introduction of a heat recovery coke oven that saves substantial amounts of energy 
(Qiang, 2011; Rizhao Focal Electric, 2008). In 2009, the company was titled a “Shandong 
Province Energy Saving Advanced Enterprise”, and in between 2011 and 2013 the company 
saved around 12,000 Tsc (SETIC, 2014). 
Rizhao Port Group is an SOE formed out of Rizhao’s port authority. It provides services such 
as cargo loading, transportation and material processing. In 2006, the Port Group signed energy 
saving contracts with domestic ESCOs to improve energy management of operations. In 2011, 
Rizhao Port Group invested into equipment for improved efficiency of heat exchange and 
unloading, installation of wind turbines, photovoltaic (PV) cells and LED for lighting, 
electricity metering and GPS navigation for energy conservation in truck-based transport 
(GLINFO, 2012). In the same year, the investments contributed to a fall in energy consumption 
of 4% in spite of an increase of 11% in total cargo (GLINFO, 2012).  
Rizhao Lingyunhai Sugar Group is a company involved primarily in food processing (sugar 
and soybeans), but also diverse activities such as e-commerce and hotel services. In 2013, the 
company was one of the enterprises that received Shandong Province’s energy saving awards, 
due to adoption of advanced industrial recycling equipment in its sugar processing (GLINFO, 
2013). The industrial system involves steam recovery, heat exchange and water cooling, based 
on an investment of around 55 million RMB. These systems were adopted through domestic 
contracting (GLINFO, 2013). In between 2011 and 2013, the company realized energy savings 
of around 10,000 Tsc.  
Rizhao Yingde Gases specializes in production of industrial gases. In 2014, Yingde signed a 
contract for introduction of energy management and energy auditing systems (Shandong 
Lvzhou, 2014). The company’s energy savings in between 2011 and 2013 reached 7,000 Tsc 
(SEITC, 2014). Shandong Wuzheng Group is a manufacturer of trucks and vehicles that has 
been active since 1962 and operated as a private firm since 2000. Since the 2000s, the company 
has focused increasingly on R&D and developed its innovative capacities (BBK, 2014b). The 
company was awarded Shandong’s energy saving awards in 2009, due to introduction of energy 
auditing systems, new energy technologies and water recycling systems (Nongjx, 2010). In 
between 2011 and 2013, the company saved almost 3,000 Tsc (SEITC, 2014). 
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In the years between 2008 and 2013, the largest energy savings in Rizhao were reached by 
adopting waste heat recycling systems and waste material to power equipment. In 2013, twelve 
companies in Rizhao were recognized as Industrial Recycling Demonstration Enterprises, 
including several of the key energy consuming enterprises, such as the steel factory and the 
power plant (REITC, 2014). Although many companies adopted industrial recycling systems, 
the firms used different strategies to reach energy saving targets. Three companies imported 
equipment, two companies formed research partnerships with the academic sector to develop 
new technological solutions, three relied on internal R&D to develop energy saving 
applications, and four enterprises signed cooperation contracts with domestic ESCOs that 
helped identify energy saving solutions. Table 15 gives an overview of energy saving strategies 
adopted by these firms. 
Table 15: Technology development and adoption of key energy using enterprises in Rizhao 
Name Activity Energy saving strategy 
Tech. development/ 
adoption 
Rizhao Focal Electric  Coke Heat recovery cogeneration coke oven 
Private-academic 
Partnership 
Rizhao Steel 
 
Steel 
 
Waste heat to power generation 
Improved heat transfer, recovery & storage capacity 
 Private-academic 
Partnership 
Domestic contracting 
Technology transfer 
Huaneng Rizhao Coal 
Power Plant  
Energy 
High efficiency, supercritical boilers 
Shut down inefficient boilers 
Technology transfer 
Yatai Senbo  Paper/Pulp Waste-to-energy system Technology transfer 
Shandong Binani 
Rongan Cement  
Cement 
Waste-to-heat co-power generation 
(Research into bio-waste power generation) 
Private-foreign Partnership 
/ Internal R&D 
China United Cement  Cement Waste heat to co-power generation Internal R&D  
Shandong Wuzheng  Auto Energy optimization Internal R&D  
Rizhao Lingyunhai 
Sugar  
Sugar 
Steam recovery 
Heat exchange and water cooling systems 
Domestic contracting 
Rizhao Yingde Gases  Gases Energy optimization Domestic contracting 
Rizhao Port Group  Shipping 
Reduction of idle time of conveyor belts, electricity 
metering, efficiency of heat exchange and 
unloading, wind turbines, PV, LED, GPS navigation  
 
Domestic contracting 
 
6.2.4 Partnerships and mobilization of information 
The case study of Rizhao indicates that public actors in cities in China rely on partnerships to 
access skills and information, facilitate policy implementation, and support innovation. The 
examples demonstrate that even a mid-size size city with an average economy creates links 
with foreign actors and research organizations to mobilize knowledge used to test and showcase 
new emission reduction solutions. Rizhao municipal authorities explicitly recognize the 
importance of cross-sector collaboration in innovation and supports it through establishment of 
technology development platforms. This type of scheme can be seen as a local response to the 
call of China’s Medium and Long Term Plan for Science and Technology on public actors to 
construct multi-stakeholder platforms to accelerate innovation (MOST, 2006).  
A surprising result is the extent to which companies create inter-organizational linkages in their 
efforts to meet energy saving targets. Mapping out the energy saving strategies used by ten key 
energy using enterprises in Rizhao shows that many of these involve collaboration with foreign 
and domestic units through contracting or research partnerships. The case study suggests that 
complex linkages for information sharing are developed as part of energy saving and emission 
reduction strategies. At the same time, this observation confirms that the perspective of 
networks and partnerships is a relevant approach for understanding local emission reduction 
activities in China. This notion is further explored in the following chapter, which presents 
results from the comparative study of the thesis.  
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7 Urban climate action through partnerships  
 
The Sino-Singaporean eco-city project in Tianjin (SSTEC) is one of China’s most famous eco-
city projects. It is known for its long list of performance indicators, the laborious clean-up of 
the polluted site chosen for the city, its ambitious master plan, smart building design, efficient 
waste collection system and renewable energy use. The project is less well known for its 
complex governance structure. A joint steering council with top leaders from China and 
Singapore is in charge of strategic planning. Below the council, a joint working committee 
representing ministries oversees implementation. Six working level sub committees are 
comprised of officials from various public agencies from both countries. The master planner is 
a joint venture formed by a Chinese and Singaporean consortium. A long list of companies and 
institutes are involved in planning and delivery of solutions on the ground. The structure of 
Tianjin eco-city illustrates the argument of this chapter, namely that a multiplicity of 
heterogeneous actors take on different roles in low carbon projects in China.  
Using the results of the comparative study of the thesis, this chapter demonstrates that climate 
partnerships are common in China, that these take a variety of shapes and forms, and involve 
sharing of information, technology, and funding. The chapter begins by mapping out the type 
of actors leading the projects in the sample selected for the study (7.1). The sample illustrates 
not only a diversity of groups and organizations initiating climate projects, but also shows that 
type of actor leading projects is associated with initiative function. For example, most initiatives 
involving some form of rule setting are led by municipal authorities. On the other hand, 
companies play a key role in delivery of low carbon public infrastructure, such as renewable 
energy plants and waste-to-energy projects. Initiatives involving information dissemination and 
demonstration activities aiming to promote low carbon practice are commonly led by both 
public and private actors, and academic organizations. This section concludes by discussing 
this division of responsibilities from the perspective of a shift to climate governance in China.  
The second section of the chapter (7.2) maps out which of the initiatives in the sample involve 
partnerships and identifies the form and function of these. The section indicates that climate 
partnerships are common, and that the functions they perform range from soft rule setting, to 
service provision, information spreading, technology development, and capacity building. 
Partnerships are employed as a strategy to access resources of actors in other sectors: 
technology, funding and information. For example, municipal authorities form partnerships 
with companies, academic organizations and foreign or international organizations to realize 
infrastructure delivery, or support technology development. Companies, on the other hand, 
often form partnerships with other firms, academia or international organizations to develop 
sophisticated demonstration projects or new technology.  
Section 7.3 assesses the role of partnerships in introducing new technologies and policy 
practices, thus answering research sub-questions 3: 
How have partnerships contributed to introduction of new climate policy and technology on an 
urban level in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
Analysis of the sample of initiatives indicates that partnerships with foreign actors and 
academia are important in introducing both new technologies and practices. The two key 
mechanisms leading to introduction of technology are technology transfers and joint technology 
development. The two mechanisms that contribute to introduction of new policy and planning 
practices are demonstration and collaborative problem solving. In illustrating these 
mechanisms, this chapter draws on information collected through the member check interviews 
of this study. Finally, section 7.4 ties together the observations of the chapter into a conclusion 
regarding knowledge production in networks in China.  
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7.1 Actors leading urban climate initiatives 
Different actors take on different roles in climate initiatives in cities in China. While adoption 
of standards, requirements and binding plans remains the realm of municipal authorities, 
companies play a key role in public infrastructure provision, and both public and non-state 
actors lead initiatives with the aim of information spreading and demonstration.  
To gain clarity about the role that different actors play in the initiatives selected for this study, 
the projects were categorized according to leading actor and function. The initiatives in this 
sample perform a range of functions, including rule-setting, service and infrastructure delivery, 
provision of incentives, information-spreading or demonstration, technology development or 
capacity building, and industrial sustainability programs. Rule setting is the most common 
function, followed by information dissemination and service provision. Type of function varies 
depending on the type of organization leading the initiative, as shown by Table 16.  
Table 16: Cross-tabulation over cooperation type & initiative function (expected outcome in brackets) 
 
 
Rule - 
Setting 
Service / 
Infrastructure 
Incentives 
Information / 
Demonstration 
Tech development /  
Capacity Building 
Green 
production 
TOTAL 
Authority 43 (23) 6 (15) 6 (4) 13 (16) 9 (14) 0 (6) 77 
Company 0 (15) 18 (10) 0 (3) 15 (11) 8 (10) 12 (4) 53 
Academia 0 (3) 3 (2) 0 (1) 3 (2) 5 (2) 0 (1) 11 
International 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (0) 1 (1) 2 (1) 0 (0) 5 
National 0 (1)  0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 2 (0) 0 (0) 2 
PPP 0 (1) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 2 
TOTAL 43 29 7 32 27 12 150 
 
The initiatives were also categorized according to leadership and sector, which showed that 
there is considerable variation in type of leadership in different sectors. As shown by Table 17, 
municipal authorities lead the largest number of projects related to urban form, climate 
information dissemination, and in the construction and transport sectors. On the other hand, 
initiatives in the waste sector and eco-city projects are mainly led by companies. These trends 
in variation of function and sector in relation to leading actor are discussed below.  
Table 17: Cross-tabulation table of leading actor type by sector (expected share in brackets) 
 Authority Company Academia International National PPP TOTAL 
Industry 17 (16.6) 13 (11.3) 0 (2.1) 1 (1.1) 0 (4) 1 (4) 32 
Energy 6 (14) 14 (9.5) 4 (1.8) 1 (0.9) 1 (0.4) 1 (0.4) 22 
Construction 12 (10.4) 6 (7.1) 0 (1.3) 2 (0.7) 0 (0.3) 0 (0.3) 20 
Transport 14 (9.9) 1 (6.7) 3(1.3) 1(0.6) 0(0.3) 0(0.3) 19 
Land use 16 (10.4) 3(7.1) 1(1.3) 0(0.7) 0(0.3) 0(0.3) 20 
Eco-city 4 (6.8) 8(4.6) 1(0.9) 0(0.4) 0(0.2) 0(0.2) 13 
Dissemination 8 (5.2) 0(3.5) 1(0.7) 0(0.3) 1(0.1) 0(0.1) 10 
Waste 1 (4.7) 8(3.2) 0(0.6) 0(0.3) 0(0.1) 0(0.1) 9 
TOTAL 78 53 10 5 2 2 150 
 
Municipal authorities: Policy-makers or policy-takers? 
In this sample, all the initiatives that perform the function of rule setting are managed by city 
authorities. This suggests that local governments maintain a firm hold over decision making, 
and that authority to formulate regulations and standards has not been shared with actors from 
the private sector or civil society.  
There is a strong correlation between municipal leadership and initiatives related to land use (a 
significance level of 99.7%) and transport (a 97% significance level). Municipal leadership in 
these two sectors is associated with a large number of initiatives with the function of rule-
setting. Many of the initiatives related to land use consist of adoption of targets for urban green 
space or zoning plans, which is the responsibility of municipal planning bureaus. For example, 
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common programs include establishment of urban parks or other green areas. In the transport 
sector, common initiatives are adoption of low carbon transport plans. These typically involve 
plans for provision of bus, subway or rail infrastructure (sometimes combined with “smart” 
public transport systems) and infrastructure for electric, hybrid or gas-fueled vehicles. 
Municipal transport bureaus are responsible for urban transport plans, making them the leading 
actor in this sector. By contrast, delivery of transport programs, as well as design of innovative 
details and new technologies, are often developed in cooperation with other actors, as is further 
discussed below.   
The results suggest that municipalities have considerable scope to act as policy makers in urban 
climate action. However, a closer look at the type of policy that is adopted by municipal 
authorities reveals that the influence of the central government over local initiatives is strong. 
To get a better picture of this influence, rule-setting initiatives were grouped into policy based 
on central level guidelines, and policy initiatives independently adopted by cities. Out of 43 
initiatives that involve some form of rule-setting, 23 were based on central guidelines and 20 
were independent. The initiatives based on higher level government policy consist of guidelines 
for implementation, such as regulations to meet targets for green construction (e.g. a certain 
share of construction must meet green construction standards), or zoning guidelines to meet 
targets for green space (e.g. a certain amount of space is to be used for tree-planting). Another 
example is local versions of China’s emission trading scheme, which is a policy scheme 
initiated by the central government, but design and implementation of local schemes is 
delegated to provincial and municipal DRCs. Another example is requirements to shut down 
heavy industries in central urban zones, which is a policy element widely used in the 10’000 
Enterprises Program.  
Initiatives not directly based on higher level guidelines are more varied in nature. A few 
examples from cities in the South of China can be mentioned to demonstrate this. Shenzhen 
Municipality has introduced green building standards for low-income housing and promoted 
this as the first nationwide low carbon low-income residential policy. Shenzhen has also 
established a city-wide pedestrian system, designed according to the principle of “people-
oriented”, low carbon development. A third initiative is an “ecological control line”, a planning 
scheme introduced to protect ecological areas, cited as the first of its kind in China. Shenzhen 
Municipality cites inspiration from other cities and best practice in introducing these schemes, 
including Hong Kong and Portland.  
Xiamen Municipality has introduced two relatively innovative policy approaches related to 
spatial planning and urban greening. The first is a non-motorized transport plan, launched in 
2007 as part of a “walking for health” project. This plan has divided the urban area into three 
planning zones: an urbanized area, a mountainous area with protected ecological spaces and the 
beach zone. The Municipality has been recognized as a national demonstration project for this 
plan. It is integrated into the urban master plan, with emphasis on emission zones, ecological 
control lines and polycentric planning to limit need to travel. The second example is a 
construction requirement for public buildings to incorporate vertical greening.  
Guangzhou Municipality has adopted a green roof requirement for public buildings. Other 
initiatives include similar construction requirement, such as for solar water heaters (Rizhao and 
Qingdao), city-wide cycling and pedestrian schemes (Shenzhen, Xiamen, Shenyang, Hangzhou 
and Wuxi), and zoning plans with emphasis on blue and green urban infrastructure or climate 
adaptation (Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Shanghai and Xiamen). In an effort to connect urban public 
transport with climate mitigation efforts, Beijing has adopted a public transport card connected 
with an emission accounting system. All these examples demonstrate that municipal authorities 
in China are using the governance mode of authority to address the climate change challenge.  
Companies: Providers of service and infrastructure 
As is illustrated by Table 16, the majority of the climate initiatives that have the function of 
service or infrastructure delivery are initiated and led by companies (the correlation has a 
significance level of 100%). This also means that most projects involving investments into large 
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scale infrastructure are led by companies, including waste-to-energy plants, renewable energy 
plants (solar, wind and biomass), intra-city rail lines and district heating and cooling schemes.  
This tendency can be illustrated by considering the size of energy saving or emission reduction 
per project in this sample (self-reported (realized or planned)) energy savings and carbon 
emission reductions per initiative were reported for 24 and 27 initiatives respectively). If 
compared with actor leading the initiative, the projects with the largest energy saving or 
emission reduction scope are those led by city authorities, as shown by Table 18. The reason is 
that these initiatives are broad planning schemes, such as energy retrofit programs, low carbon 
transport programs, emission trading schemes, or zoning programs. In these programs, the 
municipal authority acts as rule-setter, by setting frameworks for action and overall emission 
reduction targets.  
By contrast, large emission reduction initiatives led by companies typically consist of 
investments into equipment and infrastructure that contribute directly to energy saving and 
emission reductions. Where city authorities have been in charge of projects with the function 
of service and infrastructure delivery, it has usually not involved capital-intense investments. 
With the exception of Kunming’s BRT system, publically led projects are either small-scale 
projects (e.g. solar traffic lights), projects delivered through cooperation with companies (e.g. 
Guangzhou waste-to-energy plant), projects funded by the national government (e.g. Shenyang 
geothermal pumps and Chongqing new energy vehicle project), or PPPs (e.g. Baoding solar 
power plant).  
Table 18: Estimated (planned or realized) energy savings & emission reductions of selected initiatives  
Actor type 
Number of 
Initiatives 
Average energy savings per initiative 
(Ton of standard coal (Tsc)/y) 
Total energy savings 
(Tsc/y) 
City authority 8 2,265,032 18,120,257 
Company 14 89,470 1,432,586 
 
Average carbon emission saving per 
imitative (ton/y) 
Total emission savings 
of initiatives (ton/y) 
City authority 15 3,473,309 52,099,646 
Company 10 574,800 5,748,002 
 
One explanation for this division of responsibilities is that many of the firms in this sample are 
public companies that have formed out of previous municipal or provincial departments. Out 
of ten SOEs responsible for service or infrastructure, seven fit this description. However, there 
are also private companies in this category (seven in total), primarily firms specialized in 
environmental technology, often operating in all of China. There are also four nation-wide 
SOEs specializing in environmental technologies and large infrastructure projects. This 
represents a new set of actors playing a key role in public service and infrastructure delivery.  
Table 17 shows that companies are the leading actor in the waste sector (the correlation is 
significant at a 99.8% level) and in eco-city projects (a correlation at a 98.3% significance 
level). In the waste sector, most initiatives consist of waste-to-energy plants that account for a 
large share of urban waste. In the construction sector, initiatives led by companies are primarily 
demonstration projects, such as zero-emission buildings with energy saving design, natural 
heating and cooling, and district heating schemes. Initiatives led by companies in the energy 
sector consist for the most part of investments into large scale renewable energy plants, 
including wind farms, solar plants, and biomass plants. The exception is investment into CCS 
technology as part of reducing emissions of coal power plants. 
Initiatives that fill the function of green production are projects that introduce cleaner 
production processes in firms. As shown by Table 16, all these initiatives are led by companies. 
Most initiatives involve energy efficiency retrofits in steel plants or other large industrial units. 
Notably, the overwhelming majority (11 initiatives out of 12) appear to be responses to central 
level policy guidelines, such as energy efficiency retrofits typical of the 10’000 Enterprises 
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Program. This result suggests that industrial units often engage in climate action in response to 
government pressure, rather than acting as leaders in the climate change issues.  
There are only two examples of initiatives led by companies that consist neither of large-scale 
infrastructure investments or seemingly government-induced energy efficiency measures. One 
of these is Kunming Green Hotel program, an initiative led by hotels in Kunming in cooperation 
with the municipality. This is a resource saving scheme that involves improved waste 
management, recycling and use of energy efficient appliances, in combination with habitat 
protection. The second example is a waste sorting program in Guiyang through which residents 
collect and separate waste in different colored bags for monetary compensation. The company 
was started by a local resident and implemented in a community where most of the households 
now use this sorting method.  
Mixed leadership: Information dissemination & technology development  
As shown by Table 16, initiatives with the function of information dissemination and 
technology development are led by a mixture of actors. However, the nature of projects differ 
depending on leadership.  
Municipal authorities dominate initiatives related to climate information dissemination (the 
correlation has a 95% significance). Common information dissemination initiatives led by 
municipal authorities are exhibitions and establishment of centers or museums promoting low 
carbon technologies and lifestyles. These venues or events are usually run by municipal Science 
and Technology Commissions. Examples include Shanghai’s World Expo Demonstration Site, 
which featured a list of energy saving technologies and designs, and Guangzhou Low Carbon 
Technology Fair, a large international exhibition that is arranged once per year. Other common 
projects are environmental campaigns to promote resource conservation, such as recycling and 
household saving of water and electricity. Shenyang has, for example, initiated a low carbon 
campaign as part of a National Science Day. An example of a different character is an 
elementary school in Baoding emphasizing low carbon education.  
By contrast, most low carbon demonstration projects led by companies consist of eco-city 
projects or demonstration projects in construction sector. This includes low carbon exhibition 
centers and zero-emission buildings with applications such as renewable energy sources (PV 
cells, solar collectors, or wind turbines) or natural heating and cooling systems. Companies also 
often lead technology development projects in the form of industrial eco-tech and recycling 
economy parks. An example is an eco-economy recycling park in Guiyang, set up by Yanzhou 
Mining Group. 
Projects aiming towards demonstration led by research organizations and international or 
foreign actors consist primarily of low carbon construction demonstration projects. Examples 
include APEC’s Low Carbon Model Town (LCMT) in Tianjin and China Sustainable 
Transportation Center’s low carbon business district in Kunming. The projects are similar in 
nature to those led by private planning firms in being technical and aiming to introduce smart 
urban planning, energy saving architecture and renewable applications. Initiatives that aim 
towards technology development is the only type where academic organizations have a 
somewhat stronger representation that other actors. This includes establishment of low carbon 
research centres and new energy technology development projects.  
New roles and shifting authorities? 
Municipal authorities are responsible for implementing higher level guidelines, which occupies 
a considerable share of their climate mitigation efforts. Versions of higher level guidelines 
account for most of policy initiatives adopted on a local level. At the same time, analysis of the 
sample of initiatives of this study suggests that Chinese municipal authorities use rule setting 
to take independent and sometimes innovative leadership in climate action.  
The analysis also shows that companies often are in charge of delivery of low carbon 
infrastructure. This observation raises questions about the extent to which projects led by firms 
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improve life for citizens and/or create low carbon cities. For example, companies are often the 
leading actor in eco-city projects, of which the nature varies. Some are constructed along a row 
of ambitious key performance indicators (KPIs), such as ecological protection, land use, green 
transport, waste systems and renewable energy use. The sample also includes several 
demonstration projects that are described as “low carbon” or “eco” that on closer scrutiny 
exhibit only a couple of green features, for example energy saving elevators. It is questionable 
whether they have capacity, or even aim, to seriously tackle the emission reduction challenge.  
In this sample, municipal authorities dominate initiatives related to climate information 
dissemination. Awareness raising is a “soft” policy function often associated with non-state 
actor leadership. The low representation of organizations that usually perform this function, 
such as independent media and environmental NGOs, explains the higher representation of 
municipal authorities performing this type of action. Green organizations that raise issues of 
equity, participation or lobby against companies or public actor are completely missing from 
this sample, and this function is therefore also absent. Research organizations are the closest 
thing to civil society represented in this sample. However, these actors are most commonly 
engaged in projects of a technical nature, such as demonstration projects in the construction 
sector or technology development projects. This tendency raises caution against the notion that 
China’s development of a modern environmental state will necessarily produce institutions that 
are increasingly similar to those in liberal democracies. Diversification of actors and emergence 
of new roles may instead be endemic to the context, such as functions of NGOs taken on by a 
strong public sector.  
  
7.2 Form and function of climate partnerships 
About half of the initiatives in this sample involve partnerships, which exist in different 
constellations and perform different functions. Linkages created through partnerships allow for 
technology, information and funding to pass across sectors, government levels and borders. The 
details of these mechanisms are discussed in this section.  
7.2.1 Form of climate partnerships 
This sample of initiatives suggests that partnerships in urban climate action is common in 
China. Almost half of the initiatives (74 initiatives, accounting for 48% of the sample) involve 
collaboration between actors, as shown by Table 19. As the sample of this study was selected 
to represent cities that are forerunners in climate action and likely to have used innovative 
governance arrangements, this share is probably higher than in smaller, “average” urban 
regions.   
Table 19: Form of collaboration in selected climate initiatives 
Actors involved in initiative Number of initiatives (%) 
City Authority 59 (39%) 
Company + International/foreign organization(s) 31 (21%) 
Company 17 (11%) 
City authority + International/foreign organization(s) 13 (9%) 
City authority + Company 9 (6%) 
City authority + Local Academia/NGO 6 (4%) 
Local Academia/NGO + International/foreign organization(s) 5 (4%) 
Company + Local Academia/NGO 5 (3%) 
City authority + National/provincial authority 2 (1%) 
International/foreign organization(s) 2 (1%) 
International/foreign organization(s) + National/provincial authority 1 (1%) 
TOTAL 150 
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As shown by Table 19, the largest share of initiatives (59 projects, accounting for 39%), is led 
only by city authorities. Most initiatives involving only municipal authorities have a regulatory 
or administrative nature. As was discussed above, many projects initiated by public actors aim 
towards enforcement of higher level planning guidelines. Examples of schemes that typically 
do not require input by other actors include green construction schemes (e.g. adoption of targets 
or implementation guidelines) and zoning regulations.  
17 initiatives (11%) are initiated and managed by a single company. There are a couple of 
different types of project in this category. The majority is large scale renewable energy projects, 
all of which are led by large SOEs. Most of these firms are owned by municipal or provincial 
governments and have extensive operations in the region. The second largest number of 
initiatives are energy efficiency retrofits of the type carried out under the 10’000 Enterprises 
Program. Many of these are also carried out by large public or private firms with internal 
research departments and sufficient economic and technical capacity to upgrade equipment 
without input from external organizations.   
The most common form of collaboration, used in 31 initiatives (21%), is between companies 
and foreign/international organizations. The foreign organization is in most cases a foreign 
company and in some cases an international NGO. Two types of relationship are common. The 
most frequent is import of technology from a foreign to a Chinese company. According to the 
theoretical discussion in Chapter 2, private-private interaction does not fall under the definition 
of a partnership, as it does not involve cross-sector collaboration (Glasbergen et al, 2007; 
Huijstee et al, 2007). However, it is an important mechanism for introducing emission reduction 
technologies and has been referred to in terms of partnerships in previous research on climate 
networks (Bulkeley et al, 2012). The second most common relationship is between Chinese 
companies and foreign companies or research organizations, where the foreign organization 
participates in the role of planner or project designer.  
The second most common form of collaboration, found in 13 initiatives (9%), is partnerships 
between city authorities and foreign/international organizations. The majority of these 
initiatives are led by municipal authorities in cooperation with foreign partners that provide 
some type of knowledge transfer. The partnerships are formed with foreign firms, international 
organizations, bilateral partners and foreign authorities. The partnerships take the form of 
traditional development assistance projects, joint ventures, jointly managed projects or loosely 
structured dialogues. 
Nine initiatives (6%) involve partnerships between city authorities and companies. In many of 
these projects, technology or infrastructure has been delivered by a company in order to 
implement a project initiated or planned by a municipal authority. There are also a couple of 
cases where a partnership with a company is formed in order to mobilize funding for project 
implementation.  
Six initiatives (4%) involve partnerships between city authorities and academic organizations, 
five (3%) between companies and academic institutions, and five (3%) between academic and 
foreign/international organizations. In most of these cases, the academic or foreign 
organizations provide expert knowledge for the purpose of technology development or planning 
design.  
7.2.2 Function of climate partnerships 
The functions of the partnerships in this sample include rule setting, provision of public service, 
technology transfer or development, and information sharing/demonstration. This section 
discusses how different partnership constellations are related to function of initiatives, and how 
responsibilities are shared between actors.  
Rule setting initiatives 
The analysis of the results presented in Table 16 (section 7.1) suggests that municipal 
authorities are the leading actor in all projects involving adoption of plans and regulations. 
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Through analysis of partnership arrangements, a somewhat different picture emerges. Out of 
the 74 initiatives involving collaboration, six have some form of rule setting function. These 
are not binding regulations and requirements, but rather emission reduction targets and low 
carbon transport plans. The partnerships are created for the purpose of obtaining planning 
advice, often of a technical nature, from foreign organizations, domestic academia or higher 
level government institutes (the initiatives are listed in Table 22 in Annex B). 
Two of the partnerships in this category were formed to create emission reduction plans in the 
industrial sector. In one case, Wuxi Municipality built on the Sino-German cooperation 
platform Low Carbon Future Cities to connect with the municipality of Dusseldorf. Through 
city-to-city collaboration, involving dialogue between a number of foreign and domestic 
authorities and research organizations, Wuxi formulated emission reduction strategies for its 
industrial sector. In another case, the city of Qingdao formed a partnership with WRI (an 
international NGO) and the Asian Development Bank to create a low carbon development plan. 
In both cases, the foreign partner contributed technical advice and suggestions based on 
international best practice.  
The other four partnerships are initiatives in the transport sector. They have a similar nature 
and involve collaboration in formulation of low carbon development plans. One of these was 
created through Kunming’s EcoPartnership with the American city of Portland. Through this 
partnership, Kunming has received advice on how to shape a non-motorized transport plan to 
reduce the emission profile of the transport sector. The cities of Baoding and Shenyang 
partnered with central and provincial level institutes to access technical advice for their low 
carbon transport plans. In the last initiative, a transit-oriented (TOD) plan in Kunming was 
developed by a domestic research institute (Kunming Planning and Design Institute and 
Kunming Urban Transport Institute) in cooperation with foreign design firms.  
Service and infrastructure provision 
Out of the 74 initiatives involving collaboration, 11 (15%) have the function of service or 
infrastructure provision. In this group of partnerships, collaborative arrangements are diverse 
in nature, including PPPs, JVs and BOTs, cooperation agreements, and partnerships for the 
purpose of mobilizing funding (these initiatives are listed in Table 23 in Annex B). 
Three of these initiatives are projects in the energy sector. In these projects, the municipal 
authorities in Kunming, Baoding and Xiamen formed partnerships with SOEs to provide two 
solar plants and a solar-powered BRT station. Baoding Municipality has provided a solar plant 
by forming a PPP with four energy companies, where the firms were in charge of development 
and delivery of technology and infrastructure. In the delivery of the solar plant in Kunming, the 
municipality signed a cooperation agreement with a firm to deliver equipment and technology 
development.   
Three partnerships are projects in the transport sector. This includes Qingdao’s low carbon 
transport plan, which was formulated by the municipal transport bureau. In order to provide 
infrastructure for electric vehicles and LNG filling stations, the municipality formed a 
partnership with the State Grid. Beijing’s low carbon transport system was initiated and 
promoted by Beijing EPB as a way to allow the public to buy carbon credits. The scheme was 
jointly managed by two municipal SOEs in charge of public transport. The last example from 
the transport sector is the project “Shenzhen New Vehicle”, in which Shenzhen Municipality 
introduced a financial leasing model for the purchase of electric buses. The municipality 
cooperated with financial group Potevio Group (an SOE), who stands as guarantor for the loans. 
Shenzhen Municipality reached a similar financing agreement with the Southern Power Group 
(another SOE) in the installation of EV charging stations. 
Infrastructure provision in the transport sector also involves partnerships between 
municipalities and domestic academia. In the delivery of Kunming’s low carbon transport 
system, the municipal authorities was responsible for providing the BRT system, but Kunming 
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Municipal Engineering Design Institute was in charge of drafting the plan. A “low carbon 
transport hub” in Shanghai is managed by Shanghai DRC, but Shanghai Urban Construction 
Design Institute provided technical and planning advice in layout and technical design.   
Finally, there are three infrastructure projects in the energy sector provided by SOEs in 
partnerships with foreign firms. One example is a district heating and cooling scheme in 
Chongqing, which is a BOT scheme, designed, built and initially operated by a foreign 
company. The project was financed by a loan from IFC. Two further projects with mixed 
ownership (a JV and a BOTs), involved partnerships with foreign companies with the purpose 
of providing renewable energy infrastructure. 
Technology transfer  
This sample of climate initiatives shows that technology transfers is a common reason for actors 
in Chinese cities to create linkages with foreign organizations. Out of the 72 initiatives 
involving collaboration, 16 initiatives (22%) have the function of technology transfer (these 
projects are listed in Table 24 in Annex B). 
Technology transfers in the form of purchase of foreign technology involves limited interaction 
between actors. Twelve of the initiatives in this sample consisted of purchase of technology 
from foreign firms. It is questionable whether this type of connection should be thought of as 
partnerships, although in some cases the foreign company is actively involved in developing 
and applying the technology, as well as providing training.  
Five infrastructure projects owned by domestic firms received technological advice as well as 
funding from international organizations in connection with technology transfers. One example 
is a low carbon district in Qingdao, owned and managed by a municipal company, which 
received technical assistance and funding from ADB. The other four are CDM projects, 
operated according to similar arrangements. Three waste-to-energy projects are managed by 
domestic firms in cooperation with a foreign firm, receiving funding through the UNFCCC. 
The fourth example is an MRT project in Guiyang, managed by a municipal SOE and a foreign 
firm, funded through the CDM mechanism.  
Technology development 
This sample of initiatives suggest that forming partnerships for the purpose of developing 
emission reduction and energy saving technology is common. Out of 72 initiatives involving 
collaboration, 16 initiatives (22%) had the function of technology development. Partnerships 
for technology development take two main forms: research projects or establishment of R&D 
platforms (these projects are listed in Table 25 in Annex B). 
There are two examples of municipal authorities forming partnerships with domestic academic 
organizations for the purpose of technology development. In these projects, the municipal 
authorities take on a supporting role, while the academic organization is responsible for 
technology development. This was the case in development of tidal energy led by China Ocean 
University in Qingdao and residential solar thermal electricity generation in households in 
Shenyang. In a couple of initiatives, municipal authorities have formed partnerships with 
companies to establish technology development platforms. In one of these, Guangzhou 
Municipality and ZTE established an energy conservation technology incubator involving 
“substantive collaborative” projects in energy conservation industries (GZZSW, 2014).  
There are five examples of companies forming partnerships with academic organizations to 
develop emission reduction technology. This includes joint research projects and joint 
establishment of research center. An example of the former is development of CCS technology 
in Chongqing, led by an SOE in cooperation with local academia. Another is a solar thermal 
power in Beijing, constructed in cooperation between several SOEs and domestic research 
institutes. Another example is a CCS-development project owned by a mixture of domestic 
SOEs and foreign firms, funded by ADB and China Ministry of Science and Technology. An 
example of the latter is an industrial park for new recycling technologies in Qingdao, led by an 
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SOE in partnership with various academic institutes. Another SOE has set up a recycling 
economy zone with support of MEP and the German Development Cooperation (GIZ).  
Partnerships have also been formed between domestic and foreign academic organizations for 
the purpose of technology development. This includes a low carbon technology development 
set up by Guangdong Low Carbon Technology and Industry Research Center (GDLRC) and 
University of Edinburgh with support from the Consulate General of the UK in Guangzhou. 
Another research partnership is set up between the Chinese National Energy Administration 
and several companies from the Netherlands to develop tidal power technology.  
Finally, three partnerships are formed to mobilize funding for technology development. One is 
a PE fund for energy saving set up by Wuxi Municipality, with the Agricultural Bank of China 
and Guolian Finance Group acting as strategic investors. This fund is used by local firms to 
fund investments into development of energy conservation equipment. Two research projects 
are owned by local SOEs and funded by international organizations. The first involves energy 
efficiency improvement of power plants in Chongqing, financed by IFC (a member of the 
World Bank Group), distributed by Chongqing Bank and managed by a domestic contracting 
firm specialized in energy technology. The second is funding for energy efficiency 
improvements in Wuxi provided through the China Energy Efficiency Financing (CHEEF) 
Program, provided by the World Bank through the Global Environment Facility, and distributed 
locally through three Chinese Banks.  
Information dissemination and demonstration 
Out of the initiatives involving collaboration, 23 initiatives (32%), had the purpose of spreading 
information or demonstrating new solutions. This accounts for almost one third of initiatives 
involving collaboration, making it the most common function of partnerships. Many initiatives 
in this category are large scale demonstration projects involving a variety of actors, taking the 
form of eco-city projects, landscaping or construction schemes. These projects are used to test 
and demonstrate emission reduction and energy saving technologies, designs, and planning 
practices (these projects are listed in Table 26 in Annex A). 
In this category, there are eleven municipal led initiatives where a foreign organization or 
domestic academia provided advice related to technology, design, or planning. This includes 
four eco-city projects carried out through different constellations of domestic and foreign 
actors. Two have mixed ownership structures, one of which is the Sino-Singaporean eco-city 
project in Tianjin (SSTEC), described in the introduction of this chapter. The second is the 
Sino-Singapore Guangzhou Knowledge City (SSGKC), also managed by a publicly owned 
consortium. A long list of MoUs is part of the cooperation agreement, which involve actors 
from the private sector and academia in both countries. Similar to the eco-city projects, three 
initiatives related to land use involved partnerships between municipal planning bureaus and 
foreign and domestic firms and academia. An example is the design of a network of green 
infrastructure in Guangzhou, a waterfront area in Tianjin, and redevelopment of a brownfield 
area in Shenyang. 
There are eight examples of projects where foreign firms and/or foreign or domestic academia 
have participated in company led partnerships as designer, planner and/or technical advisor. 
These consist of two construction projects and five eco-city projects. An example is a 
“neofuturistic” skyscraper in Guangzhou, designed by two foreign architect firms to be the most 
energy-efficient “super-tall” building in the world. An eco-city project in Qingdao is owned by 
a large domestic SOE, and the master planning has been done by a foreign design firm. There 
are two examples of domestic academia leading the planning of similar eco-city and 
landscaping projects in Kunming. In both these cases, China Sustainable Transportation Center 
partnered with local planning organizations and foreign design firm to create low carbon spatial 
plans. 
Only three initiatives in this sample explicitly aim towards capacity building (understood here 
as staff training and development of new policy toolkits). Notably, all three involved 
150 
 
collaboration with international organizations. For example, a project led in partnership 
between Shanghai Municipality and the World Bank provided technical assistance to develop 
emission reduction policies in the built environment. An initiative with the aim of capacity 
building run in cooperation between Guangzhou Municipality and the British Consulate-
General in Chongqing provided training in the development of low carbon toolkits. Finally, 
Beijing Transportation Research Centre formed a partnership with the German Development 
Agency GIZ to develop a toolkit for transport demand management (TDM).  
 
7.3 Partnerships and introduction of technology and policy practices 
This section shows that climate partnerships, in particular those involving foreign actors or 
academic institutes, contribute to introduction of emission reduction technology and policy 
practices in cities in China. Two mechanisms are offered to explain how each is realized. 
Introduction of new technology occurs either through technology transfer or joint research 
projects. Introduction of new policy and planning practices is realized through either 
demonstration followed by market diffusion, or collaborative problem solving followed by 
internalization. In illustrating these mechanisms, this section draws on information collected 
through the member check interviews of the study.   
7.3.1 Introduction of new technology 
To find how important different partnership constellations are to the introduction of new 
technology in this sample of initiatives, a contingency table was created for “introduction of 
new technology” and “partnership constellation”. As shown by Table 20, collaboration between 
companies and international/foreign organizations play an important role in introducing new 
technology (the correlation is significant on a 100% level). Initiatives involving partnerships 
with academia also lead to introduction of new technology more often than expected. Common 
mechanisms of introduction of technology through partnerships include technology transfers 
and joint research projects. 
Table 20: Contingency table for collaboration type & new technology (expected outcomes in brackets) 
 
As discussed in section 7.2.2, many of the partnerships in this sample are formed for the purpose 
of technology transfers. The most commonly imported types of technology is equipment for 
large scale wind plants, waste-to-energy plants, co-generation facilities, district heating and 
cooling technology, and equipment used in upgrades of power plants and steel factories (e.g. 
energy efficient boilers). As mentioned above, a number of partnerships with the function of 
technology transfers have been funded by international institutions, ADB and UNFCC through 
the CDM.  
Member check interviews with firms confirm that import of foreign equipment remains a 
common strategy to realize energy savings and emission reductions. Nevertheless, imports are 
becoming less important with rising sophistication of domestic research. For example, in the 
paper and pulp industry, equipment import was a way to raise environmental standards and 
reduce emissions over the past decade (Interview with domestic paper group, 2016.06.18, 
Shandong; Interview with domestic paper company, 2016.06.13, Shandong). A manager of a 
Partnership constellation Technology introduction 
Company +  International/foreign organization(s) 22 (9) 
Authority + Academia 5 (2) 
Company + Academia  5 (1) 
Authority + Company  4 (3) 
International/foreign organization(s)+ National 1 (0) 
Authority +  International/foreign organization(s) 0 (5) 
Academia +  International/foreign organization(s) 0 (2) 
Company + National  0 (1) 
TOTAL 37 
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paper and pulp company states that a key reason behind their performance improvement is 
import of foreign equipment. However, this is now becoming less crucial. This respondent 
expects domestic equipment and level of environmental research to catch up with Western 
competitors in a couple of years (Interview with domestic paper company, 2016.06.13, 
Shandong; Interview with paper industry alliance, 2016.05.22, Beijing). The situation looks 
similar in the iron and steel industry, where equipment has been imported to raise environmental 
performance. However, this trend is slowly being replaced by internal technology development. 
A spokesperson of Shandong Iron and Steel Industry Alliance observes that energy efficiency 
improvement and emission reduction are key research areas where companies are investing 
heavily to catch up with the “West” (Interview with Iron and Steel Industry Alliance, 
2016.03.04, Shandong). 
As domestic innovation is becoming a more important driver of technology development, 
forging partnerships for innovation is becoming more crucial. The member check interviews 
confirm that environmental technology development to a large extent is carried out through 
partnership arrangements between companies, academia and foreign organizations. A 
representative of China Paper Industry Alliance confirms that research into energy efficiency, 
emission reduction and waste management often is carried out through private-academic 
collaboration.21. A manager at a paper and pulp firm describes their involvement in research 
partnerships with China Paper Research Institute (CIPRI), CAS, Beijing Forestry University, 
foreign companies, and foreign universities. Much of this research focuses on improvement of 
resource conservation and environmental protection (Interview with domestic paper company, 
2016.06.13, Shandong). Another paper and pulp company runs five research platforms 
involving partnership projects with ten academic institutes and collaboration contracts 
(strategic alliances) with several foreign firms (Interview with domestic paper group, 
2016.06.18, Shandong). 
Companies from the iron and steel sector describe a similar relationship with academia. A 
representative of a steel company explains that the firm has several research centres involving 
collaboration with universities. In these centres, environmental technology and energy 
efficiency are prioritized research topics (Interview with steel company, Shandong, 
2016.04.19). Research on CCS is raised as an example of technology development carried out 
through platforms involving universities, companies, government units, foreign authorities and 
funding from international institutions (Ibid). According to a respondent from Shandong Iron 
and Steel Industry Alliance, their organization is also involved in cross-sector research 
partnerships to support research on energy efficiency in the industry (Interview with iron and 
steel industry alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong). 22  In sum, multiple connections between the 
private sector, domestic academia, foreign research organizations and parastatal research 
institutes are involved in research on industrial emission reductions in China. These 
connections are created in a bottom-up fashion and illustrate how multiple-level, horizontal 
interactions play a key role in introducing new technology on a local level.  
7.3.2 Introduction of new policy 
To find how different partnership constellations are related to introduction of new policy and 
planning practices, a contingency table was created for “introduction of new policy and 
planning practices” and “partnership constellation”. As shown by Table 21, partnerships 
between a municipal authority and a foreign or international partner is, by far, the most common 
way to introduce new policy and planning practices (the correlation between international 
                                                 
21 The industry alliance in itself functions as a platform for knowledge sharing between sectors, by collecting and 
sharing data, disseminating research and creating forums for communication and collaboration (Interview with paper 
industry alliance, 2016.05.22, Beijing). 
22 As in the paper industry, the iron and steel industry alliance is a semi-governmental organization that provides 
spaces for collaboration. The representative explains that “solutions usually require large infrastructure investments 
to improve systems solutions. To make this easier our association has a platform for developing large-scale solutions. 
This is a public platform for cooperation” (Interview with iron and steel industry alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong). 
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cooperation and adoption of new policy practices is significant on a 98.3% level). This thesis 
suggests that two mechanisms explaining introduction of new policy practices through 
partnerships are demonstration and collaborative problem solving. These two mechanisms are 
discussed below.  
Table 21: Contingency table for partnership and policy innovation (expected outcomes in brackets) 
 
Demonstration followed by market based diffusion 
In this sample, the most common way to that new policy and planning practices are introduced 
is through large demonstration projects. These usually consist of partnerships formed in the 
construction of eco-city projects and low carbon districts. In online accounts about these 
projects, a number of policy or planning approaches are self-reported as “new”. 23  This includes 
new energy efficiency building standards in Tianjin (Tianjin SSTEC), use of ecological 
infrastructure and networks of wetlands in Shenzhen (Guangming Low Carbon District), and 
low carbon zoning codes in Beijing (Changxindian low carbon community). Further examples 
are transformation of a poor neighborhood into a livable, climate smart urban area, and man-
made wetlands for cleanup of polluted river water in Shenzhen (Pingdi International Low 
Carbon District), and “participatory simulation” as a planning approach to better integrate the 
views of stakeholders in Wuxi (Sino-Swedish Low Carbon Eco-City). Other examples include 
natural flood protection, use of unconventional water sources and permeable surfaces, new 
waste collection and separation systems integrated with waste-to-power systems, and natural 
ventilation systems. These projects have one thing in common, which is that their process of 
design and management involve sharing of ideas between a range of partners, allowing for 
opportunities to introduce new ideas and perspectives. It is argued, therefore, that large 
demonstration projects are used to test new policy and planning practices.  
The question is to what extent these practices travel from spatially delimited projects to other 
locations or jurisdictions? The member check interviews suggest that one way in which this 
happens is by practices being absorbed by domestic companies and reproduced through their 
marketing strategies. Several accounts support this notion. For example, a foreign consultant 
states that domestic real estate or architectural companies that receive planning advice from a 
foreign consultancy firm tend to use these in future projects:  
For example with the developer X, they will ask us for a demo and then they can learn from this 
project and then they can copy it and sell it as their own market model! We have seen a lot of this. 
It makes the practises spread. If they have been part of the whole project, after we finish, some key 
members will know how the planning done … it is in their interest to learn as they can use it as a 
selling point (Interview with international consultancy firm, 2016.06.13, Beijing) 
The same respondent explains that companies gain a competitive advantage by learning to 
apply new technologies and system solutions. They are willing to pay for this knowledge to be 
                                                 
23 A reminder from the methodology chapter is that reliance on self-reported evidence most likely creates a bias 
towards exaggeration in description of new practices. As these projects are promoted as flagship examples, they aim 
to showcase new solutions, and therefore have an inherent incentive to refer to policy as new. The cases have been 
selected according to the best knowledge of the researcher and compared with projects in other cities to find which 
practices stand out. 
Partnership constellation Introduction of policy/planning practice 
Authority +  International/foreign organization(s) 13 (3)  
Authority + Company  3 (2) 
Academia +  International/foreign organization(s) 3 (1) 
Company +  International/foreign organization(s) 1 (6) 
Company + National  1 (0) 
Authority + Academia 0 (2) 
Company + Academia  0 (1) 
International/foreign organization(s) + National 0 (0) 
TOTAL 21 
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able to provide “show-off” projects, such as low carbon districts or CBDs with an eco-profile 
(Interview with foreign consultancy firm, Beijing, 2016.06.13). Another respondent claims that 
using a green image is a way for companies to respond to government policy, which in return 
provides better investment opportunities (often cheaper land). Real estate companies also 
pursue eco-city building to create an image of being forerunners and green pioneers (Interview 
with international consultancy firm, 2013.04.10, Beijing; Interview with energy consultant, 
2014.02.25, Hong Kong). Real estate developments with a green image can also create a higher 
property value. Companies “make a profit out of ecological/low-carbon development, as it 
creates a high land price” (Interview with domestic policy research institute, 2013.03.08, 
Beijing). An official at a domestic policy institute observes that in high-level projects (such as 
eco-cities), the prestige motivates companies to accept higher costs. At the same time, the 
companies learn to meet higher sustainability performance indicators (Interview with domestic 
planning institute, 2016.05.02, Beijing).  
The limitation of this mechanism is that solutions of a technical nature are preferred, whereas 
complicated system solutions less often are copied. A foreign planning consultant points out 
that complex planning approaches that require collaboration between several actors (waste, 
energy, spatial planning) are especially unlikely to be reproduced. One reason is that these 
require cooperation with municipal departments, which takes up too much time and trouble 
(interview with foreign consultancy firm, Beijing, 2016.06.3). New planning procedures, such 
as participatory planning approaches, are also unlikely to be copied, as these carry no obvious 
profit for domestic firms (Ibid).  
Further, most companies only improve their energy use profile or if it leads to cost cuts. 24 A 
consultant involved in eco-city planning confirms this view, stating: “if we give them 24 criteria 
they will just take the one that are economically beneficial and forget the rest… The 
environmental and ecological calculations are a basis for our planning, but the cost analysis is 
the basis for them” (Interview with international consultancy firm, 2013.04.10, Beijing). On 
average, companies only consider energy conservation solutions that contribute directly to cost 
cuts (e.g. district heating in large public projects), and these incentives are limited due to the 
low energy costs (Interview with foreign consultancy firm, Beijing, 2016.06.3).  
In conclusion, replication of policy strategies introduced through flagship demonstration 
projects can be realized through market diffusion. However, it is not a potent mechanism for 
spreading system solutions and policy strategies of a non-technical nature.  
Collaborative problem solving followed by internalization 
The second mechanism through which partnerships introduce new policy practices is 
collaborative problem solving. This mechanism is realized when municipal authorities seek 
external advice from academic/expert organizations, bilateral partners or international 
institutions to solve a specific urban issue. Through pragmatic absorption of successful 
solutions, these policy strategies can be internalized by local administrations. Cases from the 
sample of initiatives illustrate that this mechanism is realized through different partnership 
constellations. 
For example, Guangzhou E-core is a planning approach introduced to protect ecological areas 
in the city centre of Guangzhou Municipality. This design uses a greenway convergence 
strategy that connects green areas and at the same time aims to support species diversification, 
limit the use of elevated highways and employ elevated green walkways. The planning strategy 
thereby tackles issues of habitat fragmentation and biodiversity protection. The plan was 
                                                 
24 When questioned about driving forces behind energy and emission improvements, company representatives refer 
to economic aspects. A representative of a steel company states that considerable savings have been realized through 
energy efficiency upgrades (Interview with steel company, Shandong, 2016.04.19). A paper company manager 
makes a statement about their improved energy profile, as the new recycling systems allows the factory to rely on 
their own electricity production (Interview with domestic paper company, 2016.06.13, Shandong). Improved 
resource efficiency can also create a competitive edge relative to companies with poor energy performance 
(Interview with iron and steel industry alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong). 
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developed in collaboration between Tongji University in Shanghai and Guangzhou Urban 
Planning Bureau. This example illustrates how public-academic partnerships produce 
horizontal linkages for mobilization of knowledge and information in urban planning processes. 
There are also examples of initiatives led by domestic research institutes in cooperation with 
international organizations, such as Guangzhou Sustainable Transport Plan. This is a 
comprehensive low carbon development plan developed by Guangzhou Municipality in 
partnership with Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP), an international 
non-profit organization. This plan is cited as innovative through its seamless connections 
between BRT system, railway system, large-scale bike-sharing stations, and cycle paths. The 
plan is cited as contributing to pollution and emission reductions, and congestion alleviation, 
while at the same time being socially inclusive. A similar example is the partnership between 
Kunming Municipality and the foreign charity foundation China Sustainable Cities Program 
(CSCP), which has produced a Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) plan in Kunming.  
An example from the industrial sector is Qingdao DRCs partnership with ADB and WRI (and 
international NGO) in the establishment of an emission accounting system used to develop an 
emission reduction development plan. The plan introduces a systematic approach to emission 
reduction control, by creating an inventory of the city’s energy use, sector scenarios, and a 
technology roadmap. At the same time, the emission reduction strategy claims to improve 
cross-sectoral coordination, information sharing, public participation and public opinion 
supervision mechanisms. In the formulation of this ambitious strategy, ADB and WRI drew 
together an international researcher team that contributed technical advice throughout the 
process. These three examples illustrate how partnerships between public actors and foreign 
NGOs introduce new planning approaches on a local level in China.  
Another partnership constellation is collaboration between Chinese authorities and foreign 
municipalities. This takes the form of participation in transnational networks, as demonstrated 
by Wuxi’s participation in the Low Carbon Future Cities project. Through the project, the 
municipality has cooperated with the German organization Wuppertal Institute in formulating 
industrial emission reduction plans. This has involved dialogue between local stakeholders and 
representatives from Dusseldorf to identify new solutions. Concrete action plans resulting from 
this partnership include establishment of a database and online information system used to 
estimate the capacity of renewable energy development in Wuxi’s urban region. Wuxi has also 
developed a policy tools for successful emission reduction in the industrial sector. Another 
example is Kunming Municipality’s EcoPartnership with the city of Portland as part of the 
program “We Build Green Cities”. Through the project, planning and design experts from 
Portland have helped Kunming to promote new planning practice in transit development, 
primarily by introducing walking and cycling paths. The aim of these strategies have been both 
to lower carbon emissions and alleviate traffic congestion.  
Finally, partnerships between Chinese authorities and bilateral partners can contribute to 
introduction of new policy strategies. An example of from the transport sector is Shenzhen 
Municipality’s cooperation with the German development agency GIZ to develop improved 
parking management strategies. The aim was to tackle issues of congestion, pollution and 
emissions. The project took the shape of a pilot project introducing parking charges in four 
zones. Due to the effectiveness of the approach it was up-scaled to the whole city. A similar 
project was carried out in Beijing, where transport demand management (TDM) and parking 
management programs were piloted in partnership with GIZ. The aim was to develop evaluation 
toolkits for TDM. These two examples illustrate how partnerships formed through traditional 
development assistance contribute to local policy development in China.  
These examples demonstrate that municipal authorities in China are actively seeking novel 
ways to solve urban emission reduction challenges. In their quest for solutions, they create links 
across sectors and across borders, which mobilize ideas, tools and information. The result is the 
establishment of networks of knowledge populated by public actors, researchers, and experts 
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at international institutions. These networks represent new loci of authority that extend beyond 
public borders and in part remove policy directions from the top-down structure of China’s 
political system.  
 
7.4 Networks of knowledge production  
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that partnerships in urban climate action in China are 
common. The results of the comparative study and information from the member check 
interview both demonstrate that municipal authorities and companies draw on resources of 
other actors (information, technology, and funding) to realize local emission reductions.  
The chapter also demonstrates that climate partnerships fulfil various functions. In this sample, 
the most common function is information dissemination and demonstration, followed by 
technology transfers and technology development, public service provision and rule setting. 
This is consistent with the literatures on sustainability partnerships and transnational climate 
networks, which highlight information dissemination and knowledge sharing as important 
partnerships functions (Betsill & Bulkeley, 2004; Glasbergen, 2007; Andonova et al, 2009; 
Pattberg et al, 2012; Bulkeley et al, 2012; UN, 2015). The sample of this study indicates that 
partnerships with the function of information dissemination and demonstration typically take 
the form of either large scale projects, such as eco-city projects or low carbon communities, or 
resource saving campaigns. 
Partnerships with the function of technology transfer often involve Chinese companies 
importing foreign equipment, while research partnerships either have the form of joint research 
projects (for example between domestic and foreign academia) or establishment of innovation 
platforms. A key conclusion of this chapter is that partnerships involving technology transfers 
and technology development play an important role in introducing emission reduction 
technology on a local level in China. While technology transfers remain a common mechanism 
for introducing new technology, research partnerships have become central to development of 
energy conservation and emission reduction technology. This is consistent with China’s shift 
from being an importer of renewable technology (e.g. wind turbines) to being a leading clean-
tech exporter (e.g. PV cells) (Caprotti, 2008). It is also consistent with studies that point to the 
capacity of actors in the global South to build independent pathways of change, rather than 
simply relying on leading firms catching up with the West (Berkhout et al, 2010). Research 
partnerships form linkages between domestic and foreign firms, domestic and foreign 
academia, as well as parastatal research institutes. The member check interviews demonstrate 
that most actors are involved in multiple, parallel collaboration projects. The image that 
emerges is one of relatively close-knit networks of knowledge production that are 
interconnected with global flows of information.  
Partnerships with the purpose of providing low carbon public service and infrastructure exist 
in a broader range of constellations. Municipal authorities form alliances with firms and 
academic organizations to facilitate delivery, access new designs, share financing burdens, and 
create new funding arrangements. In provision of infrastructure such as renewable energy 
plants and district heating systems, companies form linkages with foreign firms to introduce 
new technical solutions. Mixed ownership structures (PPPs, JVs and BOTs) appear to be 
relatively common in provision of low carbon infrastructure, such as renewable energy plants.  
In partnerships with the purpose of rule setting, municipalities create coalitions with 
organizations representing expertise, such as academic institutes and foreign partners. These 
connections provide channels of information and knowledge that are used to shape urban 
emission reduction strategies, policy tools, and low carbon development plans. These results 
are consistent with Mai and Francesch-Huidobro’s (2015) research on collaborative municipal 
networks. The results of the comparative study confirm that municipal actors create vertical 
and horizontal intra- and intergovernmental linkages to access resources and facilitate urban 
climate action.  
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Clearly, actors also operate independently to deliver climate action. However, this sample 
suggests that climate initiatives led by a single actor tend to reproduce known examples of 
climate action and be less innovative than initiatives led through partnerships. Many municipal-
led initiatives had a regulatory or administrative nature, such as targets for green construction 
and zoning regulation. Nearly all initiatives were led by large SOEs with significant financial 
and technical capacity and the ability to deliver projects without collaborating with other actors. 
While most non-partnership initiatives in this sample were projects following top-down 
guidelines or large infrastructure projects, collaborative initiatives often involved 
experimentation with new solutions. This difference in character suggests that governance 
through partnerships is linked with policy and technology innovation. 
This chapter presents empirical evidence suggesting that climate partnerships, especially 
between municipal authorities and domestic or foreign academia, introduce new policy and 
planning practices on a local level in China. Two mechanisms explain how this is realized. The 
first consists of large scale demonstration projects involving multiple organizations, which 
function as platforms where new policy ideas are tried out. The member check interviews 
suggest that low carbon policy and planning approaches maybe absorbed by actors that are 
involved in these projects (often real estate forms and consultancy companies),  who will diffuse 
them by applying them in other projects. However, this mechanism is weak. Companies are 
unable to replicate system solutions (which require coordination with local authorities) and tend 
to be primarily interested in technical solutions.  
The second mechanisms through which new policy approaches are introduced is through 
collaborative problem solving. This mechanism is realized by local authorities or academic 
institutes forming coalitions with foreign authorities, research organizations, bilateral partners 
or international NGOs when drafting urban low carbon plans. Through dialogue and joint 
search for new solutions, new solutions can be absorbed and adapted to fit local contexts. This 
conclusion is aligned with the research of Bauer and Steurer (2014), who have shown that 
climate partnerships contribute to policy diffusion. Bauer and Steurer (Ibid) argue that 
collaborative strategies, such as working groups, leads to information sharing that affects 
formulation of action plans and strategies. The results of this study demonstrate that this 
tendency also exists in China.  
The findings also build on the research of Schroeder (2008) who have shown that Chinese 
NGOs participating in transnational networks contribute to internalization of international 
climate policy. This chapter demonstrates that participation of municipal authorities in 
transnational networks is one way through which partnerships contribute to policy innovation. 
Beyond this, this chapter shows that other forms of partnership (public-academic partnerships, 
partnerships between public actors and international NGOs, and traditional development 
assistance), create the same kind of internalization mechanism. These linkages are more 
pervasive than expected and seem to make up an integral element of Chinese authorities’ search 
for low carbon development solutions. They suggest that knowledge production related to 
emission reductions is concentrated in linkages that on the one hand are integrated into 
international flows of skills and technology, and on the other hand are concentrated in local 
inter-institutional linkages.  
At the same time, these results indicate that partnerships create new channels of participation 
and influence for non-state actors over policy making, in particular “soft” rule setting, such as 
(not necessarily binding) emission reduction targets and low carbon transport schemes, 
development of new policy toolkits, and spatial plans that are part of eco-city and land-scraping 
projects. In local climate action in China, foreign organizations and domestic research institutes 
regularly exert influence over climate policy on a local level. The locus of technical and 
planning expertise thereby shifts towards cross-sector and cross-border linkages through which 
local planners and policy makers mobilize information. However, not all groups are part of 
these information flows. The next chapter will continue the exploration of which actors 
participate in environmental policy networks, and why some actors are excluded.  
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8 Participation in environmental policy based on techno-economic rationalities 
 
The leadership navigates by special interests – they are trying to keep everyone happy, this is 
rational… but a transition requires losers and winners (Interview with manager at international 
NGO, 2013.01.25, Beijing) 
 
In the quote above, a manager at an international NGO observes that the pursuit of sustainability 
in China is not a neutral quest. The citation refers to the way in which authorities at a central 
and local level in China try to avoid conflict, but inevitably need to deal with diverging actor 
interests. The respondent raises the auto manufacturing industry as an example of a group that 
would lose out by shifting towards a low carbon transport system. According to this respondent, 
the leverage that this group has over policy makers is preventing such a transition from taking 
place. This chapter provides further insight into which groups are able to influence 
environmental policy, which interests are considered, and which actors are seen as legitimate 
in intervention in environmental issues. The chapter does so by relying on information from 
member check interviews conducted in Beijing and Hong Kong in 2013, 2014 and 2016.  
The first section of the chapter (8.1) describes a traditional approach to environmental policy. 
In this approach, central and local government authorities deal with the climate change 
challenge by adopting increasingly strict environmental regulations. Government authorities 
are the key actors in environmental policy, acting on behalf of the public good. Their leadership 
in environmental action is based on traditional authority. Companies are the key object of these 
regulations, in particular industrial firms. In response to higher emission standards, companies 
are adopting improved environmental protection equipment or are forced to shut down. The 
member check interviews suggest that this traditional form of environmental governance 
(rather, environmental “government”) remains important and common in China. As noted by 
Rosenau (p.39, 1995), the notion of governance does not imply that national governments no 
longer are central loci in processes of governance; government authorities continue to be 
central, although they have lost some of their earlier dominance to other systems of rule.  
The second section (8.2) presents a different principle for intervention in environmental policy 
issues. Information from the member check interviews shows that actors representing local 
economic and political interests have the opportunity to influence decision making processes 
and align decisions with their priorities. This refers to local government departments 
representing economic issues (such as DRCs), local political leaders (Mayors and the Mayor’s 
Office), as well as economic stakeholders. In making this argument, this section builds on the 
insights of Chapter 5, which applied a policy network perspective on local decision making. 
The argument is that actors with a crucial role in the political economy are seen as legitimate 
to intervene in environmental policy making processes.  
The third section (8.3) discusses another rationale for participation in environmental policy, 
which is based on the expertise of organizations. Groups that (are believed to) represent 
technical knowledge are able to influence environmental policy and participate in sustainability 
projects. Because government authorities and companies see expert organizations as legitimate 
cooperation partners, green organizations need to frame themselves as technical advisors to be 
included in environmental efforts.  The argument in this section is that expert organizations are 
seen as legitimate actors in environmental policy issues by virtue of the professionalism or 
technical skills they hold.  
Section 8.4 presents additional analysis to contrast to these principles. In includes the findings 
of the additional period of fieldwork in Hong Kong. The case study of Hong Kong provides an 
alternative picture of a greater diversity of voices, interests, and viewpoints influencing 
environmental policy processes. The member check interviews from Hong Kong show that in 
this somewhat more open political space, participation in environmental policy is based on a 
broader variety of rationales. Interviewees themselves compare their experiences in Hong Kong 
with those of colleagues in mainland China. Apart from groups representing political and 
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economic interests and expert knowledge, a range of social concerns related to energy issues 
are expressed and debated. At the same time, this variety demonstrates the range of social and 
environmental objectives that are lost in environmental policy on the mainland.  
Section 8.5 draws these arguments together by showing that the principles of inclusion into 
environmental policy in China can be explained by theories of technocracy. This section 
discusses how principles of legitimacy in China’s political system are based on an ideology that 
places economic stakeholders and experts as authorities in public policy. This thesis proposes 
to refer to this tendency using the concept of techno-economic rationalities. This concept 
explains how inclusion and exclusion in environmental policy is structured according to deep-
set values and routines of China’s political system.  
 
8.1 Traditional environmental “government” 
This thesis focuses on the role of non-state actors in environmental governance and the ways 
in which authority is shared horizontally with companies, think tanks, academic institutes, 
NGOs and foreign partners. While these actors are important, government organizations 
continue to play a central role in formulation and delivery of environmental policy. The member 
check interviews emphasize that traditional forms of steering are central to local environmental 
action in China. The interviews show that companies perceive government authorities primarily 
as an actor formulating regulation, standards and emission requirements. Much of the energy 
saving and emission reduction actions taken by local companies are carried out in response to 
binding regulation. In this section, statements from key respondents illustrate this tendency.  
In an interview with a department in charge of climate change issues at China’s Ministry of 
Environmental Protection (MEP), an official confirms that introducing increasing emission 
standards is their key strategy to reduce emissions in the industrial sector. The respondent sees 
continuously rising emission standards as a key tool for forcing companies to improve 
equipment or otherwise to shut down (Interview with domestic environmental authority, 
2016.05.28, Beijing).  
Respondents from industrial units and industry associations point in a similar way to 
environmental legislation as a key driving force behind their pollution reduction activities. A 
manager at a paper and pulp company in Shandong Province describes the increased pressure 
on small, polluting units over the past few years as follows:  
For example in COD [emissions25], we have made extremely fast progress. 3-5 years ago … the 
limit in Shandong was around 300 ppm, and then suddenly they cut it to 40 ppm! This meant that a 
lot of the small factories had to close. The investment in equipment to meet that kind of standards 
was very high. Our leadership had been proactive in that area, so it was quite easy for us to reach 
that target. But for all the household size units in Shandong there were really a lot that had to close 
down. They were rather accepting the fines for pollution than installing that kind of waste control 
equipment, because it was just too expensive (Interview with domestic paper group, 2016.06.18, 
Shandong) 
A representative of another paper and pulp company in the province makes a similar statement, 
pointing out that rising emission standards has contributed to closure of small plants and 
consolidation of the paper industry. The respondent states that their company consistently 
stayed above the standards, but while they invested massively in new equipment, the local 
government kept rising the emission control levels. After the most recent upgrade, the company 
found that their emission levels were lower than an American cooperation partner (Interview 
with domestic paper company, 2016.06.13, Shandong).  
Representatives of the iron and steel industry point to the importance of government regulation 
as a driving force behind energy saving measures. Within this sector, the most important policy 
pressure has been local government requirements to shift from coal to gas boilers, in 
                                                 
25 A measure of organic compound concentration in water, an indicator for water pollution.  
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combination with rapidly raised emission standards and performance targets for energy 
efficiency. Many small, inefficient units have been shut down in this sector as well. A 
representative from Shandong Iron and Steel Industry Alliance states that recent environmental 
improvements in the sector definitely were incited by government regulation (Interview with 
Iron and Steel Industry Alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong). A manager of a large steel enterprise 
notes that investment into gas boilers were made specifically due to government pressure: 
“companies have been forced to shut down coal boilers and replace them with gas units. This 
was an expensive investment for us, which generated no economic benefit. Of course, it is good 
that they are cleaner, but I doubt that companies would have made this type of investment 
without the government pressure, it made no economic sense” (Interview with steel company, 
Shandong, 2016.04.19). 
Respondents also observe that the pressure of raised pollution emission standards will continue 
to affect industrial activities in the coming years. A representative of China Paper Industry 
Alliance states that “the key thing right now is the recently introduced environmental law, 
which has very high standards for certain types of emissions … A lot of small factories will 
have to shut down in the coming years” (Interview with China Paper Industry Alliance, 
2016.05.22, Beijing). A representative of a pulp and paper company states that all industrial 
sectors will be under high pressure during the 13th FYP due to government regulation. The 
intention of the central government is to consolidate the sector and only allow high performing 
units and companies with economies of scale to remain in the market (Interview with domestic 
paper group, 2016.06.18, Shandong). Another round of shut-downs is expected in the iron and 
steel sector as well (Interview with Iron and Steel Industry Alliance, 2016.03.04, Shandong). 
Other policy strategies also affect company activities, but to a more limited extent. Overall, the 
member check interviews suggest that the most important tool is economic incentives: subsidies 
and tax benefits. A respondent from MEP confirms that use of locally issued subsidies is an 
important policy support. However, capacity to rely on these tools is connected with economic 
strength of local authorities, which means that economically weaker areas ted to fail 
implementation of such strategies (Interview with domestic environmental authority, 
2016.05.28, Beijing). According to representatives of the steel and paper industries, beneficial 
tax policy is the type of incentive that has the largest effect on their activities (Interview with 
domestic paper group, 2016.06.18, Shandong; Interview with paper industry alliance, 
2016.05.22, Beijing; Interview with domestic paper company, 2016.06.13, Shandong).  
A related observation is that many private sector actors continue to have a reactive approach 
towards energy savings and emission reduction activities. The interview material suggests that 
respondents from the industrial sector perceive government authorities as the actors primarily 
responsible for the quality of the environment. Empirical material presented in other chapters 
of the thesis points to a similar tendency. For example, the comparative study included very 
few companies that had taken independent climate mitigation action – almost all initiatives in 
the industrial sector appeared to be measures adopted in response to government regulations or 
guidelines. In the case study in Rizhao, key industrial actors did not agree to participate in 
interviews. If these actors had seen themselves as leaders in climate action, it is possible that 
they would have been more enthusiastic about the opportunity to promote their efforts online 
or through discussions with researchers.   
These accounts demonstrate that traditional “government” (rather than governance) still plays 
an important role in environmental protection efforts in China. These accounts indicate that 
authorities in charge of environmental actors remain the most important actors addressing 
environmental issues on a local level. However, environmental government authorities are not 
the only actors shaping and delivering environmental policy. 
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8.2 Political-economic interests in environmental policy  
Chapter 5 shows how local authorities, economic stakeholders, external planners, and academia 
interacted in urban planning processes in Rizhao. The chapter illustrates that some actors, such 
as the top municipal leadership and economic stakeholders, have better opportunities to 
influence policy and planning outcomes. The member check interviews confirm that actors with 
access to political or economic resources influence decisions with a considerable impact on the 
local environment. This section illustrates this argument by providing further information 
regarding environmental and economic conflicts in planning processes. This relates to 
intragovernmental conflict and the uneven ability of municipal authorities to influence 
decisions. It also relates to conflicts between environmental agendas and economic growth, and 
the leverage that economic stakeholders exercise over local planning processes.  
Several member check interviews demonstrate that conflict and lack of coordination 
characterizes interaction between municipal departments. A researcher at a domestic research 
institute suggests that “departments are parallel and have their own ideas. There should be a 
higher level office that coordinates their agendas instead of them fighting with each other” 
(Interview with domestic policy research institute, 2013.04.24, Beijing). The same respondent 
explains that “if an issue is not a department’s focus, they will not care much about it, or at least 
not do much about it, not try hard … Every department has different interests and demands and 
puts their own priorities on top” (Interview with domestic policy research institute, 2013.03.08, 
Beijing). These observations provide an image of local departments in pursuit of non-
coordinated goals and in continuous clashes over diverging priorities.  
Further, the priorities of environmental units are less influential and frequently differ from those 
of economically oriented units. This situation is reflected at the highest level of government. A 
representative of the climate change department of MEP states that “environmental legislation 
has exerted a larger influence on the industry, but it is still a lot weaker than the influence from 
NDRC. Only recently has the NDRC and other economic units recognized the influence that 
climate change and pollution has on the economy and realized that this must be considered” 
(Interview with domestic environmental authority, 2016.05.28, Beijing).  
A foreign researcher at an NGO explains that municipal authorities often face conflicting 
priorities. For example, transport department often argue for road expansion, which is opposed 
by construction commissions and EPBs. The decision in these cases are made by the Mayor, 
and the EPBs are seldom able to affect the outcome (Interview with international NGO, 
2013.04.18). On a local level, the DRC usually has a stronger influence than environmental 
bureaus (Interview with policy advisor, Beijing, 2013.01.18). A representative of a municipal 
EPB confirms that suggestions of their unit sometimes simply are ignored: 
As an environmental department we do our own research in this area. We will come with policy 
suggestions to other departments. Our feeling is that if the solutions are helpful and can contribute 
to earnings in some way, they follow them. If the suggestions are expensive, they ignore them 
(Interview with local EPB, 2016.06.20, Shandong) 
The relative weakness of environmental departments relative to economic units has been 
observed in a number of previous studies (Lo & Leung, 2000; Liu et al, 2012; Kostka, 2014; 
Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). The added insight of these observations is that conflict is 
an integral part of inter-governmental interactions and that planning processes are influenced 
by the relative strength of different units.  
Several member check interviews support the notion that the strongest influence over local 
planning decisions lies with the Mayor’s office. A planner at a domestic research institute states 
that “if Tsinghua [University] has done a plan and it says one thing, it will still be done 
according to what the government wants. In a research project if there are contradictions, the 
outcome will be decided by the Mayor” (Interview with domestic policy research institute, 
2013.03.08, Beijing). A respondent that has been part of drafting eco-city plans in a number of 
cities states that “the most important factor is what the municipal leadership wants. When their 
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ideas change, the incentives for the city to change also change … Our plans change with the 
ideas of the leader” (Interview with urban planner at a domestic planning institute, Beijing, 
2013.03.06). A policy advisor at an international NGO states that they try to get their advice 
into the Mayor’s hand, since he will make planning decisions (Interview with international 
NGO, 2013.04.18, Beijing). These observations support the results of Chapter 5, which 
suggested that the municipal leadership has the strongest influence over local planning 
decisions.  
A foreign policy advisor illustrates this tendency by describing “sustainable” urban planning as 
follows: 
In terms of sustainable urbanization, the Mayor’s office basically decides the development direction 
of a city. In comparison, the EPB has no power. For example, the Mayor’s office will decide where 
the subway lines will be drawn. Then they will ask for research to support this decision. Research 
organizations that are invited to provide consultancy on urban planning (such as the CAUPD) are 
placed under the government, and therefore their function is to provide results that show the 
political office’s decisions are correct (Interview with director at international environmental NGO, 
2013.03.07, Beijing) 
The citation points to the weak role of the EPBs and the strong role of municipal leaderships. 
The quote also illustrates how the Mayor’s Office prioritizes options that generate economic 
growth and pushes other actors to support these objectives. 
A number of respondents point out that climate change policy is adopted only if it creates 
investment and economic expansion. An advisor at an international organization states that 
municipal governments do want renewable technologies and energy efficient applications, but 
only if they have an economic application for this. The respondent states that “only then will 
they be seriously considered … this is something that municipal governments do in order to 
create a city brand and attract more investment” (Interview with director at international 
environmental NGO, 2013.03.07, Beijing). A policy advisor working at a national policy 
research makes a similar statement: “there is a strong focus on new technology. For example, 
in low carbon transport there is a lot of talk on electric vehicles and subway projects. However, 
this is because such projects can create GDP growth. Big infrastructure attracts investment, 
especially if it is new technology” (Interview with domestic policy research institute, 
2013.03.08, Beijing). These citations also illustrate the tendency to prioritize infrastructure and 
technology intense climate solutions, because they are viewed as stronger investment options.  
According to several respondents, low carbon development will not be considered if it is viewed 
as conflicting with economic growth. For example, decision makers in less developed regions 
are unlikely to prioritize climate change policy, or even be aware that this exists. A foreign 
policy advisor explains that “if you talk to a mayor in Yunnan about low carbon he will probably 
say: what is this? He has enough to think about his industrial development, his GDP, and has 
no money to spend on this kind of thing” (Interview with international consultancy firm, 
2013.04.10, Beijing). A foreigner researcher states that if a province sees economic benefits of 
implementing a policy, they will do it. If they do not see the economic benefits, or if the policy 
is contrary to their benefits, they will try not to implement it (Interview with international 
research institute, 2013.02.29, Beijing).  
Further, Mayors tend to favour planning directions that contribute to city branding and other 
quick achievements that benefit political careers. As stated by a representative of an 
international NGO, “leaders have limited timeframes; they only care about the results within 
their own period of mandate” (Interview with director at international environmental NGO, 
2013.03.07, Beijing). A policy advisor at an international organization believes that “political 
performance seems to be the biggest reason behind [eco-city development]… Many will adopt 
them for the sake of the benefit of their political leaders… They need quick results. So after 
their period they can say, I have done this, now we are an eco-city” (Interview with policy 
advisor, Beijing, 2013.03.08). These observations suggest that climate policy only will be 
considered if it is directly related to political achievements. 
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For the same reason, long term, strategic decisions, such as investment into non-motorized 
transport systems, are less useful for political promotions and therefore less likely to be 
prioritized or sustained with changes of leadership (Interview with director at international 
NGO, 2013.03.07, Beijing; Interview with policy advisor, Beijing, 2013.03.08). Further, this 
short-sighted focus on political results makes the realization of system level change difficult. 
As explained by a consultant in relation to introducing system level solutions “it needs time, 
patience and courage to aim for this. There is no fast-track. If you are using eco-cities as a 
strategy for realizing a political career, there is no way to get results. You get a spotlight on a 
project, then nothing happens” (Interview with foreign consultancy firm, Beijing, 2016.06.3). 
As a result, political leaders are more likely to opt for technical fixes with a high level of 
visibility when considering climate policy alternatives.  
Access to funding in the form of grants and subsidies is another motivation to adopt eco-city 
agendas (Interview with international NGO, 2013.04.18; Interview with domestic research 
centre, 2013.04.24, Beijing). A representative of a local government in Shandong Province 
explains that the city accessed 30 billion RMB in central government investments into local 
projects when it became approved as an environmental model city. This was an important 
driving force for the leadership (Interview with local EPB, 2016.06.20, Shandong). However, 
this also means that carbon reduction calculations often are carried out for the purpose of 
receiving grants, but completely overlooked in the implementation phase when the only 
important aspect is how much land real estate developers can sell (Interview with foreign 
consultancy firm, Beijing, 2016.06.3). As stated by an engineer at a foreign consultancy firm, 
“I have so many examples of cases where we have been asked by a company or municipality 
to give a district heating plan with energy optimization, and once it is approved by the NDRC, 
they forget about the plan. They are almost never implemented” (Ibid). 
In conclusion, the member check accounts point to the way in which political and economic 
motivations play a key role in urban policy decisions, and how actors that represent local 
economic or political interests influence important planning decisions. These insights 
strengthens the conclusion from Chapter 5, namely that inclusion in urban planning is closely 
associated with structures of the local political economy and priorities of local elites. There is 
also further evidence suggesting that the dominating role of political leaders and key economic 
stakeholders allows for planning conflicts to be made invisible. He (2006) has previously 
described how planning meetings in cities in China have the purpose of reaching consensus, 
which in turn helps build legitimacy of policy decisions. In this context, however, key actors 
involved in planning meetings tend to be those that represent reasonably well-aligned interests. 
There is no attempt to, for example, involve representatives of citizens that are negatively 
affected by industrial expansion and build-up of land in decision making processes. “Building 
consensus” in this consensus therefore is not so much an exercise in resolving conflicting 
interests, but rather a way for political and economic elites to agree on mutually supportive 
agendas.       
 
8.3 Participation in environmental policy based on “expertise” 
Apart from participation in environmental policy based on traditional authority and political-
economic interests, a third form of influence over environmental policy is participation 
legitimized through technical “expertise”. This section shows that this influence is expressed 
through inclusion of representatives of technical knowledge in local planning processes and 
partnerships. The section also argues that by acting as experts, channels of influence are created 
for actors that otherwise would not be able to access environmental policy and programs.  
The member check interviews confirm that experts from research institutions and universities 
often are invited by local governments to draft planning documents, in particular if local 
planning bureaus lack experience and knowledge (Interview with policy advisor, Beijing, 
2013.01.18). According to a policy maker at a government policy research institute, researchers 
and planners that work at semi-governmental institutes and universities are guided by the 
163 
 
priorities of their organization, rather than local development interests. For this reason, the plans 
developed by external “experts” are more likely to give weight to environmental considerations 
(Interview with domestic policy research institute, 2013.03.08, Beijing).  
A number of respondents suggest that external planners act as a counterweight to economic 
interests, by placing more emphasis on long term sustainability considerations and ecological 
capacity. Two examples of this are provided by a researcher and a planner in relation to eco-
city projects. The first is stated by a low carbon planner involved in designing the spatial lay-
out of Tianjin eco-city. This planner explains that the Singaporean development partner, a 
private investment company, wanted a large residential area for the purpose of selling property. 
The central planning organization of the respondent wanted instead to follow ecological 
principles: 
One motive for [the Singaporean firm] was to have a chance to use many new forms of technology, 
such as water technology, city district lay-out, and so forth. However, they were also interested in 
getting some form of economic profit from this. They wanted to sell real estate in the eco-city, so 
they wanted to increase the planning of the real estate area. However, we thought that in an eco-
city the residential area could not be too large. So a main source of conflict was the size of the 
residential area (Interview with domestic planning institute, 2013.05.24, Beijing) 
A similar example is provided by a consultant at an international consultancy firm involved in 
the eco-city planning in Wuxi. The respondent explains that their organization suggested 
protecting a larger amount of green area and water resources, whereas the local government 
preferred to develop a larger area to generate more profit from the project. Eventually, the 
advice of the external organization was accepted in this case: 
We thought that the amount of protected green areas left by the government was not wide enough, 
this was a key conflict. Also, although the water system of Wuxi is developed, we thought that they 
had not left enough water resources from an eco-city perspective. Both sides were in agreement to 
develop the area according to eco-city principles, so in the end they agreed to leave more water… 
I think one key issue was the amount of green areas left to be protected. From the local government’s 
perspective, they might want to develop more area, but from the eco-planners perspective, we 
wanted to keep more area protected (Interview with eco-city planner at a domestic consultancy firm, 
Beijing, 2013.05.27) 
For green NGOs in China, public mobilization and policy advocacy activities can be difficult 
to perform. This difficulty is described in previous research (Tang & Zhang, 2008), and is 
confirmed by the member check interviews of this study. A representative of an international 
NGO explains that the main role of their organization is meant to be environmental activism 
and raising awareness about environmental issues. This is hard for the organization to realize 
as their online information and publications get removed and blocked by the government 
(Interview with international NGO, 2016.05.05, Beijing). When running into these dead ends, 
the organization has instead engaged in research and explored the possibilities to work in 
partnerships in the role as technical advisor. The organization does research and writes reports, 
collects data and measures industrial impact on the environment and people’s health. Through 
their technical engagement in pollution issues, the organization has joined a partnership with 
the toxic chemicals unit of the MEP, where it participated as policy advisor (Ibid). This is a 
much less confrontational approach than the NGO usually takes, but one which has allowed it 
to achieve greater impact on environmental policy in China.  
A second NGO presents a similar picture. The organization works with research into energy 
trends, emission trends and energy policy and functions as a technical advisor in policy issues 
(Interview with international NGO, 2016.04.17, Beijing). The NGO has partnerships with 
several domestic central and local research institutions. According to the respondent, the advice 
they provide to their domestic cooperation partners travels through these connections to 
national and local decision makers. Furthermore, the respondent states that their advice is 
considered by central and local policy makers because it carried the authority of science: 
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[Our domestic research partners] pass on policy recommendation to various ministries through 
their cooperation partners … Our role in this becomes an expert advisor of sorts. We continuously 
review our research projects, and provide funding for those that go well. These results in turn serve 
as policy advice through our domestic partners. Our recommendations can have a lot of impact on 
central and local decision-makers, because they see it as scientific (Interview with international 
NGO, 2016.04.17, Beijing) 
An example of the organization’s influence on environmental policy is the joint development 
of environmental standards for coal to gas conversion projects. The NGO also works directly 
with local policy makers in developing strategies to reduce the economic impact of emission 
reduction programs. According to the respondent, a central part of this work is to find ways to 
reduce negative economic impacts of shifting from reliance on coal, such as by developing 
alternative industries. Interestingly, even though the emphasis is on economic considerations, 
this advice incorporates social and ecological aspects. For example, the organization tries to 
explain to local decision makers that there are red lines, ecological capacities, they have to 
consider (Interview with international NGO, 2016.04.17, Beijing). To lay off coal, they have 
also worked on development of policy for protecting laid-off workers from the coal industry by 
using welfare and insurance programs. The respondent admits that “there is a lot of political 
opposition to these kinds of suggestions, though. They will only go through if alternative 
[economic] development paths can be identified” (Interview with international NGO, 
2016.04.17, Beijing). 
There are also examples of engagement in partnerships between Chinese authorities and foreign 
partners acting as technical advisors in environmental policy development. A representative of 
MEP explains how dialogue with foreign cooperation partners is one way in which China’s 
new soil pollution standards (currently being drafted) is developed. According to the 
respondent, other countries have worked for decades with soil pollution, which means that 
China can draw on their knowledge and experience to shape effective action. Central and local 
government authorities use the experience of their partners and best practice examples as 
guidelines for deciding who takes on responsibility for clean-up, procedures for risk 
assessment, use of remediation technology, and so on. The format for sharing these experiences 
is joint work-shops and conferences, collection of case studies, bilateral dialogues and inviting 
foreign companies to take part of remediation projects. The dialogues also involve 
representatives of leading universities who access information and contribute to the central 
government’s policy development (Interview with domestic environmental authority, 
2016.05.28, Beijing).  
Similar processes of interaction with foreign partners influence policy development on a local 
level. A representative of a municipal environmental protection bureau in Shandong Province 
describes how bilateral cooperation projects contribute to environmental awareness raising and 
adoption of new policy, standards and institutional frameworks. These projects primarily take 
the form of traditional development assistance, where partners carry out environmental 
research, find out where to emphasize environmental protection, identify polluted areas where 
agriculture is taking place, and learn about methods for risk management. The local government 
have absorbed elements of the partner’s environmental assessment indicator system, as well as 
format for operation of a local environmental court (Interview with local EPB, 2016.06.20, 
Shandong).  
The previous chapter on partnerships provides many similar examples. Section 7.2.2 discusses 
initiatives involving local rule setting activities, where academic organizations and foreign 
partners act as advisors in formulating emission reduction schemes. The section also 
demonstrates the variety of organizations involved in large scale demonstration projects. For 
example, in eco-city projects, planning institutes and consultancy firms participate to provide 
managerial or technical advice on lay-out and design, and companies provide input into 
technological solutions. The next section of the chapter (7.3) discusses how the involvement of 
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non-public actors in policy processes contribute to adoption of new policy elements. It 
concludes that partnerships are providing avenues for organizations representing technical 
expertise to influence local policies and projects. 
On the contrary, “the public” is usually not able to participate in policy processes, as has been 
observed in previous research (e.g. Lo & Leung, 2000). A number of member check interviews 
point to public opinion as largely irrelevant to environmental planning processes. A researcher 
at a national institute that has been involved in environmental planning in many cities expresses 
that common citizens “have almost no say. It seems more like suddenly there will be a plan and 
nobody knows where it came from” (Interview with domestic policy research institute, 
2013.03.08, Beijing). A domestic researcher agrees, and points to the lack of participation as a 
weakness of planning procedures, which tend to be based on technological consideration but 
divorced from local priorities and lifestyles (Interview with domestic research centre, 
2013.04.24, Beijing). A local official claims that the public is not “mature” enough to be 
involved, as otherwise there would be chaos. In case they were aware of environmental issues, 
they would swarm public authorities with claims for pollution compensation (Interview with 
local EPB, 2016.06.20, Shandong). These observations suggest a designation of organisations 
holding expertise as justified in their intervention in environmental policy in China, and a lack 
of recognition of other groups that lack this capacity.  
What are the implications of allowing groups representing certain forms of interests or 
knowledge to participate in environmental policy formulation and delivery? Below, the city of 
Hong Kong is used as a contrasting case to show the various viewpoints and interests that are 
made invisible through the selective inclusion of interests in environmental agendas on the 
mainland.  
 
8.4 Hong Kong: A contrasting case 
At the time when the member check interviews in Hong Kong were carried out, the city was 
involved in a consultation process aiming to decide the strategy of a future urban energy policy. 
As part of the interviews, various views on this process were discussed with representatives 
from government authorities, academia, companies and environmental NGOs. The diverging 
and conflicting priorities and interests of these actors are discussed below.  
First, a few words of introduction to the consultation process are in order. Currently, the energy 
mix of the power sector in Hong Kong is made up of around 53% coal, 23% natural gas, 22% 
coal and 2% renewables. In 2017, a number of coal power plants will retire, leaving room for 
other types of energy sources to replace this supply. This has led to a discussion about what 
future energy mix is desirable, as well as what economic, social and environmental priorities 
should dictate urban energy policy. Two key options proposed by the local government are 
hotly debated. The first is to import electricity (either nuclear or coal based) from China and 
the second to import natural gas.  
Several actors express concerns with the proposal to import electricity from China. Some 
aspects of these considerations are environmental. There is limited knowledge about the sources 
of energy used for electricity production in China, which may eventually lead to a higher 
reliance on coal, thereby increasing the emission footprint of Hong Kong (Interview with 
researcher, 2014.02.24, Hong Kong; Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong 
Kong). Use of electricity produced on the mainland may also imply a higher reliance of nuclear 
power, which is associated with safety concerns – an aspect that is highlighted after Fukushima 
(Interview with researcher, 2014.02.24, Hong Kong; Interview with utility manager, 
2014.02.26, Hong Kong).26  
                                                 
26  The current proposal has already steered away from a previously heavier focus on nuclear power, due to 
Fukushima accident (utility public relations manager, 2014.06.26, Hong Kong). 
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Another problematic aspect related to import of electricity is energy security. The mainland is 
said to experiences power shortages and is not seen as a reliable supply source (Interview with 
researcher, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong). Further, residents in Hong Kong are averse to increasing 
their reliance on resources from the mainland, for fear of falling under increasing Chinese 
control (Ibid; Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong Kong). Other concerns 
with importing electricity from China are economic. A viewpoint proposed by a researcher is 
that this suggestion implies moving gear, jobs, infrastructure, and training opportunities away 
from Hong Kong to the mainland. From an economic perspective, natural gas therefore makes 
much more sense (Interview with researcher, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong).  
Rather than accepting the proposal to increase the supply of natural gas, several organizations 
oppose a continued reliance on fossil fuels. One environmental NGO expresses frustration that 
promotion of renewables have completely disappeared from the consultation process (Interview 
with environmental activist, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong). Increasing the share of renewables in 
the fuel mix is an issue that has been formally debated previously, but is overlooked in the 
current proposals (“it’s like they forgot it”). This organization disagrees with the government’s 
pessimism about the capacity of renewables and points to the need to encourage small scale 
solutions, such as end of line wind power generators. Focus on large renewable farms always 
ends up in the same dead ends of lack of space and ecological impacts (Ibid).  
A representative of an environmental NGO explains that their organization supports neither of 
the government proposals, as both alternatives support the current “energy monopoly” and fails 
to introduce sustainable alternatives (Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.26, Hong 
Kong). Their main criticism is that increased import from China does not imply liberalization 
of Hong Kong’s electricity market. The respondent states: 
As a green group, we are obviously concerned with the impacts of climate change, and we hope to 
increase the share of renewables and improve energy efficiency in HK. The structure of the market 
right now is not encouraging these goals. I’ll give you an example. Right now, if you have your own 
renewable power system, and you manage to generate a surplus of power, you can’t feed this back 
into the grid. Because the grid is owned by CLP and HKE, you can’t supply any electricity to the 
grid, it is impossible! The problem is that they own everything, the power production, the 
distribution, and so forth, and this situation does not encourage renewable distribution (Interview 
with environmental activist, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong) 
This organization argues that opening up the markets to imports from the Chinese mainland 
might contribute to a larger supply of renewable energy from alternative suppliers (Ibid). The 
respondent also complains that one of the reasons this is not happening is because the two 
power utilities have too much power over the negotiations with the government.  
In contrast, a representative from one of the two power utilities argues that there is no 
monopoly, but simply an electricity market with high barriers of entry. The respondent 
expresses that “actually there is no monopoly, anybody who has the money or has the interest 
can come and knock the door and then say I have interest to build so and so. I mean of course, 
practically it would be very, very difficult to build another grid” (Interview with utility public 
relations manager, 2014.06.26, Hong Kong). The respondent also points out that the utility 
company has made the largest investments into renewable energy in the city, as well as very 
early investments into environmental protection technology. According to the company 
representative, lack of space is the greatest barrier to adoption of renewable energy systems in 
Hong Kong. Their proposed off-shore wind projects have, for example, not been approved 
because of their expected impact on sensitive marine ecosystem (Ibid).  
A representative of a local green movements points out that it is impossible to have a standpoint 
in relation to either of the proposals, because it is unclear how future options are related to price 
(Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong Kong). This respondent argues that 
energy poverty of households, related with high electricity prices, is a key social concern that 
the consultation fails to address. At is it unclear how import of natural gas or electricity from 
China will influence consumer prices, the debate makes no sense. Instead of choosing a 
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standpoint in this process, the NGO focuses on helping energy poor households manage costs, 
for example by promoting energy-efficient home appliances (Ibid)  
Rather than focusing on a shift in the energy mix, other green NGOs are arguing that the 
authorities should redirect their attention from supply to energy demand. In particular, there is 
a need to address electricity consumption in buildings, which accounts for a high share of 
electricity demand in the city. Some environmental NGOs are pushing for demand side 
management as an alternative to, what in their opinion constitutes, “unsustainable” energy 
supply (Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.24, Hong Kong; Interview with 
environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong Kong). Others suggest that the power utilities should 
take on a greater burden through energy saving targets (Interview with environmental activist, 
2014.02.26, Hong Kong). 
Another contested issue related to energy supply is use of waste-to-energy incineration. At the 
time of the interviews, this was promoted by the government as a way to contribute renewable 
sources to the energy mix and solving the issue of lack of space for landfills. Individuals 
contesting the project point to the production of ash and toxic pollutants, as well as the 
destruction of sensitive ecosystems in construction and operation of the plant and associated 
infrastructure (Interview with energy researcher, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong). They argue that 
setting up a large scale system of collection of waste and recycling would solve the problem 
more effectively (Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong Kong). In response 
to vocal protests against this plant, the government allegedly reconsidered the project 
(Interview with energy researcher, 2014.02.24, Hong Kong).  
In spite of the diversity of viewpoints expressed through the consultation, respondents complain 
that the final decision making of the process is not handled openly. An activist explains that “it 
is hard for us to say anything about the energy planning, because this happens behind closed 
doors… sometimes there are public hearings in the legislative councils and so on, but how they 
decide I don’t know, we can’t monitor the decision-making process… everything that is related 
to policy making and planning is very difficult to do” (Interview with environmental activist, 
2014.02.26, Hong Kong). A researcher and policy advisor with a position on an advisory 
committee describes the processes in Hong Kong legislative council as rubber stamp 
procedures, in which “experts” and professionals with personal connections to the political 
leadership are invited to present evidence in support of government proposals (Interview with 
policy advisor, 2014.02.26, Hong Kong). The respondent states disparagingly that the processes 
are becoming more and more “like in China” (Ibid). Another respondent describes the 
consultation as “a one-sided process, where advice goes in and it is not clear if anyone is 
listening” (Interview with environmental activist, 2014.02.27, Hong Kong).  
The reason for describing the contested nature of Hong Kong’s future energy policy is to 
demonstrate the variety of principles that underpin the viewpoints of different groups and 
individuals. These principles are geopolitical (concern with increasing China’s influence over 
issues in Hong Kong), economic (debates on the electricity market and issues of monopoly 
versus liberalization), social (the impact of electricity prices on low income households), 
technical (feasibility of introduction of renewables into the energy mix), and environmental 
(ecological protection in relation to development of renewable energy sources and waste-to-
energy technology). Although the final decision of the consultation occurs behind closed doors, 
a multiplicity of concerns are expressed and hotly debated in the process. There is also evidence 
that these views are considered, such as in the repeal of planned expansion of supply of nuclear 
power (in response to safety concerns) and reconsideration of a waste-to-energy project (due to 
ecological impacts). This is surprising in comparison with the situation on the mainland. In 
China, the key arguments that are seriously considered are primarily economic and technical. 
Explanations for this tendency are discussed in the last section of this chapter.  
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8.5 Techno-economic rationalities as a principle of policy participation 
This chapter centres on the question of who influences and participates in formulation of 
environmental policy in China. This question ultimately concerns which groups and actors are 
seen as appropriate or legitimate in intervention in environmental issues. This chapter suggests 
that alongside traditional forms of management of environmental policy (environmental 
government), two groups of actors influence environmental policy. That includes groups with 
an important role in (local) political economies and groups representing expert knowledge.  
To explain this tendency, it is necessary to step back and consider principles of inclusion and 
legitimacy of Chinese politics. During the years of communism under Mao’s leadership, 
recruitment to and mobility within the political system was based on class background, political 
ideology, and seniority within the party (Zang, 1999). A turning point in communist politics 
occurred with Deng Xiaoping’s reformist agenda at the end of the 1970s. Deng Xiaoping 
introduced the concept of modernization, thereby placing technology at the centre of the 
political agenda and of political leadership (Cheng and White, 1990; Zang 1999; Ouyang, 
2003). Deng Xiaoping’s modernization campaign in the 1980s is associated with promotion of 
a generation of leaders identified as “technocrats”. This involved appointment of scientists and 
engineers to party positions, along with a rapid increase of university graduates among China’s 
political ranks, and establishment of influential think tanks connected to the political apparatus 
(Cheng and White, 1990; Zang, 1999; Ouyang, 2003). Zhu (p.284, 2012) describes the nature 
of these experts as “politically engaged intellectuals” (in communist politics), making a 
distinction between this group and the “social intellectuals” who were not welcome in public 
policy making circles. The advice of the former is assumed to be neutral and offered in the 
name of public (rather than personal) interests (Ibid).  
According to Cheng and White (1990) China’s long history of officialdom based on scholarship 
facilitated the turnaround in the 1980s. They describe China’s traditional bureaucracy as a 
“meritocratic” political system, in which examinations and educational was the basis for 
inclusion into civil service. Elitist ideologies underpinned this system, such as Menicus’ 
proposition that those who labour with their minds “rule” and those who labour with their body 
are “ruled” (Ibid, p.17).  
The concept of technocracy originally emerged in the literature on Chinese politics as a way to 
describe the nature of China’s political apparatus (Cheng & White, 1999).27 However, the 
concept also represents as an ideology used to legitimize political leadership. Zang (p.112, 
1999) observes that China’s technocratic leadership is able to “co-opt intellectuals and 
professionals into the power circle”. This refers to inclusion of intellectuals into the party, but 
also applies to powerful think tanks, working groups and parastatal committees. By drawing on 
the ideology of technocracy, China’s political leadership manages dissent and creates mutual 
support between intellectuals and party officials. The leadership also uses the ideology to 
manage and resolve ideological conflict between sociology and capitalism and to legitimize 
leadership in the face of declining faith in communist principles (Cheng & White, 1999). As an 
ideology, technocracy therefore explains more than recruitment and mobility within China’s 
political apparatus. It also extends to actors and units tied to the bureaucracy, such as groups 
and actors involved in policy making processes.  
Ouyang captures this argument by defining technocracy as “governance of society by a group 
of experts who attempt to develop social policy based on technological principles and promises 
an efficiency approach to the solution of social problems” (p.177, 2003). Ouyang argues that 
Deng Xiaoping placed technological development as a prerequisite for economic development, 
making it a political goal in itself. These principles transformed China into a technological 
society in which “managerial effectiveness and economic utility become the ultimate moral 
                                                 
27 In contemporary Chinese politics, they define a technocrat as an individual that is specialized by training, has a 
professional background, who contributes to politics through his or her expertise (Cheng & White, p.19, 1990). 
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values” (Ibid, p.178). Within this society, engineers, managers and professionals have a self-
defined legitimacy to govern. As a result, experts shape political decisions, even when they are 
not themselves decision makers. Ouyang (p.187, 2003) concludes that due to effective 
popularization of technocracy as an ideal, the only responsibility of Chia’s ruling elites 
(officials, bureaucrats and SOEs) is to maximize economic gain and managerial effectiveness, 
leaving morality to operate in a vacuum: 
Clearly, if Deng’s technocratic model of reform made China an economic giant, it also may be a 
Faustian bargain, with the attendant crisis of emptiness of values for the well-off and the crisis of 
resentment, injustice, and poverty for those marginalized by the policies of the state. The emptiness 
of values of the wealthy can be in large part attributed to the fact that the one value that can be 
pointed to is the Greatness of the State. And yet the greatness of the State amounts to nothing more 
than promotion of technological and economic power (Ouyang, p.188, 2003) 
This thesis suggests that the way in which authority over environmental policy is constituted in 
China matches underlying principles of the ideology of technocracy. The empirical evidence of 
the thesis illustrates that while non-state actors are intervening in formulation of environmental 
policy in China, this does refer to any or all groups. Rather, as China’s leadership have based 
development goals on principles of economic expansion and technological progress since the 
1980s, these principles structure intervention and participation in current environmental 
agendas. This means that arguments based on economic growth have a strong resonance within 
the political system. Further, actors representing technical expertise are considered authorities 
on public issues. This thesis proposes that the concept of techno-economic rationalities explains 
trends in participation in China’s environmental policy. Techno-economic rationalities is a 
broader concept than technocracy. Technocratic principles explain who is included in a political 
apparatus and how policy directions are legitimized by individuals operating in the political 
bureaucracy. By contrast, techno-economic rationalities explain broader notions of political 
agency and authority that extends beyond the state. The concept also identifies what actors are 
seen as appropriate collaboration partners, what actors are excluded from political processes, 
what projects are seen as legitimate, and what operations and practices are understood as 
normal.   
For example, techno-economic rationalities explain why NGOs act as technical advisors in 
order to access political processes related to environmental concerns. Examples provided in this 
chapter demonstrate how green organizations frame their activities as research-based and 
scientific in order to gain influence. This throws further light on results from previous research 
on how activities of NGOs affect policy processes in China. Schroeder’s (2008, p.522) 
conclusion regarding the way in which NGOs introduce policy elements is stated as follows: 
“the conveyers of the message, the ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in constructivist terms, do not seem to 
have been the transnational advocacy network of like-minded NGOs, but rather scientists that 
shared information with policy-makers”. Schroeder attributes this tendency to the scientific 
nature of the climate change agenda. Further explanation is provided by considering that NGOs 
are not seen as legitimate policy advisors unless guised in robes of science and technology.  
Moreover, techno-economic rationalities explain why foreign organizations are seen as 
appropriate cooperation partners in environmental policy when they represent technical 
knowledge. Examples provided in this chapter relates to how Chinese authorities seek to tackle 
soil pollution. This involves multi-partner dialogues and an active search for tested technical 
tools, such as risk assessment systems and remediation technologies. The concept also explains 
the greater variety of interests addressed in energy policy processes in Hong Kong, which is a 
city with a different political history embedded in a different ideological context. In policy 
processes in this setting, a much broader spectrum of issues surface in the formulation of energy 
agendas. Finally, it matches the observation that public opinion is marginal in environmental 
policy processes in China. Due to their lack of access to significant economic resources or any 
special technical skills, citizens are seen as the subjects of rule rather than rulers.  
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9 Conclusions 
 
China does not escape the power of vested interests in the political economy of carbon and its solid 
coalitions of firms, employees and governments (Balme, p.51, 2011) 
 
The quote above refers to the way in which issues related to power and entrenched political and 
economic interests cause difficulty in implementing low carbon development targets in China. 
The citation also illustrates the impossibility of escaping particularistic interests and political 
choices when constructing paths to a sustainable future and deciding what this future should 
look like (Meadowcroft, 2011). This thesis investigates these political priorities by considering 
which groups and interests are represented in urban policy making, how their priorities conflict, 
and which interests prevail in decision making processes. This focus reveals that political and 
economic interests play a central role in shaping environmental decisions in cities, and that 
these interests are negotiated in informal governance networks. 
Informal governance networks, made up of companies, research institutes and think tanks, 
international NGOs, and foreign authorities, are sites where local environmental policy is 
negotiated and formulated. These networks are also sites of technology development, design 
of emission reduction plans and instruments, and implementation of demonstration projects 
related to low carbon development. The first section of this chapter (9.1) discusses the nature 
and characteristics of these networks by presenting answers to the research questions of this 
thesis.  
Although sustainability policy is shaped through network interactions, participation in these 
networks is not open for all actors. Rather, inclusion is structured by what this thesis refers to 
as techno-economic rationalities. Section 9.2 reflects on how concepts such as partnerships and 
collaborative environmental governance can be interpreted in this political context and in the 
light of techno-economic policy practices. This discussion points to the difficulty of applying 
concepts developed in liberalized democracies in (semi-)authoritarian political systems based 
on entirely different ideologies. Section 9.2 also presents a discussion on how to interpret 
vertical and horizontal diffusion of state authority that result from emerging network 
interactions. Empowerment of municipal authorities is discussed in relation to Brenner’s 
(2004) interpretation of urban entrepreneurialism as a form of reconfiguration of state power. 
Horizontal diffusion of authority is explained through Allen and Cochrane’s (2007) 
conceptualization of relational expressions of state power.  
Techno-economic rationalities relate to broader debates on viewing sustainability as a quest 
produced through economic progress and technological advance, for example as portrayed in 
ecological modernization theory (Mol, 1997; Dryzek, 1997; Gibbs, 2000). This approach is 
criticized for ignoring how environmental issues are interconnected with social questions 
(Romero Lankao, 2007). The implications of these tendencies on China’s current energy policy 
are discussed in section 9.3. The section points out that current climate initiatives in China are 
limited in their exploration of new practices, habits, lifestyles, or any other social aspect of 
emission activities that need to be altered to set China on a path to a low carbon future. A 
question for further research is how social innovation can become part of climate policy 
experimentation in China. Another question for future research is further exploration of the 
legitimacy basis of sustainability policy and practices in China. Legitimacy and accountability 
aspects have been amply analyzed in studies of network governance in the global North, but a 
completely different theoretical toolbox is required to understand these aspects in China’s non-
democratic political system.  
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9.1 Answers to the research questions 
This section returns to the research question of this thesis: How have municipal authorities and 
non-state actors participated in climate mitigation action in cities in China during the period of 
the 10th to 12th FYPs? The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that China is no exception 
from the global shift from government to governance in environmental politics. Local 
formulation and delivery of climate mitigation policy in China relies on interactions between 
public and non-state actors, while cross-sector, cross-jurisdictional and cross-border linkages 
are employed to access information, skills, technology, and economic resources.  
Further, this thesis demonstrates that China has a particular style of climate change governance. 
Previous research on China’s political system has already demonstrated that complex 
interactions emerge within this fragmented authoritarian system (Lieberthal, 1992; Dumbaugh 
and Martin; 2011). Studies of local policy interactions have illustrated that the top-down, 
hierarchical structures of China’s central government remain, while semi-independent groups 
and organizations create vertical and horizontal links embedded in this superstructure (Mai & 
Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). The literature on environmental governance in China describes a 
transition towards new styles of governing, expressed through increasing autonomy of local 
officials and non-state actors in addressing environmental issues (Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 
2009). This thesis tracks, specifically, how some non-state actors are incorporated in networks 
of environmental governance, and which activities (such as policy making, technology 
development, and information dissemination) are carried out through cross-sector 
collaboration.  
9.1.1 RSQ1: Non-state actor participation in local policy and planning 
The first sub-question is how have non-state actors participated in environmental planning 
processes in Rizhao during the 10th and 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? Local authorities, companies, 
external planning experts, and to some extend local academics interact in Rizhao’s 
environmental planning processes through rounds of consultation and meetings involving 
negotiation. Through both consultation and meetings, these actors are able to express their 
views and in some cases influence planning outcomes.  
Both Chapters 5 and 8 confirm previous studies on local decision making processes in China, 
showing that deliberation and consultations are an integral part of urban planning processes 
(He, 2006; Mol, 2009; He & Warren, 2011; Zhou, 2012). The results also build on Mai and 
Francesch-Huidobro’s (2015) research on municipal collaborative networks, which illustrates 
that vertical and horizontal connections both within and without government structures shape 
local climate policy. The evidence in Chapter 5 confirms that when drafting urban plans and 
policy, local authorities create connections across government levels and sectors. For example, 
they develop relationships with higher level government organizations or research institutes to 
access information and expertise. This also involves extensive horizontal interaction with local 
authorities and economic stakeholders to assess planning options and consolidate different 
viewpoints.  
The case of Rizhao in Chapter 5 shows that the involvement of stakeholders in urban planning 
is associated with economic development interests and the structure of the political economy. 
Actors participate in planning processes on an uneven basis of power, and planning processes 
are characterized by multiple lines of conflict. For example, in Rizhao, tourism development 
agendas clash with industrial development strategies, as air and water pollution ruin the 
waterfront. Similarly, concern with protection of ecologically sensitive areas conflict with land 
development interests. In these conflicts of interest, economic stakeholders, primarily industrial 
units and land developers, have a strong ability to pursue their priorities. Moreover, their 
interests tend to be aligned with those of the top leadership. The dependence of political leaders 
on economic stakeholders to generate economic growth, and of economic interests on the 
leadership for political support, creates interdependence between local elites and a tendency to 
form coalitions.  
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The literature on policy networks asserts that existing distributions of power and priorities of 
local elites shape planning interactions, particularly when there is a lack of formal principles 
for inclusion and decision making (Aars & Fimreite, 2005; Sorensen, 2006; Khan, 2013). The 
structure of the political economy also shapes policy processes, as economic stakeholders tend 
to have significant leverage over political decision makers (Levy & Newell, 2005; Newell, 
2008). The case study in Rizhao confirms these insights within the context of environmental 
governance in China. Planning decisions in Rizhao systematically favour conversion of land 
into real estate developments or industrial zones. These decisions downplay priorities of 
authorities responsible for environmental protection, tourism, forestry or agriculture, who 
favour ecological protection or development of land for other purposes. Priorities of 
populations residing close to polluting factories or waste-to-energy plants are similarly 
overlooked. Although the viewpoints of these actors are raised in consultation processes, they 
are overruled by decisions of the Mayor’s Office, which are in line with economic development 
concerns. Studies of state-group relations have since long recognized that policy decisions 
dominated by economic and political elites are unlikely to generate radical change (Richardson 
& Jordan, 1983; Rhodes & Marsh, 1992). In Rizhao, stakeholder co-optation of the planning 
process means that any opportunity to explore alternative development paths are curtailed. 
There is a risk of cementation of status quo, which in this case implies reproducing the factors 
that create high carbon paths of growth (Khan, 2013).  
Thus, a contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that while urban planning meetings 
ostensibly have the purpose of resolving conflicts in order to reach consensus, interactions are 
dominated by political and economic elites representing common development interests. Rather 
than to resolve planning conflicts, municipal authorities use planning meetings to legitimate 
and cement mutually beneficial policy options. This confirms the inherent danger of elite 
management of deliberative processes (as noted by He (2006)), which magnifies the voice of 
powerful actors while permanently excluding marginalized interests. The results of this thesis 
thus point in a considerably less optimistic direction than previous research on the micro-level, 
deliberative interactions seen to emerge in urban decision making contexts (Leib & He, 2006). 
Rather than contributing to democratising practices (He & Warren, 2011), the empirical results 
of this thesis shows that political-economic elites use planning interactions to strengthen their 
dominant position and block alternative agendas.  
Another insight related to participation of non-state actor in urban planning processes is that 
lack of capacity of municipal authorities creates dependence on expert advice. The case study 
and information from the member check interviews shows that planners and researchers from 
provincial and central institutes often participate in urban policy and have a relatively strong 
leverage over decision making. This confirms the findings of previous research on the role of 
professional groups as local policy advisors (Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015) and the 
possibility for parastatal research organizations to act as advocacy coalitions that promote 
certain environmental narratives (Francesch-Huidobro & Mai, 2012). The empirical evidence 
of the case study of Rizhao shows how inclusion of these actors in local decision making allows 
discourses to travel across government levels. External experts participating in urban planning 
processes can highlight otherwise marginalized environmental narratives based on long term 
sustainability and ecological protection. To some extent, this can act as a counterweight to local 
economic development interests. On the other hand, it enhances tendencies of technocratic rule, 
as is further discussed in section 9.2. 
9.1.2 RSQ2: Modes of urban climate governance 
The second sub-question is how have different modes of urban climate governance contributed 
to climate mitigation in cities in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? A mixture of 
governance modes is used by municipal authorities to address the climate change challenge in 
China. Alongside traditional administrative and regulative approaches, local government 
departments use strategies of low carbon public service provision and soft approaches such as 
training and information dissemination to support local emission reduction activities. Chapter 
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7 also provides evidence showing that climate partnerships are common, and that these are 
initiated by both public and non-state actors.  
Chapter 7 demonstrates that alongside implementation of energy conservation and emission 
reduction agendas set by the central government, municipal authorities in China address the 
climate change challenge by adopting local requirements, planning guidelines and emission 
reduction schemes. This includes construction policy, such as requirements to use solar heaters 
or vertical greening, zoning strategies based on emission reduction strategies, and 
comprehensive sector-based emission reduction plans (e.g. for industry and transport). The case 
study in Chapter 6 demonstrates the effectiveness of regulation in supporting the adoption of 
renewable energy technology. The member check interviews presented in Chapter 8 similarly 
point to stricter emission reduction standards adopted by local governments playing a key role 
in emission control activities in companies.  
At the same time, binding requirements and regulations are vulnerable to implementation flaws. 
Previous research on environmental protection in China shows that enforcement of 
environmental regulation is weak (Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Lo & Leung, 2000; Wang, 2010; Liu 
et al, 2012; Kostka, 2014; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015). The case study of Rizhao 
presented in Chapter 6 demonstrates that active support of the Mayor’s office was essential to 
secure implementation of a local requirement to attach solar heaters to buildings. In the outskirts 
of the city were implementation was not prioritized, a much lower share of buildings were 
constructed with solar heaters.  
To a more limited extent, municipal authorities use provision of low carbon services as a 
climate governance strategy. An example from the case study is Rizhao Municipality’s 
provision of gas fueled and electric buses, which is promoted as a way to reduce energy 
consumption and air pollution. The comparative analysis in Chapter 7 suggests that companies 
play a central role in provision of large scale public infrastructure in Chinese cities, such as 
renewable energy plants (wind and solar), waste-to-energy projects and transport infrastructure. 
This can be explained in part by the conversion of public departments into firms. Similar 
examples can be found in countries in Europe (e.g. the UK, Sweden, Germany), where 
privatization leads to a lower degree of public influence over service and infrastructure 
provision (Wolmann, 2004; Monstadt, 2007). The comparative study presented in Chapter 7 of 
this thesis demonstrate that public actors in China often influence energy and emission profiles 
of waste, energy and transport infrastructure through adoption of plans and strategies (e.g. 
municipal low carbon transport plans), rather than through direct provision.  
Furthermore, the evidence in Chapters 6 and 7 shows that municipal authorities in China act as 
enablers of local climate action. The case study of Rizhao in Chapter 6 illustrates that in 
implementing energy saving targets in the industrial and construction sectors, public authorities 
emphasize the importance of information dissemination. This takes the form of energy 
management activities, demonstration projects, promotion of energy measuring and 
monitoring, benchmarking activities and improvement of energy evaluation and examination 
systems. In interviews, local officials proclaim that this type of activities help companies 
overcome knowledge barriers associated with adoption of green practices, while demonstrating 
cost savings related with going “green”. The comparative study presented in Chapter 7 also 
shows how municipal authorities arrange low carbon exhibitions, centres or museums 
promoting low carbon technologies and lifestyles and engage in environmental campaigns. 
These enabling strategies can be seen as complementary to “hard” tools, while covering a gap 
in the civil society space created through the weak representation of green NGOs in local 
environmental action in China.  
The key contribution related to this sub-question is to demonstrate the common use of 
partnerships in urban climate action, and the extent to which non-state actors are leading climate 
initiatives in China. Out of the climate initiatives selected for the comparative study of this 
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thesis, about half involved inter-organizational interaction.28 The selection of initiatives was 
chosen in cities considered to be leading in climate action in China, so the findings are not 
expected to be representative of all urban areas in the country. At the same time, there is 
evidence of a trend emerging in cities with an explicit climate agenda.  The implication is that 
public actors in cities that are aiming to actively respond to the climate mitigation challenge are 
likely to search for new strategies by drawing on resources and ideas offered by non-state actors 
and parastatal organizations. However, in forming collaborative arrangements, not all actors 
and groups are considered potential cooperation partners.  
The comparative study presented in Chapter 7 demonstrates that municipal authorities often 
form partnerships with firms or academia to facilitate technology or infrastructure delivery, 
access new ideas and planning designs, and create new funding arrangements. Municipal 
authorities also form partnerships with foreign entities in the formulation of local emission 
reduction strategies. Companies often lead large scale infrastructure projects and low carbon 
demonstration projects in the form of low emission buildings, eco-city projects, and industrial 
eco-technology/recycling economy centres. In these projects, firms form partnerships with 
foreign and domestic companies, and research and design institutes to access information, 
skills, and technology. These linkages allow parastatal think tanks, research institutes and 
universities to play an important role in designing local projects. Cross-sector, cross-border 
linkages thereby create transfers of knowledge, funding and technical capacity that facilitate 
local climate action. 
This observation confirms that in China, different actors join and are active members of   
transnational networks that govern environmental governance. The study of transnational 
networks is well documented at the global level (Andonova et al, 2009; Bulkeley & Betsill, 
2010; Bulkeley et al; 2012). The empirical material in the thesis emphasises that transnational 
dynamics are present in China, not only through city participation in municipal led networks, 
but also through formation of connections between local authorities and international NGOs 
and bilateral partners.  
The contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that mobilization of knowledge through cross-
sector, cross-border linkages are an integral part of technology and policy development in 
China. As long as an organization is seen as able to provide technological skill and expertise, 
Chinese authorities see this actor as an appropriate collaboration partner. As national and local 
authorities seek to address environmental issues, myriads of relations are created through which 
information is shared. These activities are the collective expression of active problem solving 
within the bounds of the rationalities of China’s political system.  
9.1.3 RSQ3: Climate governance through partnerships 
The third sub-question is how have partnerships contributed to introduction of climate policy 
and technology on an urban level in China during the 10th to 12th FYPs (2001-2015)? 
Partnerships, in particular with foreign actors and academic institutes, contribute to introduction 
of new climate technology and policy in cities in China. New technology is introduced through 
technology transfers as well as through research partnerships. The two key mechanisms through 
which policy practices are introduced are demonstration projects, followed by market based 
diffusion, and collaborative problem solving followed by pragmatic selection and absorption 
of policy elements.  
The analysis of the comparative study presented in Chapter 7 demonstrates that partnerships 
are common in development of emission reduction and renewable energy technologies in 
China. Or, turning this statement around, development of technology is a common reason for 
actors to form partnerships. The analysis of the comparative sample in Chapter 7 suggests that 
partnerships with foreign or international organizations play an especially important role in 
introducing energy saving and emission reduction technology on a local level. This is realized 
                                                 
28 This includes firm-firm interactions and public-public interactions that according to the definition of this thesis 
(Huijistee et al, 2007) are not considered partnerships.  
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both through technology transfers and research projects. Research partnerships in China exist 
in two key forms: joint research projects and joint innovation platforms. The most common 
constellation is partnerships between private and academic actors, and private or academic 
actors with foreign organizations. It is also common for private and academic actors to be 
involved in technology development projects with multiple actors, including foreign institutes.  
Empirical evidence from the member check interviews presented in Chapter 7 shows that 
technology development in China occurs in relatively close-knit networks involving domestic 
research institutes, firms, universities and foreign partners. The increasing concentration and 
sophistication of knowledge in these networks allows domestic R&D to become increasingly 
important, relative to technology transfers. This is consistent with China’s shift from renewable 
energy importer to renewable energy exporter (Caprotti, 2008). It is also consistent with the 
suggestion that sustainability innovation is becoming advanced to the extent that a key purpose 
no longer is to simply catch up with European or North American firms (Berkhout et al, 2010). 
This suggests that China is interconnected with global flows of knowledge, but also that China 
is actively aiming to concentrate these flows around local concerns.   
Finally, the results of the comparative study presented in Chapter 7 suggest that partnerships 
are important in the introduction of new policy and planning practices on a local level in China. 
This is consistent with the research of Bauer and Steurer (2014) who argue that climate 
partnerships contribute to policy diffusion. Chapter 7 demonstrates that policy development 
most commonly occurs in partnerships between local authorities with foreign partners of 
academia. The mechanisms through which this is realized is through joint demonstration 
projects, as well as through joint problem solving processes that seek new solutions to urban 
issues, such as improved transport planning or emission control in the industrial sector.  
Through the first of these mechanisms, policy and planning practices are introduced through 
large-scale projects, such as eco-cities or low carbon districts, which involve an ambition to 
show-case new solutions. Leading companies and research organizations are frequently invited 
to provide high-tech applications, novel designs and new planning strategies in these projects. 
Information from the member check interviews discussed in Chapter 7 suggests that companies 
(real estate developers, consultancy firms or utilities) absorb successful designs, and that these 
may be multiplied in other projects. This occurs to the extent that the companies gain advantage 
from a green profile. However, a limitation of this mechanism is that companies rarely replicate 
complex system solutions. Further, technical solutions are more likely to spread than policy 
and planning practices.   
Through the second mechanism, municipalities form partnerships with other actors in their 
pursuit for low carbon development solutions. Through dialogue, meetings and workshops, 
urban development challenges are debated and best practice examples are studied. Chapter 7 
provides several examples to illustrate this tendency, showing for example how the cities of 
Wuxi and Kunming used such strategies to improve low carbon transport planning and 
industrial emission reduction plans. These observations confirm Schroder’s (2008) observation 
that participation of Chinese organizations in transnational networks contributes to 
internalization of international climate policy elements.  
The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 7 and 8 illustrate that this type of policy transfer 
is created not only by participation in transnational networks, but through a greater diversity of 
interactions. Municipalities form partnerships with domestic or foreign academic institutes to 
seek strategic planning advice, for example in designing emission zoning strategies. An 
example is Guangzhou E-core (a planning approach based on ecological networks), which was 
drafted by Tongji University in Shanghai in collaboration with Guangzhou Urban Planning 
Bureau. These linkages are can be understood in terms of Mai and Francesch-Huidobro’s 
(2015) collaborative municipal networks, where local authorities mobilize knowledge and 
expertise through vertical and horizontal connections. Other types of interactions include 
partnerships with bilateral partners, through which elements of environmental policy are 
absorbed. These take the form of traditional development assistance projects, such as 
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collaboration between the German development agency GIZ and Beijing Municipality in the 
development of transport demand management (TDM) tools. It also takes the form of 
international dialogues and forums initiated by Chinese authorities to collect information about 
foreign policy strategies, such as national and local level collaboration in development of 
China’s soil pollution standards described in Chapter 8.  
The contribution of this thesis is to demonstrate that partnerships, as a governance mode, is 
associated with pursuit of material and policy innovation. Climate initiatives led by a single 
actor (usually a local authority or a company) tend to be characterized by top-down control or 
large infrastructure investment. These interventions reproduce well-known responses to climate 
change on a local level in China. By contrast, initiatives managed through partnerships exhibit 
a greater variety of strategies and instruments, and more often an explicit focus on introducing 
novel solutions. The emergence of projects led through collaborative arrangements in China 
thus appear to open up for greater possibilities to experiment with new policy and planning 
approaches. This experimentation plays a particularly important role in China’s top-down 
political system, which as a whole is less able to generate pluralistic policy processes. 
 
9.2 State authority beyond top-down steering   
The empirical evidence in this thesis shows that actors other than the central government 
intervene in environmental policy in China. However, increased participation by no means 
suggests equal opportunity for any group or actor to engage in climate change issues. Trends 
revealed through the research of this thesis calls for further attention to constellations of 
collaboration and trends of bias in access and participation (Andonova & Levy, 2003; Benner 
et al, 2004; Pattberg & Stripple, 2008; Forsyth, 2010). This section discusses how governance 
arrangements such as partnerships replicate existing power structures, rather than open up for 
broader societal participation. Non-state actor participation is also discussed from perspectives 
of reconfiguration or diffusion of state authority.  
9.2.1 Partnerships: Vehicles for societal deliberation or techno-economic empowerment? 
The scholarship on public policy has long observed how, in practice, policy makers contribute 
to the reproduction of hegemonic practices that are understood to represent normality. In his 
seminal essay on “muddling through”, Lindblom (1959) explains that bureaucrats choose policy 
instruments and strategies that appear “normal” and appropriate according to their set routines 
rather than making rational, calculated choices. In China, local bureaucrats and decision makers 
that are confronted with the policy issue of climate change cannot choose freely between all 
theoretically conceivable ways to address this new challenge. Political structures and processes 
are deeply rooted in the ideologies and institutions of China’s political system. 
A key finding of this thesis is that techno-economic rationalities guide the perception of which 
actors are normal, appropriate, and legitimate participants in China’s climate change agendas. 
This argument builds on the concept of technocracy as it has already been applied in describing 
China’s political system (Cheng and White, 1990; Zang 1999; Ouyang, 2003). It also draws 
inspirations from Zhu’s (2012) description of the role of “neutral” experts in policy processes. 
Overall, this illustrates that principles of economic growth and technological progress are 
deeply ingrained in China’s political development visions. These ideals guide recruitment and 
mobility of politicians and bureaucrats, which lends environmental policy a rational-managerial 
and technical character. Ouyang (p.177, 2003) broadened the debate on technocracy in China 
by defining the concept of technocracy as societal rule by “groups of experts”, indicating that 
the principles extend beyond the political apparatus. By introducing the concept of techno-
economic rationalities the focus is further expanded, as this explains a broader logic that shapes 
governance modes and instruments.  
Techno-economic rationalities produce multiple effects on climate policy in China. One is that 
local government authorities favor projects with a focus on advanced technologies or financial 
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investments over potential alternatives. Further, groups or actors representing either economic 
resources or technical skills are included in formulation and delivery of climate projects. The 
concept also identifies what actors are seen as appropriate collaboration partners, what actors 
are excluded from political processes, and what policy operations and practices are understood 
as normal.  
Epistemic authority (Haas, 2017) has a particular strong traction in this particular context. Cross 
(2016) observes multiple circumstances in which expert authority is likely to be particularly 
persuasive, which includes political contexts of uncertainty and limited knowledge. Uncertainty 
and limited knowledge characterizes the climate policy domain in general, but in particular with 
regards to local government authorities with inherently limited capacity and knowledge about 
this issue. Further, experts need to have direct access to decision makers. This is clearly the 
case in urban policy processes in China, where experts in fact often are delegated responsibility 
for drafting environmental policy and planning documents. Moreover, Cross (2016) suggests 
that experts should be involved in technical decision making, rather than in shaping political 
beliefs, in order to be seen as legitimate and authoritative. In China, where energy policy is 
predefined as an issue of technical development, experts are posed as self-evident authorities. 
Finally, experts are more likely to be authoritative on policy issues involving natural systems, 
which is the case in sustainability issues as they pertain to the natural environment. All of these 
specific characteristics reinforce the positions of technical experts and professionals in climate 
policy processes on an urban level in China.  
These insights explain trends that emerged in previous chapters of the thesis. The comparative 
study of Chapter 7 and the member check interviews presented in Chapter 8 demonstrate that 
not all types of actors are included in climate governance networks. Notably, there is a complete 
absence of local green NGOs, communities or other social movements. All the civil society 
organizations represented in the sample are either research organizations, think tanks or NGOs 
with a predominantly technical character. As a result, channels of influence over local policy 
and programs reach companies, such as environmental technology firms, high-tech developers, 
and consultancy firms working with environmental planning and design. The networks also 
incorporate civil society organizations of a technical character, such as research organizations, 
planning institutes, and international organizations with a claim to expertize, such as the Asian 
Development Bank. However, diffusion of authority is contained within the circle of actors that 
possess these capacities.  
This conclusion has broader implications for the way in which partnerships as a specific 
governance mode are understood from a normative perspective. While notions of collaborative 
environmental governance can be associated with normatively positive outcomes in terms of 
enhanced participation and democratic performance (e.g. Glasbergen, 2007), this is not 
necessarily the case in a (semi-)authoritarian political system. The empirical material presented 
in this thesis demonstrates that authority, in the form of influence over sustainability plans and 
policy processes (through design, technical advice, direct rule setting), is transferred from 
municipal authorities, such as planning departments, to non-state expert organizations, such as 
parastatal research organizations, foreign institutes, and firms. While a larger number of actors 
are involved in formulating and delivering sustainability plans and projects, this does not 
necessarily imply a diversification in the type of actor or social group, greater equity, or higher 
degree of representation in participation.  
These observations caution against assuming that China’s transitions towards a modern 
environmental state will necessarily create institutions that are more similar to those in the 
“West” (Mol & Carter, 2006; Carter & Mol, 2013). The emergence of partnership constellations 
in this context follows a particular logic and is a response to perceived development challenges 
that are intimately related with China’s political and economic context. As a result, climate 
partnerships produced in this political system to a large extent focus on linking local activities 
to the global economy, or to access technology and information that is understood to represent 
cutting-edge solutions. Although there is some evidence that collaborative arrangements allow 
for new ideas, there is scant evidence of increased societal deliberation or representation 
178 
 
resulting. Diversification of actors, therefore, cannot be equated with a process of 
democratization of environmental governance in China.  
Further reflections of the role of techno-economic rationalities in climate politics in China 
pertain to the nature of environmental discourses. The insertion of techno-economic agendas 
into the core of sustainability principles is a broader problem, linked to narrow 
conceptualizations of technological progress, which cause ethical concerns to be obscured or 
erased (Davison, 2010). The socio-political meaning of sustainability can thereby be reinvented 
as a quest for technological and economic advance, which is a concern that has permeated 
sustainability debates since their inception (Lélé, 1991). A review of international 
environmental policy documents, for example, reveals that one of the key changes in policy 
framing since the 1970s is a shift from a political to a technocratic focus, through which 
environmental challenges have been depoliticized (Gomez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). There 
are important implications linked to the dominance of technocratic discourses and ideals in low 
carbon policy in China. One is the ease with which social considerations can be continuously 
framed as subversive and unnecessary elements in climate mitigation initiatives. This restricts 
possibilities to experiment with social innovation in projects at a local level. As a result, limited 
emphasis is placed on low carbon policy and planning approaches that aim to develop new 
processes for participation, new ways of doing things, new routines, or lifestyles. This is 
consistent with previous research that criticizes the definition of “eco” and sustainability in 
China for one-sided promotion of GDP generation and use of sophisticated technologies for the 
benefit of local governments, high-end developers, and high-tech corporations (Caprotti, 2014).  
Environmental discourses are reproduced in policy documents by authorities on all political 
levels in China. Furthermore, official language and formal development goals play a strong role 
in politics by being constantly reiterated by public figures of all capacities and in all kinds of 
situations (although this does not necessarily mean that goals are implemented), by political 
figures such as party representatives, by newspapers, on television, and on banners on public 
infrastructure. As a result, dominant political discourses gain a strong salience. Public figures 
reciting policy aims may not always believe in their fundamental logic, but nevertheless, 
dominant ideas and priorities become ingrained in politics on all levels. Arguably, this allows 
for techno-economic discourses to become more self-evident than might be the case in more 
pluralistic sociocultural environments. Opportunities to question problem assumptions or 
priorities become completely marginalized, while continuous reproduction strengthens 
dominant ideologies and narratives.  
The way in which dominating techno-economic ideologies and practices shape inclusion and 
exclusion into climate mitigation policy in China is of broader theoretical relevance. While 
China’s historical and political background explains the particularly strong resonance of 
techno-economic rationalities in this context, ideologies and political practices are likely to 
similarly empower or exclude certain groups in emerging climate mitigation politics in other 
jurisdictions and locations. Understanding how policy practices are embedded in beliefs, 
ideologies and firmly established “ways of doing things” constitutes a strategy to reveal patterns 
through which agency is produced in local climate change politics. 
9.2.2 Reconfiguration and reconceptualizations of state authority  
This thesis suggests that through formation of governance networks, authority may be 
transferred vertically and horizontally from the state to municipal authorities and non-public 
actors. Below, these processes are discussed from the theoretical perspectives of urban 
entrepreneurialism and relational conceptualizations of state power.  
Reconfiguration of state authority through urban entrepreneurialism 
How is state authority transferred to urban governments as local authorities they take on a more 
visible role in urban governance? This question can be answered by referring to Brenner’s 
(2004) interpretation of state power reconfiguration through specific processes of urban 
governance. Brenner has mapped out transformations of urban governance and state spatiality 
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in Europe over four decades. This effort resulted in a system of categorization based on three 
distinct phases of urban governance: spatial Keynesianism, the crisis of Fordism, and urban 
entrepreneurialism. During the phase of urban entrepreneurialism, which unfolded since the 
1980s, urban governance has been shaped by neo-liberalist policies and pressures, demands on 
economic performance, and competition. Alongside weakening of former economic nodes of 
manufacturing and industrial activity, new economic centres based on financial activities and 
trade have emerged, followed by a deepening inequality between high-income urban cores and 
depressed peripheries. In response to this development, national governments have begun to 
perceive urban centres as drivers of national economies and dynamic growth engines. 
Attracting investment and encouraging property development became fixed as key urban policy 
agendas, replacing former programs of regional redistributive policies. 
Brenner (2004) understands the entrenchment of urban entrepreneurialism as a major 
reconfiguration of the way in which state authority regulates social relations across space. He 
points to the “splintering” of state regulatory activities on behalf of “glocalization” strategies – 
a trend that involves at least two mechanisms. The first is a rise in local capacity to introduce 
economic regulation and responsibilities for socio-economic development to improve the 
competitiveness of the urban economy. The second is concentration of socioeconomic assets in 
globally competitive urban regions and industrial districts, captured by the concept of 
“Glocalizing Competition State Regimes (GCSRs)”. Rather than attempting to create equal 
development opportunities across space, these new urban agendas encourage concentration of 
populations and economic enterprises in cities. Brenner (2004, p.481) describes this process as 
a form of institutionalization of competitive relations and reformulation of state power as local 
accumulation strategies:   
Within this rescaled configuration of state spatiality, national governments have not simply 
downscaled or upscaled regulatory power, but have attempted to institutionalize competitive 
relations between major subnational administrative units as a means to position local and 
regional economies strategically within supranational (European and global) circuits of capital. 
In this sense, even in the midst of the wide-ranging rescaling processes that have unsettled 
traditional, nationally focused regulatory arrangements and institutional forms, national states 
have attempted to retain control over major subnational political-economic spaces by integrating 
them within operationally rescaled, but still nationally coordinated, accumulation strategies.  
This thesis indicates that a similar development has unfolded (and continues to unfold) in 
Chinese cities. While financial regulation and other legislative domains remain under control 
of central agencies, local authorities are granted increasing responsibilities and opportunities to 
create conditions for economic growth. From this perspective, reconfiguration of state power 
is expressed as increasing local room for manoeuvre to shape economic development strategies 
and devise plans to attract investment. While municipal authorities are also held responsible for 
other aspects of their performance (such as infrastructure provision or environmental 
protection), ability to generate economic expansion remains the most important indicator of 
success for local political leaders in China.  
The analyses of environmental policy agendas presented by this thesis reveal patterns that 
match Benner’s (Ibid) observations of urban entrepreneurialism. Efforts to construct growth-
oriented low carbon solutions dominate examples of climate agendas presented both in the case 
study and comparative study of this thesis. Sustainability policy is associated with emergence 
of new institutions, such as enterprise zones and urban development corporations, geared 
towards improving the economic competitiveness of the urban region. Local authorities direct 
significant time and resources towards development of high-technology, high-growth, high-
investment clusters, in the form of eco-city or low carbon demonstration projects, clean-tech 
industrial development zones, or clean energy technology innovation platforms. Climate 
protection agendas are components of broader strategies to create domestically or 
internationally competitive urban areas. Establishment of sustainability projects and 
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partnerships becomes a key strategy for local authorities to access global flows of information, 
technology, and financial resources. Reconfiguration of state authority, from this perspective, 
takes the form of a national mandate for municipal authorities to pursue growth- and investment 
enhancing activities and contribute to local accumulation of wealth and capital.  
Brenner (Ibid) argues than urban entrepreneurialism is associated with major challenges in 
terms of the ability of national governments and cities to simultaneously pursue objectives of 
equality and social justice. As urban governance processes become increasingly focused on 
building connections with the global economy and attracting competitive capital, other agendas 
may become permanently under-prioritized. Ironically, the central government’s concern to 
create cities built on harmony and social stability may become side-lined by city-branding, 
investment-attracting agendas that instead accentuate the divide between high-income urban 
centres and rural hinterlands. Such a tendency is already visible in China’s increasingly 
splintered social landscape. 
Reconceptualizing state authority as a relational property 
The question of how state authority is diffused through vertical linkages to non-public actors 
can be explored by turning to theories of relational forms of power. This is a perspective that 
seeks to move beyond perceptions of authority as fixed to specific “levels” of government, as 
well as to geographical territories.   
In making this argument, Allen (2004) takes as point of departure the apparent contradiction of 
power at once being highly centralized (which is certainly the case in a semi-authoritarian state 
such as China), and at the same time present everywhere or even nowhere (along Foucauldian 
or Rosneau-inspired views of reinforcing rule systems on all levels). At the centre of Allen’s 
argument is a fundamental criticism of the traditional view of state power as a constant resource 
or property that central institutions can non-problematically extend in a top-down fashion. This 
perception is extended through theories of multi-level governance, where top-down command 
is simply interchanged by influence extended across government levels and sectors (power is 
still tied to hierarchical “levels” where actors higher up on the ladder are associated with 
stronger power resources). Attention to relational, or associational, properties of power helps 
to escape this binary conflict and reveal a more nuanced understanding of state power is 
expressed and employed by different actors. 
A relational interpretation of state power recognizes that governance is realized through fluid, 
political arrangements that stretch across regional boundaries (Allen & Cochrane, 2007). Allan 
and Cochrane (Ibid) propose that the concept of complex “assemblages of power” represents 
how such political arrangements operate. These arrangements are populated by sets of semi-
elite actors which normally are interpreted as “multi-level” governance that intervene in policy 
issues on different political levels. Cochrane and Allen suggest that these arrangements are 
made up of fragmented collections of institutions and agencies that are connected through series 
of networked relationships and involvement in formal and informal forums (Ibid, p.1165). The 
key difference between conceptualizations that focus on government levels is that actors are 
not necessarily clustered around traditional, hierarchical elites. These actors are professional 
and business elites, such as non-profit and private consultant organizations involved in 
delivering politics to public agencies. While their agendas may cluster around interests that are 
discursively associated with “regional” issues, they also pursue individualistic interests, 
through persuasive or manipulative means. In these assemblages, actors compete over 
resources, legitimacy, interests, agendas, and political framing.  
In these political arrangements, power is accessed and expressed in multiple ways, rarely in a 
direct fashion and often through tangled sets of relations. On the one hand, national government 
actors can manipulate these arrangements by using them to mobilize pre-defined national 
agendas through “local” organizations. On the other hand, heterogeneous sets of actors can 
introduce “shared agendas” that represent particularistic interests and potentially mask 
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significant conflicts of interest. Power assemblages can create significant opportunities for 
professional organizations to mediate decision making processes or to legitimize decisions of 
others. A key insight based on this conceptualization is that power is not a static resource that 
political actors on lower government levels can access in a straightforward fashion. Rather, it 
is specific practices and relations that allow actors to mobilize resurces and assets. Allen and 
Cochrane (2007, p.1171) observe that: 
Such capabilities [of state power], however, represent latent rather than actual qualities of power; 
they refer to the effective institutional resources and decision-making abilities that can be 
marshalled to great effect. Indeed, there is no question as to how effective and extensive such 
capabilities can be and have been over time; they encapsulate all that one understands by the 
term, state power. But such territorially embedded assets and resources are of less help when it 
is the actual practices of power that one wishes to understand, rather than the concentration of 
abilities that lie behind them. 
We witness in local politics in China such assemblages of power that cluster around politics of 
sustainability, climate protection, and climate action. In this context, construction of 
assemblages of power does not imply that the state is or becomes powerless. Rather, it implies 
that actors representing central government are often not exercising power over policy 
processes and projects in cities. In the formulation and delivery of climate plans and projects, 
heterogeneous sets of actors are drawn together in dynamic constellations – tight-knit or loose, 
durable or short-term alliances. These constellations encompass local authorities, as well as 
company representatives, foreign advisors, parastatal research organizations, universities, and 
design institutes.  
Through constantly renegotiated sets of relations in these constellations, actors use a variety of 
means to mobilize power. Some actors are able to broker consensus to allow particular courses 
of action to be pursued. Some actors are able to dictate designs or technical details of plans and 
sustainability projects. Some actors draw on political or economic resources to leverage 
decisions in a particular direction. In this setting, power is less about visibly taking control over 
decision making processes and government activities, but more about displacing central 
authority by creating new political relations. Which actors are included in local politics is 
defined by practices of governance instead of formal (geographical, administrative) principles 
of inclusion. Proximity between actors and degree of influentiality is better understood by 
considering the nature of interorganizational or interpersonal relationships rather than formal 
positons within the political hierarchy. This is an understanding that resonates with the socio-
political environment in China, heavily characterized by the importance of guanxi 
(relationships). 
A final remark on this topic is that if power resides in relations between actors in networks, and 
if public and non-state actors are constantly involved in processes that shape and formulate 
public policy, we are led back to the perennial question of how to define the elusive borders of 
the state (Mitchell, 1991). It may be necessary to revisit the question of how to draw the 
conceptual boundaries of the government machine in order to encompass the way in which non-
state actors exercise state authority through complex sets of relations. 
 
9.3 Future research 
While there is already a consolidated tradition of research in environmental governance in 
China (Mol & Carter, 2006; Mol, 2009; Liu et al, 2012; Carter & Mol, 2013; Zhang & Barr, 
2013; Mai & Francesch-Huidobro, 2015) this thesis makes a significant contribution by 
mapping the reasons behind the proliferation of actors active in environmental governance 
networks and their efforts to govern carbon emissions in Chinese cities. The thesis also raises 
a number of questions that require further research. A key question is the extent to which current 
Chinese climate policy strategies place China on a path to a low carbon transition. This is a 
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question which may emerge in other contexts as well. In China, however, there is a pressing 
concern associated with the context of rapid urbanization and industrial development, as well 
as the mere size of China’s emission reduction challenge.  
This thesis also raises more complicated questions related to the limitations of available 
methods and conceptual tools required to understand current trends. Specifically, there is a need 
for greater understanding of theoretical perspectives that merit exploration, including 
legitimacy issues of current climate policy arrangements in China, as well as how rationalities 
of climate governance can be explained using the concept of governmentality.  
9.3.1 Chinese cities and social innovation 
Much of the analysis of this thesis has dealt with the technical nature of low carbon policy in 
China. The discourse analysis of Chapter 5 illustrated how key planning documents frame 
energy policy as an issue of industrial development. This produces policy solutions that 
emphasize upgrading of traditional industries, support of emerging industries and development 
of new technologies. The case study of Rizhao in Chapter 6 demonstrates how strongly these 
preferences are reflected in municipal agendas. Similarly, the comparative analysis of Chapter 
7 demonstrates a bias towards technology-intense interventions in local climate action.  
The perspective of techno-economic rationalities and associated legitimacy of technology-
based projects is one way to explain this tendency. Another way to approach this trend is to 
consider that social innovation is seen as subversive and a threat to political power in China. 
Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, restrictions over NGOs, media and social mobilization have 
increased (Zhan & Tang, 2013; Lam, 2015; Shambaugh, 2016). This has important implications 
for opportunities to experiment with social innovation at a local level. In current policy 
documents and discourses, there is very little emphasis on policy and planning approaches that 
aim to develop new processes for participation, new ways of doing things, new routines or 
lifestyles. Although this thesis has emphasized that involving external organizations in local 
projects can contribute to introduction of new ideas, this often refers to new architecture, 
planning design, accounting systems, or other technical tools. Although some projects refer to 
use of participatory procedures, this is seldom emphasized or prioritized.  
If China is to move beyond large-scale technology investments and industrial incrementalism 
in climate agendas, social dimensions may be crucial. A possible area of research is to direct 
attention towards social innovation from a bottom-up perspective. More research is required to 
establish whether such dynamics are invisible in China because of their political sensitivity, or 
whether they simply do not exist at all. If this is the case, is the lack of social innovation 
preventing development towards a sustainable transition in China? If so, how can social 
innovation be brought about? How can a broader range of actors be brought into existing 
networks and produce climate action associated with practices, lifestyles, beliefs, values, and 
habits? If China is to move beyond technical interventions and incrementalism in climate 
agendas, these dimensions are likely to be crucial.  
9.3.2 Issues of legitimacy and governmentality 
Two theoretical research agendas are presented to round up this thesis. The first pertains to 
issues of legitimacy and accountability of network governance, which is an important topic in 
studies of nations with liberal democratic systems (Sorensen, 2002; Aars & Fimreite, 2005; 
Bogason & Musso, 2006; Backstrand, 2008; Peters & Pierre, 2010; Forsyth, 2010). The 
problem with governance networks is that participation and decision making is not based on 
equal opportunity to influence public policy decision through the electoral mechanism. The 
transfer of authority from elected politicians to administrators, companies, NGOs and 
supranational organizations thereby undermines the legitimacy attached to political decisions 
in electoral systems.  
These arguments are turned on their head in China, where little or no electoral legitimacy are 
attached to decisions to begin with. Legitimacy and accountability of decisions are assessed 
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according to other principles, as was discussed in the argument on the ideology of technocracy 
in Chapter 8 (section 8.5). It has also been argued that China’s political system relies on 
ideological legitimacy (and continuous ideological reformulation) (Chen, 1995) and 
performance legitimacy (also known as output based or substantive legitimacy) (Wang, 2013b). 
According to a performance based perspective, delivering improved environmental protection 
is an important aspect of maintaining legitimacy, while the process for doing so is less important 
(Ibid).  
However, a robust framework for evaluating legitimacy of decisions in governance networks 
in China does not yet exist. At the same time, issues related to current decision making models 
are already protruding. For example, a trend that merits scrutiny is the shift of influence to 
companies in delivery of urban infrastructure. As argued by Owens and Cowell (2011), a 
fundamental role of planning is to allow for scrutiny and critique, in which social and 
environmental objectives are taken into meaningful account. Such questioning appears to work 
particularly poorly in the promotion of glamorous initiatives such as eco-towns, where 
sustainability tags instead are used to legitimize investment decision (Ibid).  
The use of low carbon and sustainability tags allows projects to be delivered in the name of 
sustainability, without raising questions about the generation of actual environmental or social 
benefits. Hodge and Greve state in relation to PPPs in Europe:  
Private financing … has seen new powerful interest groups moving in alongside elected 
governments. New infrastructure projects are now being suggested by real estate agents, project 
financiers and merchant bankers, rather than by the bureaucrats who historically had this 
responsibility. If such government-business deals do end up meeting the public interest, that would 
seem more by coincidence than by design (Hodge & Greve, p.S17, 2010) 
Hodge and Greve suggest that long term infrastructure arrangements based on private funding 
reduce accountability arrangements without being questioned in democratic debates. Hodge 
and Greve argue that “the analogy of governments quietly making a Faustian bargain (where a 
deal made for ‘short term benefit may come at a tremendous long term cost in both economic 
and democratic terms’) would indeed seem well placed” (Ibid, p. S17). In the case of China, 
reliance on company investments to deliver low carbon infrastructure is associated with similar 
risks. Rather than assuming that company investments into projects with an eco- or low carbon 
label will generate sustainability benefits, initiatives should be placed under scrutiny for 
potential long term lock-in implications. Local governments relying on the financial and 
economic capacity of firms to realize emission reductions through infrastructure projects may 
otherwise fall victim to short term business interests poorly aligned with socio-environmental 
priorities. There is also a risk that investment interests systematically override actors and 
coalitions representing less strongly articulated social and environmental concerns. 
The final remarks of this thesis consist of ideas and observations yet to be fully explored. 
Reviewing the results of this research, the findings on principles of participation in 
environmental policy may contribute to an emerging research agenda on rationalities and 
governmentality. This new direction of research recognizes the limitations of formal regime 
and state-centric theories, but continue the search for conceptual tools to understand agency 
and authority in climate change politics. Stripple and Bulkeley (2014) propose to draw on 
Foucault’s theories on governmentality as a way to problematize governing strategies. They 
see this as a way to examine particular articulations and rationalities of steering, and enable 
deeper interrogation of the sets of processes that govern the climate. According to Stripple and 
Bulkeley, rationalities can help to engage with the particular logics that structure social order 
in climate politics and explain why and how particular forms of authority dominate the climate 
change domain (Ibid, p.14).  
Governments need to formulate rationalities of climate change politics to make the issue 
acceptable and normal. Looking empirically at the case of China, the way that this has been 
done is by building responses on deep-set ideologies and norms that are fundamental parts of 
the political system. Administrations face a new problem, but this does not mean that any new 
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cooperation partner, instrument or strategy is seen as relevant, appropriate, acceptable, or 
normal. To make new programs acceptable, policy formulations are strongly influenced by 
belief systems, preferences, and overarching political and economic development goals. A 
governmentality approach could shed further light on how climate policy practices are 
produced, internalized, normalized and legitimized in political processes in China. 
Perhaps closer attention to political practices and processes of legitimization also could help 
answer the question of how far China can run with techno-economic approaches to 
environmental issues. What happens when (literally) a million voices in cyberspace criticize 
the government’s failure to recognize ethical and social dimensions of environmental agendas? 
Will trajectories follow those of the West in the 1990s, where public responses to technical, 
rational management of sustainability issues created an unravelling of the “mainstream agenda” 
(Berkhout et al, p.6, 2003)? If so, it may be the beginning of a true diversification of actors, 
agendas, strategies and interests in China’s environmental policy; a real shift from government 
to governance.  
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Annex A: Eco-tech firms in Rizhao 
 
Table 22: Eco-tech firms in Rizhao 
Name  Year Key area of business 
Rizhao Heat Transfer Equipment 2000 R&D, sales and consultation related to heat exchange equipment 
Rizhao Haichen Environmental 
Tech.  
2002 Manufacturing, sales and R&D of kiln waste heat recovery boiler technology, thermal energy 
conversion technology and wastewater treatment technology. 
Rizhao Hongye Environmental 
Engineering  
2003 Contractor of electrical and mechanical equipment engineering, environmental pollution 
control, sewage treatment, and industrial waste.  
Rizhao Haida Automatic Tech.  2004 New energy development, contracting and consulting of energy management and energy 
services, computer automation control equipment, low-voltage electrical equipment, 
application and implementation of Internet of Things; building intelligent equipment design. 
R&D into new technologies.  
Rizhao Haicheng Environmental 
Tech. Engineering  
2008 Design, production, installation and services of water treatment, air purification, air 
sterilization equipment.  
Kelin Shier Environmental Tech.  2009 Production and sales of “smart” water boiler and other innovative energy-saving drinking 
water equipment. 
Rizhao Yibang Environmental 
Protection Equipment  
2009 Energy and environmental protection equipment R&D, manufacturing, sales, such as heat 
recovery and exchange equipment. 
Rizhao Xiangchen Energy Saving 
Construction and Design  
2009 Energy construction materials and design.  
Rizhao Lande Environmental 
Protection Tech. 
2010 R&D, engineering and sales of thermal environmental protection equipment, e.g. waste heat 
recovery products and superconducting heat pipe 
Rizhao Letian Energy Saving Tech.  2010 R&D and production of energy saving material for the construction sector.  
Rizhao Yueda Energy Tech.  2012 Production and development of LED, solar street lights, eco-friendly materials and technical 
services. 
Rizhao Jiangyu Environmental 
Tech. 
2010 Air pollution control and environmental protection advisory services, technology 
development, environmental engineering and installations. 
Shandong Chenneng Energy Tech. 2011 Promotion of energy-saving technologies, through technical advice, technology transfers, and 
technical services. This includes energy audits, energy management and installations of 
recycling of waste heat and pressure systems. The company also has an R&D team.  
Rizhao Huayi Energy Saving 
Projects  
2011 Energy saving and energy efficiency contracting, as well as sales, design, and manufacturing 
of energy-saving equipment. 
Rizhao Zhongji Tianxiang Low 
Carbon Construction Technology  
2011 Contracting for low carbon construction.  
Rizhao Zhongrui Energy Saving 
Materials  
2011 Energy-saving products development, production and marketing, in particular energy saving 
materials 
Rizhao Kaige Environmental Tech. 2012 Environmental research, development, production, sales and services for port, steel, mining, 
metallurgy, electric power, railway. 
Shandong Wanju Energy Saving 
Equipment Co.  
2012 R&D and sales of heat recovery equipment. 
Rizhao New Green Construction 
Energy Saving 
2012 Energy saving services for the construction sector. 
Rizhao Aodewei Construction 
Energy Tech.  
2012 Energy saving equipment manufacturing and energy saving services. 
Rizhao Liqi Keji  2013 Sales of energy saving equipment, in particular heat recovery technology.  
Shandong Jiayuan Air-conditioning  2013 R&D and application of low temperature heat source underground extraction. R&D 
cooperation with academic sector.  
Wulian Chenheng Energy Saving 
Equipment Factory 
2013 Manufacturing of vacuum heat pipe heat exchangers, waste heat recovery boilers, and 
superconducting heat pipe radiators. 
Rizhao Wantongda Energy Saving 
Technology 
2014 Consulting and services related to energy saving technology. 
Rizhao Wanxiang Weixin Energy 
Saving Tech. 
2014 Energy saving services related to electronic systems.  
Rizhao Youwei Energy Saving and 
Environmental Protection 
Engineering  
2014 Engineering, sales and services of energy saving of central cooling systems, ventilation and 
heating systems.  
Rizhao Wohai Energy Saving Tech. 2014 R&D, sales and consulting related to energy saving technology. 
Rizhao Mingruida Energy Saving 2014 Wholesale and retail of carbon fiber heaters, carbon fiber floor heating and energy-saving 
lamps. 
Rizhao Muming Energy Saving 
Technology 
2014 Technical support and services related to energy saving technology.  
Rizhao Lanze Environmental 
Protection Engineering Co. Ltd. 
2015 Technical consultation and installation of water treatment, air pollution control, solid waste 
management and resource utilization, environmental protection equipment manufacturing. 
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Table 23: Solar-tech firms in Rizhao 
Name 
 
Year Key business No. 
Staff 
Export 
Rizhao Xintailai 
Photoelectronic  
1996 Design and manufacturing of solar panels, LED display screens  201 - 
300  
Yes 
Rizhao Golden Giant Solar 1997 Development, design, production and sales of solar water heaters, solar 
water collectors + solar R&D 
120- 
200 
No 
Rizhao Guopu Electronics  1999 Primarily manufacturing of solar water heaters = solar R&D ? Yes 
Shandong Jinfeng Solar Giant  2000 Manufacturing of solar energy technology + solar technology R&D 41- 
50 
Yes 
Qiannuo New Energy 
Technology  
2002 Solar energy R&D and development of solar energy high-end products 
(solar thermal and PV applications) 
5-10 ? 
Rizhao Apollo Solar Energy 
Technology 
2002 Manufacturing of solar water heaters + solar technology R&D 500 Yes 
Rizhao Haixing Zhenzhi 
Clothing, Solar Power Branch 
2002  Production of solar water heaters, installation of solar collectors + 
energy-saving product R&D. 
10 No 
Rizhao Shenglong solar 
energy co., ltd 
2003 Solar water heater manufacturing 101 - 
500  
No (?) 
Rizhao JF solar water heater 
factory 
2003 Solar water heater manufacturing ? Yes 
Minyue Solar cookers  2004 Solar cooker manufcturing 5-10 No? 
Rizhao Shouliang Solar Water 
Heateer  
2005 Development and manufacturing of solar collectors and solar water 
heaters 
51- 
1000 
? 
Rizhao Heping Solar Plant 2005 Solar water heater manufacturing 11- 50 Yes 
Rizhao Shengneng Solar 
Products Factory 
2006 Manufacturing of solar cookers, solar cells, solar power systems and 
other household products 
5-10 ? 
Rizhao Aoli Solar Energy 2006 Technical research development, production  and trade in solar power 
products 
5 - 10  No 
Rizhao Zhongke Meiyang 
Solar Power  
2006 Solar technology manufacturing,  sales and installation, solar R&D +60 No 
Rizhao Juheng Guangfu 2007 Manufacturing of solar systems, street lights, PV panels 5- 10 Yes 
Shandong Dafeng Energy 
Saving Equipment 
2007 Research, development and manufacturing of high-tech solar water 
heaters 
120 Yes? 
Solar Manufacturing Co., Ltd. 
Rizhao Kingsfield 
2007  Solar water heater manufacturing, installations and maintenance 18 No 
Rizhao Globe Solar System 2007  Manufacturing of solar power systems, solar street light, wind power 
systems, solar panels, and wind turbines 
10 - 50  Yes 
Shandong Rizhao Dongguan 
Star Solar Water Heaters 
2008 Research and manufacturing of solar water heaters and specialized in 
solar thermal utilization 
5-10 ? 
Rizhao New Energy 
Environmental Tech.  
2008 Manufacturing of solar lights, solar garden lights, LED lights ? ? 
Rizhao City Wyatt New 
Energy  
2009 Manufacturing of solar energy products and energy saving products 
(solar water heaters, energy-efficient appliances, geothermal floor 
heating)  
10- 
50 
No 
Shandong Blue Carbon 
Technology Inc. 
2009 Manufacturing of solar module products 
 
101 – 
200  
Yes 
Shandong Rizhao Xuyang 
Solar Energy Technology 
2010 Manufacturing of solar water heaters, solar collectors 51 - 100 No 
Hao Ge Solar  2010 Solar water heater production, sales and installation 10 - 99 No 
Rizhao Sanguo New Energy 
Deveopment  
2011 Research into and production of solar energy products and industrial 
and agricultural pumps. R&D cooperation with the academic sector.  
100 Yes 
Rizhao Yunkai Solar 2011 Manufacturing of solar technology products, primarily solar water 
heaters 
? ? 
Rizhao Solar Yuxin Power  2011 Manufacturing of solar equipment 
 
51- 
100 
No 
Rizhao Hongzhao Solar 
Engineering  
2011 Production of solar water heaters and air-conditioning energy saving 110- 50 No 
Rizhao Yunjia Solar Energy 2011 Research into and manufacturing of solar water heaters 91- 
100 
Yes 
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Annex B: Partnership constellations  
 
Table 24: Partnerships in rule setting initiatives 
Partner 1 Partner 2 Role of partner 2  
Municipality 
Bilateral partner + Foreign 
academia + Domestic academia 
Planning advice (industry) 
Municipality 
Foreign NGO + International 
institute + Foreign academia 
Planning advice (industry) + Funding 
Municipality Foreign authority Planning advice (transport) 
Municipality Central institute Planning advice (transport) 
Municipality Provincial institute Planning advice (transport) 
Municipality Domestic academia  Planning advice (transport) 
 
Table 25: Partnerships in service/infrastructure initiatives 
Partner 1 Partner 2 Partner roles 
Municipality Four SOEs 
PPP: Joint management + Technology delivery  
(energy) 
Municipality SOE (province-wide) 
Cooperation agreement in planning and delivery 
(energy) 
Municipality SOE (municipal) Municipal planning + Company delivery (energy) 
Municipality Various SOEs Municipal planning + Company delivery (transport) 
Municipality  Various SOEs Municipal planning + Company delivery (transport) 
Municipality  Bank + Financial group Municipal planning + Company financing (transport) 
Municipality  Domestic academia Planning/technical advice (transport) 
Municipality  Domestic academia Planning/technical advice (transport) 
SOE (municipal) Foreign Firm 
BOT: Technology transfer + Operation + Funding 
(energy) 
Two SOEs (country-
wide)  
Foreign firms BOT: Technology transfer + Operation (energy) 
SOEs (municipal) Foreign firm JV: Technology transfer + Operation (energy) 
 
Table 26: Initiatives involving technology transfer and partnerships 
Partner 1 Partner 2 Role of partner 2 
Municipality Foreign firm Technology transfer (waste) 
Private company Foreign firm Technology transfer (energy) 
SOE (country-wide)  Foreign firm Technology transfer (energy) 
SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Technology transfer (energy) 
SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Technology transfer (energy) 
Private company  Foreign firm Technology transfer (industry) 
SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Technology transfer (industry) 
Private company Foreign firm Technology transfer (industry) 
Private company Foreign firm Technology transfer (industry) 
SOE (municipal) Foreign firm Technology transfer (industry) 
Private company Foreign firm Technology transfer (waste) 
Private company Foreign firm Technology transfer (waste) 
SOE (municipal) 
Foreign firm + 
International institution 
Company delivery + International funding (CDM) (waste) 
SOE (municipal) 
Foreign firm + 
International institution 
Company delivery + International funding (CDM) (waste) 
Private company 
Foreign firm + 
International institution 
Company delivery + International funding (CDM) (waste) 
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SOE (municipal) 
Foreign firm + 
International institution 
Company delivery + International funding (CDM) 
(transport) 
 
Table 27: Initiatives involving technology development and partnerships 
Partner 1 Partner 2 Partner roles 
Municipality  Domestic academia Technology development + Support (energy) 
Municipality  Domestic academia Technology development + Support (energy) 
Municipality SOE (country-wide) Joint technology development (industry) 
Municipality SOE (province-wide) Joint technology development (industry) 
Municipality 
SOE (municipal) + International 
org. 
Technology development + Funding (industry) 
SOE (municipal)  Domestic academia Joint technology development (industry) 
SOE (municipal) Domestic academia Joint technology development (industry) 
Private company Foreign academia Joint technology development (industry) 
SOE (country-wide) Domestic academia Joint technology development (energy) 
Various SOEs 
Domestic academia + Foreign 
institute + National authority 
Joint technology development + Funding 
(energy) 
SOE (country-wide, 
consortium) 
Bilateral partner & National 
authority 
Joint technology development (industry) 
SOE (municipal) International org. + Domestic bank  Technology development + Funding (energy) 
SOE (municipal) International org. + Domestic bank  Technology development + Funding (industry) 
Domestic academia 
Foreign academia + Bilateral 
partner 
Joint technology development (energy) 
Domestic academia Foreign academia Joint technology development (energy) 
National authority  Foreign firms Joint technology development (energy) 
 
Table 28: Partnerships in initiatives involving information dissemination/demonstration 
Partner 1 Partner 2 Partner role 
Municipality  (consortium) 
Bilateral partner + Firms + 
Domestic and foreign authorities 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Municipality  (consortium) 
Bilateral partner + Firms + 
Domestic and foreign authorities 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Municipality  
Domestic and foreign firms + 
Domestic and foreign academia 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Municipality  
Domestic and foreign firms +  
Foreign academia 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Municipality 
Foreign institute + Domestic 
academia 
Planning advice (land use) 
Municipality Foreign institute  Planning advice (land use) 
Municipality Foreign institute Planning advice (land use) 
Municipality  Domestic academia Planning advice (land use) 
Municipality  International organization 
Technical advice + Funding 
(industry) 
Municipality International institution 
Technical advice + Training + 
Funding (construction) 
Municipality Bilateral partner 
Information dissemination + Training 
(dissemination) 
Domestic SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Technical advice (construction) 
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Domestic SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Technical advice (construction) 
SOE (municipal) International institute 
Planning/technical advice + Funding 
(construction) 
Domestic SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic SOE (country-wide) Foreign firm Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic SOE (municipal) 
Foreign firms + International 
organization 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic SOE (municipal)  
Foreign Academia + Municipal 
department 
Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic SOE (municipal)  Foreign firm Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic SOE (municipal)  Domestic academia Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic academia Foreign design institute Planning/technical advice (eco-city) 
Domestic academia Foreign design institute Planning/technical advice (land use) 
Domestic academia Bilateral partner  
Technical advice + Toolkit 
development + Funding (transport) 
 
 
